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Power and Opposition in the Ancient Near Eastern and Mediterranean World

edited by Mait Kõiv and Vladimir Sazonov

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Power and Opposition in the Ancient Near Eastern and Mediterranean World

Monarchy in the Iron Age Levant and Archaic Greece: the Rulers of Corinth in a Comparative Context

Mait KÕIV[*]

Abstract. Tyrannies emerging in the Greek poleis during the Archaic period (8.–6. centuries BC), among which the rule of the Kypselid dynasty in Corinth appears as an outstanding example, were in many respects comparable to the city-state monarchies in Ancient Near East, particularly in Iron Age Levant. The rulers performed important governmental functions and were able to legitimate their power for a notable period of time. However, differently from the East, these monarchies were never wholly entrenched and were eventually replaced by republican governments. The article explores the reason for this difference, suggesting that it was caused by the relative egalitarianism of the Greek society precluding an accumulation of sufficient resources for entrenching the power.

Rezumat. Tiraniile apărute în cetățile grecești în timpul perioadei Arhaice (secolele VIII-VI î.Hr), în rândul cărora dinastia Kypselidă din Corint se remarcă în mod exceptional, au fost în multe privințe comparabile cu monarhiile orașelor-stat din Orientul Apropiat antic, în special cu cele din Levantul din timpul Epocii Fierului. Conducătorii exercitau importante funcții guvernamentale și erau capabili să-și legitimeze puterea pentru o perioadă semnificativă de timp. Totuși, spre deosebire de cele din Orient, aceste monarhii nu erau niciodată pe deplin înrădăcinate și erau, mai devreme sau mai târziu, înlocuite de guvernări republicane. Articolul de față analizează motivele pentru care a existat această deosebire, sugerând că a fost cauzată de relativul egalitarism al societății grecești, ceea ce a împiedicat acumularea de suficiente resurse în mâinile puterii pentru ca aceasta să fie cu adevărat consolidată.

Keywords: Archaic Greece, Greek tyranny, monarchies, early statehood.

Introduction

Personal leadership, i.e. community members following or obeying to one particular person as their leader or ruler, has been a very usual leadership pattern in the human history, developing long before the emergence of state societies.[1] The people might have understood

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[1] The recognition of this has produced the neoevolutionist band–tribe–chiefdom–state development model (SERVICE 1962; 1975; CARNEIRO 1981; JOHNSON–EARLE 1987; EARLE 1997; etc.) which, despite criticism (YOFFEE 1993; 2005, 22-31; PAUKETAT 2007) and recent emphasis on more collegial evolutionary possibilities (FEINMAN 1995; 2001; BLANTON et al 1996; KIENLIN–ZIMMERMANN 2012; BLANTON–FARGHER 2008; 2016; FLAIG 2013), is still, at least implicitly, followed by scholars.

it as an imitation of the ways of heavenly powers.[2] Early states, at least the so-called pristine states, have generally emerged as monarchies, both world-wide and in the Near Eastern region.[3] During the Bronze Age both the city-states (or micro-states) and, of course, the empires in the Near East and the Eastern Mediterranean were almost invariably governed by monarchs. We cannot exactly establish the leadership patterns in the fourth millennium BC[4] Uruk in Mesopotamia,[5] but there is no doubt that from the Early Dynastic period the Sumerian city-states were headed by kings. Kings ruled in Mari and Ebla in the third millennium Syria, and in the subsequent periods – the Middle to the Late Bronze Age and the Iron Age – almost all city-states in the whole Fertile crescent from Mesopotamia to the southern Levant were monarchies.[6] The Bronze Age Aegean was probably no exception to this rule. The lack of adequate evidence does not allow to establish the leadership patterns in the emerging Minoan polities, and some forms of collective government have been suggested,[7] but from the Late Bronze age when the Linear B tablets start to give evidence for the political system, it is reasonably clear that the Greek (Mycenaean) states, both on Crete and on the mainland, were governed by monarchs (*wanaktes*).[8]

The Greek city states – poleis – emerging during the so-called Archaic Period (8th–6th centuries), a few centuries after the 12th century collapse of the Bronze Age civilisation, look exceptional on this background. Although there certainly emerged monarchies – called tyrannies (*tyrannis*) by the contemporaries and the later Greeks – and many poleis were for certain periods of time governed by the sole rulers, this monarchy appeared only as an alternative to the collective leadership. The dynasties were usually unable to entrench their

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[2] GRAEBER–SAHLINS 2017, 1-22. Already FRIEDMAN–ROWLANDS 1977, 206-208 have viewed the supposed closeness to the supra-natural sphere as the principal promotor of elite leadership in early societies, and CLAESSEN 1978, 555-559 has described the power in the 'early state' as relying essentially on an imagined heavenly authority and prototypes (see also TRIGGER 2003, 79-87).

[3] YOFFEE 2005, 42-90 has viewed the city-statehood as the primary way of state formation. For city-states as a parallel development to the territorial macro-states see STONE 1997; MORRIS 1997, 98–100. A pervasive synthesis of monarchy in the early state societies, the city-states included, is given by TRIGGER 2003, 71-91, 664.

[4] All the following dates will be BC.

[5] See SELZ 1998; 2005, 31-42.

[6] Sumerian city-states: POSTGATE 1992, 109-154; KUHRT 1995, 33-40; GLASSNER 2000; EDZARD 2004, 43-61; SELZ 2005, 41-63; VAN DE MIEROOP 2007, 45-47, 55-59; CHARVÁT 2007, 251-255; LIVERANI 2014, 93-114; SCHRAKAMP 2013. The 3rd millennium Ebla: EDZARD 2004, 65-68; VAN DE MIEROOP 2007, 59; LIVERANI 2014, 115-128. Old Assur: LARSEN 1976, 109-223; 2000, 83-85; VEENHOF 2003, 73-82; 2010: especially 52-53, 65-70; FAIST 2010, 16-17; AUBET 2013, 279-286. The Bronze Age Levantine city-states: NIEMEYER 2000; PFOH 2016, 89-167. The Anatolian principalities from which the Hittite empire eventually arose were also monarchies (BRYCE 2005, 21-40).

[7] See DRIESSEN 2002; HAMILAKIS 2002; for doubts about Minoan kingship see also MANNING 2007, 118-120; SCHOEP 2010, 116-117. Other scholars accept that Minoan palaces were headed by kings: BETANCOURT 2002; MARINATOS 2009.

[8] For the monarchy of the palatial LBA see e.g. KILIAN 1988; HALSTEAD 2007; SHELMERDINE–BENNET 2007; NAKASSI–GALATY–Parkinson 2010; BURNS 2010, 105–129; FITZSIMONS 2011 (for a different point of view see SCHMITT 2009; 2017 viewing the Mycenaean palaces as places of cultic and social interaction of an oligarchic elite).

power, were sooner or later overthrown and replaced by a collective rule. Although tyrannies continued to emerge during the Classical period (5th–4th centuries) and monarchies became increasingly influential during the 4th century, the attitude towards sole rule was sceptical. Monarchy was often demonised as an inherently bad form of government, and the originally neutral terms *tyrannis* and *tyrannos* – synonyms for *monarchia* (sole rule) and *monarchos* (sole ruler) – acquired the meaning of lawless and violent rulership.[9]

This difference from most of the early city-states, and from the city-states in the Near East and the eastern Mediterranean in particular, requires explanation. The following comparative discussion will, on the one hand, point out several characteristics showing the Greek tyrannies as a natural part of the city-state monarchies of the eastern Mediterranean, and will, on the other hand, consider the reason for the divergent development leading to the abandonment of monarchy and the confirmation of collective power. Corinth, a wealthy polis on the juncture of the central and southern Greece, producing one of the most famous Archaic Greek tyrannies, will be taken as the prime example for the discussion, and will be compared above all to the Iron Age microstates in Levant. In both cases we have to do with relatively small states, often city-states, evolving after the collapse of the Late Bronze Age kingdoms.[10]

Power base of monarchies in the Near East

Rulers must achieve compliance of the subjects. They provide necessary leadership for the community, but must be able also to use force or at least to credibly threaten with it. Usually rulers combine these strategies.[11] An entrenchment of power requires legitimation, which in the early monarchies usually involves enhancing an ideology viewing monarchy as the divinely established norm, almost a part of the world order, and presenting the ruler as a divinely protected benefactor and caretaker of the subjects.[12] On the other hand, monarchs need means for suppressing the almost always existing opposition. For all these purposes it is necessary to establish control over the resources that would sustain the rule, enabling to reward loyal subjects and to fund the physical force assuring compliance.[13] In the other words, besides the social, ideological and military base of the reign it is crucially important to establish a solid economic base, which on the one hand depends on the social, ideological and

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[9] See BARCELÓ 1993, 83-202; DE LIBERO 1996, 21-38; PARKER 1998; ANDERSON 2005, 203-214; KÕIV 2016a, 15-25.

[10] The article will thus elaborate the argument in KÕIV 2021, focusing on the example of a particular city-state.

[11] See especially HAAS 1982, 172-182.

[12] For the importance of the ideology in formation of the early state power see especially CLAESSEN 1978, 555-567; CLAESSEN–OOSTEN 1996; EARLE 2002, 367-383; TRIGGER 2003, 486-494; YOFFEE 2005, 38-40. The importance of paying attention to the subjects' interests for achieving compliance has been pointed out by BLANTON–FARGHER 2008, especially 12-24; 2016, 99-158.

[13] HAAS 1982, 173-178; EARLE 2002, 60-64.

military resources of the ruler, while on the other hand sustains these and thereby enables an effective rule.

In the Ancient Near East, the social capital of the kings was granted by their role of representing the polities outwards, taking care of the legal order as the supreme judges and, occasionally, lawgivers, and presenting themselves as the 'good shepherds' of their people. They led the military forces and represented their people before the gods, which included dedication of temples as probably the highest reverence to the gods for attaining their benevolence towards the city and demonstrating the piety of the ruler.[14] On the other hand, the monarchies controlled strategic resources of their realms and were generally able to derive affluent revenues. During the Bronze Age, the states were usually organised around big central institutions – the royal and/or temple households – functioning as centres of redistributive economies.[15] The palatial households enabled the kings to reward followers, not least by granting land leases to them, which sustained their elite status, made them dependent from the monarchy and confirmed their loyalty towards the ruler.[16] This enabled the rulers to command the manpower in war, to conscribe corvée labour, and to tax the peasant farmers. The Late Bronze Age monarchies in the Aegean were based on similar centrally controlled palace economies. Although the exact proportions and relationship between the palatial and the private sector in the Mycenaean states is debatable, there is no doubt that a considerable part of land and other resources was under palatial control.[17] This control of the strategic resources, and the consequent loyalty of a critical part of the elite, made monarchies, at least ideally but often in practice, the guarantors of the stability in the society as a whole.[18] It was natural that kingship was generally accepted as a legitimate form of government, as almost the only possible kind of political organisation. A balance of power and mutual agreement was established between the monarchs and their communities, or at

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[14] For the responsibilities of kings and royal ideology see e.g. SUTER 2013; SAZONOV 2016, 36-46 (Sumer); POSTGATE 1992, 149-150, 262-266 (Early and Middle BA Mesopotamia); HELTZER 1982, 178-181 (Late BA Ugarit); SOMMER 2000, 239-242; 2008, 94-100; WOOLMER 2011, 52-54 (Phoenicia).

[15] Temples with hierarchically organised priesthoods played a crucial role in the emergence of Sumerian city-states (see note 6), and despite a decline of their political significance in the second millennium (VAN DE MIEROOP 2007, 93-94) they retained the status of important economic institutions with large land holdings and numerous dependents – see AUBET 2013, 238-242, 258-263, 273-274, 279; DANDAMAEV 1979; BEDFORD 2005, 81-83. Royal household are documented from III millennium Akkad (SCHRAKAMP 2017) and Ebla (see note 6), and from the LBA Syrian city-states Emar (PRUZSINSZKY 2008, 74; DÉMARE-LAFONT 2008, 210), Alalakh and Ugarit (especially HELTZER 1982; SOMMER 2000, 196-200), not speaking about the big territorial states.

[16] The system is perhaps best testified from the Babylon of Hammurapi (LIVERANI 2014, 242-244), but was surely more widespread (SELZ 2007, 280-282). The charioteers (*maryannu*) forming the elite force of the LBA kingdoms were probably attached to their rulers as the possessors of royal fiefs.

[17] See the literature in note 8 above. King (*wanax*) might have relied on the loyalty of the elite warriors know as 'followers' (*e-qe-ta*) attached to the palace and controlling the professional soldiers, and perhaps receiving land grants from the king – see DEGER-JALKOTZY 1978; MONTECCHI 2014.

[18] Pointed out by BUNNENS 2000, 14.

least between the monarchs and the elites, which in the city-states were usually represented by councils of elders, and in some cases perhaps by broader assemblies.[19] The legitimacy of sole rule was generally accepted, and the position of a king on the top of social pyramid was hardly contestable.

In the Iron Age following the 12th century collapse of the Late Bronze Age socio-political system the relative importance of palatial economies decreased, and the significance of private sector correspondingly increased,[20] while in the Aegean the palatial economies were abolished altogether. In the Greek world the transformation led eventually to an establishment of collective rule, the poleis, while the monarchies which emerged were increasingly resented. In the Near East, despite the changes, monarchy continued as the normative form of government on both the imperial and the city-state level. The eastern monarchs clearly maintained, or re-developed, relatively stable means for confirming the power and attaching the followers. In this respect the Levantine states, many of them city-states of comparable size to the emerging Greek poleis, serve as good examples against which the contemporary development in Greece can be compared.

In a number of the states re-emerging in Syria and Levant after the collapse of the Late Bronze Age kingdoms, the kings could build their power on tribal loyalties and ties of kinship. The Aramaic states in Syria and states like Ammon, Moab and Edom in Jordan and Palestine can serve as the examples. The small and relatively egalitarian agro-pastoral communities developing in these regions, emancipated from the palatial control and deprived of stately protection, were probably organised along (real or fictive) kinship ties, both internally and in building up intracommunity networks. The heads of these tribal unions, whose leadership was required above all during wars, commanded the loyalty of their people and established dynasties when succeeding to make their initially presumably charismatic leadership hereditary. Many states emerging here were designated as the 'houses' (Bīt) of eponymous dynasty founders (Bīt Gabbari, Bīt Agūsi, Bīt Bahiani, Bīt Hazaili), in all likelihood the heads of a tribal unions.[21] Not all tribal leaders, we must assume, could entrench the power.[22]

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[19] The councils of elders (Sumerian abba uru, Akkadian *šibutu*) and/or assemblies (Sumerian unken, Akkadian *puhrum*, West Semitic *tahtamum* – for the meanings of these terms see FLEMING 2004, 203-211) are well documented in the Mesopotamian city-states from the EBA until the first millennium Babylonia (see OPPENHEIM 1964, 111-112; LIVERANI 1993; VAN DE MIEROOP 1999, 121-128; the Sumerian cities: JACOBSEN 1943; RHEE 1981, 17-19; KATZ 1987; POSTGATE 1992, 80-81; SELZ 1998, 301-305, 316-317; 2005, 39-40; GLASSNER 2000, 43-48; WESTENHOLTZ 2002, 27-29; VAN DE MIEROOP 2013, 28-21, 285-287; for the Old Assur see the literature in note 6; the New Babylonian cities: DANDAMAYEV 1997, 145-146; LARSEN 2000b, 123-125; BARJAMOVIC 2004, 77-84); collective bodies are known from the III millennium Ebla (ARCARI 1988, 125; SELZ 1998, 302-303, 320-321; THUESEN 2000, 59), from III–II millennium Emar and Tuttul (ARCHI 1990, 24; DURAND 1990, 55-56; FLEMING 2004, 212-216; PRUZSINZSKY 2008; DÉMARE-LAFONT 2008, 208-213), from Ugarit of the II millennium (HELTZER 2001; 2005); from Palestine in the Amarna period (NIEMEYER 2000, 100-101; BENZ 2015, 459-461). For a synthesis see KÕIV 2011a, 110-114.

[20] SOMMER 2000, 156-266; MONROE 2009; SHERRATT 2014; 2016; MORENO GARCÍA 2016.

[21] See LIVERANI 2014, 396-400; BUNNENS 2000, 13-15; SADER 2016 (Aramaic states); ROUTLEDGE 2004; 2016 (Moab); TEBES 2016 (Edom described as a chiefdom); NIEHR 2018 (Samal).

However, the late 9th century stele of King Meša of Moab suggests that success in wars enabled the kings to establish an effective control of the people, to exploit the war-captives as slaves, thereby to concentrate resources for notable building projects, and to entrench and perpetuate the kingship in that way.[23] Control of the trade passing their territories could have been an additional source of income for these rulers.[24]

The kingdom of Judah under the Davidic dynasty probably emerged in a similar way.[25] It was referred to as Bīt David on the Dan Stele from the northern Israel and the Meša Stele from Moab, and the Biblical evidence (the books of Judges and Samuel) infer a fundamental importance of tribal structure and kinship ties for the early Hebrew society. However, although the monarchy is likely to have arisen from tribal leadership and the kings presented themselves as the promoters and favourites of the 'national' god JHWH (like Meša of Moab promoted his tribal god Kemoš), the Israelite and Judahite monarchs soon established a veritable control of economy and of the strategical resources. Ahab the king of Israel was able, in the battle of Qarqar against Assyria in 853, to put on field 2000 war chariots, besides the 10 000 soldiers, the maintenance of which must have required considerable means.[26] The Biblical evidence tells that Salomon had cities for storing supplies, for his chariots and horsemen, that he imposed corvée labour, had twelve officers over all Israel who were in charge of providing food and supplies for the king and his household, and forced the non-Israelite local peoples into servitude. These means allegedly enabled him to build the temple in Jerusalem, his own palace, the walls of Jerusalem, and the cities of Hazor, Megiddo and Gezer; he could donate twenty cities (presumably villages) to Hiram the king of Tyros in return of the Lebanese cedar wood that Hiram provided for the construction of the temple of JHWH, and he conscripted 30 000 men of forced labour to be sent to Lebanon for supplying the wood.[27] We may of course doubt the accuracy of this evidence so far as the reign of Salomon is concerned,[28] but it still shows the confidence with which the Deuteronomic historian(s) assumed a command of huge resources by an Israelite king. More reliable

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[22] Note the discussion between Bienkowski 2009 (seeing these kingdoms as shortlived, based on charismatic leadership) and ROUTLEDGE 2016, 83-92 (regarding the kingship of Moab as entrenched).

[23] A translation e.g. in ZWICKEL 2013, 152-153. The control (or loyalty – mšm't – see ROUTLEDGE 2016, 89) of the people stated in line 28, the use of the Israelite captives for the construction works in lines 25-26. Building projects are testified also archaeologically (ROUTLEDGE 2016, 90).

[24] ROUTLEDGE 2016, 91-92.

[25] See MASTER 2001; LEHMANN–NIEMANN 2006; NIEMANN 2015; 2016. For the Dan and Meša Steles see e.g. ZWICKEL 2013, 152-153; LIVERANI 2014, 405. For the tribal basis of the early Israelite society (the importance of the 'clans' – mišpahah) see e.g. FAUST 2012, 8-14; 170-174.

[26] See e.g. FALES 2017, 226-227.

[27] 1 Kings 3.7 (12 officers in charge of providing food and supplies); 5.27-28 (30 000 men sent to Lebanon); 9.11-19 (cities donated to Hiram, forced labor and buildings, cities for storage, chariots and horsemen – the same in 2 Chron 8.6 – and the servitude of the conquered peoples). According to 1 Kings 10.26 Salomon had 1400 war chariots and 12 000 horsemen stationed in the cities for chariots and in Jerusalem.

[28] For the question of the reliability of the Biblical record see FINKELSTEIN 2015 with references.

evidence for the later monarchs confirms this. We are told about the store-cities of Israel destroyed by the forces of the 9th century Syrian king Ben Hadad, about the 9th century king Jehoshaphat of Judah building cities of store, and about the wealth of late 8th century king Hezekiah of Judah, including store-houses for grain, wine and oil, and stalls for the flocks and herds he allegedly possessed in abundance.[29] The ability to concentrate resources is demonstrated by the magnificent 9th century palaces / administrative buildings, for which the edifices in Megiddo and Samaria in Israel and Lachiš and Beeršeba in Judah serve as outstanding examples.[30] On the local level a state-run storage might be testified by the numerous storage installations in different parts of the land.[31] The early 8th century Samaria ostraca indicate a stately collection of agricultural production which derived, at least in part, from the royal estates, and similar system may be testified by the jars with the kingly (*mlk*) stamps from the late 8th and 7th century Judah.[32] We cannot tell how the necessary resources, not least the land for maintaining the force, was achieved in the first place, but can guess that conquests enabled the kings to take possession of lands in the valleys, not traditionally owned by the farming communities of the highland, to keep these under direct control as bases for royal household or to distribute as grants to the supporters.[33] However, the Biblical evidence suggests that the kings used to increase their holdings by appropriating the possessions of others, which could cause hard feelings among the subjects.[34]

Monarchy persisted also in the city-states of Phoenicia and was established in the Philistine city-states, the small territories of which, the maritime contacts, and in the case of the Phoenicians the colonisation in the Mediterranean, make them probably the closest Near Eastern parallel to the Greek poleis. The internal organisation of the Philistine states is hardly known. However, the Biblical and the Assyrian evidence leaves no doubt that they were ruled by monarchs.[35] A well-known inscription from the 7th century Ekron makes it clear that the

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[29] 2 Chron 16.4 (the store-cities of Israel destroyed); 2 Chron 17.12 (Jehoshaphatõs cities of store); 2 Chron 32,27-29 (the wealth of Hezekiah).

[30] See FAUST 2012, 46-95; ZWICKEL 2013, 147-148; VAN DER WEEN 3013, 169.

[31] ZWICKEL 2016. For the stately bureaucracy in Israel see AVISHUR–HELZER 2000; KESSLER 2006, 85-88.

[32] See KESSLER 2006, 91-92; FAUST 2012, 193-194; and especially 2011 suggesting that the taxation of the rural population was mediated by the lineage structures which organized this production on the level of local communities, and that in Judah most of the foreign trade, including the grain export, was to a great extent monopolized by the king. LIPSCHITS 2018 connects the emergence of this system with the tax requirements of Assyria from the late 8th century, but the earlier evidence from Israel suggests that also in Judah a comparative royal economy was developing independently of the Assyrian taxation.

[33] CHANEY 1986, 67-68; FAUST 2012, 261.

[34] Ezekiel 46.18 warns the king not to seize the land of others, but to give grants of land from his own holdings. Note also the story of Naboth, Jezebel and Ahab in I Kings 21.1-16. See Lewis 2017: 36.

[35] Achiš the king of Gath, by whom David allegedly sought refuge, is mentioned in 1 Samuel 21.11-16; 27.2-6. Assyrian sources mention king Hanun od Gaza in 722/21, a king of Ašdod replaced by a rebel Yamani in 712, the kings Sidqa of Aškelon and Padi of Ekron in 701, and Ikausu the king of Ekron from the first half of the 7th century (see GITIN 1998, 173; SHAI 2006, 357; BEN SHLOMO 2014, 719).

monarchy was hereditary and the kings presented themselves as the favourites and protectors of a goddess.[36] The monumental architectural complex from which the inscription derives likewise testifies an integral connection of royalty with divine powers, indicated by the natural connectedness of the throne room and the temple.[37] Moreover, the monumental temple-palace complex contained thousands of storage jars and other vessels which, like the olive oil installations from city, suggest olive production organised by the state. A comparable royal winery from Aškelon is another example of a management of lucrative production, and probably trade, which must have concentrated vast resources into the hands of the Philistine kings.[38]

Concerning the Phoenicia states we have evidence of series of kings forming well established dynasties from Byblos, Tyros and Sidon, and there can be hardly any doubt that the other city-states were likewise ruled by monarchs.[39] The only possible exceptions are presented by the Early Iron Age Arwad, the people of which figure in the Assyrian sources as independent entities without any king mentioned before the 9th century (from which time Arwad was undoubtedly a monarchy),[40] and by Tyros during the short period of the Neo-Babylonian rule in the 6th century when the city was headed by two suffetes – a system forced upon by Nebukadnezzar II of Babylon and abolished after his death.[41] These cases excluded, monarchy persisted as the normative form of government, as it had been during the Bronze Age. The kings represented the cities outwards, commanded armed forces, and interacted with the divine sphere as priests of the highest divinity of their state, as testified by the inscription of two 6th and 5th century Sidonian kings – Tabnit and Ešmunazar II – acting as the priests of the goddess Aštarte. The lavish burials of the kings are testified by the monumental sarcophagi discovered above all from Byblos and Sidon.[42]

However, private trade flourished in the Phoenician cities,[43] and at least the wealthier part of the population had some say in the government. We have evidence for councils of

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[36] The inscription records that Akhayuš (Ikausu – see the previous note) the son of Padi, son of Ysd, son of Ada, son of Ya'ir, ruler of Ekron, built the temple for Ptygh (a goddess) his Lady (BEN SHLOMO 2014, 719; SCHÄFER-LICHTENBERGER 2016, 108-109).

[37] GITIN 1998, 173-179.

[38] FAUST–WEISS 2005, 73; FAUST 2011, 267; BEN-SHLOMO 2014, 722-723.

[39] For the political order of the Phoenician states see BONDÌ 1995a; NIEMEYER 2000; SOMMER 2000, 91-266; WOOLMER 2011; MORSTADT 2015, 61-112; SADER 2019, 51-146; KATZENSTEIN 1997 (Tyros); BOYES 2012 (Sidon); ELAYI 2015 (Arwad).

[40] The earliest king of Arwad recorded in the extant sources is Mattan-Baal mentioned by Šalmaneser III among his enemies in the battle of Qarqar in 853. The absence of hereditary kingship in the earlier Arwad is supposed by BRIQUEL-CHATONNET 2000 and supported by SADER 2019, 64-65.

[41] The events are recorded in Josephus C. Ap. I 156-159 and confirmed by the Babylonian evidence (see KATZENSTEIN 1997, 325-343; SADER 2019, 134-135).

[42] See BOYES 2012; MORSTADT 2015, 61-67, 79-81, 85-101.

[43] See TSIRKIN 1990; BONDÌ 1995b, 345-347; SOMMER 2000, 189-266; HEINZ 2002, 234-236; LIVERANI 2003, 131-133; WOOLMER 2011, 53

elders besides the kings. The Egyptian 'Story of Wenamun', describing the (real or fictious) events in the 11th century, mentions an 'assembly' summoned by Zakarbaal the king of Byblos.[44] The treaty between Assarhaddon of Assyria and King Baal of Tyros from the 7th century mentions the 'elders of the country in counsel' besides the Tyrian king.[45] 'Elders of Byblos' are mentioned slightly later by prophet Hezekiel.[46] From the Classical authors we hear about 'elders' or 'senators' of Tyros in connection to the 4th century events.[47] Moreover the fact that Assyrian sources sometimes refer to the Phoenician states as 'people' of these cities or lands (note especially a text of Šalmaneser III where 'the people of Tyros and Sidon' are listed besides 'Jehu of Bīt Ḫumrî', making thus a difference between the Phoenician cities labelled as 'people' and Israel represented by the king) may suggest that a notable part of their population had some sort of political rights.[48] The kings of Sidon were titled as 'Kings of Sidonians', which may suggest that the founder of the dynasty was acclaimed king by the people.[49] An Athenian decree from the 4th century mentions 'those who participate in government' (*politeuomenoi*) in Sidon besides the king,[50] and Classical authors imply the existence for broader assemblies in the Phoenician states.[51] We can therefore assume the existence of some collective bodies in the Phoenician cities, although there are no local sources which could explicitly testify this. The possible composition and competences of these bodies as well as the circle included among the 'people' or the *politeuomenoi*, thus the extent of the circle of those who might have enjoyed some political participation, remain a guesswork. We must however consider that the Phoenician cities were relatively small, and the city centres, sometimes located on islands or narrow promontories, still smaller, while the broader hinterland controlled by the city-states was volatile and not permanently tied to the capital centres. It is extremely unlikely that the inhabitants of the hinterland were included among the possible citizens. We can guess that 'those who participate in government' included only the people of the narrow city centres, probably only a wealthier part of it, and that the participation in the councils was usually confined to the heads of the wealthy merchant families as the scholars usually assume. The Phoenician states can be

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[44] ANET 25-29 (29).

[45] SAA 2 5, III 7´ (ANET 533-534); see FALES 2017, 241.

[46] Hezekiel 27.9.

[47] Arrianos Anab. II 16.7 ('elders of Tyros'); Iustinus XVIII 4. 15 (Tyrian senators). Diodoros VI 45.1 writes about 100 noble councillors besides the Sidonan king.

[48] Some examples are noted in FALES 2017, 226-229. The inscription of Šalmaneser – RIMA 3 A.0.102.8.22´-27´ (p. 48) quoted by FALES 2017, 228. Whether 'the people of Tyros' mentioned in the treaty Assarhaddon and Baal of Tyros (note 45) suggest an assembly besides the council of elders (as implied by NIEMEIER 2000, 101) cannot be proven.

[49] SADER 2019, 104.

[50] IG II² 141. 31-32.

[51] Curtius Rufus (IV 1. 16) speaks of the 'will of the people' of Sidon and mentions a *contio* (assembly) of Tyros (IV 3. 21). When Arrianos (Anab. II 15. 6) speaks of a decision of the *koinon* (community) of the Tyrians, this also can point to the assembly of this city. An assembly of the Phoenicians during Xerxes' campaign against the Greeks was mentioned by Herodotos VII 23.

therefore described as oligarchies headed by the mostly hereditary monarchs, which ruled over a relatively broad but loosely integrated and mutable hinterland.

No centrally managed palace economies are directly testified from the Phoenician cities. However, two monumental buildings from Early Iron Age Dor, one probably an administrative centre (palace?) and the other a storage installation filled with numerous jars, indicates an effective control of resources by the local ruler.[52] Despite the lack of definite evidence we can still suppose that palatial economies continued in the Phoenician states, even if their importance versus private enterprise declined compared to the Bronze Age.[53] We can also suppose that the kings could derive revenues from the agricultural hinterland. Biblical evidence tells that Salomon of Israel gave 20 'cities' (presumably villages) to Hiram the king of Tyros in return of cedar wood that the Phoenician king provided for his building projects.[54] The reliability of this evidence may be doubtful, but comparable or even considerable bigger donations of territories to Tyros and Sidon by the Assyrian and Persian kings are testified by more reliable sources.[55] The obvious interest of the Phoenician kings to have these lands under their control leaves no doubt about the economic importance for these monarchies. The possible absence of hereditary monarchy in the early Arwad may be connected with its tiny hinterland during this period, which could not allow a concentration of agricultural resources and thereby to build up a secure economic base for a permanent monarchy.

Above all, the Phoenician kings participated in the lucrative trade of their states, and most notably, profited from the trade with the strategically important timber from the Lebanon hinterland the access to which they controlled. The king of Tyros possessed merchant ships besides the ships of the 'people of Tyros', as we know from the treaty between Sennaherib of Assyria and Baal of Tyros,[56] and the contemporary king Ikkilû of Arwad 'turned the whole trade to himself' around his state by 'providing for anyone who comes to him, but killing anyone who docks at the Assyrian quay'.[57] The king must have greatly profited from this concentration of trade to the port(s) under his control. The control of the trade with the Lebanese timber is indicated by various sources. We have already noted the wood provided by Hiram of Tyros to Salomon in exchange to 20 villages, in addition to which Salomon allegedly provided yearly 100,000 bushels of wheat and a thousand gallons of oil from pressed olives as

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[52] SADER 2019, 47, 48.

[53] Note the somewhat divergent judgements of SHERRATT 2016 and MANOLOVA 2020, 1200.

[54] 1 Kings 9.11-14. The kings of Tyre were probably able to derive income from the hinterland of Akko in the northern Israel (AUBET 2014, 712; MORSTADT 2015, 108).

[55] The territory of Sidon in the 8th and early 7th century extended far towards north (apparently granted by the Assyrian kings – see the discussion in SADER 2019, 91-94), while during the Persian hegemony it was enlarged southwards, including Dor and Joppa (SADER 2019, 94-96). Tyros was granted with some territories of Sidon when the latter was in 677 destroyed by Essarhaddon of Assyrian (Sader 2019: 121).

[56] SAA 2 5, iii 15'-22'. See FALES 2017, 242.

[57] SAA 16 127, 13-23. See FALES 2017, 243-244.

'food' for Hiram's 'household'.[58] The control of the timber trade by the king of Byblos is indicated by the 'Story of Wenamun',[59] and the importance of the control of the timber resources is demonstrated by the documents of the Assyrian kings imposing to the Phoenician rulers the task to supply the timber.[60] Metallurgy seems to have been equally under royal control.[61]

All this suggest that a great deal of the Phoenician trade was organised directly by the royal agents an brought revenues to the kings, while on the other hand the rulers profited from trade also indirectly by taxing the commercial activities in the ports. Moreover, the representation of their polities in the international relations, not least by arranging agreements with the foreign states (either their equals as the Israelite kings or the imperial powers as Assyria, Babylonia and Persia), made the monarchies in the Phoenician cities necessary for the local merchants for granting the conditions for successful international trade.[62] And as the cities depended on the import of agricultural produce, the ability of the kings to derive revenues by taxing the agricultural hinterland was, besides funding the royal power, probably vitally important for the whole urban population. We can therefore suppose that the Phoenician monarchies were supported by the city dwellers, including the commercial elites, and were funded by adequate revenues.

Thus, despite the collapse of the Late Bronze Age palatial system the economic basis for monarchy persisted in the Near East. Kingship still functioned as the ultimate controller and central manager of an important sector of the political economy. The monarchs generally controlled strategic resources of their polities and derived sufficient revenues for effective power building. Royal power was moreover generally profitable for the elite, opening possibilities which could have been unattainable without it. This granted elite support to the monarchies. Particular kings might have been perceived as better or worse, many of them were violently overthrown and replaced by others, but there is no sign that monarchy as the legitimate form of government was ever questioned.[63]

Monarchy in the early Greek poleis: the case of Corinth

In the Aegean, palatial monarchy disappeared with the 12th century collapse and did never emerge again in a similar form. Sole rule, however, did not disappear. The small communities developing during the Early Iron Age could have practiced various form of

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[58] 1 Kings 5.25. See also note 28.

[59] ANET 25-29 (28).

[60] SAA 19 22, 8-r2 (a letter of a governor to Tiglatpilesar); RINAP 4 1, V73-VI1; ANET 291 (a prism of Essarhaddon imposing to the Phoenician rulers the task to supply the timber). For the discussion of this evidence see FALES 2017, 230-247.

[61] SADER 2019, 306.

[62] AUBET 2014, 707: 'archaeology reflects a strong continuity with Late Bronze Age traditions in which private trade and institutional trade were intermixed and coexisted.'

[63] Pointed out by WIESEHÖFER 2015, 62-63; LURAGHI 2018, 25.

leadership, and many of them were probably headed by personal leaders arising from the local elites, but we can hardly speak about statehood or proper monarchy during this period.[64] More reliable evidence for sole leadership more or less coincides with the state formation, detectable from the 8th century. This was indeed the period when the growth of population and wealth, the rise of big settlements developing into veritable towns, and the emergence of sanctuaries of both local and pan-hellenic significance indicates the formation of bigger and better organised communities reasonably described as incipient poleis.[65] For many poleis the evidence pertaining to the earliest events after the end of the Heroic Age (a legendary reflection of the Late Bronze Age) recorded by the later traditions consists of the stories about sole rulers, or about the rule of narrow kinship groups (or families) often headed by a single man.[66] Such dynasties heading the poleis at the beginning of the Archaic period can be exemplified by the Penthilids of Lesbos, the Neleids of Miletos, the Basilids of Ephesos and Erythrai, the Temenids of Argos and the Bakchiads of Corinth.[67] The belief of later writers that these dynasties had been in charge without interruption since the end of the Heroic Age, thus throughout the Early Iron Age, is contradicted by the obviously stateless society during this period, the instability of the settlement pattern and power relations suggested by the archaeological record, which would hardly have allowed single families to

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[64] The concept of EIA monarchy rests almost entirely on the evidence of the Homeric poems (see especially DEGER 1970; CARLIER 1984, 136-290; 2006; LENZ 1993), and depends largely on the debatable historicity of the 'Homeric world' (see LURAGHI 2013c, 134-135; KÕIV 2016a, 9-15). Several scholars have been sceptical about the EIA monarchy and suggested the possibility of the collective rule (ANDREEV 1979; DREWS 1983; VAN WEES 2002, 114; MORRIS 2003, 10; DICKINSON 2006, 240; 2017, 16-17; OSBORNE 2009, 144; KÕIV 2016a, 15, 70; 2016b, 338-341). In the archaeological record the only more or less obvious sign of personal leadership, the 10th century 'heroon' of Lefkanid (POPHAM–TOULOUPA–SACKETT 1982; POPHAM–CALLIGAS–SACKETT 1993; LEMOS 2002, 140-146, 161-168; DICKINSON 2006, 191-193), appears as a singular phenomenon (see MITCHELL 2013, 36-39; KÕIV 2016b, 302-308). MAZARAKIS AINIAN 1997 has detected a number of supposed 'rulers' dwellings' in the archaeological record, but none of these can be considered as certain (see KÕIV 2011b, 163-165).

[65] On the growth of the elite display and the different views on the rise of aristocracy in the 8th century see SNODGRASS 1980, 15-84; MORRIS 1987, 171-210; 2000, 195-306; WHITLEY 2001, 98-101; ULF 2001; COLDSTREAM 2003, 109-366; HALL 2007, 127-131; OSBORNE 2009, 66-130; ROSE 2012, 68-92; OBER 2015, 132-137.

[66] The difference between narrow oligarchy and a monarchy is highly conditional in these cases. SANCISI-WEERDENBURG 2000, 13-14 and MITCHELL 2013, 91-118 have indeed pointed out that tyranny was largely a family affair.

[67] In Mytilene on Lesbos the possibly reliable record begins with the rule of the Penthilids followed by a series of tyrannies mentioned by the contemporary poet Alkaios (Arist. Pol. 1311b 23-30, 1285 a31ff; Strab. XIII 2.3; Dio. Laert. I 74; see PAGE 1955, 149-243; DE LIBERO 1996, 314-328; KÕIV 2016a, 28-33). From Miletos the tradition reports a competition inside the ruling family of the Neleidai and the tyranny of Amphitres (Konon 44; Nic. Dam. FGrH 90 F 52). In Ephesos the rule of the family of Basilidai was followed by a tyranny of Pythagoras (Pherekydes FGrH 3 F 155; Baton FGrH 268 F3). In Erythrai we hear about the rule of the Basilidai (Arist. Pol. 1305 b19-22) and an early tyranny of Ortyges and his companions (Hippias FGrH 421 F 1; see BERVE 1967, 9-7; DE LIBERO 1996, 375-376; THOMAS 2019, 245-260). On the Temenidai see the next note. The Bakchiadai will be discussed below. Despite the questionable reliability of these accounts they demonstrate that the historical memory concerning these poleis begins with the stories about dynastic rule.

maintain an exclusive power during several generations. But the traditional evidence leaves hardly any doubt about the rule of these dynasties in the early Archaic age, from which we can expect some more or less reliable evidence. There is every reason to suppose that the proper establishment of their power became possible with the 8th century state formation, and that the formation of these poleis, consequently, took place under sole leadership. Some strong monarchs reputedly emerged from these dynasties, best exemplified by the quasi-legendary Pheidon of Argos who allegedly subjected a considerable realm in the north-eastern Peloponnese.[68] Monarchies continued, or re-emerged, during the following Archaic period, for which Argos, Sikyon and Corinth in the Peloponnese, and Ephesos, Miletos and Samos on or near the Anatolian coast, all among the most important Archaic poleis, serve as obvious examples.[69]

From the 7th century at the latest the Greeks called sole rulers 'tyrants' – *tyrannos* (singular), the rule *tyrannis* – or used the abstract nouns *monarchos* and *monarchia* (literally: 'sole ruler' and 'sole rule'). How were sole rulers, or leaders, called earlier cannot be stated with any confidence – *basileus*, the term for the legendary kings in the heroic epic is a possibility, but the use of it for the contemporary monarchs in the Archaic period can hardly be testified.[70] Whatever the case, there is no reason to assume that the earliest testification of the word *tyrannis* indicates the date of the emergence of the kind of regiment marked by it,[71] or to use the terminology of later sources for distinguishing between legal kings (*basileis*) and illegal tyrants (*tyrannoi*) among the Archaic rulers. The classical and post-classical sources simply cannot present reliable evidence for this. What we can say is that an effective monarchy after the 12th century collapse in Greece re-emerged with the rise of polis and probably contributed to the state formation.

A good example of dynastic power in the early Greece is presented by Corinth. Situated on the Isthmus between the Central Greece and the Peloponnese, Corinth was one of the principal nodes of trade in the Aegean world. Urban centre emerged here from the 8th century onwards and developed soon into a notable city on the foot of a steep acropolis.

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[68] Hdt. VI 127.3; Ephoros FGrH 70 F 115; Arist. Pol. 1310 b 26-27; for the discussion of the evidence see KÕIV 2003, 239-297; HALL 2007, 145-154. All the ancients except Herodotos dated Pheidon to the very beginning of the Archaic period (for the ancient datings see especially KÕIV 2001 and 2003, 255-276; the moderns have dated Pheidon to the 8th (HUXLEY 1958; BERVE 1967, 6; GEHRKE 1990, 38-42; DE LIBERO 1996, 208; KÕIV 2003, 255-276, 344-353), the 7th (ANDREWES 1956, 40-41) or the early 6th century (KELLY 1975, 94-111; CARLIER 1984, 387-388; BARCELÓ 1993, 114).

[69] See the detailed discussion in DE LIBERO 1996.

[70] The only more or less certain example is given by an oracle quoted by Herodotos (V 92 ε) where Kypselos the ruler of Corinth was called '*basileus* of glorious Corinth' – see below.

[71] LEWIS 2008, 16; KÕIV 2016a, 24. The fact that the earliest use of the word *tyrannis* known for the late 5th century sophist Hippias of Elis (FGrH 6 F 6) and for us (Archilochos fr. 19 West, referring to the Lydian king Gyges) dates from the mid-7th century cannot exclude the possibility that similar monarchs emerged already before that date – Hippias refers to the use of the term not the beginning of the historical phenomenon. Note OGDEN 1997, 148 accepting that there could have been 'tyrants' in Greece before the Archaic era.

Already before that, from the 9th century, the archaeological evidence shows a growth of elite display in a number of burial places near the future town, suggesting the emergence of probably competing elite families. During the 8th century, especially around the middle of this period, a number of cemeteries within the settlement clusters were abandoned and the burials were afterwards concentrated mainly to the plain northeast of the consolidating town, where elite burials were placed around a Bronze Age burial mound, probably viewed as a tomb of ancestors. This, and the increasing habitation in the future city centre, indicate a significant change reasonably interpreted as polis formation.[72] The earliest monumental temples in the town, and another on Isthmos outside the conurbation, date from around the middle of the 7th century.[73] During the 7th century Corinth became the leading ceramic producer of the Aegean world. The Corinthians were among the pioneers of the Greek colonisation, reputed as the founders of Syracuse in Sicily in the 730s,[74] which developed into the biggest and mightiest Greek polis in the west. They must have closely interacted with the Phoenicians and were strongly influenced by the eastern culture, as demonstrated by the orientalising stile of the Corinthian pottery, while their colony Syracuse became the chief opponent of Carthage founded by the Phoenicians from Tyre and becoming the main Phoenician metropolis in the western Mediterranean.

Around the middle of the 8th century, thus probably at the crucial period of the incipient urbanisation and the formation of the polis community, a kinship group called the Bakchiads, reputedly the descendants of Heracles and of an eponymous Bakchis a son of Dionysos,[75] confirmed their power in Corinth. The precise time of their ascendance cannot be established. The belief of the ancients that their ancestors had ruled Corinth uninterruptedly since the Dorian invasion can be almost certainly rejected as unhistorical.[76] However, there were accounts about internal troubles in Corinth around the middle of the 8th century, which deserve attention. Later sources report about internecine conflicts among the Bakchiads leading an institutionalisation of the Bakchiad rule (dated to 747 by the later sources). Another story tells about a sacrilegious crime committed by an arrogant Bakchiad man

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[72] See ROEBUCK 1972, 101-103; WILLIAMS 1982, 11-12, 18-19; SALMON 1984, 59-62, 75–80; MORGAN 1999, 406-410, 472-473; POLIGNAC 2005, 60-61; KOURSOUMIS 2013, 45-50; FREDRIKSEN 2013; TZONOU–MORGAN 2020, 726-730. The most comprehensive discussion of the burial record is given by DICKEY 1992. For the recent excavation results see PFAFF 2007; YANNOPOULOU et al. 2013; SANDERS et al 2014; ASLAMITZIDOU 2018. The continuing elite display indicated by the burial record is minutely analyzed in an important paper by VAN WEES (forthcoming).

[73] For the temples see BRONEER 1971, 40-53; GEBHARD 1993, 159-163; MORGAN 1999, 428-429; RHODES 2003; BOOKIDIS 2003, 48-50; TASINOS 2013, 16; KOURSOUMIS 2013, 45.

[74] Thuc. VI 3-4 who dates the foundation to 733.

[75] The Bakchiads were reputed as the descendants of Aletes the legendary founder of the Dorian Corinth and a grand-grand-grandson of Heracles (Diod. VII 9; Schol. Pind. Ol. XIII 17b–c; Paus. II 4.3-4). Bakchis the Bakchiad ancestor, a descendant of Aletes, was seen as a son of Dionysos (Schol. Ap. Rhod. 1212), implied by his very name related to Bakchos. The stemma in Diod. VII 9 and Paus. II 4.4 places Bakchis to the late 10th century.

[76] As the name of the last king Telestes, from *telos* (the end) is obviously invented, we cannot expect any reliable information about his predecessors either. See SCHMITZ 2010, 22-26; KÕIV 2016a, 57-61; 2019, 119.

which, on the on hand, led to the expulsion of the culprit and the foundation of Syracuse by (dated to 733 by the later sources), while on the other hand produced a curse of the Bakchiads which apparently caused their eventual overthrow three generations later.[77] Both these traditions infer serious vicissitudes, which could be connected to the establishment of the Bakchiad rule. Chronologically, both point to the period of state formation suggested by the archaeological record, which justifies the assumption that they reflect actual upheavals from which the Bakchiads emerged as the rulers of Corinth.[78] The elite cemetery northwards of the town emerging since ca 800 may be seen as the Bakchiad's burial plot, and some formalisation in it ca 720 can the mark the definite establishment of their power. We might assume that the deceased of the Bronze Age tombs around which the burials were arranged were seen as the ancestors of the emerging dynasty.[79]

The exact character of the Bakchiad rule was not quite clear for the ancients. According to Herodotos the Bakchiads were endogamous, which suggests a relatively broad group; according to Diodoros they numbered over 200, and according to Aristotle they descended from 7 daughters and 3 sons of Bakchis, which can suggest that they were believed to have been divided into 10 families.[80] However, Hans van Wees has in his recent scrupulous study of the early Corinthian burial evidence come to the conclusion that the 8th to early 7th century North cemetery was used by three very narrow but closely related elite groups, possibly families, and suggests that this was the burial place of the Bakchiads. If he is right, this would narrow down the size of the ruling dynasty.[81] A probably Archaic oracle quoted by Herodotos called them 'monarchic men', which emphasises the exclusiveness of their rule, comparable to a monarchy, while the historian himself, whose anti-monarchical attitude and narrative context required a clear distinction between the rule of the Bakchiads and the following 'tyranny' of the Kypselids, let the Corinthians to speak about their oligarchy.[82] The later authors present conflicting views concerning their rule. On the one hand, it was believed that each year they appointed one of them to be the head of the state as *prytanis*, while on the other hand they were called tyrants, and were allegedly headed by hereditary kings (*basilees*)

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[77] See KÕIV 2019, 108-112.

[78] Diod. VII 9 and Paus. II 4.4 believed that at 747 (for the date see JACOBY 1902, 150-155 and MOSSHAMMER 1979, 234-245), after internal conflicts, the Bakchiad reign was reorganised and henceforth they appointed an annual *prytanis* (ruler) from among them. For the possible reflection of real development see KÕIV 2003, 339-344; 2019, 119.

[79] Van Wees (forthcoming) suggests that the elite burials around the earlier tumulus belonged to the Bakchiads. We may speculate that the tumulus might have been identified as the tomb of Bakchis, or perhaps of Aletes the supposed founder of the Dorian Corinth (see note 75).

[80] Hdt. V 92β; Diod. VII 9.6; Arist. fr. 611.19 Rose. According to Hdt. V 92γ the Bakchiads sent ten men from among them to kill the baby Kypselos (see below), which can also imply a tradition about ten families of the clan.

[81] VAN WEES forthcoming.

[82] Hdt. V 92β presented the story of the Kypselids as a warning against tyranny, was thus motivated to distinguish their monarchy from the previous Bakchiad rule, and could have chosen the terms accordingly.

until the very end of their rule.[83] Aristotle classified their power as kingship (*basileia*),[84] but it would easily suit also with his definition of *dynasteia* – the voluntary rule by narrow elite group where son succeeds father in office. The philosopher compares this kind of rule to tyranny.[85]

Be this as it may with the exact power relations among the Bakchiads, probably not indicated by the oral tradition from which the information surely derives and therefore unclear for the ancient writers, there is hardly any doubt that they formed a dynasty monopolising the power in Corinth, and that the period of their rule (90 years according to the tradition, indicating three generations) from the 8th century establishment to the overthrow, marked the emergence of Corinth as a prosperous polis. The Bakchiads probably established some laws concerning the system of land tenure, suggested by Aristotle's notice of a certain Pheidon legislating in the early Corinth, probably during the Bakchiad rule.[86] They almost certainly organised public buildings in the town and might have erected (or at least started the building of) the first monumental temples.[87] The colonies to Syracuse and Korkyra (Korfu) were reputedly sent under their rule.[88] Later authors believed that they derived revenues from trade,[89] and we can assume that they also possessed considerable landed property.

However, around the middle of the 7th century the Bakchiads were overthrown, allegedly because of their arrogance and violence. The tradition tells that this was accomplished by the war-leader (*polemarchos*) Kypselos, himself a Bakchiad from his mother's side, who rallied the

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[83] Diod. VII 9.6 and Paus. II 4.4. tell about the annual *prytaneis* (see note 78) while in VII 9.3 Diodoros states that the oldest son always inherited the position of the king (*ebasileuse*) until the tyranny of Kypselos. Nic. Dam. FGrH 90 F 57.1,6 calls the last Bakchiad leader a *basileus*. The Bakchiads as tyrants (*tyranneusantes*) in Strab. VIII 6.20. See KÕIV 2019, 120-122.

[84] According to the *Korinthion Politeia* of Aristotle, the kingship (*basileia*) in Corinth lasted from Bakchis until Periandros the son of Kypselos turned it into *tyrannis* (Arist. fr. 611.19-20 Rose; the same point of view in Nic. Dam. FGrH 90 F 58.1), which was, according to Aristotle, the first change of the constitution of Corinth. He did not indicate any difference between the rule of the Bakchiads and Kypselos the founder of the following dynasty. A degree of continuity between the Bakchiads and the Kypselids is accepted by SCHMITZ 2010, 46-47; KÕIV 2016a, 61-64; 2019, 119-122.

[85] Arist. Pol. 1292b4-19; 1293a30-31; 1302b17-18.

[86] Arist. Pol. 1265 b13-16 (quoted and discussed below, with notes 144-147). Aristotle's statement that Pheidon was 'one of the most ancient lawgivers' (ὢν νομοθέτης τῶν ἀρχαιοτάτων) is likely to suggest the period of the of the Bakchiad rule, although the time immediately after the overthrew of the following Kypselids cannot be completely ruled out. Pheidon could well have belonged to the Bakchiad family, as did the Theban legislator Philolaos (a Bakchiad emigrant from Corinth according to Arist. Pol. 1274 a32-b6), perhaps his contemporary.

[87] The temple, like the city walls, could have been constructed both at the time of the Bakchiads and during the following rule of Kypselos.

[88] Archias the founder of Syracuse was reputedly a Bakchiad (as indicated by the combination of Plut. Am. Narr. 2; schol. Ap. Rhod. 1212; Max. Tyr. 18.1; Parthen. Erot. 14). Korkyra was according to Strab. VI 2.4 and schol. Ap. Rhod. 1212 founded at the same time.

[89] Strab. VIII 6.20.

discontent people against the previous rulers, overthrew the Bakchiad *basileus* (king), and was himself proclaimed the *basileus* by the people.[90] The fabulous birth story of Kypselos told that already before his birth the oracles predicted that he would overthrow the predecessors, that the Bakchiads tried to kill him when he was born, but he miraculously escaped the death to fulfil the prediction.[91] One of the oracles quoted by Herodotos addressed him as the '*basileus* of glorious Corinth'.[92] Coupled with the opinion of Diodoros that the Bakchiads were headed by hereditary *basileis*, with the account of Nikolaos of Damascus that Kypselose was proclaimed *basileus* instead of the last Bakchiad 'king', and the circumstance that Aristotle's qualified the rule of both the Bakchiads and of Kypselos as *basileia*,[93] this can suggest that the nature of the power did not crucially change with the Kypselos' coup. Instead of viewing this as a replacement of oligarchy with tyranny we should see here rather a shift of the power from one branch of the dynasty to another, which could, admittedly, have brought along a narrowing of the circle of the rulers.

Kypselos reputedly expelled the Bakchiads, thus got rid of the most dangerous competitors, and restored the rights of those who were expelled during their rule. He confiscated (literally 'made public' – *edēmeuse*) the property of the Bakchiads,[94] thereby taking their possessions under control. He further levied the people with a tithe, allegedly to fulfil the promise to dedicate the property of the Corinthians the Olympian Zeus he had given before the establishment of his power.[95] He founded a number of colonies in the North-Western Greece, and placed his (legitimate and illegitimate) sons as the rulers.[96] And he probably organised extensive building works in Corinth: the city walls could have been built and the monumental temples in the town centre and at Isthmia finished during his reign.[97] Later tradition remembered Kypselos as a popular ruler who even did not need any bodyguard for protection.[98]

Kypselos' son and successor Periandros was perhaps the mightiest Greek ruler of his time, governing a small-scale empire. He controlled the colonies founded by his father, to

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[90] Nic. Dam. FGrH 90 F 57.4-6.

[91] Hdt. V 92β- ε. For the discussion of the meaning of the story see HOW–WELLS 1912, 50-55; ANDREWES 1956, 45-48; WATERS 1971, 13-15, 19f; ZÖRNER 1971, 26-35, 47-49; STAHL 1983; WĘCOWSKI 1996; GRAY 1996; JOHNSON 2001; DEWALD 2003; MOLES 2007; GIANGIULIO 2013; KÕIV 2019, 98-103.

[92] Hdt. V 92ε.

[93] Diod. VII 9.3; Nic. Dam. FGrH 90 F 57.1,6; Arist. fr. 611.19-20 Rose. See note 84 above.

[94] Nic. Dam. FGrH 90 F 57.7.

[95] Arist. Oec. 1346 a31-b5. Kypselos allegedly promised to dedicate the property of the Corinthians to Zeus when he will become the ruler, and consequently demanded from the people one tenth of their possessions during ten years.

[96] Most of the measures, including the colonies at Leukas and Anaktorion (Strab. VIII 2.8 etc.), are related by Nic. Dam. FGrH 90 F 57.7. According to Hdt. I 14 Kypselos dedicated the Corinthian treasure house at Delphi. The golden statue at Olympia was ascribed both to Kypselos (Arist. Oec. 1346 a31-b5; Agaklythos FGrH 411 F 1; Strab. VIII 6.20; Plut. Pyth. Or. 13; Paus. V 2.3) and his son Periandros (Ephoros FGrH 70 F 178; Suda s.v. *Kypselidon anathemata*).

[97] See notes 72-73.

[98] Nic. Dam. FGrH 90 F 57.8; Arist. fr. 611.20 Rose; Pol. 1315 b28-9; 1310 b29-30.

which he probably added some new. He allegedly kept navies on both the Corinthian and Saronic gulf and fought many wars (the conquest of Epidauros and a war against Sicyon can be specified).[99] Above all, the tradition leaves no doubt that he possessed wide international authority and was in good terms with many rulers both in Greece and abroad. He had good relations with the panhellenic sanctuaries at Delphi and Olympia to which he, or his father, made precious dedications;[100] he was married to a daughter of the tyrant of nearby Epidauros,[101] was the friend of the contemporary tyrant of Miletos,[102] and was called to mediate the dispute between Athens and Mytilene over Sigeion near Troy.[103] Outside Greece he had relations with the dynasty of the Lydian kings, possibly inherited from his father,[104] while the account that his nephew and successor was called Psammetichos (the Hellenic form of the name of the Egyptian king Psamtik) infers relations, perhaps intermarriage, with the Egyptian rulers.[105]

Internally, Periandros reputedly established a strict order in Corinth. We are told that he relied on a bodyguard of 300 men, founded a special council for restricting expenditure, prohibited luxury, compelled the people to work, forbade the use of slaves, did not allow the people to dwell in the town, and even banned the informal gatherings on the agora, fearing that the people might conspire against him.[106] Whatever was the exact aim of these measures, in all likelihood recorded imprecisely, perhaps incorrectly, by the later tradition, they obviously depict Periandros as a ruler regulating the internal order of the state. The tyrants,

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[99] Nic. Dam. FGrH 90 F 58.3 (wars and navies); Arist. Pol. 1315 b29-30 (Periandros as a warlike tyrant); Hdt. III 52.7 (war against Epidauros); Frontinus Strat.3.9.7 (war against Sicyon); Periandros was certainly believed to have controlled Korkyra (Hdt. III 48-53; Nic. Dam. FGrH 90 F 59); according to Nic. Dam. F 59.1 his son Euagoras founded Poteidaia; according to Arist. Pol. 1304a31-34, 1311a40-b2 a younger Periandros ruled Ambrakia. Plut. De ser. num. vind. 552e seems to ascribe to Periandros the foundation of Leukas and Anaktorion, the foundations of Kypselos according to Nic. Dam. F 57.7). For the colonies see BERVE 1967, 20, 527; SALMON 1984, 209-217; DE LIBERO 1996, 153-156.

[100] Kypselos allegedly built a treasure house at Delphi (Hdt. I 14.2; Put. Mor. 400de; Paus. X 13.5) and the Kypselids dedicated a golden statue of Zeus at Olympia (Ephoros FGrH 70 F 178; Arist. Oec. 1346 a31-b5; Agaklythos FGrH 411 F 1; Strab. VIII 6.20; Plut. Pyth. Or. 13; Paus. V 2.3; Photius and Suda s.v. *Kypselidon anathemata*). A fragmentary inscription from Olympia (IvO 650 mentioning Βοῶ[ν] Κυψ[έλου]) probably derives form a Kypselid dedication. See DE LIBERO 1996, 147-149; KÕIV 2019, 97 n. 27.

[101] Hdt. V 50; Heracl. Pont. fr. 114 Wehrli.

[102] Hdt. I 20 telling how Periandros gave valuable information to Thrasybulos the tyrant of Miletos; another story told about Thrasybulos' advise to Periandros to annihilate the outstanding men in the polis (Hdt. V 92ζ-η; Arist. Pol. 1284 a26-33, 1311 a20-3 tells it other way round, Periandros advising Thrasybulos).

[103] Hdt. V 95; Arist. Rhet. 1375 b31; Timaos FGrH 566 F 129; Strab. XIII 1.38-39; Apollodoros FGrH 244 F 27.

[104] Periandros' alleged decision to send the Korkyraian boys to Alyattes for castration (Hdt. III 48.3; Nic. Dam. FGrH 90 F 59.3; Diog. Laert. I 95) probably indicates pre-existing relations. It is notable that one of Kypselos' sons was called Gordios (Arist. Pol. 1315b26-27), an obviously Anatolian name, and that the dedications of the Phrygian and Lydian kings in Delphi were kept in the treasury of Kypselos (Hdt. I 14.1-2). See SHANKS 1999, 54.

[105] Arist. Pol. 1315 b27; Nic. Dam. FGrH 90 F 59.4, 60.1.

[106] Arist fr. 611.20 Rose; Nic. Dam. FGrH 90 F 58.1; Ephoros FGrH 70 F 179. Aristotle (Pol. 1313 a36-b32) considers such measures typically tyrannical, aimed at keeping the people under control, and claims that most of these was implemented by Periandros.

either Kypselos or Periandros, or perhaps already the Bakchiads before them, might have established the division of the Corinthians into the eight *phylai*, the structural units into which the citizens were divided in the following times.[107] Periandros hosted the famous dithyrambic poet Arion,[108] and erected public buildings like his father. He allegedly planned digging the Ithmian channel, while the archaeological record would date to his reign the building of *diolkos* (the way for carrying ships over Isthmos), the construction of the harbour at Lechaion and perhaps of the building of the new temple of Apollo on the Corinthian agora.[109] All these achievements considered, there is no surprise that Periandros was included among the Seven Sages celebrated for their political wisdom and services to their poleis.[110]

We have thus evidence for two successive dynasties ruling the early Corinth, whose reign virtually marked the emergence of the Corinthian polis, and probably the peak of its power and renown. The Bakchiads seem to have formed a broader group than the Kypselids, but this does not warrant distinguishing between the Bakchiads as 'traditional' rulers and the Kypselids as 'illegal tyrants'.[111] Both dynasties were headed by a sole ruler described in the sources as *basileus* or *tyrannos*. As these terms were used indiscriminately before the late 5th century, the late sources giving this evidence cannot reliably indicate any distinction, and we can doubt if such a distinction was made at all during the Archaic era.[112] Both dynasties presented themselves as legitimate (for which see below), and the duration of their reign – three generations for the Bakchiads and two for the Kypselids – suggests that for a relatively long time this legitimacy was accepted by a considerable part of the Corinthians.

The functions performed by the Corinthian rulers and the ways of legitimating the power were clearly comparable to the city state monarchies of the east. The Bakchiads and the Kypselisds were war-leaders.[113] They presented themselves as the caretakers of justice and

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[107] Nic. Dam. FGrH 90 F 60 implies that after the expulsion of the Kypselids the Corinthians were divided into eight parts (*oktades*). The tradition ascribing the establishment of the eightfold division to Aletes the legendary founder of the Dorian polis (Suda sv *panta okto*) may suggest that that the division dates from an early period: probably from the time of the Bakchiads (Reobuck 1972: 115-116) or the Kypselids (SALMON 1984, 206-207). See also SHANKS 1999, 54; KÕIV 2003, 235-236; GROTE 2016, 146-148.

[108] Hdt. I 23-24.

[109] Intention to dig the channel recorded in Diog. Laert. I 99; on the archaeological evidence for Periandros' buildings see especially SALMON 1984, 201-202; SHANKS 1999, 61-65.

[110] Plat. Prot. 343A; Rep. 336A (who, like many other writers, protested against this inclusion); Diog. Laert. I 94-100; etc. On Periandros among the Sages see ENGELS 2010, 45-47.

[111] The supposed tomb epigram of Periandros called him *prytanis* (Diog. Laert. I 97), thus ascribing him the same title that allegedly had been used by the head of the Bakchiads. This might suggest that the Kypselids reputedly left the formal 'constitution' of the Bakchiads unchanged and ruled as the traditional heads of the state.

[112] As pointed out in KÕIV 2016a, 24-25.

[113] This is clearly stated for the Kypselids (see note 99 above). For the Bakchiads the evidence is scarce and of doubtful reliability: they allegedly fought an early successless war against Megara (Zenob. V 8; Demon FGrH 327 F 19; Schol. Plat. Euthyd. 292e; Schol. Aristoph. Ran. 439. Plut. QGr 17; see HAMMOND 1954; LEGON 1981, 54-55, 60-70; SALMON 1984, 179-192; TAUSEND 1992, 99-102; KÕIV 2003, 229-232; VAN WEES 2003, 62-64) and Kypselos reputedly held the position of war-leader (*polemarchos*) before the fall of their rule (Nic. Dam. FGrH 90 F 57.5).

social order, as indicated by the oracle, quoted by Herodotos, stating that Kypselos would set Corinth straight (*dikaiozei de Korinthon*),[114] and acted as lawgivers arranging the internal order of Corinth. And they took care of the worship of the gods, making precious dedications in the pan-hellenic sanctuaries and erecting temples at home. Both dynasties claimed divine protection for their power. The Bakchiads indeed claimed descent from Herakles and Dionysos, and perhaps suggested that their ancestors had been ruling Corinth from the time of the legendary foundation. The rule of Kypselos was allegedly legitimated by the will of the people proclaiming him to be their king,[115] and by the oracles inferring divine support to the establishment of his rule. One of them, noted above, explicitly blessed Kypselos as the *basileus* of Corinth,[116] perhaps comparing him to the heroic kings of the legendary past. The very story of his miraculous escape from death in infancy, similar to the legends of eastern rulers like Sargon and later Kyros, served to legitimate his power, and may have been purposefully promoted by the Kypselids for comparing the dynasty founder to the legendary Sargon.[117] All this considered, there can be no doubt that both dynasties regarded themselves as legitimate, being sanctioned by the gods and probably by the consent of the people. Monarchy was ostensibly firmly entrenched.

Unfortunately, we have no evidence concerning the functioning of the collegial organs, either under the Bakchiads, or under Kypselos and Periandros, although the story that Kypselos was proclaimed *basileus* by the people can infer an acclamation by the assembly. However, these institutions functioned under some other Archaic monarchs (e.g. the Athenian Peisistratids, the Deinomenids of Syracuse).[118] The evidence from Mytilene on Lesbos is particularly significant in this respect. When the early 6th century poet Alkaios was exiled during the reign of some tyrants, he complained about exclusion from *agora* (assembly) and *bolla* (council) that had been attended by his father and grandfather, which indicates not only that assembly and council functioned under his contemporary tyrants, but also that these organs were traditional in Mytilene, thus functioning also during the previous Penthilid dynasty.[119] The situation in Mytilene where the Penthilids were followed by subsequent monarchs is clearly comparable to the sequence of the Bakchiads and the Kypselids in

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[114] Hdt. V 92β. See MCGLEW 1993, 61-74; Shanks 1999: 60-61. The legislative activity of the tyrants has been pointed out by SALMON 1997, 63-66; ROSE 2012, 239; TAYLOR 2022, 318-319; for the fluid difference between tyrant and lawgiver see BERNHARDT 2022.

[115] See note 90.

[116] Hdt. V 92ε.

[117] GIANGIULIO 2013, 231-234.

[118] Ath. Pol. 14.1 reports that the assembly voted a formal decision giving Peisistratos the bodyguard, while Thuc. VI 54.6 and Ath. Pol. 16 stated that the Peisistratids ruled through the traditional institutions (see LAVELLE 2005, 89-90; ROSE 2012, 341-345; SANCISI-WEERDENBURG 2000, 11-12). In Syracuse Gelon was allegedly proclaimed the king (*basileus*) by the Syracusians (Diod. XI 23.3), probably by the assembly mentioned by Diodoros below (26.5; see also Polyain. I 27.1; Aelian. VH VI 11).

[119] Alkaios fr. 130b. 3-7; see Kõiv 2016a: 33.

Corinth, which, considering the alleged acclamation of Kypselos by the people, makes the functioning of collective bodies in Corinth under the monarchs highly probable.

However, both the Bakchiads and the Kypselids were overthrown, the Bakchiads by Kypselos and the Kypselids by the Corinthian people, and both were demonized by the following government. The Bakchiads were described as unjust by their Kypselid successors (Kypselos indeed had to 'make Corinth straight' by expelling the Bakchiads), and when their ancestor Bakchis was described as lame and ugly, as told by Aristotle, and the dynasty as cursed because of their earlier crime, we can suspect the Kypselid propaganda in work here.[120] The attitude towards the Kypselids was twofold. On the one hand the tradition describes Kypselos in positive terms, as a hero liberating Corinth from the oppressive Bakchiads,[121] and the inclusion of Periandros among the Seven Sages suggests the existence of a positive tradition about him. This favourable tradition could have been shaped by the tyrants, but as it survived long after the tyranny's fall it must have been entrenched in the local memory, perhaps reflecting the real popularity of Kypselos and the glory the city achieved under his successor. On the other hand, if Kypselos retained his predominantly positive image throughout the later times (the negative appraisal of Herodotos was clearly exceptional, caused by his generally anti-monarchical attitude and the narrative context)[122], representing thus the positive aspects of the monarchy, his successor Periandros was, despite his achievements, remembered in predominantly negative terms.[123] He was reputed as a cruel man repressive towards the people,[124] harsh towards his own family and almost deranged in his sexual desires. He allegedly killed his wife out of jealousy, believing the accusations of his concubines whom he later set to fire when regretting the murder, had sexual intercourse with his wife's dead body,[125] stripped the women of Corinth of their clothes and jewellery for appeasing the dead wife,[126] had sexual relationship with his mother,[127] expelled his son from home causing his eventual death, and sent the sons of outstanding men of Korkyra, an island polis under his rule, to the Lydian king Alyattes for castration.[128] This unfavourable tradition

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[120] Arist. fr. 611.19 Rose. For the 'lameness' and the curse of the Bakchiads see KÕIV 2019, 108-112.

[121] The story of the infancy and the rise of Kypselos is clearly favourable to him (ANDREWES 1956, 47-48; ZÖRNER 1971, 27, 31-32; OOST 1972, 16–18; SALMON 1984, 187-188; MCGLEW 1993, 71; SCHMITZ 2010, 30-31; CATENACCI 2012, 38-46; KÕIV 2019, 100-103).

[122] Hdt. V 92δ. See KÕIV 2019, 100-103.

[123] It was assumed that Periandros turned the good kingship of Kypselos into an evil tyranny (Nic. Dam. FGrH 90 F 58.1; in a milder form in Arist. Pol. 1315 b28-30; fr. 611.20 Rose). Herodotos V 92ζ also believed that Periandros became worse than his father.

[124] As noted above (with note 106), he compelled the people to work and prohibiting gatherings, allegedly for making them busy and thus avoiding any plotting against the ruler; besides this, he reputedly drowned the pimps into the sea (Arist. fr. 611.20 Rose; Hermippos FHG iii 40 fr. 16 ap. Athen. X 443a).

[125] Hdt. V 92ζ; Diog. Laert. I 94.

[126] Hdt. V 92ζ; Ephoros FGrH 70 F 178.

[127] Diog. Laert. I 96; Parthen. Erot. 17.

[128] Hdt. III 50-53.

can, on the one hand, reflect the growing resentment against the tyranny, and we can perhaps believe that, partly because of this resentment, Periandros was, in reality, more repressive than his father. On the other hand, this ambivalence illuminates the controversial attitude towards the monarchy, remembered both as a glorious rule bringing Corinth to the apex of glory, and as an unacceptably repressive government. As often in the oral traditions concerning the great dynasties, the positive aspects were connected with the dynasty founder, while the negative traits were ascribed to the last great figure, making him a monster contrasted to his heroic predecessor. Sargon and Naram-Sin, the paradigmatic rulers of Akkad, serve as good examples for this, showing that the Corinthian dynasty was no exception in this respect.[129]

However, the evidence leaves no doubt that the Kypselid monarchy became oppressive and hateful. The tradition tells that in the end the Corinthians hated the tyrants so much that they killed Periandros' successor (called either Kypselos or Psammetichos) and desecrated the tombs of the Kypselids, throwing their remains out of the Corinthian land. An oligarchic government was thereby established,[130] which apparently secured the internal stability of Corinth for almost two hundred years.[131]

This evidence demonstrates that the Corinthian polis emerged and developed under dynastic rule. The rulers performed functions and legitimated the power similarly to the kings in the east. Nor is there anything extraordinary in overthrowing a dynasty, or in hating particular rulers. Demonising the overthrown predecessors has been usual in history. Viewed from this perspective the Corinthian monarchy seems easily comparable to the city-state kingdoms elsewhere, not least the commercial Phoenician city-states, which were of more or less the same size as Corinth and where the ruling dynasties profited from trade as the Bakchiads allegedly did. Corinth, like many other poleis ruled by tyrants, compares well to the monarchical city-states of the Near East.

Clearly different from the east is however the fact that when the Kypselids were overthrown they were not replaced by a new dynasty, but monarchy was abolished altogether. Typically for Greece, it was not only a particular ruler or dynasty that was condemned, but the whole concept of monarchy was demonised. We lack contemporary evidence from Corinth, but Archaic poetry from elsewhere shows strong criticism of sole rule. Monarchy was equalised with 'devouring' the community and enslaving the people, or viewed as a punishment of the citizens for their vices, an evil for the polis and a danger for

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[129] Note the similarity to the traditions about the rulers of Akkad: Sargon the dynasty founder depicted as the hero and Naram-Sin its last outstanding member as an arrogant ruler causing the fall of the dynasty and the Akkadian state. For the discussion and more examples see KÕIV 2018.

[130] Nic. Dam. FGrH 90 F 60; Arist. Pol. 1315 b27.

[131] The subsequent history of Corinth is discussed in detail by SALMON 1984, 231-386; see also LEGON 2004, 467.

the ruler himself.[132] Poleis took legislative measures for avoiding the emergence of a monarch (note the 7th century legislative inscription from the Cretan polis Dreros precluding the repeated tenure of the highest state office, probably with the purpose of avoiding the monopolisation of power),[133] and the turn from the Archaic to the Classical period (the late 6th and the first half of the 5th century) marked a widespread abolition of tyrannies and their replacement with republican governments.[134] The originally neutral words *tyrannis* and *tyrannos*, meaning simply 'monarchy' and 'monarch', attained increasingly negative connotation, until were defined by the Athenian philosophers as the terms for bad and lawless rule and contrasted to the good and lawful monarchy called *basileia* (kingship),[135] for which, however, no real example from the Greek poleis was easily found.[136]

Thus, although many poleis emerged under dynastic rule, for which Corinth appears as an excellent example, and the tyrants acted in many ways similarly to the city-state rulers of the east, achieved legitimation for their power and often brought prosperity for their poleis, in the long run monarchy failed to consolidate the polis society. Even those dynasties which had successfully maintained stability during a fairly long period of time were eventually unable to entrench the power, became hateful, were violently overthrown and replaced by collective governments. Rather than sustaining social coherence, like in the Near Eastern and other early states, monarchy in Greece became a destabilizing factor, a trouble-maker, and was consequently abolished.

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[132] Alkaios complained that tyrant (his enemy Pittakos) 'devoured' the polis (fr. 129.23-4, 70.7), 'set it upside down' (fr. 141), and 'brings the people to ruin' fr. 70.12), that it was necessary to save the people from this (fr. 129.20; fr. 75 and 348 mention tyranny in an equally reproachful context). Solon viewed monarchy as the enslavement of the people (fr. 9 West), something that must be definitely avoided (fr. 32, 33 West). Theognis 39-52 saw monarchy as a punishment for the people for their badness (*hybris*), while in 1181-1182 the *tyrannos* is described as devouring the people, and killing him won't cause vengeance. See BARCELÓ 1993, 92-102; DE LIBERO 1996, 28-35; PARKER 1998, 155-157; ANDERSON 2005, 205-210: KÕIV 2016a. 17-19.

[133] For the decree see KOERNER 1993, no 90; GAGARIN 1986, 81-97; 2008, 45-49, 76-79; 2013, 223-224; HÖLKESKAMP 1999, 262-269; GAGARIN–PERLMAN 2016, 200-207. The anti-monarchic purpose of the degree has been suggested by GEHRKE 1993, 63-64; HALL 2007, 135 and MITCHELL 2013, 15; see also SEELENTAG 2015, 139-155. Note the statement of Aristotle (Pol. 1305a15-19) that a number of early tyrants had acquired the power through some high state office.

[134] The tyrannies were abolished in Athens, on Samos, in the poleis on the Anatolian coast (here in connection to the resistance to the Persian power upholding these rulers); many tyrannies were allegedly abolished by the Spartans (Plut. De mal. Herod. 21; FGrH 105 F 1). Tyrannies collapsed in Sicily (Akragas and Syracuse) and Italy (Kyme and Rhegion) in the 470s and 460s (see LURAGHI 1994).

[135] This distinction was allegedly made by Socrates (Xen. Mem. IV 6.12) and was accepted by both Plato (Politikos 291d-292a) and Aristotle (Pol. 1279 a33-b10) – see KÕIV 2016a, 23-24. For the concept of tyranny in the 4th century political thought see most recently SCHMITZ 2010, 19-22 (focusing on Aristotle) and LURAGHI 2013a; 2013c, 139-144; NIPPEL 2017.

[136] It is notable that from the five kinds of 'legal' monarchy distinguished by Aristotle (Pol. 1284 b35-1285b33) the only recommendable, the *pambasileia* (described more precisely in Pol. 1288 a7-29), was a construction for which no real example was mentioned. LURAGHI 2013c, 142-144; 2015, 78; 2018: 24 and DREHER 2017, 173-174 note that ideal kingship was constructed simply as the antipode of hateful tyranny.

Problems with entrenching the power

This failure of monarchy, exceptional in the eastern Mediterranean context, requires explanation. We cannot simply refer to different cultural tradition, but must explain how and why such a tradition developed. Monarchy had been the dominant form of government in the Aegean Late Bronze Age, heroic epic sustained a traditional view of heroic kingship as an ideal for Archaic elite, and contacts with the Near Eastern world provided the Greek leaders with imitable examples of the eastern rulers. The contemporary poets leave no doubt that sole rule was a desirable goal,[137] and the frequent emergence of tyrannies in the Archaic Greece show that these desires were indeed realised in practice. Periandros (or his daughter) was credited with the saying that 'tyranny is a slippery thing – it has many lovers',[138] which wonderfully expresses both the desirability and the inherent instability of monarchic power. As monarchies did not become traditional, there must have been strong forces which, different from the city-states in the Near East, forbade an entrenchment of sole rule. We must ask what made the members of the society unwilling to obey and able to resist a monarch, and why were the rulers eventually unable to break this opposition. This must have been conditioned by the nature of the Greek society developing after the 12th century collapse.

As noted above, a successful and sustainable government requires support, or at least consent, of the subjects. Rule must seem necessary, beneficious, or at least acceptable for a critical part of the population. At the same time, an effective reign requires a concentration and control of resources. The supporters must be rewarded for assuring their loyalty, the wars, the festivals, and the building projects have to be financed, and the rulers need to build up repressive apparatuses to suppress the opposition. All this needs to be financed.

The relative longevity of several dynasties, and their achievements, show that many Greek monarchs, including the Corinthian rulers, succeeded in securing the power base, at least for a certain period of time. Both the Bakchiad and the Kypselid reign must have been accepted by many, both dynasties were capable of effective resource concentration, and Periandros had means for maintaining a bodyguard, probably composed of mercenaries.[139] The rulers clearly must have derived considerable revenues. The questions we must ask are, which kind of support could the rulers receive from the community, how were the supporters rewarded, how was the necessary resource concentration achieved, to which extent did the

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[137] Archilochos fr. 19, 23 West, our earliest evidence for the use of the word *tyrannis*, make clear that sole rule was desirable and enviable. See also Solon fr. 33-34 West.

[138] Hdt. III 53.4: Τυραννὶς χρῆμα σφαλερόν, πολλοὶ δὲ αὐτῆς ἐρασταί εἰσι. Herodotos let this be said by Periandros' daughter acting as her father's messenger, but we can assume that this was transmitted as a saying of Periandros. For the other sayings ascribed to him see Diog. Laert. I 97-98.

[139] Periandros' bodyguard of 300 soldiers (Nic. Dam. FGrH 90 F 58.1; Arist. fr. 611.20 Rose) probably consisted of mercenaries. Mercenaries were allegedly employed by Peisistratos (Hdt. I 61.4, 64.1; Ath. Pol. 15.2), Lygdamis of Naxos and Polykrates (Polyainos I 23); and we can be fairly sure that similar measures were used by many Archaic tyrants (see De Libero 1996: 396-398). Aristotle (Pol. 1285 a25-28; 1311 a7-8) regarded the employment of foreign mercenaries as typical for tyranny.

position of a monarch depend on it, and how did the rest of the community, either the elite or the common citizens, respond to the fundraising by the rulers.

Two essential factors must be taken into account when considering these questions. On the one hand, tyrannies emerged in the period of economic growth and increasing prosperity. The historian Thukydides later explicitly connected the rise of tyrannies with the increase of wealth and revenues,[140] and the correspondence of the Bakchiad and Kypselid rule with the rise of Corinth as one of the wealthiest poleis clearly supports his point of view. The availability of the resources surely was a necessary condition for the concentration of wealth necessary for an effective reign. On the other hand, attaining control of this wealth, above all taking possession of large parcels of land as the principal source of income in an agrarian society, could not have been easy. As Greece is a rugged country with relatively small arable plains separated by often steep mountains, and therefore strictly limited lands possessed by the communities, the prospects of land accumulation were inevitably restricted. Extensive landholdings of the elites would have meant landlessness for the others, while the existence of a broad circle of landholders precluded the concentration of the lands to the top.

Corinth had the territory of ca 900 km²,[141] and when counting that about a third of it was arable,[142] we can assume that the polis possessed ca 300 km² (30 000 ha) of arable land. Survey evidence from a number of other Greek regions indicates that peripheral lands were not yet cultivated during the early Archaic period, which suggests that only a part of the arable land, mainly the plain from the Sikyonian border in the west to the Isthmos in the east was cultivated at that time. We may perhaps count with about two thirds of the total amount thus with ca 20 000 ha. How big part of this was possessed by the Bakchiads can be only guessed. We do not know how big was the circle of the Bakchiad rulers, and how numerous were the elite families outside this circle. That such families existed can be inferred from the tradition about the non-Bakchiad background of Kypselos' father.[143] However, the Bakchiads almost certainly did not possess most of the arable land in Corinth. Not only that we must account with the estates of the non-Bakchiad elite, there is evidence that a considerable part of the land was possessed by the citizen smallholders. This can be inferred from the Aristoteles' statement about the legislation of Pheidon, probably during the Bakchiad period. According to Aristotle, Pheidon 'thought that the house-holds and the citizen population ought to

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[140] Thuc. I 13.1. Thukydides could not have possessed written evidence from the period of the emergence of tyranny and must have generalised from the stories of oral tradition, but he seems to have hit the point.

[141] SALMON 1984, 19.

[142] This seems to be a reasonable assumption: Attica with the territory of ca 2500 km² (HANSEN 2004a, 72; 2004b, 624) is estimated to have possessed ca 90 km² of arable land (see JAMESON 1992, 144-145 with references); Mantinea with the territory of ca 295 km² possessed probably up to 100 km² of arable land (HODKINSON–HODKINSON 1981, 175; see ROY 1999, 375 n. 138).

[143] According to Hdt. V 92β his father Aetion was a Lapith, while according to Paus. II 4.4 he descended from a pre-Dorian family originating from Corinth's neighbourhood. Both traditions make him thus distinct of the Dorian Bakchiads.

remain the same/equal (*isos*), even though at the outset the *klēroi* of all were of unequal in size'.[144] Unfortunately, we cannot tell from which source did the philosopher gather this information (it could derive, directly or indirectly, from some ancient inscription or form oral tradition) and, consequently, to which extent his view could be relied on. Nor does this short statement make clear how exactly Aristotle understood the enactment. However, despite the possibly variable readings,[145] the passage demonstrates that, according to Aristotle, there was a clear notion of citizenship in the early Corinth, that citizenship was tied to land ownership, and that the land plots were of different size. The context in which the statement was introduced makes it clear that in Aristotle's opinion Pheidon's aim was to keep the number of the citizens constant by avoiding their impoverishment and thus falling out from the citizenry.[146] This makes sense only if a considerable part of the citizens possessed relatively small parcels.[147] If Aristotle was correct, this would indicate the existence of a class of citizen smallholders during the Bakchiads' rule, and indeed the Bakchiads' concern about the preservation of this circle.

The landholding pattern in the early Corinth can be approached also in another way, by reading back form evidence concerning the end of the Archaic era. As noted above, Corinth with the territory of ca 900 km² possessed probably ca 30 000 ha of arable land, most of which was probably cultivated by that time. The number of the landholdings can be calculated on the basis of the evidence of Herodotos, giving the number of the hoplites (heavily armed infantry men) that Corinth, among the other poleis, put on the field in 479 in the battle of Plataia against the Persians. As hoplite equipment – shield, helmet, spear and often panzer – was relatively expensive, the men who could afford this could not have been poor in the contemporary standards, and most of them must, in the agrarian society, possessed an adequate amount of land. The hoplite numbers, therefore, are a relatively reliable guide for establishing the number of the landholdings.

According to Herodotos, there were 5000 Corinthian hoplites in the battle of Plataia.[148] This would allow 6 ha per a hoplite (30 000 : 5000 = 6) if we would equate the number of the

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[144] Arist. Pol. 1265b 6-16: Φείδων μὲν οὖν ὁ Κορίνθιος, ὢν νομοθέτης τῶν ἀρχαιοτάτων, τοὺς οἴκους ἴσους ᾠήθη δεῖν διαμένειν καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν, καὶ εἰ τὸ πρῶτον τοὺς κλήρους ἀνίσους εἶχον πάντες κατὰ μέγεθος·

[145] The statement could mean that the number of the *oikoi* and of the citizens must remain constant (OOST 1972, 13), or that the size of the *oikoi* and the number of the citizens must remain constant (LINK 1991, 50-51), or that the number of the *oikoi* must remain equal to the number of citizens (ZURBACH 2017, 502-503). All these readings, however, imply that the constancy of the number of the *oikoi* was prescribed, and that the lawgiver was concerned about the number of citizen landholders.

[146] Aristotle argues against Plato's suggestion that the citizen landholdings should be of equal size, objecting that if this equality would be preserved without birth control this would lead to the birth of extra children for whom no property would be available, and thus to poverty and internal conflict. Pheidon maintaining the number of the citizens and the properties (or the correspondence between them) apparently avoided this threat.

[147] This militates against the opinion of WILL 1955, 317-319 that Pheidon intended to preserve intact the large holdings of the Bakchiads.

[148] Hdt. IX 28.3.

hoplites with the number of landholdings and assume that all the land was divided among the hoplites. This, of course, could not have been exactly the case. On the one hand, we must take into account that the 5000 hoplites probably did not constitute the total hoplite force. If we assume, reasonably, that this was a two-third mobilisation,[149] then the actual number of the hoplites must have been even bigger (ca 7500) and the average land plot smaller – ca 4 ha.[150] On the other hand, we cannot automatically equate the number of the hoplites with that of the landholdings even if assuming that most of the hoplites possessed land. Some household could have put forward more than one hoplite (perhaps father and son, or two brothers) while in some others of hoplite standard nobody might have been able to fight at the moment. Moreover, as Corinth was a notable commercial and trade centre a certain number of the hoplites could have been city dwellers who did not possess land outside the town. However, we can suppose that some of the poorer people, below the hoplite standard, also possessed land. A year before Plataia Corinth contributed 40 triremes (manned with ca 8000 men) to the Hellenic fleet at Artemision and Salamis.[151] Although the fleet could have been manned partly by employed foreigners and by slaves, this nevertheless implies a considerable number of citizens below the hoplite standard, who could have fought as light armed soldiers at Plataia, where their number was allegedly roughly equal to that of the hoplites.[152] Many of the poorer citizens surel were landless city dwellers, but these who possessed land would have inevitably reduced the possible share of the hoplites. We must also account with the bigger landholdings of the elite, whose members probably fought among the hoplites.[153]

Despite all the uncertainties, we can be sure that at the end of the Archaic period a big majority of the Corinthian hoplites were smallholders possessing hardly more than 5 ha of land, and that most of the arable land in Corinth was divided among them. This would allow to speculate about the size of the land possessed by the wealthier elite. Let us conjecture without counting the possible landholdings below the hoplite standard, and assume that 1000 of the 5000 hoplites formed an elite possessing more land than average.[154] The 4000 'average' hoplite households of 5 ha would, in this case, possess 20 000 ha (4000 x 5 = 20 000). This

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[149] So VAN WEES 2013, 250 n. 72.

[150] The evidence of Herodotos for the Spartan numbers can be instructive in this respect. There was allegedly 8000 Spartans at the time of the Persian War (VII 234.2) of whom 5000 were present at Plataia (IX 28.2). The same proportions for Corinth would suggest the existence of 8000 Corinthian hoplites, which would allow only 3.75 ha for an average hoplite.

[151] Hdt. VIII 1.1.

[152] Herodotos (IX 29.2) states that the poleis generally put on field as many light armed fighters as there were hoplites.

[153] No Greek cavalry in the battle is mentioned by Herodotos, which suggests that all the soldiers above the hoplite standard fought as hoplites.

[154] Simonton 2017: 41-54 counts that ruling elite in Classical oligarichies included ca 10% of citizens. Following the evidence of Herodotos that there was 5000 hoplites and the same number of lightarmed soldiers at Plataia we can count with ca 10 000 Corinthian citizens.

would leave 10 000 ha for the wealthier part – that is ca 10 ha for an 'elite' family (10 000 ha for 1000 families). There was surely a still narrower and wealthier group of families among this broad elite, but the previous calculation shows that not much land was left for their possessions which, consequently, could not have been very extensive. If to conjecture, for the sake of argument, that there were 20 top elite families in Corinth, who possessed ca 50 ha each,[155] thus 1000 ha all together, this would leave the total of 9000 ha for the rest broader elite, thus slightly over 9 ha for each wealthier family.

We would have in such a case:

ca 20 families with ca 50 ha each = 1000 ha

ca 1000 (980) families with ca 9 ha each = 9000 ha (more exactly 980 x 9 = 8820)

ca 4000 families with ca 5 ha each = 20 000 ha

These calculations are obviously hypothetical, but the evidence would hardly allow a very different solution.[156] The landholding pattern in the early 5th century Corinth must have been fairly egalitarian, and the possessions of the elite restricted.

This evidence does not of course concern the period of the Bakchiad and Kypselid rule more than hundred years earlier. However, we must consider how was such a landholding pattern arrived at. We must accept that the number of smallholdings could have increased when the previously neglected lands in the periphery were cultivated, a process suggested by the archaeological surveys in many parts of Greece (but not in Corinthia),[157] but this could not have changed the landholding pattern on the plain where most of the more than 5000 late Archaic hoplites surely had their possessions.[158] Still less could this development reduce the possessions of the elite. Some effect on the rise of the hoplite numbers could be ascribed to

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[155] This can be indirectly supported by the evidence for the Solonian census classes in Atens (Ath. Pol. 7.4). VAN WEES 2013, 230 calculates that a *zeugites* (aquiring annually 200 *medimnoi* of production from his household) must have possessed ca 14 ha of land as the minimum. The member of the wealthiest class – the *pentakosiomedimnoi* (aquiring annually 500 *medimnoi*) – must thus have possessed at least 35 ha. Up to 50 ha for a top elite household seems thus a reasonable size in the Archaic Greece. The nature of the Solonian census classes, and the reliability of the evidence, is however debatable (see e.g. DE TE CROIX 2004, 5-69; RAAFLAUB 2006, 404-421; VALDÉS GUÍA – GALLEGO 2010; DUPLOUY 2014; VALDÉS GUÍA 2019, 394-402).

[156] If assuming that Corinth had 10 000 citizens at that time (5000 hoplites + 5000 light armed soldiers) then 10% of them would have possessed about a third of the arable land. This would be more or less in line with the suggestion of FOXHALL 1992, 157-158; 2002, 211 that in the Classical Athens about 9% of households owned around 35% of the land.

[157] Recent field surveys can suggest that the countryside in most of the regions in Greece was relatively thinly settled during the early Archaic era, which implies that habitation was concentrated mainly in the more or less nucleated centres on the plains, while the peripheral areas were occupied only in the late Archaic and Classical periods (see FOXHALL 2013; for the comparable evidence from the neighbouring Sikyon see LOLOS 2011, 269-376; but see RONNINGEN 2021, 83-166, whose research of Attika suggests different conclusions). VAN WEES 2013, 235-242 has consequently posited a notable increase of the hoplite numbers at that time, resulting from agricultural expansion creating the previously largely missing class of yeoman farmers.

[158] The early Archaic 'empty' countryside cannot indicate that the land on the central plains was not possessed by smallholders, but suggests is that the farmers lived in nucleated settlements, not far from their plots given the small size of the poleis.

the growth of the urban population. Herodotos said that the Corinthians did not despise the artisans as much as most Greeks did,[159] which suggests that several artisans here were relatively well-to-do people and therefore probably served as hoplites.[160] But their number could hardly have been very significand.[161] Most of the city dwellers, including the elite families who probably preferred to live in the polis centre, are likely to have possessed land, as was typical for the Greek poleis.

Therefore, if suggesting that in the earlier period more land was held by the elite, which would allow bigger possessions for the ruling Bakchiads, we must assume a land reform in the course of which the elite landholdings were distributed among the previously landless people. Is there any evidence for that?

That some change in the land possession took place is indicated by the tradition that Kypselos confiscated ('made public') the holdings of the Bakchiads.[162] He might have distributed these to his supporters, which, if these supporters were landless people, would obviously have increased the number of the peasant farms. Kypselos was indeed reputed as a popular ruler, and might have owed his popularity among the commoners to this move. However, such a measure has never been ascribed to any Archaic tyrant by the ancient sources, which suggests that nothing of this has been recorded in the tradition. This makes it more probable that Kypselos kept the lands in 'public' possession, thus presumably under his own control. Some further change could have taken place when the Kypselids were overthrown. We can assume that their lands were confiscated and possibly divided among the citizens (although no evidence for this is available). Hans van Wees has recently noted an increase of the number of elite burials during in the first half of the 6th century, which can be reasonably connected with the Kypselids' overthrow,[163] and perhaps with the distribution of the lands previously hold by the tyrants. However, this would indicate a rearrangement of landholdings among the wealthier elite rather than a distribution to the (prospective) smallholders. The fact that Corinth was subsequently governed by an oligarchy surely does not suggest any democratising reform distributing the land between the previously landless people and thereby essentially increasing the number of the small property owners.[164]

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[159] Hdt. II 167.2.

[160] Potters' dedication in an extra-urban sanctuary are testified from Penteskouphia near Corinth (D'AGOSTINO–PALMIERI 2016).

[161] The number of the artisans and traders was probably very limited even by the end of the Archaic period (VAN WEES 2009, 456 estimates that the production of the widely exported Athenian pottery involved less than one percent of the Athenian population). Concerning Corinth, it has been estimated that many potters worked on seasonal basis while the full professionals formed a rather insignificant sector of the Corinthian economy (SALMON 1984, 101; SHANKS 1999, 42-50).

[162] Nic. Dam. FGrH 90 F 57.7; Hdt. V 92ε.

[163] VAN WEES forthcoming.

[164] For the Corinthian constitution see SALMON 1984, 231-239; LEGON 2004, 467; see also SIMONTON 2017, 192-193.

There would be therefore little reason for assuming a radical change of the landholding pattern either after the overthrow of the Bakchiads or after the Kypselid tyranny. We must consequently accept that the averages suggested for the early fifth century apply also for the earlier period. The expropriation of the Bakchiads and the Kypselids is likely to have brought changes within the wealthier sector – among the ca 1000 families probably consisting the elite – rather than a massive redistribution in favour of the poor. We must accept that the comparatively equal land distribution pertains also to the period the Bakchiads and the Kypselids, which can only mean that the extent of land possessed by either of these dynasties must have been comparatively modest. Even if assuming that the whole of the 1000 ha which later could have been possessed by the top families was held by the Bakchiads (an impossible suggestion in my view), and was thereafter taken over by the Kypselids, this would mean a tiny proportion compared to the total of ca 30 000 ha (or perhaps ca 20 000 ha, when assuming a smaller amount of cultivated land for the Bakchiad era). We might of course speculate that the elite possessions were slightly bigger than proposed here, but without assuming a fundamental social revolution during or after the Kypselid tyranny, for which no evidence is available, it would be impossible to assume that the rulers, or a narrow elite, possessed anything approaching the majority of lands in the Archaic Corinth. The evidence form other poleis suggests a similar picture.[165]

The majority of the Corinthians during the dynastic period were thus smallholders, and these smallholders possessed most of the arable land in Corinth. We can be sure that the smallholders fighting as hoplites and forming the majority of the citizens were economically relatively independent from the wealthier elite. The only possible, though indirect, evidence is given by the early Hellenistic historian Timaios, stating that the Corinthians possesses 460 000 slaves, and that Pythia therefore called them *choinikometres* (according to the measure of rations for the slaves).[166] The number is of course incredible, but it demonstrates that Corinth was proverbially famous for the extent of its slave population. Timaios stated this in the third book of his history, thus in the early part of the work, which suggests that he had reason to mention the importance of slavery in Corinth in connection to its early history.[167] This implies that the early Corinthian elite exploited above all chattel slaves, not the citizen population, which, combined with the concern of preserving the numbers of landholding citizens by the legislator Pheidon, suggests that the smallholders were more or less protected from direct exploitation. Such a view is supported by the evidence of Hesiod and Homer

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[165] This corresponds with the evidence for the other poleis (see KÕIV 2021, 153-155), which supports the opinion of Hanson 1995: 181-201 that there was no radical inequality in the holding of rural property in the Archaic poleis, contrary FOXHALL 1997; VAN WEES 2006; 2013 describing the Archaic poleis as much more hierarchical (the suggestion of FOXHALL 1992, 157-158; 2002, 211 that in the Classical Athens about 9% of households owned around 35% of the land surely does not indicate any radical inequality).

[166] Timaios FGrH 566 F 5 ap. Athen. VI 103 (272b).

[167] VAN WEES forthcoming.

(perhaps from the 7th century, the very time of the Bakchiad and Kypselid rule).[168] The Homeric epics infer that the elite *basileis* exploited above all slaves (*dmōes*) and occasionally wage laborers (*thētes*),[169] while the *Works and Days* of Hesiod leaves no doubt that the relatively broad circle of farmers below the elite *basileis* was economically independent.[170] No dependent peasantry is mentioned by either Homer or Hesiod.[171]

The early Corinthian society, like the societies on most of the other contemporary Greek poleis, was thus composed of an elite possessing relatively modestly sized lands and exploiting mainly chattel slaves, and a broad circle of usually economically independent smallholders. The elite families were rich compared to the smallholders, but compared to the contemporary states in the east the society was egalitarian and the possessions of the elite restricted.[172]

Building up a solid economic power base for a permanent dynastic rule must have been notoriously complicated in such a society. Any elite family or kinship group could hardly have possessed ancestral lands sufficient for effective power building, or considerably larger than what was controlled by the potential opponents. If the Bakchiads took hold of big parcels of land, this must have taken place at the expense of their competitors, which was bound to cause opposition among the other elite families whose rights were thereby injured. The Kypselids could have been in a better position in this respect, as they could simply take over and manage the Bakchiad possessions. However, even if up to 1000 ha was possessed by the Bakchiads and taken over by their successor, these lands were still hardly large enough for being distributed as grants to numerous followers and thereby assuring their loyalty. If divided among the supporters, this could have satisfied only a relatively small circle of citizens (supposing that 1000 ha was divide to the plots of 5 ha, this would have reached for 200 people), and above all, would have left the rulers without the revenues from this land. It is therefore more probable that Kypselos kept the Bakchiads' lands under his direct control. This would have preserved the revenues that the Bakchiads had enjoyed, and secured a sort of 'royal household', similar to the palace holdings in the east. 'Royal holdings' (*basilikon*) is

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[168] E.g. WEST 1966; 1995; BURKERT 1976; TAPLIN 1992, 33-35; BURGESS 2001; FINKELBERG 2017; 2018.

[169] *Dmoes: Odyssey* I 398, 430-431; XIV 115, 272, 302, 340, 449-450; XV 386–388, 425–429, 450–484; note also *Iliad* XXI 453–454; Wage labourers (*thetes* and *erithoi*): *Iliad* XVIII 550, 560; XXI 444-445; *Odyssey* IV 644; XVIII 357-361; and Hes. Erga 602-603. See SCHMITZ 2004, 111-119; HARRIS 2012; ZURBACH 2017, 232-251, 292-293; LEWIS 2018, 107-120.

[170] For Hesiod's status and attitudes see WILL 1965; MILLET 1984; RAAFLAUB 1993, 59-64; EDWARDS 2004; CLAY 2003; SCHMITZ 2004, 27-104; VAN WEES 2013, 226-229 (who overrates the wealth and status of the Hesiodic 'gentleman farmers', not accounting with the idealised exemplariness of Hesiod's farm); BARRY 2016; VALDÉS GUÍA 2019, 389-394.

[171] Pointed out by VAN WEES 2009, 451-452; LURAGHI 2009. 273; ZURBACH 2017, 254.

[172] The easiness with which the Lydian Kroisos reputedly enriched Alkmeon (Hdt. VI 125) indicates the modesty of the Greek wealth by the eastern standards. The comparative egalitarianism of the Greek society as the key for understanding the emergence of polis has been often pointed out: MORRIS 2000, 109-191; ULF 2001, 174-179; RAAFLAUB 1993, 46-82; RAAFLAUB–WALLACE 2007; KÕIV 2011a, 126-138; LYTTKENS 2013, 35-38.

indeed attested for the early 5th century Syracusan tyrants.[173] If a similar strategy was used by the Corinthian rulers, the consequent permanent possession of the relatively big landed estate could have been crucial for financing their reign, which could significantly contribute to their ability to keep the power for the relatively long time.

Additional revenues could have been acquired from outside. The Bakchiads reputedly profited from trade.[174] One of them, Demaratos, reputedly made a huge fortune from trade between Corinth and Italy, and settled there when the Bakchiads were overthrown.[175] The reliability of this evidence may be doubtful, but it still demonstrates the assumption that income from maritime trade formed an essential part of the wealth of the Bakchiads. The wide spread of the 7th century proto-Corinthian pottery supports this assumption, and we can guess that this income was essential for confirming the dynasty's power. Concerning the Kypselids, we are told by Aristotle that Periandros levied custom duties.[176] Combined with his alleged plan to dig the channel through Isthmos, the construction of *diolkos* and the improvement of the ports at his time, this indicates the wish to promote trade and to profit from this. Kypselos' strategy of founding colonies on the western coast, close to the seaway to Italy and Sicily, and on the northern shore of the Aegean, may also have had at least partially commercial motives. If the Kypselids were, like Demaratos, personally engaged with trade remains a matter of guess.

Trade and piracy belonged together in the early Greece,[177] which makes it almost certain that booty from sea-robbery, as well as from the wars, was equally essential for the rulers. We lack particular evidence for the Bakchiad and the Kypselids, but from elsewhere in Greece the evidence is illuminative. Polykrates the tyrant of Samos allegedly put war captives to build the fortifications of Samos,[178]and it has been credibly suggested that he made huge profit from slave trade.[179] If Aiakes the *epistates* ('the president') who made a dedication to the Samian Heraion 'from the booty' was an earlier tyrant of Samos, this would demonstrate that piracy of the Samian rulers was traditional.[180] Most of the captives taken by the Sicilian tyrants Theron of Akragas and Gelon of Syracuse in the battle of Himera in 480 were kept in communal possession (*es to demosion*), thus presumably under the rulers' control, and put to work in the public building projects organised by the tyrants.[181] Alliances with the potentates

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[173] Thrasybulos of Syracuse allegedly added the confiscated properties 'to the royal household' (*eis to basilikon*) – Diod. XI 67.5.

[174] Strab. VIII 6.20.

[175] Dion. Hal. III 46.3. See also Liv. I 34.1; Strab. V 2.2; Polyb. VI 11a.7.

[176] Arist. fr. 611.20.

[177] See e.g. MELE 1979; RHILL 1995.

[178] Hdt. III 39.4.

[179] CARTY 2015, 144-148 suggests that Polykrates sold slaves to the Egyptian king Amasis.

[180] TOD 1951, no 7: Ἥρηι τὴν σύλην ἔπρησε. For the possible connection between Aiakes and Polykrates see BARRON 1964, 218-219; SHIPLEY 1987, 70-2; DE LIBERO 1996, 253-257; CARTY 2015, 49-66.

[181] Diod. XI 26.

of other polities, for which Periandros was particularly famous, also played crucial role. Again, we lack direct evidence for how this profited the Corinthian rulers, but in Athens Peisistratos allegedly acquired the means for achieving power from abroad, while Polykrates of Samos tried, fatefully, to attain wealth from the Persian satrap.[182]

The external resources, however, were highly precarious and ephemeral, and perhaps above all, the tyrants had almost no chance of monopolizing the access to them and precluding this for the opponents.[183] The colonies founded and ruled by the Kypselids might have given some possibilities to control maritime trade, and the rulers were surely able to deny the opponents from an access to the ports of Corinth, but they could hardly have had the possibility to prevent the opponents to possess ships and profiting from trade and piracy outside their realm. Corinth had no natural resources comparable to the Lebanese seder wood the export of which could have been controlled, an there was no possibility to assume the role of a necessary mediator in the trade with some foreign power.

Besides the revenues from the lands kept under the rulers' direct control, the rulers could impose taxes, as is reported for the Kypselids.[184] Periandros moreover allegedly compelled the people to work, which may indicate the establishment of a sort of corvée obligation necessary for executing the magnificent building projects.[185] Aristotle considered taxation and imposing work obligation as a typically tyrannical measures, and saw Periandros as the first to introduce them.[186] We can suppose that the Kypselids were heavily dependent of these measures for financing their rule.[187]

However, if taxation and corvée labour were traditional and therefore perceived as natural in the Near Eastern states, they were bound to cause resentment among the traditionally independent members of the Greek poleis. If the attempts to secure revenues by taking more land under control must have alienated those whose possessions were thereby expropriated, usually the elite families, the taxation and the work obligation threatened to alienate the smallholders who were not accustomed to a direct economic exploitation. The

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[182] Peisistratos: Hdt. I 61.3-4, 64.1; Ath. Pol. 15.2. Polykrates: Hdt. III 120-125. The private character of Peisistratos' means for rising to power is pointed out by SANCISI-WEERDENBURG 2000, 10. See the discussion VALENTE 2019 and KALDMA in the present volume.

[183] The Alkmeonids, the opponents the Peisistratid tyrants, were able to acquire foreign wealth in a comparable amount (Hdt. VI 125; see also V 62.3).

[184] Nic. Dam. FGrH 90 F 57.7; Arist. Oec. 1346a31-b5. Aristotle (Pol. 1313b26) considers taxation as a typically tyrannical measure.

[185] Nic. Dam. FGrH 90 F 58.1.

[186] Arist. Pol. 1313b18-26. According to Aristotle, work obligation was aimed at keeping the people busy, and thus unable to plot against the tyrant. However, the real purpose of these measures was probably economical, as accepted in Ath. Pol. 16.4 describing the policy of Peisistratos.

[187] Taxation of the subjects is recorded also for the Peisistratids of Athens (Thuc. VI 54.5; Ath. Pol. 16.4.). However, the fact that Aristotle regarded both taxation and establishing work obligation typical for tyrannies suggests that the Kypselids and the Peisistratids were no exception.

possibilities to build up a sustainable economic power base were therefore scarce, and the chances to maintain a repressive apparatus, like hiring mercenaries, relatively restricted.

It is therefore natural that for being successful the rulers must have relied on consensus of the citizens. Monarchy could have been perceived as beneficial as crisis management, providing internal stability. The establishment of the Bakchiad power probably resulted from the internal conflicts in the course of the 8th century polis formation, reflected by the traditions about the internecine murders, the sacrilegious crime and the consequent emigration. The internal peace and stability that the Bakchiads may have granted could have been perceived as a relief. Combined with the following economic prosperity, and the legislation of Pheidon protecting the rights of the smallholders, this could have secured the citizens' loyalty towards the rulers. We do not know why exactly was the rule eventually perceived as oppressive. However, Nikolaos of Damascus reports that when Kypselos was *polemarchos* before his coup, he set free the persons who were to be imprisoned for some charges, providing the guarantors for them,[188] which may imply some oppressive obligations established by the Bakchiads. Be this as it may, we can accept the tradition that Kypselos successfully exploited the discontent towards the previous rulers and rose as a charismatic leader reputedly restoring justice as the oracle in Herodotos suggests.[189] The magnificent building projects promoting the glory and the unity of the polis, and perhaps the successful wars, the booty from which could have been in part shared by the community members and which surely exhorted the feeling of 'national' pride, were probably a further factor promoting the loyalty of the citizens.[190]

But charismatic rulership could not have lasted for long, and a strong personal power was not indispensable for securing internal stability. Building projects could have been organised collectively, military leaders elected, and in the world of numerous economically independent actors there was hardly any need, or indeed possibility, for a centralised management of production. Fundraising for covering the expenses must have evoked resentment, which compelled the rulers to enforce obedience and secure the revenues repressively. It is hardly possible to make sense of all the alleged measures of Periandros, but the tradition leaves no doubt that they targeted at increasing the revenues, taking control of the citizens' private lives and suppressing the opposition. These aspects were clearly connected. Effective fundraising necessitated control but also evoked opposition, and the increasing needs to suppress this required additional revenues and still stronger control, which in turn promoted discontent and made the opposition stronger. Growing discontent among both the elite and the commoners undermined the support and required a repressive

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[188] Nic. Dam. FGrH 90 F 57.5.

[189] See above, with note 114. If he distributed among his supporters a part of the confiscated the Bakchiad possessions this probably contributed to his charisma.

[190] For tyranny as charismatic leadership relying on the consent of the people see LAVELLE 2005, 155-162 (concerning Peisistratos); WALLACE 2009, 413-417; MITCHELL 2013, 57-90, especially 64.

apparatus which proved too expensive for the available sources of income. This made eventual collapse inevitable, resulting in replacement of monarchy with more consensual collective rule.

Conclusion: egalitarianism and the failure of monarchy in early Greece

The evidence allows to describe archaic Greek tyranny as a failed attempt to establish a permanent city-state monarchy when statehood re-emerged after the disintegration of the palace-centred kingdoms of the Late Bronze Age. Monarchies emerged together with the city-states and in many poleis this clearly promoted the polity formation. Like rulers everywhere the monarchs organised defence and led their communities in wars, tried to hold up internal order and sought the benevolence of divine powers by representing their communities before the gods. This could bring comparatively long-lasting success, as demonstrated by the at least five generations of rule by the successive and probably related Bakchiad and Kypselid dynasties in Corinth. In long term, however, the sole rule proved both unnecessary and inacceptable. Differently from the states in the Near East, including the city-states, where monarchs relied on tribal loyalties and palace economies enabled to reward and thereby grant the loyalty of the elites, the comparatively egalitarian society without hierarchical kinship groups developing in Greece precluded the establishment of an adequate base for monarchic power. The society composed of a broad circle of independent landholders did not need a sole ruler, and the restricted social hierarchies precluded an effective enforcement of power from above. As the economy was based on free interaction of private individuals there was no need for a central economical management, while the absence of traditional ties of dependency among the community members, and the limited possessions of the elite, avoided a concentration of wealth necessary for the formation of an adequate economic basis for sole rule. The Greek monarchs attempted to build up this, comparable to the palace economies and the royal taxation in the city-states of the east,[191] and some of them were initially successful, but differently from the eastern states with entrenched elite power, this proved both insufficient and dangerous. Attempts to establish an effective control over resources evoked resentment, and the revenues that could have been gathered, not least through expropriations and exploitation of the citizens, were insufficient for covering the costs of the repressive apparatus necessary for assuring compliance. The rulers lacked the means for rewarding the members of the elites for granting their loyalty. Elite families did not profit from monarchy and saw the ruler as a competitor depriving them of the honour, authority and perhaps the income they deserved. This compelled the monarchs to seek support from below, as demonstrated for Kypselos who rose as a popular leader. Aristotle

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[191] This has been recently pointed out by ROSE 2012, 234-237 who, however, pays no attention to the undesirable consequences of these measures for the tyrants.

indeed believed that most of the early tyrants relied on the support of demos.[192] The reliability of this evidence has been questioned,[193] but the inherent weakness of the monarchs' position suggests that the support or at least consent of the people was highly necessary.[194] The economically independent and militarily equipped smallholders could have supported the monarch as a crisis-manager, perhaps as protector against elite pressure, but they were jealous about any curtailment of their rights, and sufficiently strong to resist economic exploitation. Neither the elite nor the commoners, consequently, saw any need for permanent sole leadership, and the communities were able to arrive at political decisions and to carry them through collectively. The need for monarchy was confined basically to the crisis situations requiring a temporary concentration of power.

The failure of monarchy in Archaic Greece was, consequently, caused by development of the relatively egalitarian society after the 12th century collapse. Differently from the Near East where social hierarches were preserved or relatively quickly resumed, and palace economies retained a notable importance, the small Greek communities with restricted land resource developed only flat hierarchies with hardly any chance for an establishment of an incontestable elite power. The monarchs, emerging as the successful members of the internally egalitarian and highly competitive elite, were unable to concentrate sufficient resources for firmly establishing the power. They had to rely on personal charisma and communal consent, which was however difficult to maintain outside the periods of crisis. The attempts of a proper institutionalisation of the power inevitably affected the rights of the others, undermined the necessary support and led to the fall. As the result, monarchy was perceived not as a glorious rule but a hateful tyranny. The natural outcome of the Greek egalitarianism was the development of a political system based on compromise between the independent actors, i.e. the system known as the republican polis.

Acknowledgements

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[192] Arist. Pol. 1310 b15-18, 28-32; see also 1315 b 14-22.

[193] CAWKWELL 1995; DE LIBERO 1996, 400-402; ANDERSON 2005, 194-198.

[194] See LAVELLE 2005, especially 155-163; RAAFLAUB–WALLACE 2007, 42-43; WALLACE 2007, 75-76; 2009, 413-417; HALL 2007, 142-143; KÕIV 2011a, 134-135; ROSE 2012, 341-350.

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