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Power and Opposition in the Ancient Near Eastern and Mediterranean World

edited by Mait Kõiv and Vladimir Sazonov

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Power and Opposition in the Ancient Near Eastern and Mediterranean World

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Introduction

Mait KÕIV, Vladimir SAZONOV

Power building and maintenance of power, both inside political communities and between them, has been a central issue in human society, and understanding this is crucial for comprehending the functioning of any socio-political or regional unit. Concentration of power in to the hands of a ruling elite can produce statehood, which can be conceptualised as a product of gradual accumulation and monopolisation of physical (i.e. predominantly military), economic, social and ideological power by the rulers.[1] Comparable processes can lead to the formation of large centrally controlled political units – hegemonical systems where a dominating polity, often but not universally ruled by a narrow elite, has established its control over a large surrounding area.

The question would be how this accumulation and monopolisation of power was attained and maintained, i.e. by which means did the rulers achieve legitimation and assure the compliance of the population. As the actual power-holders usually form a tiny minority, we must ask what made the others comply, often perhaps at the expense of their own interests and welfare. What means did the power-holders (leaders, rulers, monarchs) have for building up, enhancing, and maintaining their position and identity? Why and on what conditions were the people loyal to them, either the other members of elite, or the commoners constituting the majority of population? And why did the rulers sometimes fail in assuring compliance? What were the chances for successful opposition? And under what conditions did this lead to changes in social or political structure instead of simply replacing one ruler or ruling group by another? These problems involve social framework and political institutions, the relations between centre and periphery, and moral code and power ideology closely tied to religion.[2]

Power can be attained and maintained differently, and rulers can use different strategies. States have been described as ‘states of mind’, meaning an establishment of ideologies viewing the rulers as the guarantors of earthly law and order and communicating with the gods for ensuring the continuity of the cosmos. The rulers can present themselves as caretakers of their subjects, and promote an ideology regarding their power as the divinely set norm.[3] But they must also be able to use force for assuring compliance, and for all these

[1] MANN 1986, 22-27; DONLAN 1997.

[2] See e.g., HRŮŠA 2015.

[3] YOFFEE 2005; TRIGGER 2003; CLAESSEN–SKALNIK 1978.

purposes they need an adequately funded power base: a control of resources enabling to reward the loyal subjects and to maintain physical force.[4] Scholars have variably emphasised the significance of a military factor and the control of strategical resources for power building,[5] the role of the privileged access to prestigious goods for creating symbolic capital,[6] the formative role of ideologies,[7] including royal ideology,[8] the importance of collective action for assuring the compliance of the subjects, and the significance of market-based economies for enhancing human cooperation.[9] An interplay of these factors allows the development of different kinds of socio-political organisation and strategies of power building, including the agrarian / 'archaic' / agro-literate states on the one hand and city-states on the other,[10] and both monarchic and collective governments.[11]

The solutions to these problems, discussed in the articles in the present volume, are bound to have been different in the variety of the early states and societies developing in the Near East and Mediterranean region. The collection is based on the papers given during the international conference 'Power and (Op)position in the Ancient Near Eastern and Mediterranean World' **1–3 June 2018 in Tartu,** approaching power relations in the communities from almost the whole of this area in Antiquity: from the Early Bronze Age Mesopotamia (III millennium BC) to Greece and Sicily during the Classical period (5.–4. centuries BC).

The collection begins with three articles discussing the cases of regional power building in the Bronze Age Near East. **Walter Sommerfeld** proposes a meticulous analysis of the demographic evidence for the Early Dynastic and Sargonid Mesopotamia to specify the impact of the Akkadian rulers' power building strategies on the ethnic situation and political structure of the region. The next two contributions are dedicated to the Egyptian hegemony and its impacts in the Levant during the late Bronze Age. **Giulia Tucci** discusses the character of the Egyptian domination, focusing on the use of religion for confirming the foreign reign and reconciling the locals with it. **Andres Nõmmik** analyses the evidence for the military, political and economic aspects of Egyptian power in the region and discusses the ways the strategies of domination could have enhanced the crisis during the following collapse.

The next three articles are dedicated to the ways of confirming and contesting power by Hittite kings and their opponents. **Vladimir Shelestin** proposes a case study of possible

[4] HAAS 1982, 172-182; EARLE 2002, 60-64; SCHRAKAMP 2017.

[5] CARNEIRO 1970; 1981.

[6] RENFREW 1972; EARLE 2002.

[7] CLAESSEN–OOSTEN 1996; TRIGGER 2003; YOFFEE 2005.

[8] MITCHELL–MELVILLE 2013; SAHLINS–GRAEBER 2017; SELZ 1998; PONGRATZ-LEISTEN 2015; PONGRATZ-LEISTEN 2019; POSTGATE 1995.

[9] BLANTON–FARGHER 2008; 2016.

[10] MORRIS 1997; TRIGGER 2003.

[11] FLAIG 2013; GLASSMAN 2017.

justification of opposition against Ḫattušili I by manipulating a mythological text. **Vladimir Sazonov and Mait Kõiv** describe the different ways of justifying the usurpations of royal power, and dealing with their consequences, used by the kings Telepinu, Šuppiluliuma I, and Ḫattušili III. **Siim Mõttus** analyses the principles of royal succession in the Hittite New Kingdom, pointing out the very limited impact that the proclamation of Telepinu ostensibly regulating this actually had in practice.

The collection continues with discussion concerning the uses and perception of monarchic power among the Greeks during the Archaic and Classical periods. **Lynette Mitchell** explores the necessity for charismatic power of the Greek monarchs. She focuses on, mainly, the imagological strategies of the Deinomenid rulers in Sicily and explains the variable success of the successively reigning brothers Gelon and Hieron in their use of power politics. **Luca Macale** discusses the descriptions of Eastern kingship by the Classical Greek historians, demonstrating how the remoteness and inapproachability ascribed to these kings was perceived as both their strength and weakness. If Mitchell and Macale pay attention above all to the image of sole rule then the two following articles focus rather on the material resources at the rulers' disposal. **Priit-Hendrik Kaldma** shows how increasing scarcity of resources led to the growing taxation and oppression by the Athenian tyrant Hippias, contributing to the fall of his power. **Mait Kõiv** compares the power politics of the Kypselid tyrants in Archaic Corinth to the monarchies of the small Iron Age Levantine states, and views the rulers' difficulties in resource control in the relatively egalitarian Greek poleis as a principal reason for the instability and eventual failure of monarchy in Archaic Greece.

The volume terminates with two articles dedicated to power politics in the republican governed poleis in Classical Greece. **Eleni Tzovla**, discussing the cynical use of rhetoric of justice by the Athenians for subjugating smaller states, as described in the 'Melian dialogue' in the History of Thukydides, shows how the historian presented this as the highpoint of the Athenian imperialistic attitude, foreshadowing the subsequent disaster. The last article by **Salvatore Tufano** analyses in detail the different ancient accounts concerning the charges brought against the Theban leaders Epameinondas and Pelopidas in connection to their Peloponnesian campaigns, comparing this to the 'show trials' from recent history, and shows how the merits of the leaders allowed them to counter the accusations with relative success.

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Sumerischer Widerstand gegen semitische Herrschaft. Migration, Machtkämpfe und Demographie im 3. Jahrtausend v. Chr.

Walter Sommerfeld *

Abstract. This study deals with historical and demographic aspects from the early history of Mesopotamia.
1 The history of the immigration of the Semites in the 3rd millennium B.C. is presented from the oldest evidence to the domination of the Akkadian Empire (ca. 2900-2300). Especially the names of persons and places are informative. The integration into the autochthonous Sumerian society seems to have proceeded largely without conflict.
2 After the Semitic dynasty of Akkade had gained dominance for about 150 years around 2300, there are detailed reports about several large uprisings in Sumer. Their backgrounds are analysed.
3 From the detailed data on the high numbers of victims, the question of the consequences for Sumerian society arises. Various methods of historical demography are presented, the results of research are referred to, conclusions on population density are attempted, and strategies for conflict resolution are discussed.

Rezumat. Acest articol tratează anumite aspect istorice și demografice din istoria timpurie a Mesopotamiei.
1 E prezentată istoria imigrării semiților în cel de-al treilea mileniu î.Hr. , de la cele mai vechi mărturii până la dominația Imperiului Akkadian (aproximativ 2900-2300), antroponimele și toponimele fiind relevante în mod deosebit. Integrarea lor în societatea sumeriană pare să se fi desfășurat fără provocarea unor conflicte.
2 După obținerea puterii de către dinastia semitică din Akkad, petrecută în jurul anului 2300 și menținută pentru aproximativ 150 de ani, sunt anumite surse ce oferă descrieri ale unor revolte de proporții în Sumer; este analizat contextul izbucnirii și desfășurării lor.
3 Informațiile pe care le deținem cu privire la numărul mare de victime din cadrul conflictelor ridică problema consecințelor asupra societății sumeriene. Sunt utilizate și prezentate mai multe metode aferente demografiei istorice. De asemenea, sunt discutate aspecte privitoare la strategiile de rezolvare a conflictelor și sunt formulate concluziile cercetării, în special cu privire la densitatea populației.

Keywords: Semites, Sumerians, Dynasty of Akkade, Migration, Conflicts, Historical Demography.

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Die auf Ethnien bezogene Formulierung in dieser Themenstellung ist von modernen Konzepten geprägt. In sumerischen Quellen werden als Gegner häufig Personen, Städte und Regionen benannt, aber keine ethnischen Gruppen. Emberling gelangt in seiner umfassenden Untersuchung *Ethnicity and the State in Early Third Millennium Mesopotamia* zu folgender Schlussfolgerung, die unverändert Gültigkeit besitzt:

> To summarize: the only evidence for separate Sumerian and Akkadian ethnic groups is in the minds of modern scholars. There are different languages, and terms for different regions. ... part of the basis for ethnic identity is self-identification ... it is unlikely that language groups as a whole formed the basis of self-identification.[1]

Wenn in diesem Beitrag trotzdem die Konstrukte „Sumerer" und „Semiten" herangezogen werden, geschieht dies in rein operativer Funktion, um komplexe politische, soziale und kulturelle Beziehungen griffig adressieren zu können. Das allgemeine und neutrale Gentilizium „Semiten" findet Verwendung neben der spezifischen Bezeichnung „Akkader", um einen Anachronismus zu vermeiden, da sumerisch-semitische Kontakte deutlich älter und vielfältiger sind als die Formen der Koexistenz, die mit der Dynastie von Akkade einsetzte, die Sargon (ca. 2316-2277 v. Chr.) begründet hat, wobei mit dessen Oberherrschaft über ganz Babylonien ab ca. 2290 eine neue Dimension in den wechselseitigen Beziehungen geschaffen wurde. Die analytische Herangehensweise muss sich jedoch entlang anderer Linien bewegen und anstelle von modernen Konzepten vielmehr auf genuine historische Strukturen und Prozesse abzielen.

Periode	Benennung
3500-2900	Späturuk-Zeit
2900-2570	Frühdynastische Periode (Early Dynastic, ED) I/II
2570-2470	Frühdynastische Periode (Early Dynastic, ED) IIIa
2470-2290	Frühdynastische Periode (Early Dynastic, ED) IIIb
2290-2170	Akkade-Zeit
2316-2277	Sargon
2276-2254	Rimuš und Maništušu
2253-2198	Naramsin
2170-2100	Spät-Akkade- / Gutäer-Zeit
2100-2000	Ur III-Zeit

[1] EMBERLING 1995, 104.

Tabelle 1: Chronologie des sumerischen Zeitalters[2]

Die sumerische Welt war in der frühdynastischen Zeit in Stadtstaaten organisiert, in denen jeweils eine zahlenmäßig überschaubare Bevölkerung – zu den demographischen Größenordnungen s. unten – in historisch gewachsenen Beziehungsgeflechten miteinander verbunden war.

Mesopotamien war aber immer auch ein Einwanderungsland. Ein entscheidendes Merkmal unter den natürlichen Grundvoraussetzungen, die die Parameter für die Entwicklung der Zivilisation setzen, resultiert aus den geographischen Gegebenheiten. Nur in seinen Randgebieten bestehen natürliche Barrieren wie Gebirgszüge oder große Wüstengebiete, die den Verkehr erschwerten oder gar unmöglich machten. Sumer war ein offenes Land, leicht zugänglich für Einwanderungen, ungeschützt gegen Einfälle. In allen historischen Phasen sorgten Migrationen aus sämtlichen Nachbarregionen für demographische Veränderungen, Raubzüge destabilisierten die Gesellschaft, Eroberer bewirkten politisch signifikante Umwälzungen. Ökonomische Krisen und Blütezeiten hingen eng zusammen mit dem leichten Transport von Menschen und Materialien. Hohe Mobilität sorgte für regen Austausch und das Zusammengehörigkeitsgefühl innerhalb der Gesellschaft.

Sumer ist eine Region, in der einige wichtige Rohstoffe fehlen oder selten vorkommen, darunter feste Steine, Metalle, großes Bauholz. Ausgedehnte Handelsbeziehungen waren erforderlich, um diese Materialien sowie Luxusgüter ins Land zu schaffen, so dass sie sich über das riesige Gebiet vom Mittelmeerraum bis nach Afghanistan und zum Industal erstreckten. Regelmäßige Kontakte mit Handelspartnern und Zwischenhändlern hatten Auswirkungen auf die sumerische Gesellschaft und Kultur, indem sie beispielsweise die Vorstellungswelt anregten oder den Wortschatz bereicherten.

Die von der sumerischen Mehrheitsgesellschaft geprägten und kontrollierten Stadtstaaten integrierten problemlos Minoritäten, von denen die Semiten eine wichtige, aber nicht die einzige Minderheitengruppe bildeten. Die Identifizierung der semitischen Bevölkerungselemente ist mit einigen Problemen verbunden, da der Zusammenhang zwischen der Sprachzugehörigkeit eines Namens und der/den Muttersprache(n) seines Sprechers mit Unschärfen behaftet ist.[3] Minoritäten können sich bei der Namengebung an der kulturell dominanten Gruppe mit dem höchsten Prestige orientieren, die Eltern in Mischehen ihre Kinder unterschiedlich benennen; bei Kurznamen ist der sprachliche Hintergrund nicht immer ersichtlich u.a.m. Da nicht generell zu erwarten ist, dass Angehörige von Majoritäten ihren Kindern fremdsprachige Namen von Minoritäten gaben, dürfte der identifizierbare semitische Anteil am Onomastikon somit wohl das

[2] Die leicht gerundeten Daten richten sich nach SALLABERGER and SCHRAKAMP 2015f, 136 usw.; Einzelheiten sind dort zu finden.

[3] Den Sachverhalt problematisiert ausführlich KRAUS 1970, 83-86; vgl. EMBERLING 1995, 96f; DE BOER 2014, 47-52.

demographische Minimum repräsentieren. Für die folgende Analyse werden nur Namen mit eindeutiger Schreibweise und Etymologie, aber keine unsicheren und ambivalenten Fälle herangezogen.

Semitische Migrationsgeschichte in der frühdynastischen Zeit (ca. 2900-2300 v. Chr.)

Seit ca. 2700 (Periode ED I/II) lassen sich die ersten eindeutigen semitischen Eigennamen (Personen, Toponyme, Götter) belegen, wenn auch zunächst in sehr geringer Anzahl.[4]

Die Begegnung von Sumerern und Semiten fand in drei regionalen Kontaktzonen mit unterschiedlicher Dynamik statt.

[1] Im sumerischen Kerngebiet – dem späteren Südbabylonien – stammen die meisten lokalisierbaren Texte aus den städtischen Zentren von Adab, Fara, Girsu / Lagaš, Isin, Umma / Umm al-Aqarib / Zabalam, Ur / Ubaid, Uruk. Hier übten Personen mit semitischen Namen während der gesamten frühdynastischen Periode einen sehr geringen Einfluss aus, und auch semitische Fremdwörter sind nur marginal anzutreffen.

[2] In der mittleren Zone lassen sowohl archäologische als auch philologische Daten darauf schließen, dass hier über einen längeren Zeitraum ein favorisiertes Einwanderungsgebiet lag. Pollock[5] stellt in der quantitativen Analyse der Aufgabe und Gründung von Siedlungen fest:

> The frequent shifting of settlements, especially smaller ones, is a striking feature of the settled landscape of southern Mesopotamia. A combination of political, economic, and ecological factors was likely responsible for these movements.[6]
>
> A final regionally distinctive pattern deserves consideration: the substantial growth in settlement in the Nippur-Adab region in the Akkadian period. This increase occurred at a time when the total settled area in the Uruk region was declining. ... Indeed, in the alluvial plains and nearby regions, only the Nippur-Adab area showed any appreciable settlement growth in the Akkadian period. In other respects, patterns of settlement in the Akkadian period show a remarkable degree of continuity with the late Early Dynastic period.[7]

Es handelt sich hierbei um einen in der Akkade-Zeit signifikant verstärkten Trend, der bereits in der ED III-Periode einsetzte.

[4] Das meiste Material findet sich in der Zusammenstellung von SOMMERFELD 2010A. Inzwischen sind aufgrund neuer Textpublikationen und Forschungsergebnisse einige Ergänzungen und Korrekturen möglich, s. insbesondere STEINKELLER 2013a.

[5] POLLOCK 1999, insbesondere pp. 45-77 Kapitel *3 Settlement patterns.*

[6] POLLOCK 1999, 76.

[7] POLLOCK 1999, 73/75, mit Karten und Statistiken pp. 61f., 74.

Aus dieser mittleren Zone sind aus Nippur und Tell Abū Ṣalābīḫ zahlreiche Texte überliefert, die zeigen, dass die Migration der Semiten bei diesen demographischen Veränderungen eine bedeutsame Rolle spielte und dass sie ganz unterschiedliche Funktionen in der sumerischen Gesellschaft übernehmen konnten.

In der ED IIIb-Zeit wurden in der Umgebung von Nippur mehrere Bezeichnungen von Siedlungen mit semitischen Sprachelementen gebildet, und zwar gehören sie durchweg zu dem Typ É „Haus, Grundbesitz“, dem ein Personenname, womit wohl der Gründer oder Besitzer des Familienanwesens bezeichnet ist, oder ein weiteres Element folgt. Auf diese Weise werden Dörfer und ländliche Siedlungen benannt.[8] In den Nippur-Texten[9] erscheinen sie in Konskriptionslisten; aus diesen Orten wurden Arbeitskräfte für das städtische Zentrum rekrutiert. Es scheint folglich, dass semitische Migranten einige Siedlungen in der Umgebung großer Städte gegründet haben und auch in diesen selbst heimisch wurden. In Nippur stellen semitische Gruppen bereits in der ED IIIb-Zeit einen bemerkenswert großen Anteil an der Bevölkerung (knapp 10 %), sie assimilieren sich aber in der Folgezeit. Dafür stellt Westenholz[10] ein mögliches Szenario folgendermaßen dar:

> In the late Pre-Sargonic period, the Akkadians came to Nippur chiefly as individuals or families. Since most of them were probably unskilled, they were generally unable to attain higher social positions. Later, under Sargon, and especially his successors, a new wave of Akkadians arrived, this time as organized conquerors and administrators. Meanwhile, the earlier Akkadian immigrants had been almost completely absorbed by the Sumerians, so that at the time of Naram-Sin, the second wave of Akkadian administrators were superimposed on a compactly Sumerian population.

Dass sich Semiten in der sozialen Stratigraphie eher im unteren Bereich wiederfanden, zeigen außerdem die Textgruppen, die vermutlich der Elite von Nippur zuzuordnen sind. Unter den frühdynastischen Votivgaben[11] (meist für den Inanna-Tempel) sind Semiten mit vier von insgesamt 64 Personennamen selten repräsentiert. Darunter befinden sich zwei „Tempelvorsteher“ (sanga),[12] wobei in einem Fall anscheinend eine gute Heirat die Karriere begünstigt hat.[13]

Die Überlieferung aus der anschließenden Akkade-Zeit bestätigt diesen Befund, wie eine Textgruppe von Rechtsdokumenten[14] aus dem Privatsektor von Nippur zeigt. „The

[8] S. LECOMPTE 2015, 214-216.

[9] S. die ausführliche Analyse von LECOMPTE 2015, 237-241.

[10] WESTENHOLZ 1975, 9; vgl. auch WESTENHOLZ 1999, 26.

[11] FRAYNE 2008, 349-356 E1.11; STEIBLE 1982, 227 AnNip. 1 – 260/261 AnNip. 64.

[12] STEIBLE 1982, 246 AnNip. 37; 250f. AnNip. 46.

[13] STEIBLE 1982, 250f. AnNip. 46; seine ebenfalls in der Stiftung erwähnte Ehefrau trägt wohl einen sumerischen Namen (AK-ni).

[14] WESTENHOLZ 1987, 59-86.

'Enlilemaba Archive' seems to involve a group of private money-lenders and owners of real estate."[15] Akkadische Elemente sind hier vollkommen abwesend; es finden sich weder Lehnwörter noch Personennamen. Semiten hatten es also offensichtlich schwer, in größeren Städten in der etablierten Gesellschaft Fuß zu fassen.

Völlig anders verlief die semitische Migrationsgeschichte im 22 km entfernten Tell Abū Ṣalābīḫ. Postgate stellt zur Siedlungsstruktur fest:

> ... a network of settlements with a clear hierarchy of size and hence of function, within which Abu Salabikh falls at the lowest end of the range of city sizes. How does this statement ... translate into a pattern of human behaviour?[16]

Die Entdeckung der Tafelfunde, die 1963 einsetzte, markiert in der Forschung den Wendepunkt in der Beurteilung der Rolle, die die Semiten in der Vor- und Frühgeschichte Mesopotamiens gespielt haben, und des Ausmaßes, in dem sie an der Ausbildung der altorientalischen Hochkultur beteiligt waren. Die Mehrheit der über 500 Tafeln und Fragmente, die in die Periode ED IIIa datiert werden können, besteht aus lexikalischen und literarischen Texten. Von zahlreichen Tafeln sind Kolophone erhalten, die ca. 100 verschiedene Schreiber und Experten nennen, die bei der Abfassung tätig waren. Personen mit semitischen Namen machen darunter etwa die Hälfte aus. In der frühesten bekannten Phase der extensiven Verschriftung der sumerischsprachigen Literatur waren folglich ebenso wie bei der Tradierung der aus der Späturuk-Zeit überkommenen lexikalischen Kompilationen Schreiber aus semitischem Milieu maßgeblich tätig.[17] In den administrativen Texten beträgt der semitische Anteil am Onomastikon ungefähr ein Drittel.[18]

Die verstärkte Migrationsbewegung, die in der mittleren Zone festzustellen ist, konnte also heterogene Ausprägungen haben. Träger von semitischen Namen erscheinen in sehr unterschiedlichen gesellschaftlichen Positionen: in Nippur überwiegend als Randgruppe, in Tell Abū Ṣalābīḫ fest integriert in enger Symbiose mit den Sumerern als kulturelle Elite. Der soziale Integrationsprozess scheint in Abhängigkeit von den spezifischen lokalen Bedingungen – wie etwa Größe der Stadt und demographische Strukturen – deutlich

[15] WESTENHOLZ 1987, 60.

[16] POSTGATE 1994, 51. Cf. POLLOCK 2015. Zu den Textfunden s. KREBERNIK 1998; KREBERNIK and POSTGATE 2009.

[17] S. grundlegend BIGGS 1967; zusammenfassend KREBERNIK 1998, 260-270; Nachträge von KREBERNIK and POSTGATE 2009. KREBERNIK 2002, 7 verdeutlicht durch kontrastierende Zahlen die Bedeutung des semitischen Elementes: „(In Fara) sind ca. 2-3 Prozent der Namen akkadisch – gegenüber mindestens 40 Prozent in den etwa zeitgleichen Texten aus dem noch weiter nördlich gelegenen Tell Abū Ṣalābīḫ."

[18] Zu den Personennamen der administrativen Texte s. KREBERNIK and POSTGATE 2009, 16-18. Der schlechte Erhaltungszustand verhindert häufiger die sprachliche Zuordnung.

abweichende Entwicklungen genommen zu haben. In keinem Fall sind Anzeichen von Konflikten oder Machtkämpfen festzustellen.

Die ungleiche zeitliche Verteilung der Quellen setzt der Analyse allerdings Grenzen. In Tell Abū Ṣalābīḫ stammen die Funde ausschließlich aus der Periode ED IIIa (Fara-Zeit), so dass sich die weiteren Geschicke des semitischen Bevölkerungsanteils folglich nicht beobachten lassen. In Nippur wurden nur vereinzelte Texte aus der ED IIIa-Zeit aufgefunden, und die lokale Überlieferung setzt erst einige Generationen später am Ende der ED IIIb-Zeit in signifikantem Umfang ein, ist dann aber kontinuierlich erhalten.

[3] In der nördlichen Zone – dem späteren Land Akkad – sind nachhaltige demographische Veränderungen eingetreten, deren Verlauf sich aber aufgrund der dürftigen Überlieferungslage nur eingeschränkt verfolgen lässt. Insgesamt ca. 100 Votivinschriften und administrative Dokumente sind aus den ungefähr 600 Jahren der gesamten frühdynastischen Epoche erhalten, oft in sehr fragmentarischem Zustand (Kiš 64; Sippar 7; Dijala-Gebiet: Ešnunna 3, Tell Agrab 4, Tutub 23).[19]

Kiš, das nach der Späturuk-Zeit in der Epoche ED I/II die dominante Position im Vorderen Orient übernahm, zur „greatest city in the world“[20] wurde und auch in der anschließenden Fara-Zeit (ED IIIa) noch eminente politische Bedeutung innehatte,[21] steht im Mittelpunkt der historischen und kulturellen Rekonstruktionen dieser Zeit.

Einen Schlüsseltext stellt das von Steinkeller unter dem Titel *An Archaic ‘Prisoner Plaque’ from Kiš*[22] veröffentlichte Monument dar, das dieser als „the oldest historical inscription from Mesopotamia“[23] bezeichnet: „The main body of the inscription … is a list of prisoners of war and the places of their origin.“[24] Es werden 25 eroberte Orte und Regionen mit insgesamt 36.000 Kriegsgefangenen aufgeführt, „who were acquired as booty by the state of Kiš in the course of its territorial conquests.“[25]

Steinkeller stellt in seiner Zusammenfassung zur Geschichte von Kiš in der ersten Hälfte des 3. Jahrtausends zur demographischen Entwicklung fest:

> [T]he history of Kiš commenced in Late Uruk times. … this original “Kiš” was a Sumerian settlement, with a genuine Sumerian population, culture, and institutions.

[19] Die lokale Zuordnung und die Datierung sind in einigen Fällen unsicher, dadurch werden aber die Größenordnungen der erhaltenen Überlieferung nicht wesentlich verändert. Zu den Quellenangaben s. unten Anm. 27, 28, 35, 36.

[20] YOFFEE 2016, 6.

[21] Zu den Rekonstruktionen der politischen Verhältnisse, die im Einzelnen beträchtliche Differenzen aufweisen, s. zuletzt mit weiterer Lit. STEINKELLER 2013a, 145-151 (Early History of Kiš); Sallaberger and SCHRAKAMP 2015b sowie im selben Band MARCHESI 2015; STEIBLE 2015, 160f.

[22] STEINKELLER 2013a.

[23] STEINKELLER 2013a, 131.

[24] STEINKELLER 2013a, 132.

[25] STEINKELLER 2013a, 142.

> The real growth of Kiš, however, occurred during the ED I period … Since, by the ED III period, the population of northern Babylonia was overwhelmingly (if not exclusively) Semitic, this rapid growth of Kiš must be attributed to the settling of large numbers of Proto-Akkadians in and around the site. … those Proto-Akkadian newcomers quickly adopted an urban way of life, intermixing with the Sumerian population of Kiš.[26]

Diese Rekonstruktion ist spekulativ, die verfügbaren Texte unterlegen allerdings zweifelsfrei bei dem semitischen Bevölkerungssegment den Übergang von einer Minorität zur Majorität, der innerhalb von zwei bis drei Jahrhunderten erfolgt sein muss. In der ED IIIa-Zeit[27] zeigen die bezeugten Personennamen eindeutig die sumerische Dominanz; Semiten sind nur marginal vertreten. Aus der nachfolgenden ED IIIb-Zeit[28] ist der erhaltene Textbestand so dürftig, dass sich aus den wenigen Namen kaum statistische Signifikanz ableiten lässt. In Ebla tritt zeitgleich allerdings eine Gruppe von annähernd 30 Bewohnern aus Kiš in Erscheinung, zu denen Archi[29] feststellt: „The PNs of the persons coming from Kish, according to the Eblaite documentation, seem all to be Semitic …, and this clearly demonstrates the character of the population of that region for the Pre-Sargonic Age." In der Akkade-Zeit[30] hat sich dann das semitische Element vollständig durchgesetzt.

Der Bezug auf das frühdynastische Machtzentrum Kiš ist in dem Herrschertitel „König von Kiš"[31] etabliert, der den Anspruch auf überregionale Dominanz proklamiert. Dieser über Jahrhunderte verbreitete Titel erscheint vor der Akkade-Zeit außerhalb von Kiš auch in Inschriften aus dem Dijala-Gebiet (Tell Agrab, Tutub), aus Mugdan, Mari sowie aus Adab, Girsu, Nippur und Ur. Von den 16 bezeugten Herrschern, die in der frühdynastischen Zeit diesen Titel verwenden, tragen fast alle einen sumerischen Namen; nur zwei sind sicher semitisch,[32] wobei *En-na-Il* vielleicht aus einer Mischehe stammt, da der Name seines Vaters sumerisch ist. Der „König von Kiš" ist eine in der sumerischen Gesellschaft integrierte Institution.

[26] STEINKELLER 2013a, 146f.

[27] Zur Liste der Texte s. WESTENHOLZ 2014, 21.

[28] Zur Liste der Texte s. WESTENHOLZ 2014, 43.

[29] ARCHI 1987, 130.

[30] Zur Liste der Texte s. WESTENHOLZ 2014, 44, ferner GELB 1970, 102-104.

[31] Zu diesem viel diskutierten Titel s. zuletzt MARCHESI 2015 mit Lit.; s. auch FRAYNE 2008, 49-76; SOMMERFELD 2004, 187; STEINKELLER 2013a, 145-151.

[32] Zu *En-na-Il* (Anfang ED IIIb-Zeit?), dessen Vater einen sumerischen Namen trägt, s. FRAYNE 2008, 75f.; MARCHESI 2011, 179f.; MARCHESI 2015, 140 Anm. 19; 153f.; STEINKELLER 2013a, 148. – Zu *En-bí-Aš-tár* (Ende ED IIIb-Zeit) s. MARCHESI 2015, 154.

Kiš erscheint auch in der späteren Historiographie als dominantes Zentrum. Die pseudohistorische Sumerische Königsliste (SKL)[33] führt diese Stadt als Sitz des ersten Königtums „nach der Flut“ auf. Hier residierte die längste aller in der Liste erwähnten Dynastien mit 23 erinnerten Herrschern; es folgen noch drei weitere Dynastien bis zur Akkade-Zeit. Die Königsnamen sind gemischt sumerisch-semitisch.[34] Die Ablösung der sumerischen durch die semitische Dominanz ist hier nicht reflektiert.

Ähnlich ist die Distribution im allerdings deutlich schlechter dokumentierten Dijala-Gebiet.[35] In den insgesamt 20 Votivinschriften der ED III-Zeit aus Ešnunna, Tell Agrab und Tutub findet sich unter den 16 identifizierbaren Personennamen nur ein semitischer, die Mehrzahl ist sumerisch. In den wenigen Inschriften aus Sippar[36] sind Sumerer und Semiten in gleichem Umfang vertreten.

Die Interpretation der demographischen Befunde erhält durch die Toponymie wichtige zusätzliche Kriterien. Der Umgang mit Ortsnamen verläuft konservativ, da zuziehende Migranten die vorgefundenen Bezeichnungen meist adaptieren. Dabei kommen sekundäre Umdeutungen fremder Namen, Anpassungen an die Sprache der Rezipienten und andere Umformungsstrategien weithin zur Anwendung; sie sind auch im Alten Orient allgegenwärtig. Zur Benennung von Neugründungen hingegen finden in der Regel die vertrauten Sprachelemente der Siedler Verwendung.[37] Toponyme erlauben folglich zu einem gewissen Maße Einblicke in die Siedlungsgeschichte, die über die diachronen Beschränkungen der zufallsbedingt erhaltenen Schriftzeugnisse hinausgehen können.[38]

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[33] Eine übersichtliche Edition bietet GLASSNER 2004, 117-127, 150-155. Eine ausführliche, aktuelle Bibliographie liefert ATTINGER 2019, 24f. S. noch PETERSON 2011, 105-108.

[34] Die Namen der in der SKL genannten Könige aus Kiš hat FRAYNE 2008, 49-53 zusammengestellt (mit Kommentar und Lit.).

[35] STEIBLE 1982, 199-203, 206-213; MÜLLER-KARPE 1993, 238.

[36] Zur Liste der Texte s. WESTENHOLZ 2014, 9.

[37] Vgl. allgemein mit einigen Beispielen EDZARD 1998-2001a, 102; EDZARD 1998-2001b, 114f.

[38] Beispielsweise ist die vorgermanische keltische Präsenz in Mitteleuropa auch nach 2000 Jahren anhand der Toponymie immer noch nachweisbar, s. DE BERNARDO STEMPEL 2000. – Die frühen Siedlungsgebiete der Slawen im *Germania Slavica*, die sich seit dem Mittelalter fast vollständig an die deutsche Bevölkerung assimiliert haben, lassen sich anhand der Toponyme noch gut rekonstruieren; s. etwa JANNERMANN 2009. – Das amerikanische Englisch hat fast keine Lehnwörter aus den autochthonen Indianersprachen aufgenommen, aber das indigene Substrat ist in den Ortsnamen vielfältig feststellbar, s. HASPELMATH and TADMOR 2009, 51 („an invading group is likely to retain place names“). – GELB 1962, 51f. hat in einem instruktiven, überprüfbaren Beispiel die Siedlungsgeschichte von Chicago anhand der 1960 dokumentierbaren Anthroponyme und Toponyme rekonstruiert, die zu sehr zuverlässigen Ergebnissen führen: „[I]t would be wrong to draw the conclusion on the basis of the geographical names and their proportions ... Only by a joint utilization of the evidence based both on personal and geographic names could the right conclusions be reached: ... the geographical names, being conservative, ... allow a historical reconstruction of the population of the area as being composed first of native, (namely, American Indian) peoples, who were later superseded as a result of a very strong settlement activity of English (or British) people and a much weaker one on the part of the peoples of French and German origins.”

Den topographischen Befund in der Umgebung von Kiš während der Akkade-Zeit hat Foster[39] folgendermaßen resümiert:

> The geographical horizon of the local administrative records [from Mugdan] embraced Kish and Cutha, and included seventeen smaller localities in the more immediate neighborhood … The names of these places were generally neither Akkadian nor Semitic, allowing the supposition that this region had once been occupied by a non-Semitic people who had disappeared. The local language of record keeping and of name-giving was Akkadian. Sumerian names are very rare, and Hurrian names do not occur.

Dieser Sachverhalt lässt sich für die gesamte „Land von Akkade" genannte Region verallgemeinern. Semitische Ortsnamen sind äußerst selten, sie werden erst in der Akkade-Zeit zahlreicher. Aber Toponyme, die sich sumerisch etymologisieren lassen, sind ebensowenig anzutreffen; die Mehrheit entzieht sich jeder Deutung.[40] Daraus lassen sich mit einiger Vorsicht die Schlussfolgerungen ableiten, dass hier ursprünglich eine autochthone Bevölkerung siedelte, über die wir nichts mehr wissen und die in später ankommenden Gruppen aufgegangen ist, dass auch die dominante sumerische Präsenz nördlich von Nippur sekundär war und diese Expansion eine begrenzte zeitliche Periode andauerte.

Der Verlauf der semitischen Migration im 3. Jahrtausend lässt sich gegenwärtig aufgrund der begrenzten Quellenlage nur schemenhaft rekonstruieren. In der ED I/II-Zeit (ca. 3000-2570) sind Semiten höchst selten anzutreffen und zwar bislang lediglich im Einzugsgebiet von Kiš, das sich in einer außergewöhnlichen Expansionsphase befand. In der ED IIIa-Zeit (ca. 2570-2470) geben vor allem die Befunde aus Tell Abū Ṣalābīḫ Einblicke in Konzentrierungen, die aber lokal begrenzt sind. Mit dem Ende der ED IIIb-Zeit (ca. 2300) ist die semitische Dominanz im Norden Mesopotamiens unzweifelhaft. Die semitische Migration hat auch die mittlere Region um Nippur erfasst, während sie das sumerische Kerngebiet kaum erreichte. Wie die Ausbreitung im dazwischen liegenden Zeitraum (ca. 2500-2300) im Einzelnen verlief, ist unbekannt.

Sich über Jahrhunderte hinziehende Migrationswellen, deutlich variierende demographische Verteilungen mit lokal sehr unterschiedlichen sozialen Entwicklungen, Akkulturation, Symbiosen, eigenständige kulturelle Aktivitäten sind also einige der wichtigen Merkmale, die bezüglich der Ausbreitung der Semiten in Mesopotamien festzustellen sind.

Zur sumerisch-semitischen Konfliktgeschichte schweigen sich die Quellen aus. Die politischen Ereignisse und soziokulturellen Umwälzungen müssen aber turbulent gewesen

[39] FOSTER 2016, 60.

[40] Vgl. die übersichtlichen Zusammenstellungen von SCHRAKAMP 2015a.

sein. Alleine die Umsiedlung von 36.000 Kriegsgefangenen aus 25 eroberten Orten und Regionen in der ED I/II-Zeit stellt eine enorme logistische Herausforderung dar mit gravierenden Auswirkungen auf die frühdynastische Demographie (zu den Größenordnungen s. unten). Über die Verdrängung der Sumerer aus Kiš, der bedeutendsten Stadt Mesopotamiens in den ersten Jahrhunderten des 3. Jahrtausends, sind keine Details überliefert. Wir wissen nicht, in welchem Umfang der Rückzug nach Sumer durch den Einsatz von Machtmitteln erzwungen wurde.

Bei den Auseinandersetzungen, die in den Quellen fassbar werden, spielt eine ethnisch begründete Gegnerschaft offensichtlich keine Rolle. Es ist eine Reihe von schweren Konflikten der Stadtstaaten untereinander bzw. Kriegen mit anderen Regionen – insbesondere mit dem Nachbarland Elam – dokumentiert,[41] die Konfrontationen sind aber durch andere Interessensgegensätze bedingt. Diese entstehen etwa durch den Kampf um Vorherrschaft, die Rivalität beim Zugang zu Ressourcen (Land und Wasser, aber auch Kontrolle der Handelswege), die Ambitionen nach Erweiterung von ökonomischer Potenz und politischer Dominanz. Wenn also der sumerische König von Uruk En-šà-kúš-an-na, „der Herrscher von Sumer und König des (einheimischen) Landes“, den semitischen Gegenspieler *En-bí-Aš-tár* von Kiš Ende der ED IIIb-Zeit besiegt und gefangen nimmt,[42] ist diese Kontroverse wohl ausschließlich machtpolitisch motiviert. Ein erhebliches Konfliktpotenzial resultiert ferner aus dem ausgeprägten Streben der Stadtstaaten nach Autonomie in ihrer weitgehend geschlossenen, homogenen Welt mit überschaubaren Abläufen, die sich gegen Interventionen von außen und Abhängigkeit wehren.

Aufstände in der Akkade-Zeit

Die tiefgreifendsten Veränderungen werden durch Sargon von Akkade[43] (ca. 2316-2277 v. Chr.) herbeigeführt. Er setzt sich in den Machtkämpfen, die das Ende der frühdynastischen Zeit in Sumer ebenso wie in Syrien bestimmen, gegen die Rivalen durch, erringt um 2290 die Oberherrschaft über ganz Mesopotamien und begründet eine Dynastie, die für ca. 150 Jahre Bestand hat. Anschließend nutzt Sargon seine Vormachtstellung konsequent und erweitert mit militärischen Mitteln seinen Herrschafts- und Einflussbereich über große Teile Vorderasiens, der deshalb häufig als „erstes Imperium“ bezeichnet wird.[44]

Bei der Rekonstruktion der Ereignisse, die zur Entstehung des Reiches von Akkade führten, bestehen noch große Unsicherheiten und Lücken. Als unmittelbare Zeugnisse über

[41] Zur Ereignisgeschichte und den historischen Quellen s. die Zusammenfassung des Forschungsstandes von SALLABERGER and SCHRAKAMP 2015c; 2015d.

[42] Zur Inschrift s. FRAYNE 2008, 430 E1.14.17.1; NEUMANN 2005, 10f.

[43] S. zusammenfassend SOMMERFELD 2009-2011.

[44] Zu den historischen Ereignissen s. ausführlich SALLABERGER and SCHRAKAMP 2015d; SALLABERGER and SCHRAKAMP 2015e; FOSTER 2016, 1-29.

den historischen Verlauf sind nur lakonische Darstellungen aus der offiziösen Perspektive Sargons erhalten, und ergänzende Quellen stehen nur vereinzelt zur Verfügung.

Die Inschriften Sargons sind sehr knapp gehalten. Sie geben nur einen Überblick über die wesentlichen Resultate, ohne den chronologischen Verlauf darzustellen und ohne Einzelheiten auszuführen. Aus ihnen wird deutlich, dass nur eine lange, kontinuierliche Serie von siegreichen militärischen Aktionen zum nachhaltigen Erfolg führte:

Sar-ru-GI LUGAL KIŠ 34 ^{kas}ŠUDUL *iš*$_{11}$-*ar* BÀD.BÀD Ì.GUL.GUL
Sargon, König der Welt, siegte in 34 Schlachten. Er zerstörte die (Stadt-)Mauern.[45]
50 ÉNSI ... SAG.GIŠ.RA
50 Stadtfürsten ... besiegte er.[46]
50 ÉNSI *ù* LUGAL *su*$_4$-*ma* ŠU.DU$_8$.A
50 Stadtfürsten nahm er gefangen und zwar persönlich den König (von Uruk).[47]

Den gesamten unterworfenen Regionen vom „Unteren Meer“ (Persisch-arabischer Golf) bis zum „Oberen Meer“ (Mittelmeer) wurde unmittelbar eine Zwangsherrschaft aufoktroyiert:

ís-tum-ma ti-a-am-tim sa-píl-tim a-dì-ma ti-a-am-tim a-lí-tim DUMU.DUMU A-kà-dè^{ki} ÉNSI-*ku*$_8$-*a-tim u-kà-lú*

Vom Unteren Meer bis zum Oberen Meer haben Bürger von Akkade die Statthalterschaften inne.[48]

Diese direkte Kontrolle durch Personen mit persönlichen loyalen Bindungen zum Herrscher, die als höchste lokale Entscheidungsinstanzen eingesetzt wurden, bedeutete einen tiefen Eingriff in die gesellschaftlichen Strukturen. Die bis dahin praktizierte Autonomie der Stadtstaaten wurde aufgehoben.

Aggressive Reaktionen ließen nicht lange auf sich warten. Unmittelbar nach seiner Inthronisation sah sich Sargons Sohn Rimuš mit einer Revolte konfrontiert, an der sich sechs bedeutende sumerische Städte paarweise unter der Führung des Königs von Ur beteiligten. Als einzige Stadt aus der nördlichen Region außerhalb des sumerischen Kerngebietes schloss sich Kazallu der Rebellion an. Über die Gründe bzw. die näheren Umstände erfahren wir nichts. Der Aufstand endete in einer verheerenden Niederlage, über den wir wiederum nur

[45] FRAYNE 1993, 28 E2.1.1.11, 1-7.
[46] FRAYNE 1993, 13 E2.1.1.2, 16-21.
[47] FRAYNE 1993, 16f. E2.1.1.3, 16-20.
[48] FRAYNE 1993, 14f. E2.1.1.2 82-91; vgl. 11f. E2.1.1.1 Akkadian 79-85.

den Bericht aus der Sicht des Siegers haben. Eine Monumentalinschrift von Rimuš enthält die akribische Auflistung der gegnerischen Opfer in drei Kategorien:[49]

Toponyme	Gefallene	Gefangene	Deportierte
Ur/Lagaš	7.804	5.460	5.985
Adab/Zabalam	15.718	14.576	[4.220?]
Umma/KI.AN	4.100	4.140	3.600
Summe	28.062 (!)	24.176	13.805
Kazallu	12.651	5.862	
Gesamtsumme	84.556		

Danach herrschte zwei Generationen lang Burgfrieden, bis unter Naramsin, einem Enkel Sargons, erneut ein Aufstand ausbrach, der das ganze Land erfasste. Dieses dramatische Ereignis, das als die „Große Revolte“ in die Geschichte einging, wird in der längsten überlieferten altakkadischen Inschrift detailliert dargestellt. Naramsin besiegte zuerst in zwei Schlachten eine Koalition von neun nördlichen Städten unter der Führung von Kiš, anschließend in sieben weiteren Gefechten ein Bündnis von acht der wichtigsten sumerischen Städte unter dem Kommando von Uruk. Die Summierungen der gegnerischen Opfer aus allen neun Schlachten enthalten folgende Angaben:[50]

„Könige“ (LUGAL)	3
„Generäle“ (ŠAGINA)	13
„Stadtfürsten“ (ÉNSI)	23
„Ortsvorsteher“ (*ra-bí-a-ni*)	1.210
„Männer“ (GURUŠ)	95.340

Aufschlussreich ist die klare Trennung zwischen dem akkadischen Norden und dem sumerischen Süden, wobei die Tatsache, dass die Aufstände in gleicher Weise in beiden Landesteilen ausbrachen, zeigt, dass die Motive nicht ethnisch begründet waren, sondern eine Reaktion auf den Druck der externen Zwangsherrschaft darstellten, die anscheinend ähnlich dominant auf die sumerisch- und akkadisch-sprachigen Regionen ausgeübt wurde.

[49] Zu den Quellen, Zahlenangaben und Analysen s. SOMMERFELD 2008; zur Rekonstruktion der Inschriften von Rimuš s. SOMMERFELD 2006-2008.

[50] Zu den Quellen und Zahlenangaben s. SOMMERFELD 2008.

Wir haben keine unabhängigen Quellen, um die in den Königsinschriften angegebenen Zahlen zu überprüfen. Vielleicht mag es im Einzelfall Irrtümer oder Übertreibungen gegeben haben, aber es besteht zunächst kein fundierter Anhaltspunkt, die Größenordnungen grundsätzlich zu bezweifeln. Bei einer völlig unrealistischen Überzeichnung des *body counts* wäre der Effekt, die überlegene Stärke und Schlagkraft der akkadischen Armeen herauszustellen, wirkungslos geworden. Eine indirekte Plausibilitätsprüfung ermöglicht hingegen die demographische Analyse: Wie viele Einwohner hatten die Städte? Wie groß konnten die Streitkräfte sein?

Demographie im 3. Jahrtausend v. Chr.

Die historische Demographie gehört zu den schwierigen Forschungsfragen, denn es sind nur lückenhafte Daten verfügbar, und die diversen Hochrechnungen, die bisher vorgelegt wurden, zeichnen sich durch erhebliche Unschärfen und gravierende Widersprüche aus.

Diese Ungewissheit lässt sich beispielhaft an zwei Einschätzungen ablesen, die in demselben Jahr (1999) veröffentlicht wurden. Westenholz kalkuliert die sumerischen Verluste beim Aufstand gegen Rimuš:

> I reckon that the rebel city-states must have lost about one-third of their adult male population. [Anm. 131:] ... Lagash and Ur ...lost 19.485 men. If we estimate the total population of these two city states at 200.000, the number of men able to carry arms may be put at 60.000.[51]

Demgegenüber postuliert Pollock dieselbe Bevölkerungszahl von 200.000 für die sehr viel größeren Regionen von Ur-Eridu, Uruk und Nippur-Adab insgesamt:

> At its maximum in Early Dynastic III, the total settled population of the surveyed portion of the southern Mesopotamian plains may have reached 200,000 (assuming 200 persons per hectare).[52]

Es bestehen mehrere verschiedene methodische Ansätze, die Größe der Bevölkerung Sumers zu berechnen:

1. Die Evaluation der archäologischen Befunde,
2. die philologische Auswertung schriftlicher Quellen,

[51] WESTENHOLZ 1999, 42 mit Anm. 131. SCHRAKAMP 2015b, 216 hält die Zahlenangaben aus den offiziellen Inschriften für glaubwürdig und rechnet ohne nähere Begründung hoch, dass die Aufstände gegen Rimuš „Sumer ein Viertel bis ein Drittel seiner wehrfähigen Männer“ kosteten. Vgl. ähnlich SCHRAKAMP 2017, 93 („bis zu 30 %“).

[52] POLLOCK 1999, 64f. Sie spricht zwar die demographischen Daten der ED-Zeit an, die sich aber für die frühe Akkade-Zeit in vergleichbarer Größenordnung befunden haben dürften.

3. Kalkulationen zur Bevölkerungsdichte aufgrund des verfügbaren Agrarlandes.

[1] Postgate hat 1994 zuerst die grundlegenden methodischen Fragestellungen zur historischen Demographie Sumers detailliert in dem Artikel strukturiert: *How Many Sumerians per Hectare? – Probing the Anatomy of an Early City.*[53] Exemplarisch stellt er seine systematischen Überlegungen anhand der archäologischen Daten aus Tell Abū Ṣalābīḫ vor.

Postgate definiert als die drei wichtigsten Variablen:

> 1. total site area; 2. proportion of site area occupied by housing; 3. correlation between house area and number of occupants.[54] ... [B]etween sites the most variable factor in population density is the number of houses per hectare; but the number of persons per house is also significant.[55]

Zu den Hochrechnungen, denen verschiedene Datengrößen zugrunde gelegt werden, zieht er eine negative Bilanz:

> [W]e are still far from being able to provide an answer. ... [A]n absolute figure for the city's population remains frustratingly elusive ...[56] [O]ur margins of error were, and still remain, extremely wide. ... [F]or the time being we are unable to make a close guess ...[57]

Die abschließende Einschätzung zur Bandbreite der möglichen Bevölkerungsdichte und Stadtgröße benennt dann einen entsprechend großen Spielraum:

> [T]he answer to the question of our title seems to be 'between 248 and 1205 Sumerians per hectare at Abu Salabikh in the mid third millennium ...'[58]

Die Hochrechnungen der „resulting notional 'total population' of our third millennium city" stellt er in Table 5[59] zusammen. Sie belaufen sich auf 3.794–18.437 Einwohner.

In der 2017 erschienenen Festschrift für Postgate nehmen zwei Autoren seine frühere Fragestellung wieder auf. Zuerst stellt Colantoni in dem Beitrag *Are We Any Closer to Establishing How Many Sumerians per Hectare? Recent Approaches to Understanding the Spatial Dynamics of Populations in Ancient Mesopotamian Cities*[60] vertiefte differenzierte Überlegungen zu den verschiedenen Faktoren an, die für die Bestimmung der Bevölkerungsdichte von Belang sind, gelangt dann aber zu einem reservierten Resultat und vermeidet konkrete Hochrechnungen. Im Abschnitt *Conclusions: The Demographic Conundrum* fasst er zusammen:

[53] POSTGATE 1994.
[54] POSTGATE 1994, 53.
[55] POSTGATE 1994, 58
[56] POSTGATE 1994, 47.
[57] POSTGATE 1994, 63.
[58] POSTGATE 1994, 64.
[59] POSTGATE 1994, 62.
[60] COLANTONI 2017.

> Population estimations typically employ methods using calculations based on individuals per household or average numbers of persons per hectare. But it is the variability in household occupancy and the density of houses within urban environments that makes reliable estimations very difficult to achieve, producing ranges of possible populations that may differ widely enough to make them simply ballpark figures. ... [R]eaching finely tuned estimations of resident population densities and numbers are hard to achieve due to a raft of unknown factors and complex interacting variables. ... [R]eaching a reasonable estimate of an urban population is dependent upon an extensive and clearly phased excavated sample combined with varied methods to assess the full extent, type and density of occupation of a settlement. ... [T]he anatomy of a city is a complex and often shifting entity.[61]

Stone weitet sodann in der Festschrift Postgate in dem Beitrag *How Many Mesopotamians per Hectare?*[62] die Fragestellung aus und bezieht insbesondere neue digitale Technologien und Satellitenaufnahmen ein. Von der früheren Schätzung der Bevölkerungsdichte von Postgate mit einer erheblichen Streubreite („between 248 and 1205 Sumerians“) gelangt sie zu einer bereinigten Berechnung:

> [W]e are left with a range from between 100 and 340 people per hectare for the site as a whole, with the population density of residential areas themselves between 170 and 600 people per hectare. ... These data suggest that settlement density varied between sites more than within them, with a few low density settlements enjoying with no more than 170 persons per hectare but with some other crowded examples with as many as 600 people per hectare.[63]

Diese Algorithmen helfen bei der Frage, wie hoch die Proportion der Verluste an der Gesamtbevölkerung in den Städten war, die sich an den Aufständen gegen Rimuš und Naramsin beteiligt hatten, aber nicht viel weiter, da die Größen der Stadtflächen nicht feststehen und noch weniger der Umfang des gleichzeitig besiedelten Stadtgebietes.

Unter den Städten, die Rimuš als Gegner nennt, sind lediglich von Ur indirekte Daten zur Stadtgröße aufgrund der Ausgrabungen verfügbar. Die Fläche innerhalb der Stadtmauer belief sich in der Ur III-Zeit und der anschließenden frühen altbabylonischen Zeit auf ca. 60

[61] COLANTONI 2017, 108-110.

[62] STONE 2017.

[63] STONE 2017, 580f.

Hektar.[64] Unbewiesen, aber möglich sind vergleichbare Dimensionen für die späte ED- und frühe Akkade-Zeit. Wir wissen jedoch nicht, inwieweit die Mobilisierung der Truppen auch das Weichbild von Ur bzw. den gesamten Stadtstaat einbezog. Unter Anwendung der Algorithmen zur demographischen Bandbreite, die Stone ermittelt hat (s.o.), würden sich Größenordnungen ergeben, die zwischen 60 ha × 170 = 10.200 Einwohnern und 60 ha × 600 = 36.000 Einwohnern liegen. Unter den ebenfalls nicht überprüfbaren Annahmen, dass auch Lagaš ähnliche Dimensionen aufwies und dass etwa ein Drittel der Bevölkerung wehrfähig war, lässt sich nicht mehr als die vage Feststellung treffen, dass die in der Rimuš-Inschrift angegebene Gesamtzahl der Opfer als 19.249 im Prinzip plausibel ist.

Naramsin beziffert nur die Summe von 95.340 besiegten „Männern“ (GURUŠ) in 16 gegnerischen Städten ohne detaillierte Aufschlüsselung. Der sich daraus ergebende Durchschnitt von knapp 6.000 liegt ebenfalls im realistischen Bereich.

[2] Ein Ansatz mit konkreten Daten zur Berechnung der historischen Demographie besteht in der Auswertung der Texte, die Angaben über die Größe der Kontingente von Arbeitern bzw. konskribierten Soldaten enthalten, wobei beide Gruppen wahrscheinlich identisch waren und nur abwechselnd zu unterschiedlichen Zeiten und Aufgaben eingesetzt wurden.

Visicato stellt die für das Akkade-zeitliche Girsu belegten Angaben zur Zahl der Aufseher und Mannschaftsstärken zusammen und kommt zu folgender Bilanz:

> [A]pproximately 4000/5000 workers could be recruited and provided rations by the é-gal and by affiliated institutions.[65]

Die gleiche Größenordnung hat Schrakamp für den gesamten präsargonischen Stadtstaat von Lagaš ermittelt. Er hat errechnet, dass sich „die Heeresstärke von Lagaš mit mindestens 5000 Mann beziffern“ lässt.[66]

Als Vergleichsgröße lässt sich die Überlieferung aus Ebla vom Ende der ED IIIb-Zeit heranziehen, die Archi[67] zusammengestellt und analysiert hat. Die Quellen bestehen hier nicht aus offiziellen Inschriften, die für Übertreibungen und Schönfärberei anfällig sind, sondern sie umfassen Verwaltungsdokumente mit detaillierten Aufstellungen diverser

[64] Nagel and STROMMENGER 1978-1979, 71. Sie kommen für Ur auf eine Einwohnerzahl von 24.000. Weitere Lit. mit demographischen Berechnungen, die sich auf die Gegebenheiten im 1. Jahrtausend v. Chr. fokussieren, s. Sommerfeld 2010b.

[65] VISICATO 2000, 129f. Anm. 114. Vgl. dazu SCHRAKAMP 2014, 717.

[66] SCHRAKAMP 2014, 717. Urukagina unterstreicht seine Ernennung zum König „aus der Mitte von 36.000 Menschen“ heraus, s. dazu SCHRAKAMP 2013, 455f. mit Anm. 56. Diese Angabe dürfte sich nicht nur auf die Einwohnerzahl von Girsu, sondern auf die Gesamtbevölkerung des Stadtstaates Lagaš beziehen, wobei infolge der hier offensichtlich zugrunde gelegten Zahlensymbolik nur vage Schlüsse auf die historische Demographie möglich sind. Zu Urukagina und der historischen Entwicklung von Lagaš am Ende der ED-Zeit s. zusammenfassend SCHRAKAMP 2014-2016 mit ausführlicher Bibliographie.

[67] ARCHI 2010.

Kontingente der Heeresstärke: „the administrative documents have to be closer to the truth". Archi schätzt aufgrund seiner Hochrechnung für den Staat von Ebla, „that the men available for the Eblaite army numbered at least 44,000."[68]

Die Zahlen aus Ebla haben zwar keine Beweiskraft für das Imperium von Akkade, sie geben aber auch keinen Anlass, die Plausibilität der Angaben von Rimuš oder Naramsin zu bezweifeln. Da die Könige von Akkade ein viel größeres Gebiet kontrollierten als der Staat von Ebla, konnten sie wohl auch eine entsprechend starke Armee aufstellen, die in der Lage war, fast 100.000 Gegner zu bezwingen.

Die umfassendsten und exaktesten demographischen Daten aus dem 3. Jahrtausend stammen aus der Ur III-Zeit. Steinkeller[69] hat eine umfangreiche Bestandsaufnahme über die Dienstleistungen durchgeführt, zu denen die gesamte männliche freie Bevölkerung verpflichtet war, insbesondere bei Projekten des Monumentalbaus und im Transportbereich.

> [O]ne should also include here military service *sensu stricto*, i.e., participation in either defensive or offensive operations, since military service was just another form of corvée. There was no distinction between civilian work and military service; the conscripted workers had to do both.[70]

Die Zensuslisten, in denen die dienstverpflichteten Personengruppen (Sumerisch éren) erfasst wurden, sind aus Umma besonders detailliert erhalten.

> We can estimate that, at Umma, 75% if not more of the entire population were royal éren living in the city of Umma and throughout the province. ... [A] census of the éren population of the city of Umma, lists 2,580 royal éren and 600 éren of the governor, plus 229 other residents of Umma that classed as royal dependents.[71]

Als Hochrechnung für die gesamte Provinz Umma gelangt Steinkeller zu folgender Einschätzung:

> The total number of the royal éren in the province may have been as high as 25,000 (only the heads of families). In contrast, members of the governor's organization were much fewer. ... within the *entire* province, some 3,000 individuals (certainly not more than 4,000).[72]

Steinkeller[73] hat in einer anschließenden Untersuchung die Gesamtgröße der Stadt Umma bilanziert:

[68] ARCHI 2010, 33.

[69] STEINKELLER 2013b, vgl. STEINKELLER 2015.

[70] STEINKELLER 2013b, 348.

[71] STEINKELLER 2013b, 359 mit anm. 54.

[72] STEINKELLER 2013b, 360.

[73] STEINKELLER 2017.

> [T]he Umma archive … contains important hard data on the numbers of people living throughout the province. Such demographic information is especially extensive as far as the city of Umma is concerned.[74]
>
> It seems safe to conclude, therefore, that the total number of the free citizens and their dependents living in the city of Umma was between 11,000 and 15,000.[75]

Unter Einbeziehung der weiteren Bevölkerungsgruppen „menials and slaves“ kommt er zu dem Befund:

> [W]e arrive at a grand total of between 14,000 and 18,000 individuals. Whatever the exact figure may have been, we may be confident that it was less than 20,000 people.[76]

Umma war auch in der frühen Akkade-Zeit ein florierendes städtisches Zentrum, so dass die demographischen Daten vergleichbar mit denen der folgenden Ur III-Zeit gewesen sein dürften.

In der Rimuš-Inschrift werden als Gegner ausdrücklich die beiden alliierten Städte Umma und KI.AN^{ki} genannt und nicht etwa Truppen aus der gesamten Provinz Umma. Selbst die Nachbarstadt Zabalam hat sich nicht dieser Koalition angeschlossen, sondern sich mit Adab verbündet.

KI.AN^{ki} wurde bisher nicht ausgegraben, es liegen keine identifizierten administrativen Dokumente aus diesem Ort vor, und auch statistische Daten über dienstverpflichtete Personengruppen fehlen.[77] Man sucht die Stadt in der Nähe von Umma. Von den vier Nachbarstädten Jokha (Umma), Ibzaykh, Tell Shmid und Umm al-Aqarib wird KI.AN^{ki} üblicherweise mit Tell Shmid[78] gleichgesetzt, während Zabalam in der Regel mit Ibzaykh[79] identifiziert wird, wobei definitive Beweise noch ausstehen. Beide Ruinenhügel sind jeweils etwa ein Viertel so groß wie Umma[80] (ca. 225 ha). Die Einwohnerzahl jeder dieser beiden Städte dürfte folglich diejenige von Umma längst nicht erreicht haben. Umm al-Aqarib spielte in der Akkade-Zeit keine Rolle mehr.

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[74] STEINKELLER 2017, 536.

[75] STEINKELLER 2017, 547.

[76] STEINKELLER 2017, 548.

[77] Zu Auflistungen der dienstverpflichteten Kontingente aus verschiedenen Städten der Provinz Umma s. STEINKELLER 2013b, 359f.; vgl. auch 2013b, 374f.; 378f. KI.AN^{ki} erscheint hier nicht.

[78] Zur Beschreibung der Lokalität s. ADAMS and NISSEN 1972, 52; 226 no. 168. Bei den dort angegebenen Maßen von 800 × 800 m beträgt die Fläche maximal 64 ha. Vom Rechteck abweichende Proportionen im Stadtgrundriss sind dabei nicht erfasst. Zur Identifizierung s. mit weiterer Lit. EDZARD et al. 1977, 85f.; ORAIBI 2014, 4 Anm. 6; ALKHAFAJI 2019, 3 mit Lit.

[79] Zur Beschreibung der Lokalität s. ADAMS and NISSEN 1972, 217; 226 no. 169. Bei den dort angegebenen Maßen von 1.100 × 520 m beträgt die Fläche 57 ha. Zur Identifizierung s. mit weiterer Lit. MOLINA 2016-2018.

[80] Zur Beschreibung der Lokalität s. ADAMS and NISSEN 1972, 227 no. 197. Bei den dort angegebenen Maßen von ca. 1.500 × 1.500 m beträgt die Fläche maximal 225 ha. Vgl. zur Größe auch STEINKELLER 2017, 536 mit Anm. 5. Zur Identifizierung s. mit weiterer Lit. WAETZOLDT 2014-2016; UR 2014-2016.

In den Rimuš-Inschriften finden sich folgende Zahlenangaben zu den Opfern aus der Umma-Region:

Toponyme	Gefallene	Gefangene	Deportierte	Summe
Umma/KI.AN^{ki}	4.100	4.140	3.600	11.840
Adab/Zabalam	15.718	14.576	[4.220?]	34.514

Steinkeller hat als Gesamtzahl der arbeits- und wehrfähigen Männer der Stadt Umma in der Ur III-Zeit weniger als 4.000 ermittelt.[81] Unter der Annahme, dass die demographischen Daten der Akkade-Zeit in einer vergleichbaren Größenordnung lagen, ergibt sich die Schlussfolgerung, dass bei dem Aufstand das größere Umma zusammen mit dem nachgeordneten KI.AN^{ki} bei insgesamt fast 12.000 Verlusten mehr oder weniger die gesamte wehrhafte männliche Bevölkerung aus diesen Städten einschließlich des Umlandes aufgeboten haben muss und dass durch die Niederlage die männlichen Leistungsträger der Bevölkerung nahezu vollständig dezimiert wurden.

Für die Provinz Umma geht Steinkeller von insgesamt etwa 30.000 arbeits- und wehrfähigen Männern aus (s.o.). Für die Stadt Adab und für die umgebende Provinz liegen keine vergleichbaren demographischen Daten vor. Adab[82] gehörte zu den großen sumerischen Städten, die Stadtfläche war aber kleiner als diejenige von Umma. Mit dem Aufgebot von ca. 35.000 Kriegern dürften die Städte Adab und Zabalam ebenfalls an die Grenzen ihrer Kapazitäten gelangt sein und vermutlich zusätzlich Männer aus dem Umland rekrutiert haben.

Aus diesen Daten und Schlussfolgerungen ergibt sich folgende Einschätzung: Die sumerischen Zentren haben bei den Aufständen ihre gesamten verfügbaren wehrtauglichen Kapazitäten aufgeboten. Rimuš wiederum hat mit harter Hand durchgegriffen und die gegnerischen Truppen im Kampf aufgerieben bzw. ihren Widerstand durch Zwangsmaßnahmen konsequent gebrochen. Über das Schicksal der gefangengenommenen und deportierten Verbände haben wir keine näheren Informationen.

[3] Renger[83] bezieht sich auf die oben referierten, 2017 erschienenen Untersuchungen von Steinkeller und Stone, wählt aber für seine demographische Analyse einen anderen Ansatz. Er geht vom verfügbaren Agrarland aus und dem Umstand:

[81] STEINKELLER 2017, 539-546.

[82] WILSON 2012, 31 zitiert die 1912 publizierten Maßangaben der früheren Aufnahme als 1.695 × 840 m = 142 ha, die aber fragwürdig sind.

[83] RENGER 2018.

> dass eine mögliche Bevölkerungszahl davon abhängt, inwieweit ein gegebenes Gebiet eine bestimmte Zahl von Menschen ernähren kann, da die Versorgung der Bevölkerung vom Ausmaß der landwirtschaftlich nutzbaren Fläche abhängt, die sie zur Verfügung hat und auf deren Erträge sie angewiesen ist. …
>
> Bisher liegen keine Untersuchungen zum Umfang der Flächen im gesamten Babylonien vor, die zum Getreideanbau genutzt wurden.[84]

Renger bestimmt die Größe des babylonischen Alluviallandes wie folgt: „Dies entspricht einer Fläche von mindestens 21.000 km².“ Der Bedarf für die Subsistenz besteht nach modernen Annahmen in „1,5 ha Feld pro Person“. Daraus ergibt sich: „Für eine Familie von fünf Personen ist daher eine Fläche von 7,5 ha zu Grunde zu legen.“ Renger errechnet auf dieser Basis eine potenzielle Bevölkerungszahl von 1.400.000 Einwohnern. Eine andere Hochrechnung, die aufgrund von dokumentierten altbabylonischen Landzuweisungen mit 6,35 ha pro Familie erfolgt, ergibt bis zu 1.655.000 Menschen, „die vom durchschnittlichen Ertrag dieser Fläche hätten ernährt werden können.“[85] Wenn auch das untere Dijala-Gebiet mit ca. 6.000 km² in die Berechnung einbezogen wird, „ergibt sich für das alluviale Kernland zusammen mit dem Dijala-Gebiet eine Bewohnerzahl von ca. 2.130.000 Personen.“[86]

Hierzu sind einige Ergänzungen zu machen. Renger[87] hat die Fläche des potenziell verfügbaren Agrarlandes im Einzugsgebiet des Euphrats mit insgesamt ca. 21.000 km² auf der Basis von sehr vagen Maßangaben ermittelt (Länge „etwa 275 km“, „Breite … zwischen 50 km und 75 km“). Er lässt aber zahlreiche, sehr viel detailliertere Versuche, die Fläche des Agrarlandes in Babylonien zu bestimmen, unerwähnt. Potts[88] referiert 2011 ausführlich eine Reihe von Ansätzen, die zu stark voneinander abweichenden Größenordnungen kommen. Einen zusammenfassenden Überblick gibt er ferner 2016.[89] Die von ihm zitierten Erhebungen bewegen sich in der Bandbreite von 8.000 bis 80.000 km².

Nach den Daten der *Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations* (FAO) beträgt die Fläche, die auf dem Gebiet des früheren Babylonien von der Bewässerung maximal erschlossen werden kann, 55.000 km².[90] Das verfügbare Flusswasser reichte wohl nur für 30.000 km² aus.[91] Diese theoretisch mögliche Höchstzahl liegt aber außerhalb der realistischen Größenordnung, denn die Marschen müssen abgezogen werden sowie die

[84] RENGER 2018, 575f.

[85] RENGER 2018, 577f.

[86] RENGER 2018, 582.

[87] RENGER 2018, 577.

[88] POTTS 2011. Vgl. ferner OATES and OATES 1976 zu Einzelheiten der Berechnung mit verschiedenen Modellen und weiterer Lit.

[89] POTTS 2016; s. vor allem pp. 56-58, Abschnitt *3 Land under cultivation*.

[90] FAO 2008, 9.

[91] POTTS 2011, 286f. FAO 2008, 9f. gibt eine etwas größere Fläche an, die in der Gegenwart mit modernen technischen Mitteln durch Bewässerung erschlossen wird.

Areale, die anderweitig genutzt wurden, aufgrund der Versalzung unfruchtbar geworden waren oder die von der Wasserversorgung zu weit entfernt lagen. Die konkreten Einzelheiten sind schwierig zu erfassen, und die Berechnungen zur Demographie im Alten Orient kommen deshalb zu unterschiedlichen Resultaten. Wenn der Grundbedarf mit ca. 1,5 ha pro Person angesetzt wird, liegt die Obergrenze der Bevölkerung, die die Landwirtschaft auf babylonischem Boden ernähren konnte, bei etwa zwei Millionen und entspricht damit ungefähr der Kalkulation Rengers.

Auch wenn die Bevölkerung Babyloniens in der Akkade-Zeit diese Größenordnung von zwei Millionen mit Sicherheit nicht erreichte – und vermutlich auch niemals im Verlauf der altorientalischen Geschichte –, so liefert sie doch ein Eckdatum für die Evaluierung der Opferzahlen anlässlich der „Großen Revolte" gegen Naramsin. Der *body count* in dessen Inschrift beträgt fast 100.000 Männer. Für die Berechnung der arbeits- und wehrfähigen männlichen Bevölkerung legt man den Faktor 3-4 zugrunde,[92] so dass die Gegner Naramsins theoretisch maximal 700.000 Kämpfer hätten aufbieten können, realiter aber wohl nur erheblich weniger. Auf jeden Fall bedeuteten 100.000 Opfer eine extreme Dezimierung, die durchaus ein Drittel oder mehr der männlichen wehrfähigen Bevölkerung im gesamten Aufstandsgebiet betragen haben mag.

Konsequenzen der Aufstände und Schlussfolgerungen

Nach den Aufständen gegen Rimuš erfolgte ein grundlegender Wandel in den Strategien der Machtausübung. Während Sargon[93] die direkte Kontrolle bevorzugte, die loyale Statthalter aus seiner unmittelbaren Umgebung im gesamten Herrschaftsgebiet ausübten, ist danach davon nicht mehr die Rede. Die Akkade-Dynastie war vorsichtig geworden und hatte ein Netz von abgesicherten Stützpunkten aufgebaut:

> [I]n the wake of the Sumerian rebellions against Rimush, the kings of Akkade established centers between the Sumerian city-states, rather than trying to install "sons of Akkade" as governors there, as Sargon had done. … The purpose of such centers would have been to collect taxes and keep a watchful eye on the former rebels. …
>
> [A] conscious strategy of nesting Akkadian centers in the Sumerian countryside was involved …[94]

[92] STEINKELLER 2017, 546f.; RENGER 2018, 577 Anm. 11.

[93] S. oben mit Anm. 48.

[94] WESTENHOLZ in WESTENHOLZ and MILANO 2015, 23.

Es sind drei entsprechende Stützpunkte in der ländlichen Region Sumers bekannt, aus denen schriftliche Dokumente erhalten sind.[95] Diese zeigen die Strukturen und Tätigkeiten von groß dimensionierten Wirtschaftsbetrieben auf, die der Provinzveraltung entzogen waren und deren Erzeugnisse nach direkter Maßgabe der Herrscher von Akkade distribuiert wurden. Militärische Infrastruktur, die nicht im Fokus der Verwaltungstexte dieser Domänen liegt, ist nur marginal nachweisbar.

Ein vergleichbares Netzwerk von Stützpunkten, die der unmittelbaren Kontrolle durch das Herrscherhaus unterlagen, wurde auch im Akkadisch-sprachigen Norden etabliert.[96] Sie waren zum Teil mit Latifundien von enormer Größe und zahlreichem Personal ausgestattet, um die Bedürfnisse der Akkade-Dynastie exklusiv zu bedienen.

Umritte des Königs unter Begleitung seiner Familie und Entourage sind in mehreren sumerischen Städten bezeugt, die sich aufwändig um deren Wohl kümmern mussten.[97] Ihre Präsenz war stets nur von kurzer Dauer. Die Alltagsgeschäfte im Interesse der Zentralregierung wurden von ortskundigen Statthaltern ausgeführt, die in die lokale Gesellschaft integriert waren und sehr viel geschickter agieren konnten als fremde Machthaber.[98] Ihre Tätigkeit wurde von Angehörigen des Herrscherhauses aus Akkade penibel kontrolliert, wie Protokolle entsprechender Inspektionen zeigen.

Die normale akkadische Bevölkerung vermischte sich gar nicht oder nur marginal mit der sumerischen Gesellschaft. Dies zeigt beispielsweise deutlich die Textgruppe des Enlilemaba, die die Rechtsgeschäfte der Elite von Nippur dokumentiert und in der keine Spur akkadischer Präsenz zu finden ist.[99] In den großen sumerischen Städten wie Adab, Isin, Girsu, Umma, aus denen eine umfangreiche Überlieferung erhalten ist, stellen Personen mit akkadischen Namen stets nur kleine Gruppierungen dar.

Häufig ist in der Sekundärliteratur von der engen Symbiose zwischen Sumerern und Akkadern die Rede, beispielsweise:

> Sumerer und Akkader waren in fast allen Kulturäußerungen zu einer nicht mehr trennbaren Symbiose zusammengewachsen.[100]
>
> Southern Mesopotamia was a bilingual culture from virtually the earliest period from which written record can be read, with Semites living among and alongside Sumerians.[101]

[95] WESTENHOLZ in WESTENHOLZ and MILANO 2015, 13-27; SCHRAKAMP 2017, 97-104 mit ausführlicher Lit.

[96] SCHRAKAMP 2017, 104 zusammenfassend mit Bibliographie; SOMMERFELD 2014, 168-170.

[97] SCHRAKAMP 2017, 107; 112f. zusammenfassend mit Bibliographie.

[98] SCHRAKAMP 2017, 104-113 bietet einen kompakten Überblick zur Verwaltung von Sumer.

[99] S. dazu oben mit Anm. 14, 15.

[100] EDZARD 2004, 94.

[101] BLACK 2000.

Derartige Sichtweisen vereinfachen die Sachlage viel zu stark. Eine „enge Symbiose“ oder „bilingual culture“ stellt sich als seltene Ausnahmesituation dar, die nur in einigen kleineren Kommunitäten wie zum Beispiel in Tell Abū Ṣalābīḫ gegeben war. Ansonsten ist für dieses Postulat in den zeitgenössischen Texten keinerlei Bestätigung zu finden, vielmehr sind überwiegend deutliche Anhaltspunkte für das genaue Gegenteil vorhanden – Sumerer und Akkader hatten im Alltagsleben nur wenige Berührungspunkte, und die Repräsentanten der Zentralregierung vermieden die Präsenz in den aufständischen sumerischen Städten bis auf wenige außergewöhnliche Situationen.

Anschließende interessante Fragen, zu denen es bislang nur wenige Forschungsergebnisse gibt, stellen sich nach den Implikationen der Verluste für die sumerische Gesellschaft:

Wie umfassend war die Dezimierung der männlichen Arbeitskraft? Inwieweit, wie und in welchem Zeitrahmen wurden diese Verluste ausgeglichen? Welche Folgen entstanden für die ökonomische Leistungsfähigkeit und die Wehrfähigkeit der städtischen Zentren? Welche Schlüsse zogen die Sumerer aus ihren Niederlagen, und wie verarbeiteten sie die schweren Verluste in ihrem Weltbild?

Die Textgruppen aus denjenigen Orten, die kontinuierlich von der frühdynastischen Periode (ED IIIb) bis zum Ende der Akkade-Zeit überliefert sind (wie in Adab, Nippur oder Umma), zeigen tiefgreifende Umstrukturierungen der Wirtschaft und Verwaltung, wobei das Bild allerdings noch recht unscharf ist. So resümiert Molina[102] für Adab die Veränderungen nach der Niederlage des lokalen „governor“ (énsi) Meskigala im Aufstand gegen Rimuš:

> After the defeat suffered by Meskigala, some things changed in Adab. ... In any case, the deep change suffered by the palace organization after Meskigala’s defeat from an economic and administrative point of view is beyond question. ... [A]bove all, the documentation at our disposal shows a picture of a palace whose activities are qualitatively different from those attested for the time of Meskigala.

In anderen Orten (wie in Girsu) ist die Überlieferung zwischen der frühdynastischen Periode und der Akkade-Zeit für eine längere Phase völlig unterbrochen. Ob dies an den Zufällen der Fundumstände liegt oder an der tiefgreifenden Zäsur nach der Revolte gegen Rimuš, lässt sich gegenwärtig noch nicht beantworten. Die Analyse der Auswirkungen der sumerischen Aufstände und Niederlagen gegen die Herrschaft von Akkade hat eine Schlüsselfunktion für das Verständnis der sozioökonomischen Entwicklungen im letzten Drittel des 3. Jahrtausends, ist aber noch weitgehend ein Desiderat.

Korrekturzusatz:

[102] MOLINA 2019, 163f.

Unter den einschlägigen Untersuchungen, die seit dem Abschluss des Manuskripts (Dezember 2019) erschienen sind, sind folgende besonders hervorzuheben. Sie ändern zwar weder die gesamte Analyse noch die Schlussfolgerungen, können aber die Diskurse in Details vertiefen.

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Religious Syncretism and Control Over the Territory: Pharaohs in Southern Levant During the Late Bronze Age

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Abstract. *Egyptian domination on the territories of Southern Levant during the Late Bronze Age brought the conquerors to maintain close contacts with the local population. Among other techniques of domination, the Pharaohs made massive use of political and religious propaganda. The identification of some divinities of the Egyptian and Palestinian Pantheons enabled both populations to share the same places of worship, which promoted contact with local communities and made integration and life together possible. This cultural entanglement operation had both ideological and functional goals. Palestinian shrines and temples became multifunctional centers well integrated into the socio-cultural context, used as the centers for the collection of taxes imposed by the Egyptian rulers.*

***Rezumat**. Dominația Egiptului asupra teritoriilor din sudul Levantului pe parcursul Epocii Târzii a Bronzului i-a adus pe cuceritori în situația de a menține contacte strânse cu populațiile locale. Printre alte metode de menținere a dominației, faraonii au utilizat la scară largă propaganda politică și religioasă. Sincretismul unor divinități din panteonul egiptean cu cele palestiniene le-a permis ambelor populații să împartă aceleași lăcașuri de cult, ceea ce a încurajat contactul cu autohtonii și au făcut posibile integrarea și conviețuirea. Realizarea unei îmbinări culturale a servit atât unor scopuri ideologice, cât și altora mai pragmatice. Altarele și templele palestiniene au devenit centre multifuncționale bine integrate în contextul socio-cultural al vremii, fiind folosite inclusiv ca locuri de colectare a taxelor impuse de către suveranii Egiptului.*

Keywords: Pharaohs, Southern Levant, Late Bronze Age, Religious Syncretism.

INTRODUCTION

During nearly three centuries, from the end of 18th to the 20th Dynasty, Southern Levant (**Fig. 1**) was subjected to the direct rule of Egypt. This long domination, imposed by a country whose ideological prestige was totally proportionate to demographic, economic and military ones, had indeed a decisive influence on various aspects of life in the region.[1]

During the Late Bronze Age the supervision of the territory was achieved through the creation of functional areas: limited areas under direct Egyptian control, territories of

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[1] LIVERANI 2004, 14, for an update overview on political and economic history of the Levant I suggest PFOH 2016.

economic and productive interests as coastal plains and harbours; small local polities linked to Pharaohs by an oath of allegiance and through taxation/tributes collected once a year by the Egyptian army, and border areas where Pharaohs operated just in case of rebellions.[2] Asiatic territories were organized into three provinces: Canaan had its capital at Gaza; Syria, the ancient province of Amurru, had the capital at Simyra/Tell Kazel; Lebanon, ancient Upe, had the capital at Kumidi/Kamid el-Loz.

The Southern Levantine region during the Late Bronze Age was perfectly integrated into the international framework of the period, as the el-Amarna correspondence can testify. Moreover, the material culture of the region, rich in importations and imitations, reflects the phenomena of hybridization and cultural entanglement, once known as "International Style".[3]

The commercial and political role of Southern Levant in this era was surely supported by the Egyptian presence within the territory, one of the crucial features characterizing the history of Canaan during the Late Bronze Age.[4] Egyptian New Kingdom left a variety of traces of its presence on the Levantine sites, visible in the architecture, customs and above all the material culture.[5]

EGYPTIAN INFLUENCE ON SOUTHERN LEVANT AND PROPAGANDA

Egyptian military and administrative presence in Southern Levant is clearly visible from the fortresses and residencies discovered along the main route of the region. We have numerous examples, such as the buildings along the *Via Maris*, Horus Way, or along the inner King's Highway.[6] Inside these buildings[7] the findings of Egyptian-style pottery along with Egyptian objects for daily-use witness the roughly permanent presence of Egyptian personnel, living in close contact and cooperation with local communities.

The archaeological remains of the Egyptian presence dating predominantly to the 19th and 20th Dynasties pertain to architecture, inscriptions, pottery, personal ornaments and faience items. Significantly, in Southern Levant there are also traces of Egyptian funerary customs and administrative practices.[8] The Egyptian-style material culture grew during the Ramesside period, witnessing to both the increase of the Egyptian control over the territory and to the local emulation of the Egyptian customs by the

[2] TUCCI 2016a, 89.

[3] KANTOR 1997; CAUBET 1998.

[4] PANITZ-COHEN 2014, 541.

[5] TUCCI 2016b, 63.

[6] AHARONI 1979, 48 and 54; DORSEY 1991, 57; GARDINER 1920, 99; OREN 1982-83, 20-24; 1987.

[7] E.g. Tell el-'Ajjul, Jaffa stratum VI late, Beth Shean strata XIB and R-1b.

[8] BEN-TOR 2016, 67.

local government group. This second aspect is highlighted by the use of amulets, scarabs[9] and personal ornament, both imported and locally imitated.

This Egyptian influence is also reflected in the most important places of worship in Palestinian cities. Shrines and temples of the Late Bronze Age were multifunctional centers well integrated into the socio-cultural context. In addition to more traditional "functions" they became centers for the collection of taxes imposed by Egyptian rulers upon the conquered cities. These tributes came in the form of food offerings (and luxury commodities) which were then stored in the sanctuaries themselves. However, the possibility should not be underestimated that some kind of religious syncretism or contamination was promoted by the foreign rulers introducing elements of the Pharaonic religion into the local cult tradition in order to obtain a better acceptance of the foreign power by the local populations.[10]

How much did the Egyptian conquerors use the infiltration into the local habits to increase their own role in the country and to profit from the local goodwill?

In the southern part of the region it is possible to assume some sort of Egyptian influence on the local religious institutions, which became an important aspect of the imperialist/colonialist policy.[11] While the Egyptian royal sources are filled with references to the power, especially military power, exercised by the Egyptians over the territory, the archaeological record provides us with the evidence for the emergence of a new segment of population: an elite participating in the negotiation and collaboration integrating a part of Egyptian culture into daily life.[12] It must be remembered that the studies on the colonization processes recognize the importance of the worship of local elites in developing and strengthening the Egyptian hegemony in the region.[13]

LEVANTINE CULT PLACES AND EGYPTIAN PRESENCE

The cult places found in Southern Levant are of different type, size and content, reflecting both the variety of deities worshipped and the diverse groups of worshippers.[14] Despite the number of structures discovered in the region we know little about the ritual and the

[9] For a hint of the propaganda motifs (Pharaoh striking enemies) on scarabs found in the southern Levant see Tucci in press, The appeal of subjugation: artistic evidences for propaganda action of the Pharaoh in the Southern Levant.

[10] SALA and TUCCI 2019, 48.

[11] NAKHAI 2005, 122.

[12] KOCH 2021, 43

[13] On the other hand, it is still under debate if the techniques of control included a conspicuous movement of personnel from Egypt or the use of local personnel (STREIT 2019, 68). The discourse can be summarize in the "direct rule" model vs "elite emulation" (WEINSTEIN 1981 and HIGGINBOTHAM 2000). The issue is partly solved by I. KOCH 2021.

[14] GONEN 1992, 222.

function of the temples and sanctuaries, due to the absence of religious local texts and to scanty findings.[15]

In Syria, cultic places of the Late Bronze Age show both elements of continuity with the Middle Bronze Age architectural traditions and innovative elements of Mittanic provenance, creating a clear-cut differentiation between the inner and coastal Syria and the Euphrates middle valley region.[16] References to the Egyptian architecture are almost absent, also in the regions under the control of the New Kingdom. As far as sacral architecture in Lebanon is concerned, there are relatively few examples available to date, provided mainly by the discoveries within the buildings. The plans of these buildings seem to be typologically similar to the religious buildings in the north of the region.

In Southern Levant (Israel, Palestine and Jordan) the major cultic areas of the Middle Bronze Age remain in use, the symmetrical *migdôl* stay standing in Canaanite centers such as Megiddo, Hazor and Shechem. Next to these traditional Syrian-derived plans, a local type emerged – a non-monumental structure with a long room and bent-axis access.[17] The most common architectural typology is that of the broad room temple which in some cases, as we shall see, was during the Late Bronze Age IIB combined with Egyptian influences, giving rise to the buildings of particular development.[18]

The sanctuaries of Beth Shean (VIII-VI),[19] and Lachish Summit (or Acropolis) Temple (Level VI) and Fosse Temple,[20] fall into the sphere of strong Egyptian influence and control.[21] During the Late Bronze Age IIB and Iron Age IA these cult places exhibit a raised Holy of Holies approached by a staircase and a tripartite plan resembling private chapels at Amarna.[22] Despite the apparent Egyptian character of the features their local nature is no longer in doubt.

The city of Beth Shean is mentioned in Egyptian Execration Texts since the Middle Kingdom; during the New Kingdom it was mentioned in the List of Cities of Thutmose III, in

[15] Usually for the Levant cult we refer to the preserved texts which are the Syrian ones from Ebla, Ugarit, Mari or Emar. This has little sense from the perspective of analyzing a South Levantine cult that did not necessarily have to follow the developments in the northern and northeastern part of the region (KEEL and UEHLINGER 1998, 11). A recent analysis on the subject is proposed by Matthew Sunsnow (SUNSNOW 2021), with the specific focus on the Middle and Late Bronze Canaan.

[16] MATTHIAE 1997, 114.

[17] MAZAR 1992, 177.

[18] See for example Beth Shean and Lachish. MAZAR 1990, 252 and 1992, 173.

[19] For Beth Shean temples see ROWE 1940, JAMES and MCGOVERN 1993, MAZAR 2011 and MULLINS 2012.

[20] For Lachish Acropolis/Summit Temple see USSISHKIN 2004, for Fosse Temple see mainly TUFNELL et al. 1940.

[21] For a detailed analysis of the sanctuaries see the recent article (that takes its main cues from this paper) SALA and TUCCI 2019.

[22] HIGGINBOTHAM 2000, 294.

the topographical list of Seti I at Qurnah and in the one of Ramesess II, as well as in the Papyrus Anastasi I.[23] Beth Shean appears just once in the el-Amarna correspondence (EA 289).[24] The transition from an Egyptian outpost to Egyptian administrative garrison-town took place from the 18th to 19th Dynasty, with a renovation in the urbanization of the site[25] and the refurbishment of the sanctuary corresponding, as mentioned, to the Egyptian architectural characteristics. The stelae and some cultic paraphernalia inside the temple[26] indicate that at least part of the Egyptian population resided at the site – probably employed as scribes, not only administrative staff but also soldiers – prayed here and performed rituals, in which probably Egyptian personnel was involved among the priests.

The identification of the deities worshipped inside this cult building is still problematic, although the veneration of the god Mekal and female deities such as Anat or Astarte are testified by the discovery of some private stelae from this period (**Fig. 2**). It is likely that that these gods were assimilated with Egyptian deities through mechanisms of religious syncretism and cultural assimilation.[27]

Lachish does not appear widely in Egyptian sources, but it is still mentioned in the Papyrus Hermitage 1116A[28] and in two el-Amarna letters (EA 287 and 288).[29] The Egyptian presence is especially visible from the LB II. As in Beth Shean, we see an architectural renewal in the areas of worship, which points towards a specific imitation of Egyptian tradition.[30] The Fosse Temple became, after a first phase adhering to local traditions, a part of the plan of renewal during the reign of Amenhotep III.[31] We can see a strong syncretism between a local female deity probably worshipped here (Elat) and the Egyptian deity Hathor, which was later associated with the cult of Tiye, wife of Amenhotep III, to strengthen the Egyptian legitimacy in the territory.[32]

When the city of Lachish reached greater development, corresponding to the Egyptian models,[33] a new building was erected on the top of the tell (Level VI) – the so-called Summit

[23] MAZAR 2011, 157-159.

[24] MORAN 1992, 322.

[25] It is possible that the city's road plan has been rearranged so as to be more orthogonal recalling the planimetric developments of Egyptian cities as in Tell el-'Ajjul.

[26] Particular reference is made to stelae and offering tables with models of bread. JAMES 1966, fig. 105: 9-10,12.

[27] MULLINS 2012, 153.

[28] KOCH 2018, 26.

29 PRITCHARD 1969, 488-489.

30 See SALA and TUCCI 2019 and for the "elite emulation model" see HIGGINBOTHAM 2000, 134.

31 Sala and TUCCI 2019, 52.

32 Koch 2017, 70.

33 USSISHKIN 2004, 224, 231-242, 245-246, 257-258, 261-266; WIMMER 1980, 1072; This temple (Level VI) falls into the category indicated by Higginbotham as "Temple with raised Holy of Holies. HIGGINBOTHAM 2000, 294 and 301.

Temple or Acropolis Temple. The Egyptian influence here is visible in the architectonic features and in some finds recovered inside, but the deities worshipped were almost certainly local. If in the previous cases (Beth Shean and Lachish Fosse Temple) we have seen the mechanism of syncretism between local and Egyptian cults, probably to bring the local population closer to foreign rulers and vice-versa, in the Summit Temple we witness a second phase of "exploitation" of places of worship promoting the Egyptian interests. A bowl and some bowl fragments with hieratic inscriptions were discovered on the site, probably originating from Level VI[34] and dated to the Ramesside period (Ramesses II or III). The almost entire bowl bears three inscriptions dating to the Ramesside period (Merneptah or beginning of Ramsess IV). The texts are grain accounts, and the term *šmw* is clearly connected to the "harvest tax".[35] During the renewed excavations at Lachish four other sherds with inscriptions have been found, and the fragmentary texts suggest the presence of Egyptian scribes in the city as part of the administrative system, probably responsible for issues relating to taxation.[36]

The concentration of these votive objects with clear functional evidence in the main place of worship of the city, in the period of greatest Egyptian presence, suggests that Lachish was an important center for the collection of annual tribute in wheat. The exploitation of a place of worship (therefore a public building) as a collection center seems a natural solution. We should not forget the strong agricultural capacity of the hinterland of Lachish and the central position of the city in respect of a number of smaller settlements.

The same type of bowls with hieratic inscription as in Lachish were found in the site of Tel Sera' (**Fig. 3**).[37] This was a seat of an Egyptian fortress (13th-12th century B.C.), perhaps the residence of a governor. On the badly preserved bowl no.1 it is possible to read the same term *šmw*, in this time luckily in association with year 22 of the reign of Ramesess III.[38] On another bowl recovered on the site it is possible to read of goods/taxes/taxation (?) arriving at a house/estate or temple.[39] It is interesting that the Late Bronze Age levels in Tel Sera' have revealed a temple with a local asymmetrical plan, situated near the already mentioned Egyptian residence/fortress.[40]

[34] Fragments found during the renewed excavation of the city do not come from a precise stratigraphic context. GILULA 1976 and GOLDWASSER 1991.

[35] TUFNELL 1958, 123-133, pl. 44 and 47.

[36] GOLDWASSER 1991, 252.

[37] To the list provided here should now, as update, be added the findings from Tel Haror, Ashkelon, Qubur el-Walalydah and Tell es-Safi. All the inscribed cups are dated between the 14th and 12th centuries BC. I refer to the article by K. STREIT 2019, 77-79 for a full analysis.

[38] GOLDWASSER 1984, 77.

[39] GOLDWASSER 1984, 80 and HIGGINBOTHAM 2000, 61.

[40] Pending publication of the final volume on the excavations of the site, see READE et al. 2017, 11.

In the site of Tell el-Farʿah South, probably the location of an estate presided by the Egyptians, two sherds were attributed to the same bowl. As in the previous case, the text, extremely fragmentary, seems to indicate a connection between barley brought or owed to the overseer and recorded by a certain scribe.[41]

The site of Deir el-Balah, a southern outpost of the Egyptian governors, has revealed a fragment of a bowl inscribed with the same kind of texts in which it is possible to read once again the term *šmw*, and the translation speaks again about the harvest tax to be delivered.[42]

The sites mentioned here testify to the coexistence of and interaction between Canaanites and Egyptians. They belong to the centres where the influence of Egyptian domination is greater, and demonstrate that the cultural interaction had both ideological and functional aims, as some LB temples where evidence for both Egyptian and local worship has been found were used to collect taxes. Private stelae found inside these temples, usually found in cultic and funerary contexts and probably representing Egyptian personnel living in the Southern Levantine sites, could convey the wish of these people to affirm their origin and maintain their own traditions.[43]

Another characteristic pertaining to cult and religion shared by these sites could be mentioned here (although it goes beyond the subject of this paper).[44] This concerns (among other funeral practices) the use of clay anthropoid sarcophagi for burying a few selected individuals (**Fig. 4**). Until recently it was thought that these were the burials of Philistines, based on some attributes depicted on the lids comparable to the Egyptian reliefs. However, the results of the analyses of the sarcophagi themselves have proposed dates prior to the arrival of the Philistines in the Southern Levant. The rich funerary furnishing that usually accompany the burials, and the central position of the sarcophagi in respect of the burials in simple pits in these cemeteries, can suggest that the sarcophagi belonged to the members of

[41] GOLDWASSER and WIMMER 1999, 39.

[42] WIMMER 2010, 225.

[43] TUCCI 2016a, 88. The number of complete or fragmentary Egyptian style stelae it is not large. Five were found in Beth Shean and five in the cemetery of Deir el-Balah, one came from Tell Chinneret/Tell el-ʻOreime (ALBRIGHT and ROWE 1928, 281), others came from the east bank of the Jordan river (SMITH 1901, 347-349; GIVEON 1965; WIMMER 2002; WARD and MARTIN 1964, pl. 3; BIENKOWSKY 1992, pl. 34).

[44] The author is preparing an article on the anthropoid sarcophagi in the Levant. The sites in the entire region that yielded anthropoid clay coffins (or fragments), dating between 14th and 11th centuries BC, are Tel Shaddud, Deir el-Balah, Tel Midrash, Tabakat Fahel (Pella), Tell el-Farʿah South and Lachish. VAN DEN BRINK et al. 2017, 126. Recently published, it is possible to add the discovery of sarcophagi at Tell el-Borg see M. Jansen https://www.academia.edu/38853479/Clay_Coffins_from_Tell_el-Borg_Tell_el Borg_Preliminary_informaTion?email_work_card=view-paper .

the governmental elite of the sites who, for reasons not yet entirely clear, wanted to underline their links (by belonging or by emulation?) to the Egyptian culture.[45]

Conclusion

The persistence of the Egyptian domination on the territories of Southern Levant during the Late Bronze Age brought the conquerors to maintain close contacts with the local population. Strong ideological beliefs and the Egyptian charisma had indeed influenced and shaped to its favor various aspects of the life in the region.

One of the techniques used by Pharaohs in Egypt, in order to gain acceptance and respect from their subjects, was the massive use of political and religious propaganda. The ingenious intuition for the Levant was to identify a comparable theological plan for some divinities of the Egyptian and Palestinian Pantheons, so that both populations could share the same places of worship, thus trying to gain a closer contact with local communities by making integration and life together possible.

This sort of steered cultural entanglement operation had clearly not only ideological goals, but also functional ones. Palestinian shrines and temples during the Late Bronze Age became multifunctional centers well integrated into the socio-cultural context, and in addition to more traditional functions become centers for the collection of taxes imposed by the Egyptian rulers. These tributes came in the form of food offerings or precious items, which were then stored in the sanctuaries themselves.

[45] As seen until now, the deceased buried inside these anthropoid sarcophagi must not have been purely of Egyptian origin. It is likely that the Egyptians present on the site, once finished their assignment abroad, returned home where they found a worthy burial after the death.



Fig. 1 Southern Levant and cities mentioned in the text.

Fig. 2 Private stele dedicated to the goddess Antit (after Schroer 2011: Kat. 881 and Mullins 2012: fig. 18).

Fig. 3 Bowl with hieratic inscription from Tel Sera‘, IAA 2015-1105 (after Ben-Tor 2016, 90).



Fig. 4 Anthropoid sarcophagi from Deir el-Balah. Israel Museum, Jerusalem (after Ben-Tor 2016).

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CAPTIONS

Fig. 1 Southern Levant and cities mentioned in the text. (Thanks to Dr. Alessandro di Ludovico).

Fig 2 Private stele dedicated to the goddess Antit (after Schroer 2011: Kat. 881 and Mullins 2012: fig. 18).

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Egyptian Control in the Southern Levant and the Late Bronze Age Crisis

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Abstract. *In the Late Bronze Age, Egypt controlled the city-states of the Southern Levant, even though local rulers maintained partial autonomy. However, the period ended with a crisis that seems to have considerably changed the local power structures along with the disappearance of the Egyptian empire in the region. This paper shows how both Egyptian power and its relatively rapid disappearance worsened the crisis. Three factors are highlighted: Egyptian policy of weakening the defensive capabilities of Levantine city-states, the Egyptians' demand for different resources and how these two aspects made city-states unable to adapt successfully to the new post- Egyptian situation.*

Rezumat. *În Epoca Târzie a Bronzului, Egiptul controla orașele-stat din sudul Levantului, în ciuda faptului că liderii locali încă păstrau o oarecare autonomie. Totuși, această perioadă s-a încheiat printr-o criză care a modificat profund structurile puterilor locale, împreună cu dispariția puterii egiptene în regiune. Acest articol descrie felul în care puterea Egiptului, precum și rapida sa decădere nu au făcut decât să accentueze acea criză. Sunt evidențiați trei factori principali: politica Egiptului centrată pe slăbirea potențialului defensiv al orașelor-stat levantine, continua exploatare a resurselor de către autoritățile egiptene, respectiv modul în care aceste două fenomene au dus la incapacitatea orașelor-stat de a se adapta la situația ce a urmat retragerii forțelor egiptene din regiune.*

Keywords: Late Bronze Age, Egypt, Southern Levant, crisis.

Introduction

During the Late Bronze Age (1550-1200 BCE), the Southern Levant was controlled by Egypt for the most part.[1] The extent of Egyptian dominance at a certain point of time was dependent on the successful or unsuccessful campaigns by pharaohs, uprisings and attacks by local groups, the loyalty of the towns and the strength of Egyptian administrative and military control. Nevertheless, Egypt was powerful and the only effective regional power in Canaan up to the disputed territories of Qadesh and Central Levant.[2] By the end of the Late Bronze Age

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[1] All dates from here on are in BCE.

[2] As evidenced by the Amarna letters (see COHEN and WESTBROOK 2002 (eds.)) and Egyptian-style buildings in Levant at the end of the Late Bronze Age (MORRIS 2005, 740-773). As Ramesses II did not manage to conquer back Qadesh in the 13th century then it can be assumed that the border of Egyptian empire did not reach further north at least for a time (CLINE 2014, 80-82).

period, however, Egyptian control and the city-state system along with the complexity that had characterized the Amarna Age and the following period seems to have collapsed.[3]

The crisis in the 12th century is evidenced by the destruction in the area while Egyptian control faded, new migrant groups arrived and overall political complexity was reduced.[4] This crisis seems to be connected to the events like the collapse of the Hittite empire, Mycenaean small states and Ugarit elsewhere in the Eastern Mediterranean.[5] Gradual worsening of the climate, famine, the political disintegration of the Hittite empire and attacks on Levantine cities by unknown assailants seem most likely among the many reasons proposed to have brought about the crisis.[6] The crisis had both natural and human-influenced reasons. At the same time collapse was not complete as Cyprus and Phoenician cities seems to have weathered the crisis at the beginning of the 12th century.[7] It is clear that in addition to the crisis encompassing the Eastern Mediterranean, local processes influenced the reduction of political system and destruction in the Southern Levant. Among these local factors is the nature of the Egyptian control and Egyptian activities in Levant. To better understand how the Egyptian control influenced the crisis locally in the Southern Levant I will analyze the way in which Egypt controlled the Southern Levant, the events that took place, and then aspects of Egyptian control that may have worsened the situation in the Southern Levant.

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[3] I will use the term „city-state" to refer to small polities, although the application of the term has some problems. For one, the term "city" may be confusing when used to describe settlements, some of which were fairly modest although more impressive ones, like Ugarit, did exist. The concept of „state" is also problematic. The polities involved were autonomous to a point but what they exactly were depends on one's definition. Neither were all these polities similar. The Egyptians viewed the rulers of these settlements officially as mayors (*hazannu*), whose task was to obey the Egyptians, protect the settlements and the Egyptian interests there (MURNANE 2002, 107; NA'AMAN 2002, 132). The local rulers saw themselves as fairly autonomous kings (*šarru*), as can be read from the Amarna letters (NA'AMAN 2002, 132). Some of the city-states were thus merely small unimpressive settlements ruled by a semi-autonomous ruler, while others were powerful polities, who nevertheless had to obey the imperial rule of either the Hittite or the Egyptian empire.

[4] See about it below. I will use the term "western migrant". That enables to view the archaeologically attested arrival of people of Aegean, Cypriot or Anatolian origin separately from the "Peleset" and the "Philistines", who are known from Egyptian and Old Testament texts, but whose connection to the former is not certain. I will use the name "Philistia" for the geographic area settled by these western migrants but only in geographic and not ethnic or political sense. Although the name originates from the later Old Testament sources, "Philistia" overlaps with the area settled by the western migrants e.g. the towns of Ekron, Gath, Ashdod and Ashkelon (BEN-SHLOMO 2006-2007, 267; BRYCE 2009, 553; DOTHAN 2000, 145).

[5] BECKMAN 2007, 111; BRYCE 2005, 344-345; CLINE 2014, 173; YASUR-LANDAU 2010, 66-71; YON 1992, 117.

[6] About the disintegration of the Hittite empire see BECKMAN 2007, 111 and BRYCE 2005, 342-346. About the climate change and famine see LANGGUT et al. 2013. About the attacks see YON 1992, 117 for Ugarit and Emar and below about the towns of Southern Levant.

[7] Some Cypriot cities show signs of destruction, but most centers were built up again (Enkomi) and towns like Kition and Palaepaphos started monumental building projects in the 12th century (IACOVOU 2014, 661-669). Archaeologically, the situation regarding Phoenicia is less clear, although there are no signs that the towns experienced a serious crisis (BIKAI 1992, 133; BOYES 2012, 50).

Sources and dating

Analysis of Egypt's control in the Southern Levant relies on archaeological and textual evidence. Archaeological evidence includes identification of the settlements mentioned in textual records, destruction layers, the settlement systems, Egyptian-style architecture and other archaeological material indicating the Egyptian presence in Levant and western-style material indicating migration to Philistia.

The most relevant textual sources relating to the nature of the Egyptian control are the 14th century Amarna letters, but there are additional written and visual sources from the 13th to the 11th century. The latter contain records about the campaigns of the Egyptian pharaohs (Seti I, Ramesses II, Merneptah, Ramesses III).[8] Although many of these campaign descriptions are full of propagandistic motifs, repeated textual and pictorial tropes or icons and Egyptian royal ideology, they also describe historical events.[9] The "Sea Peoples" reliefs of Medinet Habu present a notorious case for such a source, where ideology is mixed with hints to the historical reality. However, finding the historical kernel in these texts is problematic and interpretations vary considerably. For example, some have seen the texts as a relatively accurate reflection of the attacks of different groups of peoples in Canaan and Egypt.[10] Others see them as the Egyptians exaggerating of minor clashes into large battles or, recently, as descriptions of battles in Central Levant, which did not bring about Egypt losing control over the south.[11] These sources should be used with due care. They seem to reflect some problems the Egyptian empire faced, but not necessarily the outcome of the resulting Egyptian activity.

One problem concerning the 12th century crisis is the absolute dating of the events. The main issue is whether the destructions and the subsequent appearance of locally made Aegean style (Philistine 1 or Mycenaean LH IIIC:1) pottery should be dated to the first half of the 12th century (ca. 1175), when the Egyptian empire was still present in Levant, or to the second half (ca. 1125), when the empire seems to have collapsed.[12]

The earlier dating (Conventional Chronology) relates the new pottery and the arrival of western settlers to the "Sea Peoples" reliefs in Medinet Habu.[13] One of the attacking groups from the reliefs – the "Peleset" – is presumed to be connected to the biblical Philistines and

[8] See about the Amarna letters in COHEN and WESTBROOK (2002, eds.) and RAINEY and SCHNIEDEWIND 2014 and about the later sources in Hasel (1998, 118-124, 152-157, 178-181) and O'CONNOR 2000.

[9] BEN-DOR EVIAN 2016, 151-153, 159-163; CLINE and O'CONNOR 2003, 120; O'CONNOR 2000, 93-94.

[10] DEVER 1992, 102; DEVER 2017, 97 141.

[11] BEN-DOR EVIAN 2017, 276-279; CIFOLA 1988, 302-303.

[12] See about that in FINKELSTEIN 2000, 162-165. I will use the term "locally made LH IIIC:1 pottery" or "Philistine 1 pottery", but these are just alternative names to "Philistine Monochrome pottery". I will also prefer the term "Philistine 2 pottery", which is alternatively known as "Philistine Bichrome pottery", for the later stage of "Philistine 1 pottery". "Philistine 1 pottery" and "Philistine 2 pottery" are, for example, used in the reports on Ekron (DOTHAN et al. 2016 (eds.)). The term "LH IIIC:1b" has been used in the past for "Philistine 1 pottery", but as "b" seems to be a meaningless addition to the term, it will not be used here (SHERRATT 2006, 368-370).

[13] FINKELSTEIN and PIASETZKI 2007, 75.

their towns in the Old Testament. A connection between the "Peleset" and the new western migrants in the towns of the "Philistines" has been proposed, because locally made Mycenaean LH IIIC:1 pottery appears in these towns.[14] Accordingly, the appearance of the new western ceramic material is contemporary with the "Sea Peoples"' attack ca. 1175. The Conventional Chronology dates the advanced stage of the Mycenaean LH IIIC:1 pottery (Philistine 2 or Philistine Bichrome) to the second half of the 12th century.[15]

An alternative – Low Chronology – has been proposed by David Ussihkin, Israel Finkelstein and others. They doubt that the locally made Mycenaean LH IIIC:1 pottery should be related to the debated events mentioned in Medinet Habu.[16] Proponents of the Low Chronology point out that there are no Egyptian items dated to the period of Ramesses III-VI alongside the western style pottery in the towns of Philistia and no Mycenaean LH IIIC:1 pottery in the Egyptian centers, although Philistia's towns were near Egyptian centers.[17] That is why supporters of the Low Chronology claim that locally made Mycenaean LH IIIC:1 pottery only appeared after the collapse of the Egyptian empire during or after the rule of Ramesses VI, when Egypt finally lost control over Megiddo (ca. 1130), a settlement further north than Philistia and standing in the way of any potential migrations.[18] Philistine 2 pottery is pushed to the 11th century.[19] However, Avraham Faust and other researchers claim that ethnic, cultural or other identity-related differences could sharply delimit the spread of the Philistine ceramics from Philistia to nearby settlements.[20]

Radiocarbon dating has failed to bring about conclusive results in this debate. Many of the C14 datings are from later periods (the 11th-10th century) or outside Philistia and are not useful for discussing the appearance of locally made Mycenaean LH IIIC:1 ceramics.[21] Some analyses have shown that several settlement destruction layers and some strata with Philistine 1 or Philistine 2 pottery should be dated differently from the Conventional Chronology.[22] However, the rare C14 dates from Philistia's settlements are not too helpful. For example, the analysis of the destruction of Stratum VIIIA in Ekron (the last stratum before the appearance of the

[14] CLINE and O'CONNOR 2003, 116; YASUR-LANDAU 2010, 180.

[15] FINKELSTEIN and PIASETZKI 2007, 75.

[16] FINKELSTEIN 2000, 163-165. For example, the Medinet Habu texts do not discuss a settlement process in Philistia and the slightly newer Papyrus Harris mentions that the "Sea Peoples" were settled in the Pharaoh's strongholds. These could have been located anywhere, including in Egypt (Ibid: 165).

[17] However, there seems to be a lack of cases where a stratum with well-dated Egyptian material from the time of Ramesses III-VI is followed by a Philistine 1 stratum. Finding these cases would indicate the validity of Low Chronology.

[18] FINKELSTEIN 2000, 163-165; USSISHKIN 1998, 214-217. The presumption of Egypt's control over Megiddo is based on a bronze statue base with the name of Ramesses VI found there (FINKELSTEIN 2000, 162, 175; USSISHKIN 1998, 2014).

[19] FINKELSTEIN 2000, 164.

[20] BUNIMOVITZ and FAUST 2001; FAUST and KATZ 2011, 240-242.

[21] See Finkelstein and Piasetzki 2010; FINKELSTEIN and PIASETZKI 2011; GILBOA et al. 2008, 173-192;

[22] FINKELSTEIN and PIASETZKI 2010, 380; FINKELSTEIN and PIASETZKI 2011.

Philistine 1 pottery) has resulted in a date range of 1205-1065.[23] This radiocarbon dating is too broad to solve the Conventional/Low Chronology problem, at least in Ekron.[24] Other C14 datings of Ekron's archaeological material have not presented more accurate information.[25] In addition, one recent analysis indicates that the period of the appearance of Philistine 2 pottery varied from settlement to settlement and the whole process took over a century.[26]

Another argument against the Low Chronology is the connection between Levantine and Cypriot ceramics. Susan Sherratt notes that using the Low Chronology requires redating the Cypriot and Aegean ceramic chronology, which is dependent on Levantine finds. However, quite an extensive C14 dating project in Cyprus places the beginning of LCIIIA pottery (and thus the similar Philistine 1 pottery) to the early 12th century, contradicting the Low Chronology. She also does not believe that the Philistine pottery would have developed after similar Cypriot pottery had died out.[27]

The solution to the problem of using the Conventional or the Low Chronology is still not clear. When discussing the destructions, the arrival of western migrants and the Egyptian empire below, I will consider events based on both the Conventional and the Low Chronology.

Egyptian control in the Southern Levant

Late Bronze Age Levant and its political system can be seen as functioning on two levels. First was the uncontested Egyptian hegemony, at least from the battle of Megiddo onwards. This brought about the free movement of the Egyptian army through the territory, obligations for the local rulers and the establishment of Egyptian garrisons, forts and other buildings.[28] The second level was the local settlements, which were often ruled by local rulers who, at least from the Egyptian perspective, were equal to mayors, although they seem to have thought of themselves as kings.[29] Even despite Egyptians designating these rulers as mayors, it seems that Egyptians acknowledged the local rulers as somewhat autonomous, although having certain duties. The city-states often controlled settlements outside their core town, waged wars with

[23] Asscher and BOARETTO 2018, 14.

[24] In addition, there are disagreements about the relative dating of the nearby areas in Ekron, which would have some effect on the C14 dating. Trude Dothan and Seymour Gitin claim that the destruction in the storage building in the Summit area is contemporary with the end of the VIIIA stratum in the Area INE East Slope, but Ann Killebrew claims that the last (pre-western material) phase of Stratum VIIIA actually succeeded the destruction of the Summit building. In that case, the settlers bringing the Philistine 1 ceramics with them are unlikely to have been behind torching the Summit building (DOTHAN and GITIN 2012, 3; KILLEBREW 2013, 81-85).

[25] FINKELSTEIN and PIASETZKI (2010, 379-381) have one C14 dating of the Monochrome phase of Ekron but warn that it is dangerous to rely on a single sample.

[26] ASSCHER and BOARETTO 2018, 19-20.

[27] SHERRATT 2006, 361, 364-368.

[28] MORRIS 2005, 20-21; NA'AMAN 1997, 607-608; NA'AMAN 2002, 132; SPALINGER 2005, 83.

[29] NA'AMAN 2002, 132.

each other and sought the pharaoh's support against each other at least in the Amarna period.[30] They seem to have had a problem also with the groups of people (the Apiru, the Shasu) who were not connected to any state, the enemy they shared with the Egyptians themselves.[31] Based on the Amarna letters the local rulers had control over soldiers and possibly mercenaries (like the Apiru).[32]

The exact number of city-states in the loosely defined Southern Levant is unknown. Based on the Amarna letters we can name a few city-states from the Late Bronze Age like Megiddo, Gezer, Jerusalem, Lachish, Gath, Ashkelon, Shechem and Yurza, often along with their leaders.[33] The cities listed in the Amarna letters surely differed in their status and possibilities. For example, the large city-state of Ugarit had considerable influence in the confines of the Hittite empire, while others may have been small settlements with practically no influence.[34] Given that the information on the city-states differs, the estimations about the number of city-states in the Southern Levant vary between 13 and 25.[35] Geography seems to have affected the autonomy of the local city-states, with those closer to Egypt being more peaceful (or at least not represented so often in the Amarna letters) but those in the Highlands (Jerusalem) and Central Levant (Byblos, Amurru) engaging in notable conflicts.[36] However, these states are known because they are represented in the 14th century Amarna letters, and the following two centuries may have changed a lot. The strengthening of Egyptian control, for example, could have reduced the autonomy of the city-states considerably.[37]

There are several ways through which Egypt controlled or heavily influenced the states of the Southern Levant. Firstly, the Egyptian empire had a considerable military presence in the area, as shown by strongholds and the accounts of the pharaohs' campaigns.[38] Locations like Gaza and Jaffa seem to have been controlled directly by the Egyptians and this also goes for the

[30] JAMES 2002, 114-117; NA'AMAN 2002, 131-133.

[31] BRYCE 2009, 636; JAMES 2002, 115-116.

[32] The Apiru are mentioned as part of his forces by the king of Damascus in EA 195 (RAINEY and SCHNIEDEWIND 2014: 897). The use of the Apiru by city-state rulers is, however, often mentioned in the letters, where one ruler is accusing other rulers of using the Apiru, which may be a rhetoric device (saying that the opponent conspires with Egypt's enemy) rather than a description of the real situation (JAMES 2002, 116).

[33] For example Megiddo in the Amarna letter (EA) 242, Gezer in EA 298, Jerusalem in EA 287, Lachish in EA 329, Gath in EA 278, Ashkelon in EA 320, Shechem in EA 289 and Yurza in EA 314. Translations of the letters can be found in RAINEY and SCHNIEDEWIND 2014. For the identification of Shuwardata as the ruler of Gath see RAINEY and SCHNIEDEWIND 2014, 1585.

[34] On Ugarit see YON 2006, 18-21.

[35] NA'AMAN 1997, 600, 619. JASMIN 2006, 172-174 indicates up to nine states for the southern part of the Southern Levant. These form only a part of about 70 city-states (or small states) mentioned in the Amarna letters.

[36] JAMES 2002, 112-119.

[37] BUNIMOVITZ 1998, 104-105; KILLEBREW 2005, 81-83, 92.

[38] On Egyptian strongholds in general see Morris 2005, on 13th century campaigns see HASEL 1998, 118-124, 152-157, 178-181.

forts along the road from Canaan to Egypt.[39] Some towns, like Sumur, which was called garrison town by the ruler of Byblos, indicate that these were the centers of the Egyptians in Levant.[40] There was a notable increase of Egyptian military architecture in the Post-Amarna Age, seen from texts and archaeology.[41] Egyptians seem to have also controlled settlements in the Jordan valley, probably to guard trade routes.[42] The best known examples of Egyptian military architecture are the fortress in Jaffa and number of fortified administrative buildings, like those known from Tel Mor, for example.[43] A type of building called "governor's residence" found in several settlements, is probably an administrative building of a slightly different type.[44] An unfinished garrison building, architecturally similar to the buildings in Egypt, has been found from Ashkelon.[45] Thus, at least in the 13th and early 12th century, Egyptian military control may have been sustained by locally placed Egyptian army units. Some of the numerous Egyptian strongholds even seem to overlap with the city-state centers.[46]

In addition to the permanent military presence, especially in the 13th century and early 12th century, the campaigning Egyptian armies could march through the Southern Levant without any powerful opposition, like in the case of the battle of Qadesh or the attacks against specific settlements.[47] References to campaigns in the Southern Levant to punish rebellious cities show that Egypt did not generally hesitate to use army to force a city-state back into submission. The Egyptians got involved in some disputes in the Amarna period and punished leaders of Amurru and Lachish for stirring up trouble.[48] In the 13th century, Seti I and Merneptah campaigned in Canaan, mostly to bring order to some regions and move against specific unruly towns.[49] It seems that sometimes the local towns rose up against Egypt, although Egyptians may have exaggerated local conflicts to give such impression. The Egyptian support was useful in the

[39] GOREN ET al. 2002, 202; HOFFMEIER and ABD EL-MAKSOUD 2003, 169-171; MORRIS 2005, 384-386.

[40] GOREN et al. 2002, 202. Rib-Hadda's letter EA 76 in RAINEY and SCHNIEDEWIND 2014, 463-465.

[41] KILLEBREW 2005, 81-83; MORRIS 2005, 382-391.

[42] BLOCH-SMITH and NAKHAI 1999, 108.

[43] BURKE et al. 2017, 86-87; KILLEBREW 2005, 60-64.

[44] HASEL 1998, 93-96; KILLEBREW 2005, 58-60. Though KILLEBREW 2005, 58-64 distinguishes between "centre-hall houses" or "residences" and "administrative buildings" sometimes called "forts", these get categorized differently by other authors. For example, HASEL 1998, 93-95 lists a building from Aphek under "governor's residences" while KILLEBREW 2005, 58, 62-63 following Carolyn Higginbotham puts it into a separate category.

[45] AJA 2009: 66.

[46] If one takes the presence of a governor's residence as a basis to indicate that the settlement was the Egyptian stronghold. Governor's residences were located in Gezer and Pella, which were both known as city-states, at least in the Amarna period HASEL 1998, 93-94; RAINEY and SCHNIEDEWIND 2014, 1571, 1581.

[47] See about the campaigns in CLINE 2014, 80-83 and HASEL 1998, 118-124, 152-157, 178-181.

[48] BRYCE 2005, 169-170; JAMES 2002, 119-122.

[49] HASEL 1998, 119-124, 178-180.

warfare between the vassal states, and numerous calls for help in the Amarna letters show that Egyptian support (even if with modest military units) on the sender's side was sought after.[50]

In addition to using its own forces, Egypt could have relied on the forces of the locals for assistance in the campaigns, as is known in the case of the Hittite empire and its vassals.[51] Egypt certainly used foreign mercenaries from territories outside of nominal Egyptian control, like the Nubians and the Sherden.[52] This may have led to the interdependence of the armies, meaning that Egypt depended on the forces of its vassals to a certain extent, while the vassals may have relied on the Egyptian forces, when they were in trouble.[53]

One last side of military control was the lack of town walls in many of the local city-states in the Late Bronze Age.[54] This is especially notable as several of them had Middle Bronze Age fortifications.[55] Although some earlier remains could have still been in use, the Late Bronze Age strata indicate that for one reason or another usually no new town walls were built. This is probably connected to the Egyptian presence. We can only speculate about the causes, but the lack of walls may have been related to the intentional Egyptian policy of keeping the city-states weak enough to keep them in check, in case some of them were thinking about rebelling, or because of the lacking resources and manpower of local settlements.[56] Another possibility is that siege warfare and perhaps warfare in general lessened due to the Egyptian control, especially in the Southern coastal areas.

The second aspect of the Egyptian control relates to political hegemony. As said, local rulers had considerable autonomy, but when Egyptian interests were threatened, the Egyptian empire got involved, as in the case of Amurru and Shechem. In both cases unchecked expansion of these states may have made them too powerful for Egypt to tolerate, especially in Amurru's instance, which was located on the Egyptian border with the Hittites.[57] It is possible and even likely that in the Amarna Age, there may have been further military actions and local uprisings in addition to the ones mentioned in the texts, because even these letters only reveal a small

[50] AVRUCH 2002, 161. See about calls for military assistance in numerous letters of Rib-Adda of Byblos (EA 69-95, 100-140) or in letters by other rulers like ʿAbdi-Ḫeba of Jerusalem (EA 288-290) and Yapaʿi of Gezer (EA 299-300). Letters are translated in RAINEY and SCHNIEDEWIND 2014.

[51] BRYCE 2013, 170; COLLINS 2007, 106.

[52] Seen, for example, from the Sherden supporting Ramesses II in the battle of Qadesh (ABBAS 2017, 9-10) and from a mathematical task in "Papyrus Anastasi I", which, although meant as an instruction for scribes, indicates that the presence of the Nubians and the Sherden in Canaan was feasible ALLEN 2003, 9, 11.

[53] Numerous requests for Egyptian help point to the vassals dependence on Egyptian forces either because of acute military threat or because of the symbolic associations involved, when the Pharaoh himself sends troops to one's aid (AVRUCH 2002, 161; MORRIS 2015, 340).

[54] BUNIMOVITZ 1998, 104.

[55] GONEN 1984, 62.

[56] BUNIMOVITZ 1998, 104, NA'AMAN 2005, 151-152. Although BUNIMOVITZ (1992, 226-227) highlights that not many people were needed for building large structures, especially if these were built over time and in stages.

[57] BRYCE 2005, 169-170; JAMES 2002, 119-122.

portion of the whole period's history. The autonomy of the locals was also limited as the result of the failed uprisings. Political control meant control over foreign politics, during the Late Bronze Age it meant that city-states had to stay loyal to the Egyptians and not collaborate with the Mitanni or the Hittite empire. Although it seems that for a time the pharaohs allowed some communication between Amurru and the Hittite side, possibly because they could not stop this communication, or because it was useful for the purpose of gathering intelligence.[58] This was a dangerous game though, as Amurru later joined the Hittites.[59]

Whilst Egypt mostly relied on local mayors/rulers to keep the order and keep the Egyptians' interests safe, the Amarna letters note several cases where Egyptian officials had travelled around solving problems and local conflicts.[60] They may have lived in Egypt and travelled from there, or resided in certain centers in Canaan, like Gaza, Jaffa and Sumur. At least some of these towns may have been settlements directly controlled by the Egyptians.[61] The appearance of the Egyptian-style "governor's residences" in the XIX dynasty (13th century) Canaan may indicate that Egyptian officials were permanently present or possibly even running the settlements.[62] Archaeology also shows the Egyptians' presence in other aspects of local material culture. There are Egyptian-type ceramics, scarabs and sarcophagi, which indicate that some Egyptians were more permanently residing in Canaan, although some items probably ended up there as the result of trade.[63] Egyptian pottery was present in large numbers in certain locations (like Tel Mor, Beth Shean, Tel Sera') and was sometimes locally made.[64] The coffins likely belonged to Egyptians who resided there, or to the Canaanite locals who wanted to imitate Egyptian burial practices.[65]

The third area of control was economic. Egyptian dominance and its strongholds meant that it had control over trade routes like the coastal road, the Jordan and Jezreel valleys and the ports of the Mediterranean coast.[66] The purpose of building these strongholds must have been to keep the trade routes safe, given the instances of banditry, but the Egyptian centers could have been used to levy some sort of a tax on the goods that passed.[67] While the existence of taxing remains speculative, the city-states had to provide Egyptians with different goods or even people.[68] The tribute included supplies, luxury goods and possibly food items, which must

[58] COHEN 2002, 92-98.

[59] COHEN and WESTBROOK 2002, 8.

[60] NA'AMAN 2002, 135-137.

[61] GOREN et al. 2002, 202; NA'AMAN 2002, 135.

[62] GADOT 2010, 52; HASEL 1998, 93-96; MORRIS 2005, 688-689.

[63] KILLEBREW 2005, 53-55, 64-80.

[64] MARTIN 2004, 279-280.

[65] KILLEBREW 2005, 53-55, 64-80.

[66] ARTZY 2018, 95; BURKE ET AL. 2017, 90; DIJKSTRA 2017, 76-78, 81; GRABBE 2017, 96; VAN der STEEN 2017, 162.

[67] DIJKSTRA 2017, 81 mentions Tell es-Saidiyeh as a taxation center. About the robberies in SAUVAGE 2011, 427-432.

[68] In addition to local labourers (NA'AMAN 2005, 221-224), the pharaoh also asked, for example, for cupbearers (EA 369 in RAINEY and SCHNIEDEWIND 2014, 1251.

have taken a toll on the local resources.[69] There was also the obligation to feed and support the passing armies moving through Canaan, sometimes possibly accompanied by the pharaoh. This put additional economic pressure on the local cities, as food, drink and other resources had to be procured, possibly on relatively short notice.[70] It is good to bear in mind that some city-states were fairly small and this kind of effort, even temporary, may have been quite costly and exhausting for the locals.

Egypt thus had military, political and economic control over the region of the Southern Levant, as seen from the letters of the Amarna Age and the archaeological records. Although pharaohs lost some territories in the northern part of the Southern Levant during the last centuries of the Bronze Age, it seems that their control over most of the city-states of Southern Levant was not weakened.[71]

Although written sources mention city-states and rulers in the Amarna age, the situation became more complicated in the following period. When discussing the influence of the Egyptian empire on the local settlements and people during this time, one has to take into account two possibilities: that much of the territory was controlled directly by the Egyptians by the beginning of the XX dynasty, or that there were still city-states at the time of Ramesses III. The date of the disappearance of local city-centered polities is not wholly clear, and it is not impossible that the Egyptians had taken full control of most of the settlements by the end of the 13th century, at least in the southern coastal Canaan area.[72]

There were Egyptian campaigns in Canaan, some within the Egyptian controlled territories. The early 13th century pharaoh Seti I recorded capturing Hammath, Yeno'am and Pella, which had risen up against Egypt and had attacked other cities, like the Egyptian center Beth Shean.[73] Pella was a city-state with a king in the Amarna period.[74] Merneptah, ruling at the end of the 13th century, supposedly campaigned in Canaan as inscribed on the "Israel Stela" and The Karnak reliefs.[75] These list Yenoam, Ashkelon and Gezer among the conquered towns even though the main focus of the "Israel stela" was fighting against the Libyans in the west. There are questions regarding the historicity of the campaign, but mentioning the towns of Ashkelon and Gezer as the enemies indicates that they may have been independent polities at the time,

[69] COHEN 2002, 88; NA'AMAN 2002, 129-130; SPALINGER 2005, 134. However, the tribute indicated in the Amarna letters does not mention foodstuff, although the locals had to probably feed the Egyptian forces SPALINGER 2005, 135. The letters do mention cattle though NA'AMAN 2002, 130.

[70] NA'AMAN 2002, 132. See EA 324 as an example of a letter confirming a ruler's preparation for the arrival of the Egyptian forces RAINEY and SCHNIEDEWIND 2014, 1203.

[71] Amurru can be mentioned as one of the notable losses (COHEN and WESTBROOK 2002, 8)

[72] Bunimovitz (1998, 104-105) writes that many former city-states were turned into Egyptian bases. Egyptian presence seems to have in any case intensified KILLEBREW 2005, 81-83, 92.

[73] HASEL 1998, 119-125, 134.

[74] RAINEY and SCHNIEDEWIND 2014, 1571.

[75] HASEL 1998, 178-181. Here I use the dating from HASEL 1998, 178, but BURKE et al. 2017, 87, for example, dates Merneptah to the 12th century.

like they were in the Amarna period.[76] The building of "governor's residences" and military forts may point to increased Egyptian military control.[77] The network of Egyptian centers protected for example the Jordan river routes and some centers (Pella) were in the locations of former (or still existing) city-states.[78]

There are indications that in the 12th century some city-states were still having an autonomous government and leaders (in addition to the "Israel stela"), despite the increased Egyptian control. Megiddo presents a case where local autonomy may have been preserved. The last of the Bronze Age strata there, which according to Ussishkin ended ca. 1130, contained a palace complex.[79] A large collection of ivories, which was buried when the settlement was destroyed, was found in one of the rooms of the appendix of the palace. Marian Feldman has proposed that these ivory pieces represented hoarding (and possibly a symbolic attempt to deposit items ritually) by a local ruler. The palace and local collection of valuables may indicate that there was a king or a local authority even then when Egyptian power was seemingly fading.[80] The city contained a statue base of Ramesses VI (a reason for Ussishkin's late dating), which shows Egyptian influence, although not necessarily direct control.[81] It should be noted that Late Bronze Age Egyptian governor's residences do not exclude the presence of a local ruler, even if they really were the homes of governors or Egyptian officials. Palace also probably existed in Lachish in the 12th century.[82]

Given the shortage of adequate textual material about the existence or lack of city-states in Canaan at the end of the 13th and especially the 12th century, it is difficult to investigate the

[76] CLINE 2009, 193; HASEL 1998, 179-180, 261. Ashkelon was a city-state in the Amarna period (EA 320 in RAINEY and SCHNIEDEWIND 2014, 1194) as was Gezer (EA 298 in RAINEY and SCHNIEDEWIND 2014, 1148).

[77] See about them above.

[78] BLOCH-SMITH and NAKHAI 1999, 107-108. The governor's residence hints at Egyptian administration (HASEL 1998: 94).

[79] USSISHKIN 1998, 214.

[80] FELDMAN 2009, 176-177, 188-192.

[81] USSISHKIN 1998, 214. The statue base is useful for dating purposes (despite not having been found in its proposed original stratum) but is a weak indicator of political control (FELDMAN 2009, 192). Although statues of rulers were often built in vassal territories, there are also indications that statues may represent diplomatic connections or trade. Text RS 88.2158 is a request by the ruler of Ugarit, who was a Hittite vassal, for the Egyptian pharaoh to send a statue to Ugarit (MORRIS 2015, 315-316). It may be an attempt to warm up relations between Ugarit and Egypt at a time when the Hittite empire was weakening (SINGER 2000, 22-24). Different possibilities, like that statue was valuable in itself, improved trade, presented some sort of military security or, indeed, showed warming of political relations, are discussed by MORRIS (2015, 320-345). Egyptian statues are present in Phoenician and Syrian cities already in the Middle Bronze Age (AUBET 2013, 252), showing that sending statues may have had economic or even aesthetic reasons, but did not indicate political domination.

[82] USSISHKIN 2004, 62-64, 69-70. There are other Late Bronze Age palaces, or at least buildings presumed to have been palaces, like the one in Hazor, but this town seems to have come to an end already some time in the middle of the 13th century (VAN DER STEEN 2017, 167, BEN-TOR and ZUCKERMAN 2008, 2; BONFIL and ZARZECKI-BELEG 2007, 40-42; VAN DER STEEN 2017, 167).

political system. This shortage of sources about the Southern Levant probably results from the fact that Pharaohs' activities (especially military campaigns) were often focused on the Central Levant (Tunip, Qadesh) and the Hittites and not on the Southern Levant.[83] The archaeological material tends to be ambivalent, when it comes to assessing whether the Egyptians controlled the towns, or whether there were local autonomous kings or mayors. When discussing Egyptian influence on Canaan below, I will consider both versions.

The Southern Levant in the crisis

The late 13th century and the 12th century brought about three processes in the Southern Levant: the destruction of several settlements, the appearance of the new settlers of western origin in Philistia, and the gradual decline of Egyptian control in the Levant.[84] Processes such as these can be seen as symptoms of a serious crisis in the region, and some (such as Egyptian decline) may have in turn amplified the crisis.[85]

Archaeological findings point to the (often not complete) destruction in several towns during the late 13th and 12th century, like in Gezer, Lachish, Ekron and Megiddo, several of which were earlier centers of city-states.[86] However, the fate of towns in a specific region varied considerably, for example in Philistia. There are possible signs of destruction in Gath and of partial destruction in Ashdod and Ekron.[87] At the same time Ashkelon has no signs of destruction, although the settlement was possibly abandoned.[88] The Conventional Chronology

[83] Especially for Ramesses II (HASEL 1998, 152-154).

[84] A much discussed aspect of this period is the development of Israelite culture in the Central Highlands. I will not touch upon these problems in detail here. The material culture of Central Highlands is similar to Bronze Age Canaanite material culture and few features, which are occasionally used to argue that distinct „Israelite" culture was arising, are all problematic. They are either adaptions to local circumstances (terracing, cisterns) or regionally more widespread (four-room house, collared-rim storage jar) (HASEL 1998, 207-215; ZEVIT 2001, 101-102).

[85] About it below.

[86] KILLEBREW 2005, 208; MORRIS 2005, 692; USSISHKIN 2004, 69-70. See above about their city-state status in the Amarna letters.

[87] In Gath, there is some doubt over the destruction. Destruction is indicated in the building in Area E, but the building does not seem to have been burned. Researchers refer to a lot of restorable pottery, which indicates that the building may have been abandoned in a hurry. Even so, the following sub-phase contains limited finds while it does not yet contain the Philistine 1 pottery, thus probably preceding the settlement process of the western migrants (MAEIR 2012, 16-19, SHAI et al. 2012, 229-230). In Ashdod, signs of destruction are limited to Areas G and A, while there are no signs of destruction in Area H (MAZAR and BEN-SHLOMO 2005, 13; DOTHAN and PORATH 1993, 53; YASUR-LANDAU 2010, 221). See also the reassessment of all layers by FINKELSTEIN and SINGER-AVITZ (2001, 233–235), which in turn is discarded in the excavation report (BEN-SHLOMO 2005, 8). About Ekron see DOTHAN and GITIN (2012, 4), KILLEBREW (2013, 85) and above about the debate on the destruction. Depending on the side in this debate, Stratum VIIIA ended peacefully or was partially destroyed. The first case would mean that the western settlers did not appear alongside the destruction, which took place some time before.

[88] YASUR-LANDAU 2010, 225-226. It is unclear how long the supposed gap lasted. The last stratum that preceded the stratum with western cultural traits had an unfinished Egyptian garrison building. Some have proposed that the

would date the destructions to the first half of 12th century and the Low Chronology to the second half of the 12th century. Depending on the dating of the destructions, these happened either despite the Egyptian control over the area or at a time after Egypt had lost dominance of the area. Philistia also illustrates another side of the crisis: that the severity of the damage was variable. In some places the whole settlement suffered while elsewhere only selected buildings were destroyed.[89]

Destructions, whether due to the local inter-city-state warfare, raids or uprisings, are not only a phenomenon of the 12th century crisis but also have taken place earlier under Egyptian domination. Hazor, for example, seems to have been destroyed in the 13th century.[90] As seen from the campaigns mentioned before, Egyptians themselves moved against Canaanite towns when necessary. However, the destruction in the 12th century Southern Levant may be connected to that of towns in Anatolia, Ugarit, the Aegean and Cyprus and the crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean, but the explanation of what sort of factors were at play depends on a specific destroyed site. Egyptian sources indicate a destructive wave of people coming towards Egypt, but do not mention any attacks on the specific towns in the Southern Levant.[91] They place the destruction to ca 1175, but as mentioned, the Low Chronology would date the destructions in Philistia into a later period (ca. 1125).[92]

Alongside the dating problems, the lack of written sources after Merneptah's rule and lack of adequate archaeological finds makes it generally impossible to tell who was responsible for the destruction of specific settlements or parts of them. Michael Hasel has concluded that at least based on Egyptian iconography and textual records, Egyptians did not burn towns. If so, the conflagrations in the settlements should indicate that someone else attacked these towns.[93] However, one has to take into account that Egyptian propaganda may have differed considerably from the historical reality.

Despite the dating problems and the difficulties of identifying the attackers (or whether the damage was caused by humans at all), it cannot be denied that numerous destructions happened in the 12th century. Sometimes, like in Lachish, the destruction was followed by the abandonment of the settlement.[94] It is not clear if any other city-states survived the crisis (or until the 12th century) either, even if the settlements were not destroyed. This hints at least to

Egyptians abandoned it when the "Sea Peoples" attacked, as it is not only unfinished, but the lack of more proper foundation, for example, may point to a hurried building process (AJA 2009, 66-67).

[89] Igor Kreimerman has shown that destructions in the Southern Levant can be divided into types, varying from total destruction to limited action against public buildings or fortifications (KREIMERMAN 2017).

[90] BEN-TOR and ZUCKERMAN 2008, 2.

[91] See about the „Sea Peoples" and Medinet Habu above and for example in CLINE and O'CONNOR 2003.

[92] See above.

[93] HASEL 1998, 191-192.

[94] BRYCE 2009, 402; USSISHKIN 2004, 69-72, 76.

a two-fold change in the political system: the disappearance of the Egyptian dominance and along with that the possible collapse of the vassal city-state system.

There are several signs pointing to the Egyptians' gradual loss of control over the Southern Levant in the 12th century. It seems that no new "governor's buildings" or fortresses were built there after the beginning of the 12th century: the last ones like the rebuilding Tel Mor citadel or Ashkelon garrison building took place at the end of the 13th or in the early 12th century.[95] There is one exception: based on C14 dating the gate of the fortress in Jaffa was still being repaired.[96] The main argument for attesting the Egyptian presence and dating the Egypt's loss of control over the Southern Levant is the disappearance of items bearing the names of Egyptian pharaohs after Ramesses VI.[97] Not all of these items are useful for dating the period when Egyptians still had some control or influence over the area. For example, scarabs and two finger-rings without provenance with the names of Ramesses IV and VI were obtained in Deir el-Balah.[98] Even the items found in archaeological contexts, like jewelry and scarabs, say little about political control (although can be used for dating). Somewhat more reliable findings, like a stone block of Ramesses IV in Tel Delhamiya and a bronze statue base of Ramesses VI in Megiddo, may indicate Egyptian control, although they have also been found out of their original context.[99] One indicator that Egypt may have still ruled some coastal areas at the time of Ramesses VI is the destruction of the gates of Jaffa – an Egyptian stronghold – around the time of his rule.[100] Strong Egyptian influence during the reigns of Ramesses IV to VI can be concluded from numerous small items found from Serabit el-Khadem and the Timna mines.[101]

In the middle of the 12th century there is, with few exceptions, a gap among the written sources mentioning the Southern Levant. Weinstein points out that there are three Egyptian officials connected to the time of Ramesses III from Megiddo, Timna and Beth Shean.[102] Papyrus Harris I, written during the reign of Ramesses IV, also mentions the Southern Levant.[103] It seems, then, that Ramesses III held onto the Southern Levant, and there are many items with

[95] AJA 2009, 66; MORRIS 2005, 772-773.

[96] BURKE et al. 2017, 126-127.

[97] See for example WEINSTEIN 1992 and FINKELSTEIN 2000.

[98] FINKELSTEIN 2000, 161-162. These items, or at least some of them, have been obtained from the black market and nothing ties them to any archaeological context, despite the fact that they were bought near the Deir el-Balah.

[99] The Megiddo statue base was not found in its supposed original stratum FELDMAN 2009, 192. The Tel Delhamiya block was found on the surface WEINSTEIN 1992, 146.

[100] There were at least two destruction events in the second half of the 12th century, with the latter probably bringing an end to the Egyptians' fortress. The dating is based on radiocarbon data BURKE et al. 2017, 126-127.

[101] WEINSTEIN 1992, 146.

[102] WEINSTEIN 1992, 146.

[103] It mentions a temple in Djahy HASEL 2009, 9.

his name found there.[104] The proposal by Shirly Ben-Dor Evian, that the Medinet Habu reliefs represent an Egyptian campaign to the Central Levant, is also worth considering.[105] In that case, Egypt during the reign of Ramesses III was more powerful than previously thought. However, these campaigns were not enough to save the empire. Gradually, dominance was lost, although if the statue base of Ramesses VI should indicate influence or even control over Megiddo, then this pharaoh still held onto the northern part of the Southern Levant and possibly Jaffa. Signs of Egyptian control disappeared after his time, which suggests that the empire had collapsed.[106] Written sources about the political situation in Canaan disappear until the Wenamun story from the 11th century, which implies that Egyptians had lost their influence, and respect towards them, in the Central Levant. However, the account is essentially a work of fiction.[107]

It is difficult, then, to pinpoint the time when Egyptians lost control over the Southern Levant. It seems to have disappeared at some time around the middle of the 12th century, but connecting the loss of dominance to a specific pharaoh may not be possible, or perhaps even not relevant given the short reigns of the pharaohs.[108] It is very likely that the collapse of the empire was a drawn-out process, during which the ability or interest to control some settlements and regions was lost. The reasons for this inability may have lied in Egypt's weakness at that period. Egyptians had to deal with an assassination attempt on Ramesses III, the short reigns of the succeeding pharaohs, the rise in grain prize and the workers' strike in Deir el-Medina.[109] Added to that were the fights against the Libyans to keep them away from the Delta.[110] For whatever reason the Egypt lost its dominance, the loss of control became a factor that deepened the distress in the Levant, as will be discussed below.

I will briefly discuss the issue of new people arriving in Philistia. New types of material like locally made Aegean Style ceramics (Philistine 1), hearths, loomweights and incised scapulae in Ekron, Gath, Ashkelon and Ashdod point to the arrival of a sizable number of people with western (Aegean, Cypriot) origin.[111] At the same time, local people using Canaanite material culture continued to inhabit the towns.[112] After a century of research, there are still considerable questions about the origin of these people, their connections to the "Sea Peoples", or to the Philistines, and the exact processes of their arrival. As noted above, some of these

[104] WEINSTEIN 1992, 146. Some are not directly named, like the reference on the inscription from Tel Sera that merely marks a ruler's year 22. But only Ramesses III ruled long enough in the 12th century to fit this description FINKELSTEIN 2000, 163.

[105] BEN-DOR EVIAN 2016, 163.

[106] Although, as mentioned above, the statue base may indicate other interactions than just political control.

[107] DEMAND 2012, 220-221; LICHTHEIM 2003, 89-93.

[108] See LESKO 1992, 154 and WEINSTEIN 1992, 147 for short reigns.

[109] LANGGUT et al. 2013, 165; WEINSTEIN 1992, 147.

[110] SPALINGER 2005, 235-245, 249.

[111] MAEIR et al. 2013, 1-15; YASUR-LANDAU 2010, 216-278.

[112] YASUR-LANDAU 2010, 240-241.

settlements (Ashdod, possibly Gath and Ekron) experienced destruction before the arrival of these western migrants. Although the destructions may be related to the settlement of the western migrants, who in turn may be the same people (the Peleset) mentioned among the hostile "Sea Peoples", it is also possible that the migrants arrived peacefully.[113] It is not clear how Egyptian control (or the lack of it) related to the arrival of the western migrants. The dating issue mentioned in the beginning of the article becomes important here. Not only are there debates over whether Philistine 1 pottery arrived ca. 1175 or ca. 1125, but as outlined above, the loss of the Egyptian control seems to be a drawn-out process, impossible to be dated accurately because of the ambivalence of archaeological material.[114]

Different scenarios can be and have been put forward depending on the chronological reconstructions and the ways the Egyptian sources are interpreted. One version sees the Egyptian records as accurate in principle, meaning that the western migrants were part of the "Sea Peoples" who were defeated by Ramesses III and settled in Philistia.[115] Another version supposes that the Egyptian records disguise the fact that Ramesses III had to accept the settlement of the "Sea Peoples" in Philistia and retained control only outside this region.[116] Israel Finkelstein and proponents of the Low Chronology would disconnect the "Sea Peoples" narrative from the settlement process in Philistia, dating the settlement process circa half a century later, after the end of the Egyptian empire in Levant and the collapse of strongholds like Megiddo.[117] All these reconstructions see the Egyptians as opposing the western settlers in some way or another.

However, it is possible that the Egyptians were not actively trying to stop the migration into their territory.[118] It cannot be said, who was behind the partial destructions in some towns of Philistia: besides western migrants these could have been other local raiders or other towns or

[113] See about the Philistines, the Peleset and western settlers above in the discussion about chronology.

[114] In addition, migration also can be a drawn-out process (YASUR-LANDAU 2010, 316-320), although the debates are about the first appearance of Philistine 1 pottery and not about the length of the migratory event. See about the dating above.

[115] FINKELSTEIN 2000, 159; Finkelstein and PIASETZKI 2007, 75.

[116] Trying to contain the settlers in Philistia: BARAKO 2013, 51; BLOCH-SMITH and NAKHAI 1999, 116.

[117] As mentioned above, they think that Medinet Habu refers to events taking place half a century before the western migrants settling in Philistia. The argument that relates specifically to Megiddo is that the settlement guarded the north-south route through the area and would have stopped any migration from happening. Thus, no large-scale migration could have happened before ca. 1130, when the settlement was destroyed USSISHKIN 1998, 214-217. This, of course, assumes that the migration was considerable. An additional assumption is that the migration process would have been violent and the Egyptians definitely opposed any such movement. However, migrants may have used the more difficult coastal route, travelled by sea or been peaceful and not posed a threat to the Egyptians. See about the coastal route in USSISHKIN (1998, 215-216), who is skeptical that it could have been used. For the possibility of sea-based migration see YASUR-LANDAU 2010, 102-113.

[118] The use of Low Chronology, of course, presumes that the migration happened after the collapse of the Egyptian dominance in Levant and the Egyptians would have not been in a position to oppose migrating people, whether they were peaceful or hostile.

even the Egyptians themselves.[119] If migrants arrived in smaller groups and settled the towns in the first half of the 12th century in the Egyptian controlled areas, then they would have been a threat to Egypt only if they were violent or wanted to break with the Egyptian empire.[120] If the new population was peaceful, it would not have threatened the Egyptians' authority. Although the Old Testament lists the former Egyptian center Gaza as one of the Philistine city-states, there is no proof that the people who settled Ekron, Ashdod, Ashkelon and Gath took over Gaza in the 12th century.[121] Late Bronze Age and Early Iron Age Gaza is archaeologically largely unknown, and the first written source to refer to the Peleset and Gaza – the Onomasticon of Amenemope – lists Gaza, Askhelon and Ashdod before Peleset, but these words are not distinctly associated with each other.[122] It is therefore possible that the western settlers did not threaten Egyptians in Gaza.

In fact, both the Egyptians and the local residents may have felt the benefits of these new western settlers coming there. They would have provided additional workforce and boosted the defensive capabilities. Given that following their arrival there were developments in ceramics and extensive building work in a new style, the Egyptians or the local Canaanites may have also appreciated people with artisanal expertise,[123] especially as Mycenaean-style ceramics were appreciated in the Bronze Age Levant.[124]

What can be said with confidence about the late 13th and 12th century Canaan is limited due to the dating problems, the archaeological ambiguities and the scarcity of written sources. There were definitely at least limited destructions in some towns, even a destruction and abandonment of some former city-state centers (Lachish, Megiddo).[125] The Egyptian empire was seemingly in control of the region in the beginning of the 12th century, but the empire had collapsed by the end of the century. No archaeological or written evidence, at least, would indicate the contrary. During the 12th century new western migrants appeared in Philistia and settled there in numbers large enough to leave behind distinct material culture, but they lived in the same settlements with people who still used the Bronze Age Canaanite material culture.

[119] As Merneptah, for example, supposedly pacified Ashkelon: HASEL 1998, 178-180.

[120] Migrants may have arrived to Philistia over time and never formed a majority YASUR-LANDAU 2010, 294-295, 316-320.

[121] See about Philistine towns in the Bible in MACHINIST 2000, 57-59.

[122] BRYCE 2009, 250-251; GILBOA 2005, 47; HASEL 1998, 137-138; KILLEBREW 2005, 208. It is thought that the onomasticon originates from the period of Ramesses IX at the earliest, thus from the end of the 12th century: GILBOA 2005, 47.

[123] See about the ceramics in KILLEBREW 2005, 219-230 and the new architecture in AJA 2009.

[124] They were wide-spread in the Eastern Mediterranean, although not only as luxuries WIJNGAARDEN 2002, 275-280. See also SHERRATT 1998, 194-298.

[125] BRYCE 2009, 402; USSISHKIN 1998, 214-215; USSISHKIN 2004, 69-72, 76. See above for Lachish and Megiddo as city-states in the Amarna letters.

The influence of Egyptian control on the crisis in Levant

Given the collapse of the Egyptian empire and destruction of several towns, the processes in Levant – the crisis in a regional sense – could be connected to the general crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean. There are signs that the climate changed in the 13th-12th century, which could have led to agricultural problems and famine.[126] At the same time the collapse of the Hittite empire and the palatial Mycenaean states brought about considerable political changes. These collapses may have been a result of a number of smaller problems (agricultural problems, raids, attacks by enemies, disputes over the throne in the Hittite empire) the cumulative effect of which proved fatal for the existing states.[127] Two notable city-states – Ugarit and Emar – were destroyed by the enemy raids and not settled again.[128] It seems that the change in the local climate and resulting agricultural pressure, attacks by hostile groups of people or other states, and imperial incapability to handle these crises caused considerable changes in the Eastern Mediterranean. This large-scale crisis can explain some of the events in Levant, but only when regional factors are also taken into account. It was not a crisis that brought destruction everywhere and many locations like Cyprus, Phoenicia or Carchemish, all of which either survived the crisis or even benefitted from it, were not negatively affected.[129]

The nature of the Egyptians' control over the Southern Levant can explain a part of what happened in the region: why were some settlements destroyed; why the political system seems to have collapsed; and even how did the situation favour the settling of migrants in Philistia. I will propose the main ways how the Egyptian power could have contributed to the crisis. However, the factors that will be outlined below represent preliminary suggestions, still to be further tested in the light of new finds and also further analysis of the current evidence.

Firstly, Egyptian military supremacy was important. Although the local city-states had military forces, at least in the Amarna Age, they were limited and were not a match for the organized Egyptian army.[130] In a situation where troubles in neighbouring regions and stress on the agriculture created favourable conditions for increased conflict in the Late Bronze Age, military forces would have become very important. The city-states or settlements (if the Egyptians were directly controlling these) would have depended on the Egyptian military for protection against both foreign and local elements. However, Egypt may have been overwhelmed by different conflicts (it had to guard its southern and western borders) and not

[126] LANGGUT et al. 2013. Famine or food-crisis is mentioned in Hittite, Egyptian and Ugaritic sources (ibid., 165).

[127] BRYCE 2005, 340-346; CLINE 2014, 128-132; HOFFNER JR. 1992, 49-51.

[128] YON 1992, 117.

[129] Cypriot construction projects were mentioned above. Phoenician towns could have benefitted from the destruction of potential competitors like Ugarit, although the expansion of Phoenician trade networks took centuries (see for example SHERRATT and SHERRATT 1993). Carchemish survived the crisis and became the center of an independent, although small, polity after the collapse of the Hittite empire, with the new ruler claiming the Hittite emperor's title „Great king": BRYCE 2005, 349-350; GÜTERBOCK 1992, 54-55; SINGER 2000, 28.

[130] See above.

willing or capable of sending support for small local polities or towns.[131] In this case the towns would have been more exposed to raids or attacks by enemies. This scenario seems to have taken place in Ugarit in the north, where the local military forces were weakened at the time the enemy came.[132] That is not to say that the Egyptians did not help at all. The "Sea Peoples" reliefs in Medinet Habu may at least partially reflect the historical conditions and the Egyptians' attempts to fight against some sort of enemy coming to Canaan. In that case, there seems to have been an enemy or enemies invading Canaan from elsewhere (many of the "Sea Peoples" are previously unknown in Egyptian records), who Egyptians defeated securing their Southern Levant territories.[133] However, no Egyptian campaigns into Levant were recorded after that point.

There was plenty of local competition from other towns, as indicated for the Amarna period, the people like the Apiru and the Shasu threatened and probably sometimes successfully attacked the settlements, and the western migrants or other groups moving into the region from outside could have also resorted to attacking the towns.[134] Neither can one exclude the Egyptians, who may have attacked the Canaanite cities when they acted against their interest.[135] However, neither the Medinet Habu texts nor the later Papyrus Harris reflect attempts to fight for or against the towns in South Levant, and it seems that the towns that were destroyed were destroyed by somebody else than by the Egyptians. The situation was worsened by another outcome of the Egyptian policy, or at least a factual result of the Egyptian dominance, namely the lack of city-walls.[136] This could explain how the towns could have easily fallen victim to even the smaller groups of raiders, who would have lacked resources and experience for siege-warfare.[137]

The economic policies of the Egyptians too played a role.[138] Supplying the Egyptian military and paying tribute and tax, especially if local autonomous polities still existed, was a burden for the towns. In peaceful periods the strains were not as serious because an imperial power would be interested in vassal-states being able to pay tribute and taxes or supplying the army.[139] Supplying Egypt with food and materials or luxury goods in a time of crisis may have

[131] See about the Libyans in SPALINGER 2005, 235-245, 249. See about interactions with the Nubians in MORRIS 2005, 782-788.

[132] At least the king of Ugarit informed the king of Alashiya that his forces and navy were away in a letter sent at some time before the destruction of the town: WACHSMANN 2000, 104.

[133] See above for Medinet Habu and the "Sea Peoples".

[134] BRYCE 2009, 269, 626. See about the western settlers above.

[135] As noted above, campaigns by Seti I and Merneptah are examples from an earlier period.

[136] BUNIMOVITZ 1998, 104.

[137] Of course, even large well-defended towns, like Ugarit, fell victim to enemy attacks: CLINE 2014, 149-151; YON 2006, 31-34, although it is not wholly clear, if fortifications were still in use before the destruction: YON 2006, 31.

[138] See above.

[139] Although, see DEVER 1992, 105 and the authors referred to in there for a quite a bleak reconstruction of the Egyptian policy, which was already exhausting resources in the 14th century. Spalinger 2005, 135, however, notes that the

been too much. Even famine would not be excluded from the possible scenario, although not very likely as there is no mention of famine in the Southern Levant. However, famine seems to have struck for example the Hittite empire. The Hittite king asked for food from his vassals, at least from Ugarit, and the latter had to justify why it did not send any, citing the lack of food as a reason.[140] Moreover, Pharaoh Merneptah claims to have sent food to the Hittites. It looks as though Egypt weathered this crisis, which might apply also for the nearby Southern Levant, although the price of grain in Egypt did eventually rise and it is not out of the question that Egypt demanded additional food or other resources from its vassals.[141] One has to keep the general lack of texts about Southern Levant in mind. The Egyptians nevertheless used the Canaanite food resources and human work-force, possibly even to the extent that caused towns to rise up or the local people to flee to other areas. The latter is one of the proposed reasons behind the increase of population in the Central Highlands.[142] A similar theory links the rise of Highland settlement to a collapse of the Egypt's control. This theory proposes that the Egyptians restricted people's movement, but when Egyptian dominance was fading the people were free to migrate to other regions like the Highlands, and did so.[143]

Tribute included luxury goods and metals, and to meet these requirements the vassal states must have continued to participate in the international trade not only for their own sake, but also for Egypt's.[144] However, the economic situation worsened due to disruptions to the trade routes and the loss of partners. In addition, Susan Sherratt has theorized that in the end of the Late Bronze Age there were more merchant operations outside of the rigid palace-controlled systems than before, increased access to bronze, and a spread of sub-elite products imitating elite art like decorated ceramics. This change would have disrupted the palace-controlled economy and left them out of the new networks.[145] The need to keep Egypt supplied with traditional goods may have put palaces in a position where they were unable to participate in this trade system of new goods. The Megiddo ivory hoard indicates that some trade or access to the luxury items still persisted.[146] These problems concerned the city-states. If the Egyptian

Amarna letters do not mention foodstuffs and Egyptian economic control, at least at that period, was not too exhaustive.

[140] Letter RS 18.038 in PARDEE 2003, 94-95.

[141] LANGGUT et al. 2013, 165.

[142] DEVER 1992, 105; DEVER 2017, 226; KILLEBREW 2005, 152; SPALINGER 2005, 134-135. The runaway Canaanite theory, of course, is highly debated as many other reasons for the increase in Highlands' settlement have also been proposed: the settlement of semi-nomadic, nomadic, or pastoral people and immigration from Trans-Jordan: DEVER 2017, 194-210; KILLEBREW 2005, 159, 182-185. A similar draining of workforce has been proposed as an explanation for the problems of Syrian city-states at the end of the Late Bronze Age: SADER 1992, 158.

[143] KILLEBREW 2005, 171.

[144] SPALINGER 2005, 134 and see above. The fact that both luxuries and metals were moved in international trade, is seen from many sources, although wrecks like Uluburun illustrate that trade in the best way: PULAK 1998.

[145] SHERRATT 1998, 294-301, 306-307; SHERRATT 2016, 290-298.

[146] See above.

control over the Levantine settlements was more direct, then it is possible that the settlements were not that extensively exploited, especially when long-distance trade goods were in question, as Egyptian officials would have known the capacity of local settlements intimately.

The last problem of the Egyptian hegemony has to do with the political control in general, and the inability of the city-states or settlements to adapt to the new situation. The rule of the Egyptian empire brought about a long relatively stable period for the city-states. For the southern states there were only two military threats: other local city-states and Egypt. Fear of the latter would have kept the city-states from forming alliances, especially if Egypt's presence increased during the Late Bronze Age. Along with the lack of military protection it became a serious issue when Egypt withdrew its presence, while new foreign or local enemies started to attack.[147] There was no time to build up fortifications, armies and alliances in the changing situation, while Egypt did not seem to be able or willing to help. It is not clear, if local conflicts or external forces were behind the destruction, abandonment or the settlement of western migrants, but it seems that the local settlements or polities had to increasingly fend for themselves. Some settlements (like Lachish) were abandoned, while settlements in Philistia saw the arrival of new people.[148] At the same time the Egyptian empire either lost its hold on Levant against its intentions, or because of the problems in Egypt proper it felt no need to hold onto Levant.

I would also propose that the slow collapse of the empire benefitted the settlement of the people arriving from west. However, the question how exactly this took place depends on which reconstruction of the settlement process one would accept. If the migrants from west were hostile and attacked the towns of Philistia before settling in them, then the unfortified towns, which were incapable of effectively protecting themselves, or did not even have local government anymore, were an easy target. Ashkelon is a good example. The town was attacked and pacified by Merneptah at the end of the 13th century, according to the pharaoh's account, and an Egyptian-style garrison building was subsequently built there. The Egyptians, in turn, seems to have abandoned the town before finishing their structure.[149] This indicates that the autonomous city-state had come to an end and the settlers from the west could have easily taken over the town. Other towns may have also lacked a local government to organize defence while not getting any help from the Egyptians. A different reconstruction is also possible. If the new settlers from the west were not hostile and the migration was peaceful, then Egyptians may have not seen them as a danger at all and may have let them settle there. The locals could have appreciated the benefits of the migrants arriving and settling the towns alongside them, as the newcomers provided additional workforce, defence capability and craft expertise in a period when uncertainty was rising and the political system on which the towns had relied on

[147] DEVER 2017, 104.

[148] See above.

[149] AJA 2009, 66-67; HASEL 1998, 180, 261. As mentioned, they may have also fled the settlement: AJA 2009, 66-67.

so far was collapsing. The exact circumstances and nature of this western migration into Philistia are, however, dependent on dating, which has remained ambiguous.

Conclusion

During the Late Bronze Age, the region of the Southern Levant was under the Egyptian dominance. Egypt controlled the area through military, economic and political hegemony, although local city-states could act relatively autonomously. Over time, the Egyptians' direct control may have increased, but there are signs in Megiddo and in the Egyptian written sources that city-states survived the 13th century. The events at the end of that century and at the beginning of the 12th century, during the crisis affecting the whole of the Eastern Mediterranean, also considerably affected the Southern Levant. Several settlements, including former city-state centers, were destroyed, abandoned or saw the arrival of new people from the west, while Egypt withdrew from the region. The dating of the destructions and the retreat of the Egyptians from the area in the 12th century is debated, but at least the Egyptian retreat probably took place gradually over a long period of time. Yet, the Egyptian policy and influence in the region played an important role in worsening the crisis.

Firstly, the Egyptian forces had previously attacked the area, and Egypt was not interested in having strong vassals, which may have led to a policy banning fortifications, and maybe even large armies, for the city-states. As the result, during the unstable 12th century local settlements were left without adequate defenses to oppose attacks by raiders, people of other settlements, foreigners and possibly even the Egyptians.

Secondly, in the time of crisis and possibly even famine, the Egyptian empire was probably using local supplies and goods. The vassal states and settlements had to supply these. But contributions became more difficult to give when the agricultural situation worsened and trade networks disintegrated.

Lastly, as the political system changed in a short time, the city-states had not enough time to adapt to the changing conditions, to start building fortifications, armies, trade networks and alliances. The previous long dependence on the empire for security had reduced the willingness to make changes, which could besides have angered the Egyptians.

Although the crisis in the Southern Levant was created by climate change, the economic changes and the increased regional insecurity, the Egyptian control of the area in the Late Bronze Age probably had effects which rather deepened the crisis than alleviated it.

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Old Hittite Opposition in the Religious Aspect

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Abstract. *The paper proposes a new approach to the conflict between Hattušili I and Tawananna using the new interpretation of some historiolae of Zuwi's ritual. A political interpretation of these historiolae explains their content better than a magical one. Tracing the parallels between the animal figures in Zuwi's ritual and in the political rhetoric of Hattušili I allows us to reconstruct an alliance between the royal relatives as well as the priesthood being the opponents to the Old Hittite external expansion.*

Rezumat: *Studiul de față propune o nouă abordare cu privire la conflictul dintre Hattušili I și Tawananna pe baza unei noi analize asupra a unor historiolae din cadrul ritualului lui Zuwi. O interpretare politică a acestora poate explica întregul context mai bine decât una strict religioasă. Identificarea paralelelor dintre figurile animaliere din ritualul lui Zuwi și retorica politică a lui Hattušili I ne permite să reconstituit o alianță din sânul familiei regale, precum și modul în care sacerdoții se opouneau expansiunii Vechiului Regat Hittit.*

Keywords: Old Hittite history, Hattušili I, Tawananna, Zuwi's ritual, political metaphors, Hittite animals.

Introduction

The opposition to the Hittite royal power in the Old Kingdom attracts a lot of attention, not least because of the polemics concerning it in the Old Hittite didactic literature. In these masterpieces of rhetoric, the Hittite kings describe many examples of their struggle for power with their relatives who appear as political troublemakers. One of the most important conflicts of this epoch was the confrontation between Tabarna Hattušili I and a person called Tawananna, described in the Edict of Hattušili (CTH 5).

The identification of this Tawananna is debatable, as different scholars identify her as either the aunt,[1] the mother,[2] a sister,[3] a wife,[4] or a daughter[5] of Hattušili I. We do not know the reasons for the political conflict between Hattušili I and Tawananna and the strictly

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[1] BEAL 1983, 126; SOYSAL 1987, 251; FORLANINI 2010, 117, 124.

[2] SOMMER, FALKENSTEIN 1938, 212.

[3] DOVGYALO 1968, 116; IVANOV 1968, 71; HOFFNER 1980, 202; BRYCE 1981, 16; CARRUBA 1992, 80; SÜRENHAGEN 1998, 88; YIĞIT 2005, 788; FREU 2007, 95.

[4] GÖTZE 1928, 17; HARDY 1941, 199; BEAL 1983, 126.

[5] BIN-NUN 1975, 53; DE MARTINO 1991, 59; STEINER 1996, 608; GILAN 2015, 89.

documentary evidence does not reflect this dispute. The bulk of the current discussion revolve around the sister and/or daughter of Hattušili I, and the scholars who consider both alternatives prefer the latter one, supposing that the exiled (according to the Testament of Hattušili (CTH 6)) daughter resumed the fight against the father.[6] The sister of Hattušili I, as we know from his Testament, was not neutralized by the king in the same degree as his daughter was,[7] and the Edict does not tell that Tawananna's actions would have trespassed some earlier restrictions. Therefore, this Tawananna should be a sister of the king.

The nature of the conflict between Tabarna and Tawananna

Neither the Testament nor the Edict describe properly the reasons for the conflicts between the king and his relatives. Hattušili I emphasises that other people exerted influence on his relatives: *aḫ-ḫu-šu ù aḫ-ḫa-tu-šu-ú a-wa-a-ti ka-aṣ-ṣa-a-ti it-ta-na-ab-ba-lu-šum-ma* 'his brothers and sisters constantly report to him cold words' (KUB 1.16 I 10–11) and tries to reduce such an influence: *nu-ut-ta* $^{LÚ.MEŠ}$ŠU.GI ^{URU}KÙ.BABBAR-*TI le-e me-mi-eš-kán-du* 'The elders of Hatti will not speak to you!' (KUB 1.16 II 60). The king does not specify the kind of opposition these influencers belonged to.

Some researchers view these conflicts as an internecine struggle caused by the large number of royal clans and the underdevelopment of the stately bureaucracy.[8] However, these factors characterise the organization of the Hittite administration throughout its history,[9] but the conflict with Tawananna seems to present a collapse of rather unusual scale. What we know about the conflict points to the problem of succession: the Hittite king established the younger Labarna, the son of his sister (Tawananna) as his heir, but he turned out to be not the best candidate and was finally deprived of power in favour of Ḫattušili's grandson Muršili, whereas Tawananna with her progeny were ostracized. However, a war of succession would have started after the deprivation of the heir, not before this. The attempts to understand this conflict as a part of a long-term struggle between royal clans[10] seem therefore questionable. The clan of Tawananna would have had no interest to be disloyal towards Ḫattušili I as long as the younger Labarna was accepted to the Hittite throne. Ḫattušili I was presently fighting his children representing another clan, as described in his Testament, which means that the wishes of this other clan to reduce Tawananna's influence would scarcely have led the king to oppose her.

[6] DE MARTINO, IMPARATI 1998, 394–395.

[7] According to the reconstruction of KUB 1.16 III 13–22 by SOMMER and FALKENSTEIN (1938, 12–13), the "Testament" describes in §17 the exile of the royal daughter from Hattuša to a countryside. The problem is that outside of lacunae MÍ.LUGAL "royal daughter" appears nearby only in KUB 1.16 III 25, the next paragraph, and not in §17. Nevertheless, the royal sister does not emerge in these lines at all.

[8] LIVERANI 1988, 431, 444; DE MARTINO 2016, 27.

[9] BILGIN 2018, 453.

[10] FORLANINI 2010, 124.

Ḫattušili I depicts in his Edict the oppositional actions of Tawananna as the removal of the capital from Ḫattuša: [*ta*] *ki-še-ra-aš-ša-an e-ep-z*[*i … ú-w*]*a-te-ez-zi ta ú-iz-zi* ^{URU}*Ḫ*[*a-at-tu-ša-an ta*]*-mi-u-ma-an i-e-zi ta eš-ḫa-na-aš* [*ut-tar i-e-zi*] '[And sh]e will seize his hand [… and will l]ead and come. She will make the city of Ḫ[attuša a]nother one. And [she will make the matter] of blood.' (KBo 3.27 obv. 3-5), *m*[*a-a-an-*]*ša-an ḫa-a-ši-*⌜*i*⌝ *p*[*a-aḫ-ḫ*]*u-ur* [*n*]*a-at-ta pa-ra-iš-*⌜*te*⌝*-ni ta ú-iz-zi* ^{U}[^{RU}*Ḫa-*]*at*[*-tu-ša-an*] ⌜MUŠ⌝*-aš ḫu-la-a-li-az-zi* 'I[f] you will [n]ot blow on the f[i]re in the stove, she will come and wrap [Ḫ]at[tuša] like the snake' (KBo 3.27 obv. 25–27). The king underlines that Tawananna disturbs the order that he had established. The capital was not a traditional site of some concrete clan of the Hittite elite, but the innovation of Ḫattušili I – the special link between this king and Ḫattuša are visible[11] even if their names had nothing in common.[12]

The most remarkable results of Ḫattušili's reign were his campaigns outside Anatolia. He was the first Hittite king who tried to conquer Syrian states, and despite his failure, the interactions between Central Anatolia and Syria intensified. This could have led to a partial loss of influence of the traditional Hittite elite. The Puḫanu Chronicle (CTH 16) could tell us how some religious innovations of Ḫattušili I, like the introduction of the Storm-God of Ḫalab, met with resistance from a part of elite.[13] As this opposition took on a religious nature, we should search for its traces in religious texts, which would help a better understanding of Tawananna's role in these events.

The conflict reflected in the ritual of Zuwi

We can find such a text in the collection of the rituals of Zuwi (CTH 412)[14]. Zuwi was a magician of Luwian origin[15] who composed the ritual for the possibility of the Storm-God becoming angry. The language of this ritual text shows its Old Hittite dating and paleographical analysis suggests that one of the manuscripts (KBo 17.17+KBo 30.30) is from this period. There is moreover a Middle Hittite manuscript in this corpus (KUB 12.63+) which contains the *historiolae* with motives similar to those in the Testament of Ḫattušili and the Edict of Ḫattušili and which could offer an additional perspective to the discussion. However,

[11] The earliest major building projects of the Old Hittite period in Ḫattuša seem to have taken place in late 17th century BC, SCHACHNER 2017.

[12] BEAL (2003, 25) argues against transferring the capital to Ḫattuša by Ḫattušili I, but he admits that Ḫattušili's heir Muršili I would be the first king of this dynasty who was crowned in Ḫattuša. MARTÍNEZ (2016, 178–182) shows that most of the arguments for Ḫattuša being the capital of Ḫattušili's ancestors are tentative. On the lack of the onomastic ties between these personal name and city name, see YAKUBOVICH 2013, 72.

[13] GILAN 2004.

[14] The *editiones princeps* GIORGIERI 1988 and MORINI n.d. are not published and are not available to us.

[15] Even if we reject any traces of the Luwian influence on the ritual's text (like MELCHERT 2013, 161), the name of Zuwi looks like Luwian (ZEHNDER 2010, 324–325).

it is not clear whether this Middle Hittite copy of an Old Hittite text[16] belongs to the rituals of Zuwi at all,[17] but we will retain the name of Zuwi for KUB 12.63+ technical reasons.

The text contains the description of treating with a bull, and the dialogue between people and the bull shows that it took place during a war campaign:

nu-za-pa KASKAL-*ši* ⌜*ku-u-un*⌝ GU_4.MAḪ-*an tar-ia-an-da-an wa-a*[*r-*(*kán-ta-an*) *e-ep-pir* xx *nu-u*(*š-ša-an*)] ⌜*pu-nu-uš*⌝-*ki-iz-zi ku-it-mu e-ep-tin nu-uš-še* LÚ.MEŠ *a-ap-p*[*a me-ma-an-zi la-aḫ*(*-ḫa-aš-ki-u-wa-ni-wa*)] *n*[*u*(-)x] KASKAL-*ši tu-uk ḫa-an-da-a-u-en UM-MA* GU_4.MAḪ *ma-u-wa-m*[(*u e*)*-ep-te-ni*(?) xx *nu-wa-r*]*a-at šu-ma-aš a-aš-ma-u-wa-aš-ma-aš-ša-an aš-šu-wa-an-da-an* [(*ḫi-ik-mi*)]

And [they caught] on the road this fat[t]ened, robust bull, [... and] he asks them: 'Why you caught me?'. And the men[18] re[ply] to him: 'We are going to [w]ar, an[d ...] we fixed you on the road'. Thus (says) the bull: 'If you c[atch] me, [...] I will pass it to you, look there, the favoured one to you' (KUB 12.63 obv. 9-11 w. dupl. KBo 22.118 r. col. 1–6, mainly after Hoffner 1976: 337 and Haas 2003: 426).

The image of the bull appears in the texts of Ḫattušili I as the symbol of power. Usually, scholars identify the bull with the Storm-God of Ḫattuša, which is a well-known association in the Hittite texts, but some researchers interpret him as the Hittite king himself.[19] The previously mentioned Puḫanu Chronicle describes how a bull opened the way to the sea through the mountains using his horns (KUB 31.4+KBo 3.41 obv. 15–19). The ritual of Zuwi swaps the participants of that action. The bull is not especially mighty here, while his opponents, not he, were going to the campaign.[20] The following expression [(GU_4.MAḪ)] *Ú-UL tar-pa-aš-ša-aš-ši-iš* 'The bull is not his ritual substitute' (KUB 12.63 obv. 16 w. dupl. KBo 22.118 r. col. 16) describes this bull as unfit for the substitution ritual allegedly depicted at the beginning of the Puḫanu Chronicle.[21]

These parallels between the *historiola* from the ritual of Zuwi and the Puḫanu Chronicle show that both texts could reflect similar (if not the same) conflicts between the parties of the Hittite elite. If the conflict reflected by the Puḫanu Chronicle was the fight between the adherents of the traditional values and the supporters of the expansion into Syria bringing new cults to Ḫattuša,[22] we could interpret the ritual of Zuwi in the same way. The different

[16] HUTTER 2000, 104–105.

[17] GIORGIERI (2011) in his unpublished lecture has shown that the position of *ḫurkelaš*-people does not correspond to the main idea of the ritual of Zuwi and traces the parallels between KUB 12.63+ and some Hittite texts on the black magic.

[18] KBo 22.118 r. col. 4: male gods (DINGIR.LÚ.MEŠ).

[19] See overview in COLLINS 1998, 16–17 and GILAN 2015, 315.

[20] Or rather returning from the campaign, as the similar account of the same events KBo 8.67(+)KBo 17.23 take place in autumn, according to SOYSAL 2007, 89.

[21] DE MARTINO 2003, 16.

[22] So (not without hesitation) GILAN 2004, 289, 292. GILAN (2015, 325) later became more skeptical, but I think that the network of allegorical images shared by different Hittite texts should reflect a certain religious-political tradition rather than come "aus Freude am Erzählen".

images of the same heroes in both texts could indicate the different stages of the conflict, the different hypothetical variants of its course or the different authorship of the accounts.

The next passage of the ritual of Zuwi describes the impossible task given by the priest from the Temple of the Storm-God. It asks the *ḫurkelaš*-people[23] to conduct the actions performed by the bull in the Puḫanu Chronicle, to overcome the mountains, but it is impossible for them:

ta-lu-ga-uš-wa KASKAL.ḪÁ *ma-ni-ku*[*-an-da-aḫ-tin ma-ni-ku-an-du-ša*] *ta-lu-ga-nu-ut-tin* ḪUR.SAG.MEŠ *pár-ga-nu-uš ma-ni-ku-an-da-aḫ-tin ma-ni-ku-an-du-ša p*[*ár-ga-nu-ut-tin*] UR.BAR.RA *ki-iš-šar-ta e-ep-tin* UR.ᵀMAḪᵀ *ga-nu-ut e-ep-tin* ÍD-*an k*[*u-wa-an-ku-nu-ur-ra ḫar-tin*(?)] MUŠ-*an zu-wa-al-wa-la-a-tin na-an* LUGAL-*wa-aš a-*ᵀ*aš*ᵀ*-ka pé-e-ḫu-te-et-tin nu* DI-[xxx] *nu an-ni-iš-ki-mi ku-in na-an-kán* ŠUM-ŠU *ḫal-zi-*ᵀ*iḫ-ḫi*ᵀ *nu-uš-ma-aš am-mu-uk-ka*$_4$ [xxx] LÚ.MEŠ *a-ap-pa i-ia-an-nir UM-MA* ŠU^{I}*<-NU>-MA Ú-UL-za šu-wa-u-e-ni da-lu-ga-uš* [KASKAL.ḪÁ-*uš Ú-UL-uš ma-ni-ku-wa-an-du-la*] *ma-ni-ku-wa-an-du-ša* KASKAL.ḪÁ-*uš Ú-UL-aš da-lu-uk-nu-la* ḪUR.SAG.ḪÁ *pár-ga-mu-u*[*š Ú-UL-uš ma-ni-ku-wa-an-du-la*] *kap-pa-uš* ḪUR.SAG.MEŠ *Ú-UL-uš pár-ga-nu-la* UR.BAR.RA *ki-iš-šar-ta Ú-UL e*[*-ep-pir* UR.MAḪ *ga-nu-ut Ú-UL e-ep-pir*] ÍD-*kán ku-wa-an-ku-nu-ur-ra pé-eš-ši-ir na-at ḫar-ra-at-ta Ú-UL* MUŠ-*an z*[*u-wa-al-wa-la-a-ir na-an* LUGAL-*wa-aš a-aš-ka*] *pé-e-ḫu-te-er Ú-UL ḫa-an-né-eš-ša-še-et ḫa-an-na-at Ú-UL ut-tar na-a*[*k-ki-*xx]

'Sho[rten] the long roads [and] lengthen [the short ones]! Lower the high mountains and r[aise] the low ones! Catch the wolf by hand, catch the lion by knee, [and hold] the river [and the rockfall]! Pin down the snake and bring it to the royal gate, and the co[urt will take place(?)]!' For whom I am performing, I call him by his name. And [...] you and me. The men returned. Thus they (said): 'We fulfill nothing. The long [roads, they are not for shortening], and the short roads, [they are not for lengthening]. The high mountains, [they are not for lowering], and the low mountains, they are not for raising'. They did not c[atch] the wolf by hand, [they did not catch the lion by knee], they neglected the river and the rockfall, and did not hold it. [They] did not p[in down] the snake and did [not] bring [it to the royal gate], and its case was not judged, and the affair [was] agg[ravated] (KUB 12.63 obv. 24–33, mainly after Friedrich 1944: 209–210).

If the *ḫurkelaš*-people committed a sin when they ate the bull from the previous passage (KUB 12.63 obv. 17), it would mean that the sympathies of the author are the same as those of Puḫanu. This narration, however, gives another alternative: what would have happened if the bull had not opened the path through the mountains? The *ḫurkelaš*-people also needed to catch three animals – the wolf, the lion and the snake. These animals should symbolize here

[23] See PELED 2020: 167-168 for the latest discussion of their nature.

not the barbarous world,[24] but the concrete opponents of the Storm-God[25] or of the master of the ritual.[26]

The snake can be clearly associated with Tawananna, whom Ḫattušili I called by this derogatory nickname several times (KUB 1.16 I 10, II 10, 20; KBo 3.27 obv. 27).[27] The nature of this association has been considered as a trivial metaphor for the evil woman,[28] or as the indication on Tawananna's sorcery practices,[29] or as the image of destructive force (constituting a trio with the lion and the wolf).[30] However, the ties between Tawananna and the sorcery practices look speculative,[31] for Ḫattušili I would have mentioned such practices in the same manner as he prohibits Ḫaštayar from consulting with the Old Women.

Some scholars have traced back all three creatures as the trio of damaging forces to the ritual of Pittei texts (KUB 44.4+KBo 13.241 rev. 32–33; KUB 35.145 rev. 14–16).[32] However, the snake appears in Pittei's ritual only once and has feet, whereas the lion and the wolf appear in the previous part of the same text without any reptiles (KUB 44.4+KBo 13.241 rev. 23–24). Even if the appearance of the reptile together with the lion and the wolf in the contexts mentioned above proves that the idea of the existence of that trio was current, the reptile there had feet, while there is no indication of reptiles with feet in KUB 12.63.[33] For this reason, the idea of the trivial metaphor for the evil woman looks still preferable for this case, and this woman-snake should be Tawananna.

Who is the lion in the ritual of Zuwi?

The lion and the wolf constitute a more stable pair of negative creatures in the Hittite rituals (besides the aforementioned contexts of the trio, e.g. KBo 21.6 obv. 9–12).[34] Both animals symbolize the positive values in the political rhetoric of Ḫattušili I: [*šu-*]*mi-in-za-na* ÌR.MEŠ-*am-ma-an* UR.BAR.RA-*aš ma-a-an pa-an-g*[*ur-še-me-it*] 1-*EN e-eš-tu* 'Let [y]our clan, that

[24] COLLINS 1989, 86.

[25] HUTTER 2000, 98.

[26] HAAS 2003, 462.

[27] IVANOV 1968; ARCHI 1987, 26.

[28] SOMMER, FALKENSTEIN 1938, 212. However, this metaphor usage looks unique in the Hittite corpus, which makes it not so trivial.

[29] BIN-NUN 1975, 115; MURPHY 2002, 438.

[30] HAAS 2003, 474–475.

[31] ARCHI 1977, 484; HAAS 1977, 156.

[32] COLLINS 1989, 219–220; GIORGIERI 2011.

[33] Assuming that the Sumerogram MUŠ in the Hittite usage should cover both legless reptiles like snakes and the reptiles having feet like lizards (cf. COLLINS 1989, 207–208) adds the argument against equality between reptiles from Zuwi's and Pittei's rituals, as catching a snake implies *pinning* it *down* with a stick (like in Zuwi's ritual), whereas catching a lizard implies using a slip knot.

[34] HAAS 2003, 462–463.

of my servants, be united like that of the wolf' (KBo 3.27 obv. 15–16);[35] *i-na u4-ma-ti-ma ir-t[i Í]DPu-ra-an ki-i-ma UR.MAḪ LUGAL.GAL i-te-ti-iq* 'Within (a few) days the Great King crossed the bank of Purana (river) like a lion' (KBo 10.1 obv. 34).[36] The ritual of Zuwi does not perceive these animals as evil creatures in the same degree as the snake, for only the snake was judged by the king. That is the reason to dissociate the lion and wolf from their image in other Hittite rituals. The expression *kessarta ep-* 'to catch by hand' does not occur in other contexts linked to the wolf, but is, in the Annals of Ḫattušili I (KBo 10.2 I 29) and later texts (e.g. KUB 31.127 I 51), one of the blessing gestures of the Sun-God. This argues for the political interpretation of these figures rather than the magical one.

We can identify the wolf as the symbol of political unity between the Hittite king and his subjects, the audience of his Testament and Edict, whom the king asked to be united like wolves. The task to catch the wolf by hand would have had a double meaning: on the one hand, it denotes the elimination of the supporters of the Hittite king; on the other hand, it parodies the blessing gesture of the Sun-God, carried out not by the god but by the *ḫurkelaš*-people.

The identity of the lion seems obvious, as it is the well-known self-definition of Ḫattušili I.[37] He was the only known Old Hittite king who used this image, but in some of his texts, this definition applies to other persons, like Muršili I: [DINGIR-*LI*]*M-iš* UR.MAḪ-*aš pé-di* UR[.MAḪ-*an-pát ti-it-ta-nu-zi*] '[The go]d [will install only] the li[on] on the lion's place!' (KUB 1.16 II 39). However, we do not have any animal simile for Muršili I in the texts of this epoch, whereas Ḫattušili I hardly was the lion of KUB 12.63, because this lion is not the king himself and looks to be the actor of the same stage as Tawananna 'the snake' who should be brought to the royal court. In the absence of a clear association of this image with Muršili I, we can connect it with the Young Labarna as the heir of Ḫattušili I, who was to become the successor of the king and thus the next 'lion'.

Conclusions

The *historiolae* of the ritual of Zuwi can shed light on the religious aspect of the Old Hittite opposition present in the epoch of Ḫattušili I. If the political rather than magical interpretation of the animal images in these *historiolae* is correct, we can summarize their fabula and context as follows: the Syrian campaigns of Ḫattušili I led to the inclusion of the Syrian gods in the Hittite pantheon. The introduction of the Storm-God of Ḫalab could undermine the position of some members of the Hittite priesthood, especially those who

[35] COLLINS (1989, 280–281) identifies the *wetna*-animals in the similar passage of KUB 1.16 II 46 with the striped hyena or the golden jackal, but neither species has a similar clannish social organization as that of wolves. On the possible coexistence of several names for the wolf in Hittite, see GAMKRELIDZE and IVANOV 1995, 413.

[36] For more examples for the lion, see COLLINS 1998.

[37] COLLINS 1998.

were connected with the cult of the Storm-God of Ḫattuša, and they expressed their displeasure by creating *historiolae* which pose a hypothetical situation of Ḫattušili's failure to start his Syrian campaign. In this situation the Hittite troops did not discover the pathway to Syria ("the long roads are not for shortening"), the Hittite kept its unity ("they did not catch the wolf by hand"), the Young Labarna did not lose his right to the throne ("they did not catch the lion by knee"), and the trial of Tawananna did not take place ("its case was not judged").

The author of the *historiolae* who used the animal images from the political rhetoric of Ḫattušili I for imagining an alternative history of his rule connected the initial successes of Ḫattušili in Syria with the failed conspiracy of Tawananna. However, he did not show any specific ties between Tawananna and the priests of the Storm-God of Ḫattuša, although both parties lost their influence as a result of the Syrian campaigns of Ḫattušili I, as can be deduced from these *historiolae*. It is difficult to say whether the confrontation between Ḫattušili I and Tawananna had a religious nature, but her alliance with the part of Hittite priesthood against the innovations of the king could have been reflected afterwards in the ritual composed by the priests of the Storm-God.

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Justification of the Usurpation of Power by Hittite Kings

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Abstract. *The article explores the ways how Hittite kings justified their usurpations of power, such usurpations happening almost constantly during the whole period of the Hittite kingdom, from the Old Hittite period until the fall of the empire. It focuses on three outstanding texts illuminating prominent cases in the Hittite history: the Proclamation of Telepinu which gives important information about several usurpations during the late 17th and 16th century BC, the First Plague Prayer of Muršili I which illuminates the reaction to the 14th century BC usurpation of Šuppiluliuma I, and the Apology of Ḫattušili III from the 13th century BC, which stands out as our best example of justification of a successful usurpation in the ancient Near Eastern region. These three cases reveal different strategies of justification accepted by the Hittite kings.*

Rezumat. *Acest articol explorează modul în care regii hitiți și-au justificat uzurpările, ele fiind prezente aproape constant pe parcursul întregii istorii a regatului, de la începuturi și până la căderea sa definitivă. Studiul este centrat pe trei surse scrise de mare importanță datorită cărora sunt clarificate cazuri bine cunoscute din istoria hitiților: proclamația lui Telepinu, ce oferă informații prețioase cu privire la câteva uzurpări de la finalul secolului al XVII-lea. și de pe parcursul celui de-al XVI-lea î.Hr., Prima Rugăciune pentru Îndepărtarea Ciumei a lui Muršili I, care ne oferă detalii în legătură cu reacția la uzurparea lui Šuppiluliuma I în secolul al XIV-lea î.Hr., respectiv Apologia lui Ḫattušili al III-lea din secolul al XIII-lea î.Hr., care reprezintă cel mai bun exemplu de justificare a unei uzurpări cunoscut în Orientul Apropiat antic. Aceste trei exemplu aduc la cunoștință diferite strategii de justificare a uzurpării, cunoscute și acceptate de către regii hitiți.*

Keywords: Ancient Near East, Hittite kingdom, Telepinu, Šuppiluliuma I, Ḫattušili III.

Introduction

Usurpations of power have been usual in most of the monarchies in world history, the ancient Near East and the Hittite empire being no exception.[1] The usurper could come from outside the ruling dynasty, even from outside the given state, in which case the seizure of power would equate to the foundation of a new dynasty or state. Sargon (2334–2279 BC)[2],

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[1] RIEMSCHNEIDER 1971, 79–102.

[2] All the following dates are BC.

founder of the Akkadian empire in Mesopotamia, and Cyrus the Great (558–530), founder of the Teispid-Achaemenid empire of the Persians, serve as perhaps the most famous examples of this.[3] Sargon indeed became a paradigmatic example for subsequent ancient Near Eastern kings early on, and the way he was believed to have achieved power therefore became exemplary. To quote Marilies Heinz: *"As a rebel and usurper, Sargon came to power in a way that could be considered almost classic."*[4] The usurpations about which we have information from the Hittite kingdom, on the other hand, generally took place inside the ruling family, involving numerous cases of fratricide and patricide.

We cannot tell if the founders of the Hittite state, Anitta[5] the king of Kuššar(a) (18th century) and Ḫattušili I[6] (1650–1620) the real founder of the imperial state,[7] were usurpers or not. Anitta wrote in his own text[8] that he was *"Son of Pitḫana, King of Kuššar(a)",*[9] which does not give any information about how he became king.[10] When Ḫattušili I, ruling ca 100 years later, mentioned in his annals[11] that he was *"the brother's son of Tawananna*",[12] thus not stating his paternity, he may have been implying illegitimate descent, but we cannot prove this for certain. With the murder of Muršili I in 1590, successor of Ḫattušili I, after his successful campaign against Babylon in 1595 there began however a long period from which a series of usurpations is testified by sources. King Telepinu in the late 16th century apparently tried to halt this with his "Proclamation" but clearly failed, as shown by the following events, some of which will be touched upon in the present paper.

The seizure of power inevitably entails some illegitimacy and required justification. In most of the Hittite cases we have no evidence of how this was attempted or achieved. However three examples allow some insight into the strategies used by the Hittite kings. These are the "Proclamation of Telepinu" (late 16th century), a statement of a usurper presenting himself as the re-establisher of the good order,[13] the First Plague Prayer of Muršili II (1321–1295) where

[3] SAZONOV 2008, 195–214; BRISCH 2012, 120.

[4] HEINZ 2007, 69.

[5] STARKE 1979, 47–120; CARRUBA 2001; SAZONOV 2017, 179–182.

[6] MELCHERT 1978, 1–22; KEMPINSKI & KOŠAK 1982, 87–116.

[7] For Anitta see NEU 1974; BADALÌ 1987, 43–44; CARRUBA 2001; CARRUBA 2003; HOFFNER 2003, 182–184; WILHELMI 2016, 223–239; SAZONOV 2017, 179–182. For Ḫattušili I see MELCHERT 1978, 1–22.

[8] The Text of Anitta consists of different literary subcategories (e.g., HAAS 2006, 28; SAZONOV 2017a, 179–182). See also HOFFNER 198, 291–293.

[9] Compare with BECKMAN 2006a, 217, § 1 (A-1–4): "Anitta, son of Pithana, became king of (the city of) Kušsara. He behaved in a manner pleasing to the storm-god in heaven".

[10] See more on SAZONOV 2017, 179–182.

[11] See more about Hittite annals SAZONOV 2019, 57–88.

[12] For more on Tawananna see BIN-NUN 1975, 105: "Hattušili's introduction in the Annals as Tawananna's brother's son seems to declare the king a legitimate successor". BECKMAN 2006b, 219: § 1; DEVECCHI 2005, 34 and 35.

[13] VAN DEN HOUT 2003B, 194–198; GOEDEGEBUURE 2006, 228–23.

the king had to justify the usurpation of his father Šuppiluliuma I (1344–1322),[14] and the "Apology of Ḫattušili III" (13th century), which appears as the most detailed and glorifying justification of usurpation known from the Hittite texts.[15]

Telepinu: a merciful king restoring order in the state

The "Proclamation of Telepinu" (*CTH 19)*,[16] issued by the late 16th century king with the ostensible intention to codify the rules of succession to the Hittite throne,[17] is one of the main sources for the history of the Old Kingdom. It gives important information about several usurpations during the period from the murder of Muršili I until the usurpation of power by Telepinu himself. The text starts with describing the glorious conquests of the early kings Labarna, Hattušili I and Muršili I, and contrasts these 'good old days' with the following disastrous period of internal violence. Muršili I was killed by his brother-in-law Ḫantili I and Ḫantili's son-in-law Zidanta. When Ḫantili died Zidanta killed the sons of Ḫantili and usurped the throne. Zidanta was in turn murdered by his own son Ammuna[18] who was however not successful as king, and when he died his family members were killed by Ḫuzziya, a new usurper and probably an illegitimate son of Ammuna. Then Telepinu, possibly a son-in-law of Ammuna, managing to escape death dethroned Ḫuzziya and became king himself. Telepinu however did not kill Ḫuzziya, if we can believe his account.[19]

The whole 16th century, from Muršili I to Telepinu, thus appears as an era of usurpations. Telepinu, although himself a usurper, clearly condemned in his proclamation this way of achieving power, or at least the act of murdering the predecessor and his relatives in addition. Such murders were presented as resentful of the gods who therefore punished the usurpers. Ḫantili I, the first usurper, already came to regret what he had done, as stated in the proclamation:

§ 13 (I 39-42) And [when H]antili reac[hed] the city of Tegarama he began to sa]y: "What (is) [this (that) I have done? [Why] did I listen to [the words of] Zidan[ta, m]y(?) [son-in-law]? [As soon as] he (however) [reig]ned [as King], the gods sough[t] (revenge for) the blood [of Mursili].[20]

The subsequent death of his son Pišeni at the hands of Zidanta might have been seen as the result of divine vengeance. However, the gods certainly avenged the crimes of Zidanta, making his son Ammuna his enemy:

[14] SINGER 2002, 61–64.

[15] SCHMID 1985.

[16] HOFFNER 1984; HAASE 2005, 56–61; VAN DEN HOUT 2003; KÜMMEL 2005, 464–469.

[17] COEDEGEBUURE 2006, 228–229.

[18] MLADJOV 2000, 21–24. See also more about Ammuna SHELESTIN 2014, 800–826.

[19] COEDEGEBUURE 2006, 230–231.

[20] Ibid., 230.

§18 (I 63–65) Now, when Ḫantili had become old and started to "become a god" (=to die)[21]*, Zidanta killed [Pišeni], son of Ḫantili, together with his sons, and he also killed his first-ranked servants.*

§19 (I 66–68) So now Zidanta had become king. But the gods started to seek the blood of Pišeni. The gods made Ammuna, his (i.e. Zidanta's) son, his enemy, and he killed Zidanta, his father.[22]

The patricide of Ammuna again evoked the wrath of the gods. At first this caused misery for the Hittite land, followed by internal revolts and external disasters:[23]

§20 (I:69–71) And Ammuna became King. The gods sought (revenge for) the blood of his father Zidanta and [they did] no[t make] him, the grain, wine, oxen (and) sheep [prosper(?)] in his hand [but it all ...] in (his) hand.[24]

§21 (II:1-7) Now, the land became his enemy: the cities of ...agga, [Matjila, Galmiya, Adaniyfa], Arzawiya, Sallapa, Parduwata and Ahhula. But wherever (his) troops went on campaign, they did not come back successfully.[25]

Furthermore, after the death of the king there followed the massacre of his family by Ḫuzziya, apparently an illegitimate son of his. Telepinu, son-in-law of Ammunas and brother-in-law of Ḫuzziya, was also threatened but succeeded in saving his and his wife's lives:

§21 (II:1–7) When Ammuna, too, became god, Zuru, the Chief of the Royal Bodyguard, in those same days secretly sent, of his own offspring, his son Taḫurwaili, Man of the Gold Spear, and he killed Titti(ya)'s family together with his sons.[26]

§22 (II:8–12) He sent Taruḫšu, a courier, as well and he killed Ḫantili together with [his] sons. Now, Ḫuzziya became King and Telepinu had Ištapariya, his sister of first rank, as his wife. When Ḫuzziya wanted to kill them, the matter came to light and Telepinu chased them away.[27]

Telepinu does not say how he came to power, stating briefly that he 'chased away' his killers, but it is obvious that he must have removed his predecessor Ḫuzziya from power and was therefore a usurper himself. He nevertheless presented his assumption of the kingship as a legitimate takeover of his "father's" (actually probably father-in-law's) throne: *When I, Telepinu, sat down on the throne of my father ...* (§24 II: 16-19).[28] Moreover, he clearly pointed out how he differed from his murderous predecessors whose crimes he presented as bringing a sort of curse upon the royal family:

[21] According to Hittite beliefs the king became a god after his death.

[22] COEDEGEBUURE 2006, 231.

[23] Compare with the case of Šuppiluliuma I who, according the Muršili II text, was also punished by the gods for the usurpation of power and killing Arnuwanda (VAN DEN HOUT 2006, 259–260).

[24] COEDEGEBUURE 2006, 231.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Ibid.

§27 (II:31-35) The blood of the whole royal family spread: Istapari[y]a, the Queen, died, later it happened that Ammuna, the prince, died. The "Men of the Gods," too, each said: "Behold, blood(shed) is widespread in Hattusa."[29]

He himself pointedly diverged from the previous pattern, pardoning his alleged enemies inside the family:

§23 (II:13–15) Five (were) his br[ot]hers and he assigned houses to them (saying): "Let them go (and) live! Let them each eat (and) drink!" May nob[ody] do harm to them! And I declare: "They did evil to me, but I [will not do] evil to them."[30]

He even wished to preserve the life of his murderous predecessor Ḫuzziya but when some dignitaries still killed him, allegedly without the knowledge and approval of the king, he decided to pardon the killers despite the death sentence passed by the council – *panku* –, and made them 'farmers' instead:

§26 (2:26-30) I, [the Ki]ng, did not k[no]w [and he killed H]u[zzi]y[a] and his brothers as well. [W]hen I, the King, heard (of it), they brought Tanuwa, Tahurwaili [and] Taruhs[u] and the Council sentenced them to death. And I, the King, said: "[Wh]y do they die? They will hide (their) eyes concerning them! I, the King, made them into tru[e] farmers: I have taken their weapons from the shoulder and have given them a yok[e(?)].[31]

His mildness was apparently pleasing to the gods who gave him success, and he consequently issued a proclamation stating the rules of succession for the future, with the proclaimed intention that nobody should "*do evil to a son of the family and draw a dagger on him*" (§27 ii 31–35).[32]

This is the first preserved justification of usurpation in Hittite history. The predecessors of Telepinu surely also had to justify their acts but no information on this has survived. Telepinu however followed a twofold strategy. On the one hand, he concealed the fact of usurpation which obviously must have been common knowledge at the time, presenting himself instead as the rightful pretender to his "father's" throne. A similar argument could also have been used by his predecessors who all came from the narrow ruling circle and in most cases had blood or family relations with some previous ruler. They might, therefore, have presented themselves as the just avengers of previous killings inside the family, as a sort of agent of divine wrath. Telepinu, however, did not accept this particular strategy. He instead not only condemned the previous murders but also emphasised his own mercifulness, even if in reality he worked towards murdering his predecessor. The godless murderers of the previous generations were, in his

[29] Ibid., 232.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Ibid., 232

[32] Ibid., 232.

presentation, replaced by a merciful king restoring peace in the land and establishing benevolent and sensible principles of good order for the future.[33]

Šuppiluliuma I: the usurper evoking punishment by the gods of Ḫatti

Šuppiluliuma I, one of the greatest kings of the New Hittite period,[34] was a usurper.[35] He became a king violently, deposing his brother Tudḫaliya the Younger.[36] We do not know how Šuppiluliuma justified his usurpation, which could have been rather easy for him as the gods granted him success in his wars when he had assumed the kingship. He added new territories to the kingdom, conquering the lands of Mitanni and invading the Egyptian territories in Syria and the Levant. During the latter part of his reign, however, his kingdom was affected by a terrible disease which eventually caused the death of the king himself. The consequences of the plague had to be faced by his son and successor Muršili II.[37] Muršili II was sure that the gods had punished his father, and were punishing his brother Arnuwanda II (1322–1321 BC) and him, thus avenging Šuppiluliuma's killing of his brother and the violent seizure of power in Ḫattuša.

In his *First Plague Prayer* composed in order to placate the wrath of the gods Muršili described the punishment of the gods and their curse, which continued for several generations and affected the whole land. The reason for this divine wrath was quite clear to the king:[38]

§ 2. O Gods, [my] lords, [i]n Hatti-Land a plague has risen: Hatti-Land is being oppressed by the plague and it is being severely punished. This is (already)the twentieth year! And since dying continues in [Hatti] – Land on a large scale, the affair of Tudhaliya the Younger, son of Tudhaliya, started to weight on [m]e and I conducted an oracle investigation through the god [and] the affair of the Tudhaliya the Younger was confirmed also by the god.[39]

Muršili II thus had to accept that his father had committed a crime which had hard consequences. On the other hand, as Muršili was the legal descendant of Šuppiluliuma, his legitimacy depended on the legitimacy of the position of his father. He therefore had to apologize for his father's acts and find justification for his seizure of power. This involved an admittedly vague incrimination of his father's predecessor:

§ 2. ...Since for Hatti-Land Tudḫ[aliya] the Younger was their lord, [Ḫat]tusa's princes, commanders, chiefs-of-thousands, officers (and) [officials] as well as [troops] and chariots, everybody had sworn an oath to him. My father too [had] sworn an oath to him.

[33] For the purpose and the ideological message of the proclamation see BECKMAN 2009, 242.

[34] See about New Kingdom, especially its early period, DE MARTINO 2010, 186–197.

[35] For Šuppiluliuma I see KEMPINSKI 1993, 81–91; STAVI 2011, 226–239; HAZENBOS 2006.

[36] HAZENBOS 2006, 235.

[37] HOUWINK TEN CATE 1995–1996, 51–72; NEMIROVSKI 2005.

[38] VAN DEN HOUT 2006, 259–260.

[39] Ibid., 261.

§ 3. [But when m]y [father] punished Tudhaliya, Ḫattusa's [princes, commander]s, chiefs-of-thousands (and) officers, all of [them joine]d my father and the Oath [Deities seized] Tudhaliya [and they kil]led [Tudḫaliya]!....[40]

The attitude expressed in this passage is obviously controversial. On the one hand Muršili accepts that Tudḫaliya the Younger was a legitimate ruler and that all in Ḫatti, even his father Šuppiluliuma, had sworn loyalty to him. On the other hand, when Šuppiluliuma broke this oath he received wide support (among the people? the nobles?) and the Oath Deities were also on his side. Muršili does not state anything about the reason why the Oath Deities turned against Tudḫaliya, simply implying that guilt must have been lying with the king. This, however, could not have been a true justification for his murderers who were consequently affected by divine wrath:

§ 4. ... Then the moment came that you, o Gods, after [the fact], sought revenge for that matter of Tudhaliya the Younger from my father: my father [died] because of the bloodshed of Tudhaliya, and the princes, commanders, chiefs-of-thousands (and) officials who joined [my father], th[ose too] died for [that] reason.[41]

As van den Hout has pointed out: "The gist of the passage is that Tudḫaliya was killed by the Oath Deities, implying that he had broken a certain oath himself. This, however, did not justify the murder by Suppiluliuma and his fellow conspirators: not only did they break their oath to him, but killing one's own relative is one of the severest taboos in Hittite society, which inevitably will lead to divine repercussions."[42] Although the way how Šuppiluliuma himself had justified his usurpation is unknown, we can suppose that the incrimination of his predecessor Tudḫaliya played an important part in this, and the involvement of the Oath Deities referred to by Muršili II were thus taken across from his father's strategy. The subsequent history, however, had patently demonstrated the discontent of the gods and thereby the gravity of Šuppiluliuma's crime. There was no way of ignoring this, which compelled Muršili to accept his father's guilt. As in the case of the predecessors of Telepinu, an usurpation and the murder of the previous king were likely to displease the gods and evoke divine vengeance. No seizure of power could lead to a successful reign if the ruler could not earn the benevolence and support of the gods.

Ḫattušili III: the glorious and merciful favourite of the Goddess Ištar

Divine support for the rising ruler is however strongly indicated in the *Apology of Ḫattušili III*[43] which stands out as our best example of justification of a successful usurpation.[44] Ḫattušili

[40] Ibid., 261.

[41] Ibid., 261.

[42] Ibid., 261.

[43] VAN DEN HOUT 2003a, 199–204. See about Hattušili III IMPARATI 1995.

[44] OTTEN 1981; ÜNAL 1974; IMPARATI 1995, 143–157.

(1267–1237) was, as he himself expressly admits, the youngest son of Muršili II[45] and had therefore very little right to the throne. He nevertheless succeeded in becoming the king, dethroning his predecessor Urḫitešub (Muršili III) (1272–1267), the son of his elder brother the king Muwattali II (1295–1272) who had inherited the reign from their father Muršili II. The apology presents an ideologically biased description of Ḫattušili's successful career.

Ḫattušili III admitted a complex strategy of justification. On the one hand he tried to discredit his predecessor Urḫitešub, emphasising that he was an illegitimate son of Muwattali II, and it was only thanks to Ḫattušili that he had become king:

§10b (3:31-54) *[When] my [bro]ther became [go]d – because I [co]mmanded [Ḫatt]uša and (because) he had [...] me in lordship, I di[d] not [do] anything (evil) out of regard for [the love] for [m]y br[other. Therefore, sin[ce] my brother did not have a [legitimate son, I took up Urḫitešub, son of a concubine. [I put] him into lordship over [Ḫatti Land and laid all of [Ḫattuša] in (his) hand, ...*[46]

Ḫattušili thus gave the impression that Urḫitešub owed his position solely to him,[47] at the same time questioning the legitimacy of Urḫitešub's kingship, implicitly referring to the statement of the proclamation of Telepinu that *king shall become a son (who is) a prince of the first rank only*, which Urḫi-Tešub obviously was not. This was however a rather weak point since the proclamation made clear that *if there is no first rank prince, he who is a second rank son, he shall become king.*[48] This was now exactly the case, which means that the accession of Urḫitešub was legitimate according to the proclamation.

On the other hand, Ḫattušili III described Urḫitešub as an evil-doer, and himself as an unjust sufferer. As noted above, it was Ḫattušili who had installed Urḫitešub to power, but the latter tried to take away all the honours and possessions which Muwattali had given to Ḫattušili III for his service:

§10c (3:54-79) *However, when Urḫitešub thus saw the benevolence [o]f the goddess towards me, he became envious of me, he [beg]an to harm me: he took away from me all those in my service, and (all) the desolate countries which I had resettled, those too he took away from me. He humiliated me, but at the behest of the goddess he did not take away Hakpis from me. Be[cau]se I was priest to the Stormgod of Nerik, he therefore did not take that (city) away from me (either). Out of regard for the love for my brother I did not react at all and during seven years I complied. He, however, sought my destruction at divine and human behest and he took away from me Ḫakpis and Nerik. Now I no longer complied and I became hostile to him.*[49]

[45] My father Muršili had four children: (three sons) Ḫalpašulupi, Muwatalli and Ḫattušili, and a daughter Maššanauzzi. Of all these I was the youngest child (HOFFNER 2006, 267).

[46] VAN DEN HOUT 2003a, 202. See also about Urḫitešub HOUWINK TEN CATE 1994.

[47] HAWKINS 2001, 176.

[48] BECKMAN 2006, 232.

[49] VAN DEN HOUT 2003a, 202–203.

Ḫattušili is indeed described here as thankful to Muwattali and observing his will, and extremely patient towards the unjust acts of Urḫitešub. Only when the latter had made his situation absolutely intolerable did he decide to resist. The whole guilt apparently lay on Urḫitešub, for which he was indeed eventually justly punished. Ḫattušili even considered it appropriate to mock Urḫi-Tešub, comparing him to a pig:

§11 (4:7-40) *When she*[50] *had left Urhitesub no other way whatsoever, she locked him up in Samuha like a pig in a sty.*[51]

Ḫattušili thus described Urḫi-Tešub as an unjust and ungrateful villain with dubious legitimacy to the throne, and therefore he wholly deserved to be removed from the kingship. Above all, however, Ḫattušili pointed out the constant support of the goddess Ištar.[52] The whole apology was presented as a glorification of the goddess, and a statement of the close relations between her and the king. This was made clear in the very Prooemium:

§2 (1:5-8) *Ištar's divine providence I will proclaim. Let man hear it! And may in future His Majesty's son, his grandson (and further) offspring of His Majesty be respectful among the gods towards Ištar!*[53]

The relationship between the goddess and Ḫattušili began when he was still a boy, and Ištar asked him to her service as the priest. This granted Ḫattušili the support of the goddess for the whole of his life:

§3 *(1:9-21) (Now), Ištar, my lady, sent Muwatalli, my brother to Muršili, my father, through a dream (saying): "For Ḫattušili the years (are) short few, he is not to live (long) but hand him over to me, and let him be my priest, and he will live." Hand him over to me, and let him be my priest, so he (will) live." My father took me up, (while still) a boy, and handed me (over) to the service of the goddess, and as a priest I brought offerings to the goddess. At the hand of Ištar, My Lady, I experienced prosperity, and Ištar, My Lady, took me by the hand and provided for me.*[54]

The support of the goddess is pervasively emphasised in the apology. Ištar never left Ḫattušili's side; she supported him in everything that he did and helped him to overcome all possible troubles. One example of the plentiful passages should suffice to demonstrate this:

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[50] Ištar

[51] Ibid.: 199.

[52] The choice of Ištar as patron was not occidental by Hattušili III. – see more about it TARACHA (2013, 378) who argues „The choice of the ruler's divine patron(s), as seen already in the case of Hattusili's predecessors, was a political decision, rather than an act of personal piety, even if he did experience personal devotion to these deities." See more on Ištar and Šauška of Samuha as patron deity of Ḫattušili. Ḫattušili chose he for political purposes – TARACHA (2009: 264): "This was undoubtedly a purely political decision and it must not be considered as an act of personal deity." P. TARACHA pointed out (2013, 378): "It seems therefore that Ḫattusili had chosen his patron deities long before his accession to the Great Kingship of Ḫatti. The choice of the ruler's divine patron(s), as seen already in the case of Ḫattusili's predecessors, was a political decision, rather than an act of personal piety, even if he did experience personal devotion to these deities. As I have argued elsewhere (TARACHA 2009b), it was Ḫattusili's entire political career that decided about Šauška of Samuha and the Storm-god of Nerik becoming his patron deities".

[53] Ibid.

[54] VAN DEN HOUT 2003a, 199, see also HOFFNER 2006, 268.

§4 (1:22-60) *Since the goddess, My Lady, held me by the hand, she never exposed me to an evil deity (nor) to an evil lawsuit, never did she let an enemy weapon sway over me: Istar, My Lady, took me to her in every respect. Whenever illness befell me, sick as I was, I looked on (it) as the goddess' providence. The goddess, My Lady, held me by the hand in every respect.*[55]

Moreover, it was Ištar who kept Ḫattušili from committing any unjust act which, we may guess, avoided any divine vengeance that could otherwise have befallen him:

§4 (1:22-60) *But, since I was a man divinely provided for, since I walked before the gods in divine providence, I never did an evil thing against man.*[56]

Ḫattušili was consequently lenient towards enemies who had harmed him. First he refrained from taking vengeance on a certain Armatarhunta, his relative who had previously more than once unjustly blamed him before Muwattali the king:

§10a (3:14-30) *So, because my brother had made me triumph over [Arma]tarhunta through the process, I did not fall back into further evil against him, and [be]cause Armatarhunta was a blood relative of mine, (and because) moreover, he was an old man, he provoked (feelings of) pity in me [a]nd I let him go. Sippaziti, to[o], his [son], I let go.' I did not harm them in any way.*[57]

Later, when the crimes of Urḫitešub made Ḫattušili rise against him, he did not plot the murder of his predecessor but called him to an open contest on the battlefield so that the divinities could decide the issue:

§10c (3:54-79) *But when I became hostile to him, I did not commit a moral offence by revolting against him on the chariot or by revolting against him within (his) house. (No,) in a manly way I declared to him: "You opposed me. You (are) Great King, whereas I (am) king of the single fortress that you left me. So come! Istar of Samuha and the Stormgod of Nerik will judge us."* [58]

And when Ištar had eventually led him to the final triumph he was merciful towards Urḫi-Tešub, giving him worthy possessions. Even when the latter revolted and was defeated again Ḫattušili did not kill him but sent him and his son Sippaziti into exile. Their property, however, Ḫattušili piously dedicated to Ištar:

§11 (4:7-40) *I went back down to Urḫitešub and brought him down like a prisoner. I gave him fortified cities in the country of Nuhasse and there he lived. When he plotted another plot against me, and wanted to ride to Babylon — when I heard the matter, I seized him and sent him alongside the sea. They made Sippaziti cross the border as well, while I took away his property and gave it to Istar, My Lady.*[59]

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[55] VAN DEN HOUT 2003a, 200.

[56] VAN DEN HOUT 2003a, 200.

[57] Ibid., 202.

[58] HOFFNER 2006, 268–269: “Rather in a manly way I declared to him: “You have disrespected me. You are a Great King, whereas I am king of the single fortress town that you have left to me. come! let Ištar of Samuḫa and the storm-god of Nerik judge our case (in the ordeal battle)””.

[59] VAN DEN HOUT 2003b, 203.

Thus, besides hinting at the illegitimacy of Urḫitešub, pointing out his own role by installing his predecessor to power, and the ingratitude and injustice of the latter, Ḫattušili pervasively emphasised the benevolence and support of Ištar, making him appear almost as a human agent of the divine. Any injustice was consequently absent from his deeds and his own acts could be seen as a promotion of divine justice. Such a close connection between goddess and the ruler obviously resembles the relationship between Ištar and Sargon of Akkad, an exemplary ruler for the whole cuneiform world and also held in high esteem by the Hittite kings.[60]

Sargon emphasised the support of Ištar in his inscriptions,[61] and the close connection between the goddess and the king preserved its crucial significance in the later literary compositions, both the Sumerian legend *"Sargon and Ur-Zababa"* from the Old-Babylonian period[62] and the still later "*Sargon legend*" preserved on the tablets recovered from the Library of Aššurbanipal.[63] The likelihood that Ḫattušili followed the example of Sargon is considerable.

Moreover, it is notable how closely the narrative structure of the *Apology of Ḫattušili* resembles the Sargon legend. Sargon appears in the legend as being of illegitimate or humble descent—either of unknown paternity or the son of a gardener[64]—and Ḫattušili expressly states that he was the youngest descendant of Muršili, thus the least legitimate successor to the throne. Sargon was indeed exposed by his mother and thereby condemned to death, and Ḫattušili pointed out his weak health in childhood and poor chances of survival if Ištar had not taken care of him. Both Sargon and Ḫattušili became favourites of the goddess at an early stage in their lives; both had their trials when they were young men; and both got through them successfully thanks to the constant support of Ištar. Sargon was, according to Sumerian legend "*Sargon and Ur-Zababa"*, first threatened by Ur-Zababa the king of Kiš,[65] and Ḫattušili III had to face the evil plans first of Armatarhunta and finally of Urḫi-Tešub. Both indeed triumphed with the help of Ištar and replaced their principal opponents on the throne; Sargon took the kingship of Kiš from Ur-Zababa and Ḫattušili the Hittite kingship from Urḫi-Tešub.

This similarity seems too close to be coincidental, suggesting that Ḫattušili intentionally followed the 'biography' of Sargon as a prototype. Sargon was indeed a paradigmatic usurper of power. The narrative pattern, however, had a much wider spread and broader significance. There are indeed numerous examples of a child of marginal descent, threatened with death in infancy or childhood, favoured by some divine power, and persecuted by their predecessor whom he eventually overthrows to become the ruler himself. This was indeed a fairly usual way of describing the rise of the founder of a new dynasty or state, for which Sargon himself,

[60] About mentioning Sargon by Ḫattušili I, see GÜTERBOCK, 1964, 1–6; BECKMAN, 2001, 85–91.

[61] See, e.g., RIME 2, Sargon E2.1.1.6, lines 4–5.

[62] COOPER, HEIMPEL 1983.

[63] ALSTER 1987, 169–173.

[64] NEMET-NEJAT 1998, 22.

[65] COOPER, HEIMPEL 1983.

Cyrus the Great, Moses and Romulus serve as perhaps the best-known examples.[66] It is however remarkable that Ḫattušili used this pattern to justify his usurpation of power inside the family.

Conclusions

The often bloody fighting for power inside the ruling dynasty in the Hittite kingdom made patricide and fratricide a relatively common practice, more of a rule than an exception, and there were few rulers who had not resorted to such measures for attaining or confirming their power. On the other hand, however, the ruler was expected to be just responsible for his people—and an unjust ruler committing crimes against his subjects therefore should not have deserved the position of king. This was both a curse and an opportunity for the Hittite kings. It was always possible to blame a predecessor for some murders, and it was always equally necessary to justify the killing of the opponents that the present ruler had committed himself. This is exactly what we see in all three cases considered here. Telepinu and Ḫattušili certainly, and Šuppiluliuma very probably, described their predecessors as guilty of certain crimes. We can only guess how Šuppiluliuma compared himself to the predecessor whom he killed, but in the cases of Telepinu and Ḫattušili we can clearly see that the kings emphasised their mercifulness towards their opponents, although the reality of this seems doubtful, and thereby purposefully contrasted themselves with their vicious forerunners. According to their own view, both Telepinu and Ḫattušili must surely have deserved the benevolence of the gods. Telepinu, however, did not emphasise this aspect. He only pointed out the divine vengeance that had befallen his predecessors, while preferring to present himself as the wise reformer stopping the intrafamily murders and restoring good order to the land. Ḫattušili, on the other hand, chose to emphasise, besides his justice and mercifulness, the divine support he received in all his actions. He appeared as almost a human agent of Ištar, the traditional supporter of the Near Eastern kings. This made him comparable to Sargon, to such an extent that even his own "biography" was shaped to conform to the legendary pattern of the life of the great Akkadian king. In this way the usurper inside the family, as Ḫattušili surely was, was raised to almost equal status to the greatest empire-founder known in these times.

Such strategies of justifying the violent seizure of power are of course fairly universal in history. A paradigmatic example is given by Cyrus the Great, founder of the Persian empire, who incriminated his predecessor Nabonaidus, pointed out the divine support of Marduk,[67] and very soon received the typical "biography" of a hero with all the necessary elements from the birth story to the seizure of the kingship, as was presented by Herodotos.[68] Success was indeed bestowed by the gods and a successful king must thus have been divinely supported, while the predecessor whom he removed from power must have been hateful to the gods and surely

[66] See, e.g., LEWIS 1980; KÕIV 2018, especially 627–633.

[67] VAN DER SPEK 2014, 260.

[68] Hdt. I 109–127.

deserved this fate. The Hittite cases discussed here show how this deeply-rooted way of thinking produced variable justifications of usurpations by particular kings.

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Some Observations About Succession Principles in the Hittite New Kingdom

Siim MÕTTUS*

Abstract. *The discussion about the principles of succession in the Hittite kingdom has been largely focused on the Old Kingdom period and not so much on its later history. But through a variety of sources (diplomatic treaties, oath impositions etc.) from the New Kingdom, one could take a gander at how the passing of the throne was viewed at those times. Unsurprisingly, similar to the previous era, the norm was still that a son of a king was to inherit the throne, but there are enough hints in the text that sometimes the political whims and needs of a king (and a queen) superseded tradition and succession rules were more fluid. In addition, the fact that certain kings felt the need to constantly take steps to legitimize and secure their and their successor's position over rivalling branches of the royal family shows that the transference of power in the Hittite New Kingdom was still problematic.*

Rezumat. *Discuțiile cu privire la principiile succesiunii la putere în Regatul Hittit au fost concentrate în principal pe perioada veche a regatului, cea târzie fiind tratată mai puțin. Totuși, prin intermediul a diverse surse (tratate diplomatice, jurăminte publice, etc.) din timpul Noului Regat, poate fi dedus felul în care această succesiune era privită la momentul respectiv. Fără a fi surprinzător, norma încă era aceea ca fiul suveranului să moștenească tronul, dar există suficiente indicii în texte asupra faptului că uneori ambițiile politice ale unui rege (sau ale unei regine) erau mai presus de tradiție și că regulile succesiunii nu erau de fapt absolute. În plus, faptul că unii conducători simțeau nevoie să întreprindă acțiuni pentru a-și legitima și consolida poziția politică (împreună cu cea a succesorului său) în fața ramurilor inamice din cadrul familiei regale dovedește că problema transferului puterii în Noul Regal Hittit încă era una delicată.*

Keywords: Hittite New Kingdom; royal succession; treaties; Telepinu's edict.

There has been a lot of focus on royal succession principles in the Hittite kingdom as numerous historians have tried to find an underlying system in the inheritance of power. Research into this has been prompted by the constant violence and intrigue that accompanied the transmission of the Hittite throne, as seen from surviving historical records. Several theories have been suggested over time—matrilinearity, patrilinearity, avuncularity, elective kingship, etc.[1]—but none of them have prevailed in the discourse. These models

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[1] Of the prominent advocates of different inheritance systems, RIEMSCHNEIDER (1971) has favoured matrilinearity; GOETZE (1957, 87–88) elective kingship; SÜRENHAGEN (1998) and GOEDEGEBUURE (2006) avuncularity (in which he proposed that the king's nephew would inherit the throne, who would produce an heir of the throne with his cousin

typically heavily rely on modern reconstructions of the royal genealogies which, due to numerous gaps in the sources, are partly conjectural.

The investigations into Hittite royal succession have, however, mostly been focused on the Old kingdom period (17th–16th century BC). At the end of 16th century, king Telepinu issued an edict to end the long-lasting bloodshed caused by the struggle for power. He stipulated who had the right to kingship and established (or codified) a line of succession. According to his principle, the first-rank son of the king had priority for the title of the Great King. In the absence of a first-rank son, a second-rank son was to inherit the throne; and if the king had no sons at all the right would fall to the husband of the king's first-rank daughter.[2] The problem of succession therefore usually ends with Telepinu's edict in modern Hittitology. And it can be said in advance that, without a doubt, the patrilinear transference of power was the norm in the Hittite New kingdom period (15th–13th c.). Numerous texts hint at the king's sons and grandsons being the expected heirs, but one could perhaps find additional patterns by looking into the particularities of later succession principles and how they related to Telepinu's succession rule. So far, this has attracted only scant attention,[3] yet it would be crucial for understanding the edict, one of the most significant texts of the Hittites, and its impact on succession and on the overall evolution of the Hittite kingship.

The present article offers some thoughts about the subject by focusing on the general concepts of royal succession expressed by sources written after the reign of Telepinu, especially in the New kingdom, and whether these concepts echo the principles laid out in his edict. There are no surviving documents comparable to Telepinu's edict that put forward a law-like enactment, but a lot of texts from different genres contain passages that deal with succession.[4] Usually, these passages are not imposed on the king himself, like in Telepinu's edict, but rather on his subordinates—the members of his court or his diplomatic partners. But despite this, they do express the mentality that the Hittites had about kingship and to whom it should be passed on.

– the daughter of the old king); ATKINS (2000) so-called Omaha IV type succession (where the king's heir would alternate between a son-in-law and a son) and BECKMAN 1986 and BEAL 2003 have argued for patrilinearity. See also KLOCK-FONTANILLE 2014; BIN-NUN 1975; FINKELBERG 2006, 71–79; FORLANINI 2010.

[2] CTH 19 §28. First-rank was composed of the princes born from the king's main wife – the queen; second-rank composed of those born from concubinage; see PUHVEL, 2010: 303–304. The third option is a kind of uxorilocal marriage, resembling the Mesopotamian *erēbu(m)* marriage, whereby the father of the bride would pay the bride price to the future son-in-law rather than vice-versa. This son-in-law (*antiyant*) would become a member of the bride's family and could also be adopted by the father-in-law; see BECKMAN 1986, 17; BEAL 1983, 117.

[3] For example, see BECKMAN 1986. Also HOUWINK TEN CATE (2007, 197–199) has very briefly addressed this topic.

[4] Most similar to Telepinu's edict is perhaps CTH 271, the so-called *Protocoles de succession dynastique* in which succession and legitimation seems to be a theme, but the tablets are heavily damaged. From what can be understood from these texts, they do not directly reflect any guidelines given by Telepinu, or the reflections of these ideas are simply hidden in the numerous lacunae; see MILLER 2013, 154–167.

The most evident of these are the diplomatic treaties between the Hittite king and his subordinate vassals or international counterparts. In some cases[5] the parties agreed to acknowledge the successors chosen by the other as the next king. One glaring example:

> *And when you take a wife and produce a son, he shall later be king in the land of Amurru. And as you protect My Majesty, I will likewise protect your son. You, Tuppi-Tešub, in the future protect the King of Hatti, the land of Hatti, my sons, and my grandsons.*[6]

These examples do not go to the same lengths as the Neo-Assyrian succession treaties from the reigns of Sennacherib and Esarhaddon,[7] but sometimes the question was more elaborate. From these instances it is possible to obtain information about Hittite royal succession after Telepinu, and if his principles were followed. In some treaties only the vassal's succession is discussed. Although it is hard to state with full confidence that the succession principles of the vassals displayed in treaties paralleled those of Hittite kings, these treaties do reflect the attitude of the Great Kings towards the practices of their subordinates. On certain questions the Hittite kings could be quite assertive with their partners and force policies on them, when it came to taboos, for example.[8] So this behaviour could apply to concepts of succession as well.

Important additions to the evidence are the loyalty oath impositions which are a subgenre of royal instructions. Issued on the behalf of the king, these documents prescribe in detail the acceptable and unacceptable behaviour of king's subordinates on threat of being "placed under oath", a violation of which evokes the anger of the oath deities.[9] Among other topics, loyalty to the king and acknowledgement of rightful succession plays a big part in these texts.

Furthermore, succession principles can be studied through other miscellaneous texts like loyalty oaths and other instructive texts, but also from some historiographical documents, the most prominent of which is the Apology of Ḫattušili III (ca 1267–1237 BC).

Reading these texts, when it comes to the presumable heirs to the throne, it is not surprising to see the dominance of the male progeny of the kings. The Hittite kings asserted that their sons and their grandsons would be the ones to ascend to the throne. For example, in CTH 255.2 §2: *"... after (me) you must protect the sons and grandsons, the seed of Tudḫaliya alone, for the lordship!"*. The same principle is repeated in numerous other texts in question.[10] This is in accordance with Telepinu's edict, however the father-son succession being introduced only by Telepinu, and it setting aside some other model of inheritance, is questionable. The sons of

[5] Not all treaties contain sections about succession. The most noteworthy examples have been chosen for this article.

[6] CTH 62 §5; see BECKMAN 1999, 59–64.

[7] For example, see PARPOLA and WATANABE 1988, 18, 22–24, 28–58; LAUINGER 2012.

[8] CTH 42 §§25–27. See also COHEN 2002, 79–88.

[9] These were the witnesses of the oath who could bring retribution to the one who breaks the oath; see FEDER, 2010, 121–126; MILLER 2013, 7.

[10] For instance, see CTH 255.1 §9; CTH 85.2, 12'; CTH 62 §5; CTH 41.I §12; CTH 42 §2; CTH 91 §11; CTH 105 §7.

the kings seem to have already been the default heirs to the throne before Telepinu because they were the ones who often stood between the throne and the usurpers and therefore had to be killed.[11] This edict did not drastically change the principles of succession, it was perhaps only a kind of codification and consolidation of the known practice, flavoured with admonitions for those who would infringe the normal succession process.

On some occasions the heir's birth from the Hittite queen was emphasised. Motherhood (*anniyatar*) and having children was definitely an important aspect of queenship, paralleling a king's valour and manliness (*pešnātar*), as apparent from a middle Hittite text:

> *And provide the king (and) queen with life, health, long y[ears] (and) children: male children (and) female children, to the first and second generations – (and) for the male (offspring) manliness (and) valour, (and) for the female (offspring) womanliness (and) motherhood (provide)!*[12]

But the distinction represented in Telepinu's edict between first- and second-rank sons and the former having priority in the line of succession can be found only in a handful of later texts. "*What son the king (with his) queen (has), protect (only) this queen's son for the lordship*"—a line from a loyalty oath imposition from the reign of Ḫattušili III.[13] This quote appears in the context of Ḫattušili still seeing as a threat his nephew Urḫi-Tešub, from whom he had usurped the throne. Therefore, Ḫattušili was still at that point more concerned about a rivalling line, rather than the priority among his own offspring. The specification of an heir being born from the queen is therefore noteworthy. A similar statement is presented in CTH 92:

> *... if from this day on you,* [*Bentešina*]*, do not protect Ḫattusili, Great King,* [*your lord, and*] *Puduḫepa, Great Queen, your lady, as well as the son and grandson of King Ḫattušili and of* [*Queen*] *Puduḫepa* [*as*] *overlords, the oath gods shall oust*(?) [*you*] *and they shall burn*(?) *you!*[14]

One could see the ambition of Puduḫepa behind the abovementioned rare examples. Perhaps these steps were taken by the queen to guarantee the prevalence of her own descendants over those Ḫattušili may have had from an earlier marriage.[15] She even makes an appearance on a seal of Tudḫaliya IV which mentions her as the king's mother, a remarkable

[11] For example, Zidanta I had to kill Ḫantili I's son Pišeni, also Ammuna's presumable sons were killed for Ḫuzziya to come to power; see CTH 19 §§18, 21–22.

[12] KUB XV 34 ii 17'–19' (CTH 481.I.A); after PRINGLE 1993, 21, 60.

[13] In KUB XXI 37 12' (CTH 85.2): ANA ^{D}UTU-*ŠI* DUMU^{MEŠ} SAL.LUGAL *ku-i-e-es nu* DUMU SAL.LUGAL *AŠ-ŠUM* EN-*UT-TI* [*pa-aḫ-ḫa-aš-ten*]. See ÜNAL 1974, 116–117; also, the comments in SINGER 2001, 399–402.

[14] CTH 92 §9; see BECKMAN 1999, 100–103. A similar phrase could be present in a lacuna in KUB XXI 46 vs i 8' (CTH 254); see GIORGIERI 1995, 261–262.

[15] Nerikkaili, who briefly acted as a crown-prince, but was later replaced with Tudḫaliya, a son of Puduḫepa's, could have been from Ḫattušili's earlier marriage, see BRYCE 2005, 465, note 437 and the bibliography cited there.

admission as the genealogies of the Hittite kings only mention the male ancestors.[16] Generally, however, these specifications about royal motherhood are absent.[17] The heirs were rarely connected with the queen in the context of succession and the heirs appear in Hittite texts as sons of kings (DUMU.LUGAL) and not sons of kings and queens. However, it could be that the heir being born from a queen was taken for granted and was therefore not often expressed in literary sources.

The problem of differentiating between first- and second-rank descendance may be present in the Apology of Ḫattušili III, and more precisely in its parallel account where Ḫattušili states that: "*Therefore, since my brother did not have a ḫuiḫuiššuwali-son* [*of his wife*]*, I took up Urḫi-Tešub, son of a concubine. I put him into lordship over Hatti Land ....*"[18] The word *ḫuiḫuiššuwali*, attested only a few times,[19] was previously read as *šaḫuiḫuiššuwali* and was (and is still by some) translated along the lines of "legitimate".[20] This contrast would not mean that Ḫattušili saw Urḫi-Tešub as illegitimate.[21] In the other documents where Ḫattušili III mentions Urḫi-Tešub this distinction as a second-rate progeny of his brother is absent.[22] A study by Košak has however shown that *ša-* should be separated from the word and read as the Akkadian *ŠA*. This does not help with the translation, however. Košak suggests "own, natural" (*leiblich*).[23] Singer and Knapp advocate for "adult".[24] In the latter case, it is possible that Urḫi-Tešub might have been appointed *tuḫkanti*, only for the time being, until some of the Muwatalli II's higher rank sons came of age. Somehow Urḫi-Tešub remained in position and ascended to the throne. Nevertheless, Ḫattušili III's choice of words implies that the son of a concubine was definitely a secondary option. Although Ḫattušili does not reproach his nephew even once for not having sufficient descent for the kingship, some others may have. An oft-cited line from a treaty supposedly shows Mašturi's, the king of the land of Šeḫa River, opinion of Urḫi-Tešub: "*Afterwards Mašturi did not protect his son Urḫi-Tešub, but went over to my*

[16] This seal impression appears on a tablet found in Ras Šamra (RŠ 17.159): "*Seal of Tudhaliya, Great King, King of Hatti, the Hero, Son of Hattušili, Great King, the Hero; and Puduhepa, Great Queen of Hatti; Grandson of Muršili, Great king, the Hero*"; see LAROCHE 1956: 111–112.

[17] Sometimes it can be explained by the fact that the Hittite queen's reign continued after their king's death into the successor's rule. For example, in KUB XXVI 57 Vs i 8'–9' (CTH 253): "*... we will hereby swear this oath to the person of Šuppiluliuma, Great King, and to Tadu-Ḫepa, Great Queen, and to the sons of the king...*" Tadu-Ḫepa was the wife of Tudḫaliya III, the preceding ruler. Therefore, one would not expect any connection here.

[18] CTH 81 §10b; also, KUB XXI 15 + 760/v i 5'–10' (CTH 85); see VAN DEN HOUT 2003, 199–204.

[19] KUB XIX 64, KUB XIX 68, which are part of the Hattušili's apology (CTH 81) and KBo VI 29 (CTH 85) which parallels the apology.

[20] OTTEN 1981, 20–21; VAN DEN HOUT 2003, 202; HED VII, 145–146.

[21] Delegitimising Urḫi-Tešub would be counterintuitive for Ḫattušili as he declares himself responsible for his nephew's coronation; see KNAPP 2015b, 151, note 195. This might be an overstatement, however, as Urḫi-Tešub was already designated as a crown-prince (*tuḫkanti*) during his father's rule; KNAPP 2015a, 118.

[22] FOR EXAMPLE, IN KUB XXI 37 18' (CTH 85).

[23] KOŠAK, 1996, 95–97.

[24] SINGER, 2002, 744–745; KNAPP, 2015a, 118–119.

father, thinking: Will I protect even a bastard (paḫḫurši)*? Why should I act on behalf of the son of a bastard?*"[25] However, one has to keep in mind that this quote has survived as Tudḫaliya IV's words condemning Mašturi for his disloyalty and not for his views on Urḫi-Tešub's legitimacy.

The vassals were sometimes also pressured into following the same path and designating the princes born from their main wives as their successors. This was usually the case when the vassals were given a Hittite princess in marriage to further the bond between the parties. They were forced to consider the Hittite princesses as their main spouse, above all the other wives the vassal may have had, and appoint the sons born from the Hittite princess as their heirs:

> *The son of Bentešina and his grandson, the progeny of Bentešina and the son of my daughter, shall hold the kingship of the land of Amurru. ... As long as Bentešina has not yet taken the princess (Gaššuliyawiya sexually) and has not yet gotten any sons, Bentešina may elevate (to crown prince) either a prince of the land of Amurru, or his brother, or his nephew, or any citizen of his land.*[26]

This paragraph shows vividly that Ḫattušili III's daughter Gaššuliyawiya was supposed to be the begetter of Bentešina's heir. Bentešina, the ruler of Amurru in north-western Syria, was active already in the time of Muršili II[27] and thus probably already had a queen and numerous descendants. He must have had children with a previous wife because one of his daughters was given to a Hittite prince called Nerikkaili in marriage, as recorded in the same text (§5). However, this injunction on Muršili's part had probably more to do with his political motivations than with some kind of forced cultural diffusion. Having a grandson as a future ruler in the vassal country would certainly benefit the king's influence over the area.

Šuppiluliuma I expressed a similar idea when he insisted on her daughter being the main wife of Šattiwaza, whom Šuppiluliuma had helped to take the throne of the Mitannian kingdom:

> *Concubines will be allowed for you, Šattiwaza, but no other woman shall be greater than my daughter. You shall allow no other woman to be her equal, and no one shall sit as an equal beside her. You shall not degrade my daughter to second rank. In the land of Mitanni she shall exercise queenship. The sons of Šattiwaza and the sons of my daughter – their sons and grandsons – shall in the future be equals in the land of Mitanni.* [...] *and the sons of Prince Šattiwaza – his sons and grandsons* [...] *– shall be brothers and equals to my grandsons.*[28]

[25] CTH 105 §§7–8; see B 103-107.

[26] CTH 92 §8; see BECKMAN 1999, 95–98.

[27] KLENGEL 1992, 168–169.

[28] CTH 51 §7; see BECKMAN 1999, 42–48.

This treaty does not state directly that only a son from their marriage should be the next king of Mitanni, but it is not a stretch to assume that Šuppiluliuma was expecting just that, especially as the treaty (and its parallel account CTH 52, which is supposed to represent the point of view of Šattiwaza) mentions several times in the later sections the (future) sons and grandsons of Šattiwaza and Šuppiluliuma's daughter, almost as a condition to the fulfilment of the treaty.[29] In the case of infringement of the treaty, Šattiwaza's other progeny is mentioned: "*... so you, together with any other wife whom you might take (in place of my daughter), and you Hurrians, together with your wives, your sons, and your land, shall thus have no progeny.*"[30] But again, these stipulations are believably prompted by Šuppiluliuma's personal interests and not any strict succession principles, but nevertheless they show the distinction between differently ranked sons.

A kind of antithesis for this can be found in the treaty between Tudḫaliya IV and Kurunta, the ruler of Tarḫuntassa:

> *And in regard to the fact that it is stipulated on the treaty tablet of my father as follows: "Set in kingship in the land of Tarḫuntassa the son of the woman whom the Queen (of Hatti) will give you in marriage" – at the time when they made the treaty tablet in the reign of my father, Kurunta had not yet even taken this woman for himself. If Kurunta now takes this woman for himself, or if he does not take her for himself this matter will not be taken up further. Whichever son Kurunta approves, whether he is the son of this woman or of some other woman, whichever son Kurunta has in mind, and whichever son he approves, he shall install in kingship in the land of Tarḫuntassa. No one shall determine this matter for Kurunta.*[31]

Tudḫaliya IV was seemingly more lenient with his diplomatic counterpart, allowing lesser-ranked heirs, in contrast to his father Ḫattušili III who demanded a first-rank heir from a prearranged marriage. This woman, given to Kurunta by Ḫattušili's queen Puduḫepa, was not a daughter of the royal couple, as was with the case with Ḫattušili's relationship with Bentešina. Kurunta was a nephew of Ḫattušili and marrying one's cousin was considered taboo by the Hittites.[32] Also, Tudḫaliya would presumably call her "sister" if she had been one and not "this woman". But she can definitely be regarded as a first-rank wife and their prospective offspring as first-rank progeny. So here, too, the differentiation between ranks is visible, albeit through the lens of Tudḫaliya's indulgent attitude towards the matter.

When we search the treaties and instructions for any hints of *antiyant*s or sons-in-law in general—the tertiary heirs to the throne—we come up almost empty. It is understandable

[29] CTH 51 §16 (rev 70'–75'), CTH 52 §10 (rev 35–39): "*And you, Šattiwaza, your sons and grandsons by the daughter of the [Great] King, [King of Hatti] – the Hurrians shall accept you(!) for kingship for eternity.*"; see BECKMAN 1999, 48.

[30] CTH 51 §15; BECKMAN 1999, 48.

[31] CTH 106.I.1 §19; see BECKMAN 1999, 114–123.

[32] See note 8.

that, as the last clause of Telepinu's succession law, it was only for the most extreme situations and emergencies and did not need to be mentioned in these texts. Surely the kings hoped that they would be succeeded by their sons and would not have to resort to elevating a son-in-law to the position of crown prince. But we know that there were a couple of kings who had to do exactly that, first and foremost Telepinu himself who was succeeded[33] by his son-in-law Alluwamna.[34] It is even possible that one of Telepinu's aims when compiling the edict was to secure and legitimize his son-in-law's position as an heir after, according to §27 of the text, Telepinu's son Ammuna, the primary candidate for the throne, had been killed.[35] Secondly, we know that Arnuwanda I was married to the daughter of Tudḫaliya I/II and was adopted by the king, even co-reigning with his father-in-law.[36] There has also been speculation that Šuppiluliuma I was a son-in-law rather than a son of Tudḫaliya III.[37] In the cases of Arnuwanda and Šuppiluliuma I, they were both named as son of Tudḫaliya I/II and Tudḫaliya III respectively on their royal seals, as are other *antiyants* known from other sources called sons and not sons-in-law.[38] Therefore, it is possible that when writing the stipulations of the treaties concerning succession, there was no need to differentiate between sons and adopted sons-in-law—*antiyants* were legally admissible as sons.

On a more curious note, the treaties of Ḫattušili III and Tudḫaliya IV with Kurunta offer an alternative to the son-in-law-succession:

> *Someone of the male line (of Kurunta) shall take them; those of the female line shall not take them. But if there is no male line of descent, and it is extinguished, then only someone of the female line of Ulmi-Tešub* (=Kurunta) *shall be sought out. Even if he is in a foreign land, he shall be brought back from there and installed in authority in the land of Tarḫuntassa.*[39]

One deviation from Telepinu's succession principle as a son of a king's daughter is to become the next king and not her husband. It is not known whether any Hittite king during the New kingdom ascended to power from such a position, but it seems that they might still have been open-minded about such an inheritance. Why was a son-in-law not considered here as a potential heir? During the conclusion of the treaty between Ḫattušili and Kurunta the latter was probably too young to have grandchildren, but he could have daughters. In a

[33] To be precise, it is still not clear whether a poorly attested king Taḫurwaili reigned before or some time after Alluwamna; see Freu and MAZOYER 2007, 154–156.

[34] Alluwamna's wife was the daughter of Telepinu – KUB XXVI 77 2' (CTH 23).

[35] MÕTTUS 2018, 60.

[36] BEAL 1983, 115–119.

[37] TARACHA 2016, 492.

[38] See Arnuwanda I's in GÜTERBOCK 1967, 31–32, no. 60: $^{[N]A4}$KIŠIB *ta-ba-ar-na* ^{m}*Ar-nu-an-ta* LUGAL.GAL DUMU ^{m}*Du-u*[*t-ḫa-li-ia* LUGAL.GAL UR.SAG?] – "Seal of the tabarna Arnuwanda, the Great King, son of Tudḫaliya, the Great King, the hero". For another example of a son-in-law being called a son, see the Inandık tablet in BALKAN 1973, 42–44.

[39] CTH 106.II.2 §1. This passage is almost verbatim reproduced in CTH 106.I.1 §20; see BECKMAN 1999, 109, 119.

time of need, designating a son-in-law as one's heir would definitely be faster than waiting for a grandson to come of age and take on the power.

Some texts clearly show that there were multiple pretenders to the royal power. In one of the loyalty oath impositions, Tudḫaliya IV is adamant about rejecting any rivalling claims to the throne: *"And you shall not recognize My Majesty's full brothers, born of the queen subsequently, nor those who are sons of a secondary wife of the father of My Majesty."* [40] There are hints that in at least one case he had grounds for concern. Ḫešni was one of the sons of Ḫattušili III and a (half?) brother of Tudḫaliya IV. One text of a court proceeding about the matter has survived. Ḫešni, together with a group of other dignitaries, planned to kill Tudḫaliya and some of his closest supporters. But the matter became public and Ḫešni was brought to trial. The motive behind the coup d'état can only be guessed at, but succession rights seem the most likely. He might have tried to restore the other competing branch of Ḫattušili III which had been sidelined by queen Puduḫepa.[41]

Tudḫaliya even saw danger from his much-distant relatives who could interfere with the succession process:

> *The land of Ḫattuša is full of royal progeny. In Ḫattuša the progeny of Šuppiluliuma, the progeny of Muršili, the progeny of Muwatalli (and) the progeny of Ḫattušili are numerous, and (yet) you shall recognize no other man for the lordship.* [42]

This could mean that royal succession was not self-evident so the king had to impose further measures to secure his and his successor's positions. Of course, demanding loyalty to the king and his descendants was probably typical for any ruler, but Tudḫaliya IV was especially insistent and very detailed in this matter, which could mean that these texts were composed as a reaction to specific problematic situations. It is remarkable how much time and effort Tudhaliya had to devote to self-legitimisation and the propagandistic quashing of his rivals. He was either very insecure about his position or very paranoid, maybe still suffering from the stigma of his father Ḫattušili III's unruly ascension. It is thought that the dynastic struggles starting from the usurpation of Hattušili III, causing the need for the kings to focus on the matter of securing their position rather than focus on the other matters of the state, were contributing factors to the downfall of the Hittite Kingdom.[43]

One of the aspects where Telepinu's rule was lacking, possibly causing problems and internal strife, was what would happen if no-one met the necessary requirements for the title. There is no provision for who should take the throne, if a king—maybe due to his youth and short span of reign or his health—leaves behind no descendants at all: no first- or second-

[40] CTH 255.1 §24; see MILLER, 2013, 290–291. See also §§4, 5, 9 and CTH 105 §7 for a similar statement.

[41] On the matter, see TANI 2001, 155–165. The court proceeding is collected under CTH 297.8.

[42] CTH 255.2 §2; see MILLER 2013, 296–297.

[43] GIORGIERI 2020, 157.

rank sons, nor any daughters. Both Arnuwanda II and Arnuwanda III were in this situation and in both cases their brothers would become kings.[44] This did not go over without problems as Talmi-Tešub, ruler of Carchemish, felt it necessary to justify his support of Šuppiluliuma II, brother of the late Arnuwanda III, as the new but ultimately the last (known) king of the Hittite kingdom:

> [*... The men*] *of Ḫatti* [*did not*] *oppose him (i.e. Arnuwanda III), and I did not misbehave. If he* [*had*] *had* [*offsp*]*ring, I would not* [*have rejected*] *them. I would have protected his offspring, but he had no offspring. I inquired after a* [*pregnant*] *woman, but there was no pregnant woman. If Arnuwanda had* [*had offspring*]*, would I have caused misconduct? Would I have rejected the offspring* [*of my lord*]*? Would I have made* [*another*] *the lord? Tudḫaliya had* [*another*] *physical son.* [*Because he was a physical*] *son,* [*I placed*] *Ḫattusa – women and men – in* [*his hand*].[45]

Talmi-Tešub is quite apologetic here. His defence demonstrates that he met some opposition concerning the installation of Šuppiluliuma to the throne—or at least he went against an existing tradition, even in the face of such a dire situation where there were no legitimate heirs to be taken.

Conclusion

In summary, father-son succession was without a doubt the standard model in the Hittite dynasty of the New Kingdom period, and in the majority of instances the throne of the king was passed on according to this principle. Second-rank sons begotten by some secondary wife of the king or a member of his harem were inferior to those born of a ruling queen, although they are not always visible in the texts addressed here. Some queens were especially adamant in making it known that their progeny was above all others. Also, when giving a daughter to a vassal, the Hittite king's demand was that she should not be denigrated to a lower rank. As the sons-in-law who inherited the throne were usually not named as such but referred to as sons of the king, it is hard to distinguish them from the king's natural sons.

But still, as seen from the evidence presented in this article, there seems to have been some fluidity in some cases and sometimes traditions of succession had to take a back seat to day-to-day politics, as each king acted on the basis of his own contemporary situation and needs and not as much under the influence of Telepinu's edict. We can also see that the kings tended to be more assertive on the question of succession if their own position was not particularly secure, taking extra steps by justifying and legitimising their ascension and guaranteeing their subjects' loyalty. These measures were necessary because, despite the

[44] BIN-NUN 1975, 279–282; BRYCE 2005, 327.

[45] KUB XXVI 33 1'–17' (CTH 122); see BECKMAN 2019, 38–40.

more-or-less entrenched practice of succession, those who were sidelined from the dynastic line could still, and sometimes did, cause trouble.

How does the edict of Telepinu relate to all of this? The later kings were probably aware of the document and its principles as, according to palaeographical analysis, all surviving copies are from the New Kingdom period.[46] However, no king ever directly refers to the edict or its guidelines in their texts. There was certainly some default view about who should inherit the throne; whether this was the direct result of Telepinu's legislation is debatable.

The evidence does suggest that because of the different deviations over time from the edict's principles, the continuing succession problems, and the wariness of the kings when it came to their close relatives who could threaten their position, royal succession in the Hittite kingdom was still standing on feet of clay.

Abbreviations

CTH Laroche, Emanuel. *Catalogue des texts hittites*. Paris, 1971.
HED Puhvel, Jaan. *Hittite Etymological Dictionary*. Mouton; 1984–... .
KBo *Keilschrifttexte aus Boghazköi* (Leipzig, Berlin).
KUB *Keilschrifturkunden aus Boghazköi* (Berlin).

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[46] STARKE 1985, 103–104.

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The Politics of Power: The Rise and Fall of the Deinomenid Dynasty in Fifth-century Sicily

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Abstract. *In the Greek world, power was based on charismatic aretē, excellence. For that reason, rulers had to prove their charismatic qualities in order to rule. However, maintaining charismatic rule over generations was difficult, especially as the successor had to show himself to be more charismatic than his predecessor. In this chapter, we will consider the rule of the Deinomenids in late sixth- and early fifth-century Sicily. We will see how power was established through the charismatic activities of the older brother (Gelon), and how the younger brother (Hieron) then had to assert his position in relation to his elder brother. Drawing on Graeber and Sahlins' model of the metaperosn, this chapter will argue that in the dynastic succession between the Deinomenids, Hieron struggled to maintain charismatic legitimacy, which meant that power was lost, and the dynasty was overthrown.*

Rezumat: *În lumea greacă, puterea era fundamentată pe excelența (*aretḗ*) carismatică. Din acest motiv, conducătorii trebuiau să se dovedească posesori ai unor calități carismatice pentru a putea domni. Totuși, înșiruirea unor domnii carismatice pe parcursul mai multor generații era dificilă, în special în condițiile în care succesorul trebuia să dețină mai multă carismă decât predecesorul său. În studiul de față vom ava în vedere stăpânirea Deinomenizilor asupra Siciliei la sfârșitul secolului al VI-lea î.Hr. și începutul celui de-al V-lea î.Hr. Vom observa felul în care puterea a fost instalată prin intermediul acțiunilor carismatice ale fratelui mai mare (Gelon) și cum Hieron (fratele lui mai mic) a fost nevoit să-și consolideze puterea în raport cu predecesorul său. Plecând de la modelul oferit de Graeber și Sahlins, acest articol va scoate în evidență faptul că în succesiunea dinastică a Deinomenizilor, Hieron nu a reușit să-și legitimeze puterea prin intermediul carismei, ceea ce a dus la pierderea ei și la înlăturarea dinastiei.*

Keywords: power, charismatic rule, Deinomenids, Gelon, Hieron.

David Cannadine has said: 'Power is like the wind: we cannot see it but we feel its force'.[1] As anthropologists have long recognised, what constitutes power, and how it is achieved is culturally specific and different cultures understand power in different ways. In this essay I want to look at royal power in the Greek world: how it is created and manipulated and how it is lost. I will begin with a brief overview of kingly power, then in the second part of the essay

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[1] CANNADINE 1987, 1.

look at the specific case- study of the Deinomenids, a ruling dynasty in Sicily at the very beginning of the fifth century, whose hold on power was gained and lost within twenty-five years, and the reasons why that was so.

The nature of royal power

In the Greek world, royal power was based on excellence (*aretē*), that is, it was based on personal charisma, and had to be made visible and tangible through the symbols of excellence which demonstrated the existence of royal power. This proved the legitimacy of rule and motivation for the ruler's subjects to follow the ruler willingly. Derived from the ideologies of Homeric epic, having an excess of excellence suggested reserves of strength, especially military strength, which had the potential of being used, perhaps violently, but did not need to be used still to have potency. In the fourth century BC, Xenophon, one of the political thinkers who tried to theorise the relationship between the ruler and the ruled, says in his *Cyropaedia* (3.1.20): 'If people think others are better than themselves, they will generally obey them willingly without compulsion.'

As well as actual military victories, another route to a display of excellence and power was victories in the games, especially the stephanitic games, or 'crown' games at Olympia, Delphi, Nemea and Isthmia. Lesley Kurke, in fact, has shown how victory in war and victory in the games was seen as suggesting the same kind of power about the individual, and attracted memorialisation through hero-cult.[2] In the same way, city-founding was also seen as heroic. In Pindar's *Pythian* 5, for the victory of Arcesilas of Cyrene in the chariot race in 462 BC, Aristoteles/Battus, the founder of the dynasty is celebrated (89-95):

> He founded larger sanctuaries for the gods
> and laid down a paved road, straight and level,
> to echo with horses' hoofs,
> in processions that honour Apollo
> and bring succour to mortals. And there, at the end of the agora he has lain apart since his death.
> He was blessed while he dwelt among men,
> and afterwards a hero worshipped by his people (*herōs ... laosebēs*). (Transl. Race)

The kind of cult offered to these heroes of war, games and city-founding was chthonic (so not Olympian: Alexander the Great was probably the first man truly to demand universal Olympian status, although others like his father had hinted at it before),[3] but it did give a kind

[2] KURKE 1993.

[3] Lysander, the Spartan nauarch at the end of the Peloponnesian War, was said by Douris to be the first man for whom an altar was built and paeans sung, as if for a god (*FGrHist* 76 F71; cf. F26), and that the Samians celebrated a

of immortality to those awarded it in so far as these heroes were remembered in perpetuity by games, songs, poems and monuments, which bound the honourand and the community to each other by tight bonds.[4] Furthermore, as Currie has argued, hero-cult could be anticipated in life through epinician poetry, which itself suggested the heroic status of the honourand through the comparison with mythical heroes, in order to begin the process of immortalisation that hero-cult could bring to mortals.[5]

Indeed, this excess of *aretē* itself could hint at divinity. From an anthropological perspective Graeber and Sahlins have argued that rulers, by the very fact of ruling, were set apart from their communities and become 'metapersons'.[6] On the one hand, this meant kings could become the sacrificial scapegoats for the community, or on the other that they could become divine. In Xenophon's *Oeconomicus* the estate-owner Ischomachus tells Socrates that even the best men will not have learned the art of ruling unless they have something of a *basilikos* nature (cf. 3.5), and that the ability to win willing obedience is more than mortal but a divine thing (21.10-12).

Nevertheless, there was an inbuilt fragility in Greek rulership because in reality the gap between the ruler and the ruled in terms of excellence or power, or anything else, was not necessarily very wide, at least in the archaic and classical periods. As well as other men who won success in the games, men who were not rulers, could become city-founders and receive hero-cult, such as Hagnon of Athens in 435 BC, and that while he was still alive (Th. 4.102.3, 5.11.1). There was always the risk, therefore, that one's rule might be threatened by another man whose excellence was shown to be greater, especially if the threat came from inside the ruling family. The stakes were raised even higher in a polygamous royal family,[7] or if a younger contender seemed to have a stronger charismatic claim.

Even at Sparta, at the end of the sixth century, trouble erupted because brothers quarrelled over who had the greatest right to rule. Although it was not customary for the Spartan *basileis* to take more than one wife (Hdt. 5.40.2), the Spartan king Anaxandridas took a second wife because he did not want to divorce his first wife when the ephors required him to because she was childless (Hdt. 5.39-41). His first wife then fell pregnant after he had married his second wife, and she also bore him a son, Cleomenes who was in fact the eldest of the

festival in his honour, the Lysandreia. Pausanias also saw a statue for Lysander at Olympia erected by the Samians, and inscribed in his honour because of Lysander's 'reputation for *aretē*' (6.3.14); see HABICHT 2017, 1-3. On Philip II and the Philippeum at Olympia, see CARNEY 2000, 213: 'Philip offered those who visited the Panhellenic shrine a way to think about the power he had come to exercise. The Philippeum did not assert that this power was divine, but it implied that it might be and that this power was *like* the power of the gods.'

[4] BURASELIS et al. 2004.

[5] CURRIE 2005, esp. 57-9, 406-14, although note also NICHOLSON 2016, who takes a rather different view of the role of epinician poetry in the community.

[6] GRAEBER – SAHLINS 2017.

[7] On polygamy among Greek ruling families in the archaic and classical periods, see L. MITCHELL 2013a, 100-105.

sons. Even though Spartan custom was for the eldest son to rule (Hdt. 5.42.2), Dorieus (the eldest son of the first wife – she had at least three sons: Hdt. 7.205), although junior to Cleomenes, was sure he would succeed his father both because of his *andragathia*, his 'manly courage', and the fact that he was the 'first' (*prōtos*) among his peers. Nevertheless, on their father's death, Cleomenes as eldest did succeed, and so Dorieus left Sparta, notably to found a colony in Sicily (although he and most of his companions died there: Hdt. 5.42.2-46.1).[8]

The intensely personal and charismatic nature of rule could create other problems with succession. Aristotle recognised the problem for a ruler if he handed rule to his children, which he notes does not always turn out well (*Pol.* 3, 1286b22-7). In Macedon, where kingship was owned by the ancient royal house of the Argeads, the succession moved through different branches of the royal family rather than by linear descent, in order to accommodate the need for successive charismatic kings, though even this also caused an intrinsic uncertainty and instability in the changeover between kings.[9] Graeber has argued that in dynastic royal families, because there is a tendency for the founder of a dynasty to rank higher than his descendants, one solution for descendants is to achieve feats so outstanding that 'their ancestors vanish'.[10] Even though Alexander the Great had obviously inherited the charismatic qualities of his father Philip II (and his father seems to have indicated very clearly that he was the preferred son for the succession by including Alexander and his mother in the statue group in the Philippeum at Olympia),[11] he clearly felt very insecure about the succession, and for that reason he (or his mother) might conceivably have been implicated in the assassination of his father in the theatre at Vergina in 336 BC.

Weber, who also wrote about charismatic kingship and the problems of succession, argued that in order to enable a stable succession, charismatic leadership has to be 'routinised' in some way, perhaps by dissociating charisma from the individual and attaching it instead to the office.[12] Clifford Ando has argued that this was the case in Rome, and that Augustus imbued the title of Imperator with charismatic qualities: 'Augustus bequeathed more than his name to the office that he had created: his legacy simultaneously attached a degree of charisma to that office and demanded charismatic appeal from its occupant'.[13]

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[8] Cleomenes (it was said) was not mentally stable and was on the verge of madness (Hdt. 5.42.2; cf. 39.1), which OGDEN 1997 argues was part of a tradition which explained archaic rulers' extraordinary power by exteriorising it as something pestilential and dangerous. OGDEN 1997, 124-5 describes Cleomenes as exhibiting many 'tyrant-like' features, by which he captures what Graeber (GRAEBER – SAHLINS 2017, 75) describe about scapegoat kings: 'turning the king into a fetish or a scapegoat—often operate (whatever their immediate intentions) as a means of controlling the obvious dangers of rulers who feel they can act like arbitrary, petulant gods.'

[9] L. MITCHELL 2007.

[10] GRAEBER in GRAEBER – SAHLINS 2017, 431-52.

[11] Carney argues that the dynastic conception of the Philippeium was Philip's, and not an addition made by Alexander after Philip's death: CARNEY 2013, 212.

[12] WEBER 1947, 366.

[13] ANDO 2000, 30.

The same could be said in Achaemenid Persia, at least from the rule of Darius, which itself marked a major rupture in the succession. While on his tomb at Naqši-e Rustam Darius makes the claim for his personal charisma (for example, he says: 'I am skilled both in hands and in feet. As a horseman, I am a good horseman. As a bowman, I am a good bowman, both on foot and on horseback. As a spearman, I am a good spearman, both on foot and on horseback; These are the skills which Ahuramazda has bestowed upon me and I have had the strength to bear them' [DNb §2h-i] transl. Kuhrt),[14] this inscription is repeated virtually verbatim by his son Xerxes (XPl), and other symbols of Achaemenid royal ideology have a generic quality which emphasise the charismatic nature of Achaemenid kingship rather than the personal charisma of individual kings. Margaret Cool Root says that 'a particularly intriguing aspect of Achaemenid art is the consistent portrayal of the king in a *dynastic* rather than a *personal* image' [her italics].[15]

It was this apparent routinisation of kingship that led to the relative stability of the Achaemenid royal house over 150 years, whatever happened to individual kings: Xerxes I was assassinated in 465 (Ctesias F13(33), cf. (24); Diod. 11.69), Ochus/Darius II emerged from the succession crisis of the late 420s after the assassination of his brothers Xerxes (II) and Sogdianus (Ctesias F15(48-51)), and Darius III succeeded as king (even though he was not in line for the succession) apparently after the assassination of Artaxerxes III/Ochus and Artaxerxes IV/Arses (Diod. 17.3-5).[16] The death of the king, even by the extreme disruption of assassination seems to have been a local court affair, and did not affect the office of kingship which continued successfully until Alexander's conquests in the 330s.[17]

However, in the Greek context there was a great deal of uncertainty surrounding any individual's ability to claim the right to rule. Aristotle thought that kingship was not appropriate for his own time since there was no man of great enough standing to be fit for kingship (*Pol.* 5, 1313a2-8). However, he does concede the possibility (*Pol.* 3, 1284a3-11):

> ... if there is any one man so greatly distinguished in outstanding virtue, or more than one but not enough to be able to make up a complete state, so that the virtue of all the rest and their political ability is not comparable with that of the men

[14] KUHRT 2007, 505.

[15] ROOT 1979, 310.

[16] BRIANT 2002: 227, 588-9 (for the assassinations of Ochus and Sogdianus); for the alleged assassination of Artaxerxes III and Artaxerxes IV by the eunuch, Bagoas, see KUHRT 2007, 418-19, 424.

[17] Another practices that suggests Achaemenid kingship was routinized is the seclusion, or separation, of the king. Although most of our evidence for this practice is from Greek sources, there is enough other evidence to confirm that access to the Persian king was strictly limited and controlled through court protocol (cf. ALLEN 2005). However, this practice of seclusion, although sometimes assumed to be a feature of 'Orientalist' royal ideologies may have been particular to the Persians. For example, KERTAI has recently argued that seclusion is not an appropriate frame of reference for understanding the Assyrian court and palaces (2015, 5-9).

> mentioned ... it is no longer proper to count these exceptional men a part of the state; for they will be treated unjustly if deemed worthy of equal status, being so widely unequal in virtue and in their political ability: since such a man will naturally be as a god among men.

Aristotle, however, also did not think that it was desirable for such a man to rule, since because of his humanity he would not be able to rule (as law could rule) without passion (*Pol.* 3, 1287a18–32).

Other Greek authors also reveal a deep anxiety about the possibility that rulers might try or want to hide the fact that they were no better than those they ruled. Herodotus tells the (ideologically charged) story of Maeandrius at Samos (3.142–43), who he says wanted to secede from his autocratic rule because he did not want to rule over men like himself (*andres homoioi*); rather Maeandrius wanted to establish *isonomia*, political equality for all. This anxiety over the inequalities implicit in kingship was often expressed through the perceived contrast with Asian kingship, where it was said that the king was generally secluded from public view and access to his person was limited.[18] Herodotus says of Deioces, who he claims is the first ruler of the Medes (although the story itself is a very Greek one and almost certainly not historical),[19] that he had a palace built for himself of seven concentric defensive circles, and that he laid down the following rules (1.96-101): that no one could go into the presence of the king, that all business would be conducted through messengers, that the king would be seen by no one, and that no one could laugh or spit in his presence. 'He exulted in these things about himself so that his peers (*homēlikes*), who had grown up with him and whose houses were of the same status, might not, if they saw him, become irritated and plot against him. But if they could not see him, he would seem to them to have become of a different kind' (Hdt. 1.99.2).

By the fourth century, the contrast between Persian kingship (which was remote and hidden) and the accessibility and availability of Greek kings had become embedded as a way of defining Greek rulership. In Xenophon's fourth-century encomiastic text, *Agesilaus*, Agesilaus (the Spartan king) is directly contrasted with the Persian king: 'First of all the Persian was proud to be seen rarely, but Agesilaus took pleasure in being always being visible, thinking that it was appropriate for a life of shame to be lived in the shadows, but for a life that was lived for nobility the light provided ornament' (Xen., *Agesilaus* 9.1).[20]

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[18] See n. 17 above.

[19] There is now an extensive bibliography on Herodotus' ahistorical (even unhistorical) accounts of the so-called Median Empire and its kings in the sixth century. As an entry point to the discussion, see the seminal article by SANCISI-WEERDENBURG 1988.

[20] This does not mean, however, that there were never controls put upon the person of the king. In Sparta, for example, where kingship was institutionalised in a way never achieved anywhere else in the Greek world control of the king's person and especially his body was important, especially when he was 'on tour' with the army (when his

Even at the Macedonian court accessibility remained an important value. Although there are few palaces for rulers in Greece, the Macedonians from the end of the fifth century did engage in palace-building. In discussing the palace of Phillip II, Alexander the Great's father, Kottaridi demonstrates its openness to the community, and the extent to which it was a communal building for communal dining, public administration and cult activities.[21] It was accessible from the street and open to all those who wanted to enter. In this sense it is reminiscent of the house of the Homeric ruler of Phaeacia, Alcinous, which also fulfilled all these public functions (Hom. *Od.* 7.81-102).[22]

The king had to be accessible to his subjects not only because he had to display his excellence, but also because he had to demonstrate that there existed between him and those he ruled a relationship of mutual trust. Aristotle notes that the seventh-century Cypselids of Corinth were one of the longest archaic dynasties because Cypselus, the founding dynast, did not have a bodyguard, but instead made himself approachable to the people (*Pol.* 5.1315b22–9). Whether the anecdote is actually true, it does give a sense of how the ideal relationship between ruler and ruled was conceived. Indeed, in the fourth century kingship (*basileia*) was theorised in opposition to tyranny because a king was protected by law and the citizens, while a tyrant who ruled outside law needed a foreign bodyguard (*Pol.* 3.1285a24-9, 5.1311a7-8).

The need to continually prove one's supremacy over others meant that there was also always the possibility of violence. Graeber, drawing ultimately on Schmitt's theory of sovereignty, shows how kingship always contains within it the threat of violence.[23] But violent resistance could come from a number of directions: from competitors for the position of ruler, from the ruled who no longer believed in the excellence of the ruler, or from the ruler himself who might push-back violently if he felt his position was being threatened.

However, those who had an excess of virtue such that they replicated or shared in the divine, were in any case dangerous, as having qualities which could also set them apart from usual norms of society and allow them the ability to carry out arbitrary violence. In the Greek

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royal powers were less prescribed: cf. Thuc. 8.5.3). Then he had with him 'tent companions' (Xen. *Hell.* 4.5.8; *Const. Lac.* 13.1; cf. *Hell.* 6.4.14) and also 'the Thirty' (Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.2), who acted as his advisers (Diod. 15.33.1). These were replaced on an annual basis (Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.20), suggesting they were supposed not only to support, but also to limit, the powers of the king. Further, the king's person, in terms of his bloodline as a genuine descendant of Heracles, was necessary to perform the sacrifices (Xen. *Const. Lac.* 15.2). On the death of the king, his person had to be returned to Sparta, and if not his person, then an effigy of his person had to be buried at Sparta (Hdt. 6.58.3), and probably received cult (Spartan kings were considered founders: Isoc. 4.61, 65).

[21] KOTTARIDI 2011.

[22] KOTTARIDI (2011), however, points out that in Philip's palace there are no living quarters. She guesses that Philip's family lived in the city; since he had seven wives and there was a Greek preference for the women in relationship with one man to live in different houses (or even different cities), they may not have been under one roof: see OGDEN 1999, esp. 273-7.

[23] GRAEBER in GRAEBER – SAHLINS 2017, ch. 2; cf. SCHMITT 1985, 5 ('Sovereign is he who decides on the exception.')

world this anxiety was recognised in the stereotype of the tyrant, the ruler who ruled arbitrarily outside law, and Currie has shown how behind claims of royal divinity lurked the threat of tyranny.[24] In Herodotus, even the idealised Cyrus, who on his final campaign thinks he has become more than mortal, meets the kind of death which in Herodotus is typical of Asian tyrannical and absolute kings.[25]

Successful rulership in the Greek world depended on the personality of the king, and his personal charisma and excellence, which he had to demonstrate through his martial accomplishments in war, victories at the games, and city foundations.[26] For this reason, it was important for him to be on display, so that his personal qualities could be manifest. Further, to have and to hold ruling power, and to pass it on, presented rulers with a political game to play, a political negotiation with their subjects and their potential rivals. In the *Cyropaedia*, Xenophon says that Cyrus the Great ruled through a balance of virtue (e.g., 1.6.22-6) and kindness, and punishment of wrong-doers and fear (e.g., 1.1.5, 6.1.136, 8.1.29). The *Cyropaedia*, however, is a work of fiction and political theory. In the rest of this essay, I intend to look at a specific case study, the Deinomenid dynasty of Sicily who seem to demonstrate the precariousness of ruling power in Greece, the delicate balancing act and the political accomplishment needed, to acquire and then to hold onto power, and the ease with which it could slip away, resulting in the complete rejection of the dynasty and their claims to divine, or metaperson, status.

The Deinomenids of Sicily

The 'dynasty' of the Deinomenids might more accurately be called a 'ruling family', since it comprised four brothers, their wives (at least one of them very significant), and their children, although only one of the children ever actually held a ruling position, and then with a regent.[27] The family seems originally to have been established in Sicily by Deinomenes who also founded the cult of Demeter and Persephone, and been among the original settlers in the eighth century (Lindian Chronicle, *BNJ* 532 F 3.28, schol. Pind. *Pyth.* 2.27b, both with Dunbabin 1948: 64 and n. 6).

The eldest of the four brothers was Gelon. He became ruler in Gela in 491 BC. Gela as a civic and political centre was founded by the sons of the Olympic victor Pantares, Cleander

[24] CURRIE 2005, 195; see also OGDEN (1997) and n. 8 above.

[25] L. MITCHELL 2013b.

[26] See L. MITCHELL 2013a, 57-90. Note also GEHRKE 2013.

[27] On ruling families, see L. MITCHELL 2013a, 91-118. It is very tempting to see the names of the four brothers as some kind of regnal names: Gelon ('Man of Gela'); Hieron (Sacred One), Polyzalus ('Full of Glory') and Thrasyboulus ('Bold in Counsel'). The use of political names was not unknown in Sicily, especially among royal families: Dionysius I of Sryacuse named his daughters Arete ('Excellence'), Dicaeosyne ('Justice') and Sophrosyne ('Moderation') (Plut. *De Alex. Fort.* 5.338c). The son of Hieron, who ruled with a regent at Aetna, was Deinomenes, surely a reference back to the original founder as well as his grandfather.

and Hippocrates, at the end of the sixth century.[28] Herodotus says that Cleander ruled in Gela first, but was assassinated, and then succeeded by Hippocrates (see Hdt 7.154.1-155.1; cf. 6.23.2-3), although some kind of shared rule (or 'family rule') might have been possible. By the time of Hippocrates' death in battle in 491, the brothers controlled a large part of eastern Sicily, but had not been able to take Syracuse (Hdt. 7.154.2). Meanwhile Gelon had served among Hippocrates' elite cavalry corps, and seems to have been already popular at the time of Hippocrates' succession (schol. Pindar, *Nemean* 9.95b), so that he may have even have used his influence to help Hippocrates establish his power. He also distinguished himself in Hippocrates' campaigns against neighbouring cities, and Herodotus says that because of his *aretē* he became the commander of Hippocrates' cavalry (7.154.2).

However, the transition in rule from Hippocrates to Gelon was not entirely straightforward. Herodotus says that on the death of Hippocrates the Geloans themselves wanted an end of one-man-rule in their city; Gelon initially defended the claim of Hippocrates' sons but then made himself ruler of Gela. Herodotus accuses him of 'robbing the children of Hippocrates' (Hdt. 7.155.1), but it is difficult to see how the apparently untried sons of Hippocrates could have withstood the experienced cavalry commander and their former champion. In any case, Gelon soon reinforced his position with an Olympic victory in the four-horse chariot race (the quadriga) in 488 (Paus. 6.9.4; cf. *IvO* 143).[29]

In 485, Gelon took advantage of civil war in Syracuse to support the land-owning elite (the *gamoroi*) against the *dēmos,* the common people, who Herodotus says surrendered the city to Gelon (7.155.2). He then moved his court to Syracuse and gave Gela to his brother Hieron to control. He also set about increasing the size of the city by forced immigration which he balanced with the reward of citizenship. Firstly, he moved the whole population of the city of Camarina and half the citizens of Gela (Hdt. 7.156.2), and gave them all citizen rights at Syracuse. He then laid siege to the Megarians, and when they surrendered to him he brought the wealthy (the *pachees*) to Syracuse and gave them citizen rights. Herodotus says that the *dēmos* of the Megarians, the non-elite, were enslaved and sold abroad, and he did the same with the population of Sicilian Euboea (7.156.2-3), although it has been suggested that at least some of these were probably left on the land to work it in order to avoid economic disruption.[30] In any case, these enforced displacements of population groups were clearly targeted at bringing the elite on-side and suppressing the disaffected.

Even if he held tight control on elite display,[31] Gelon's rule in Syracuse was popular, based at least in part on his military skill (cf. Diod. 11.67.2). He seems to have been elected in 480 to

[28] DE ANGELIS 2016, 94-102.

[29] SCOTT 2010, 176 ('One of the most impressive [of the athletic victory statues at Olympia] was that of the tyrant Gelon, who dedicated the sanctuary's second life-size chariot group following his victory in 488 BC.')

[30] DE ANGELIS 2016, 182; cf. 279.

[31] On Gelon's sumptuary laws: DE ANGELIS 2016, 184-6.

lead the army against a Carthaginian attack on Himera in support of his ally Theron of Acragas (Diod. 13.94.5), and for this victory he was acclaimed, according to Diodorus (11.26.6), benefactor (*euergetēs*), saviour (*sōtēr*) and *basileus* (king).[32] Nevertheless, he treated his enemies leniently, and as part of the peace settlement (which is said to have been brokered by his wife Demarete),[33] he required the Carthaginians to build two temples to Demeter and Persephone (Diod. 11.26.2), the principal deities for Sicily (Diod. 5.2.3), and for which he already held the hereditary priesthood in Gela (Hdt. 7.153.2-154.1).

He also issued a coin series that identified himself closely with the Syracusan elite while at the same time making a reference to his Olympic victory in 488. The series is similar to the Syracusan pre-Gelon coinage (dated by Rutter to about 490)[34] which had a quadriga on the obverse (which must be a reference to the elite interests of the *gamoroi*) and a portrait of the nymph Arethusa, the nymph associated with the founding of Syracuse, set within an incuse square (which was produced as tetradrachms and didrachms, so fairly high value currency). An inscription on the obverse gives the name of the citizens (SYRAKOSION or SYRA) as the issuing body.

Gelon's currency issue enlarged the head of Arethusa on the reverse, turned the square into dolphins and inscribed the name 'SYRAKUSION'. On the obverse, he retained the quadriga, but added a small figure of Nike, the goddess of victory, which is generally agreed to have referred to his success at the Olympic games in 488 (which pre-dated his takeover of Syracuse). As well as tetradrachms and didrachms (the tetradrachms had four horses, the didrachms had two), the issue also contained an obol which had Arethusa on the reverse and a four-spoked wheel on the obverse, referring metonymically to the larger denominations.[35]

As a means of understanding how Gelon was trying to build a relationship between himself and the community of the Syracusans, it is important that this smaller denomination carried the same ideological message as the larger denominations. The larger issues were probably used for taxation and paying the mercenaries, but the smaller issue (an obol was worth a sixth of a drachm, and in the early fourth century at Athens four obols could comfortably feed a family for a day)[36] would have been the currency in more general circulation. Gelon's rule connected him to the Syracusans and their elite interests – the coinage continued the imagery of the pre-Gelon issues and was also issued in the name of the Syracusans, but by connecting his personal status as 'victor' to the coins on the obverse he was making a connection to his metaperson status. He was favoured by the gods as was

[32] On the face of it, these titles may appear anachronistic (cf. HORNBLOWER 2011, 47-8), but as titles of praise they do appear in Pindar so may well be genuine: L. MITCHELL 2013a, 85 n. 68.

[33] On Demarete, see L. MITCHELL 2012, 13-14.

[34] For the first coins of Syracuse: RUTTER 1997, 123-4.

[35] For the Deionomenid Syracusan tetradrachm, didrachm and obol, see RUTTER 1997, 123-32.

[36] MARKLE 1985.

shown by his victories, both military and on the racecourse. His temple-building and his priesthood added to his sanctity. Gelon was a man set apart.

In fact, Diodorus says that Gelon was a man of the people (even if that was an engineered political community of the local elite, wealthy deportees and mercenaries – Diodorus says that he enrolled 10,000 foreign mercenaries as citizens: 11.72.3). Diodorus also says he treated everyone fairly, and that this was his temperament, but he particularly wanted to make everyone his 'own' through his acts of goodwill (11.25.4), that he spoke in the assembly without his armour or even his *chitōn* (11.26.5) – indicating among other things that he did not need a body guard – and, through his mildness, that he won great approbation among the Sicilians (11.67.2). Diodorus is clearly drawing on a positive source (perhaps Timaeus of Sicily) or himself wanted to read Gelon positively (Diodorus was also Sicilian, and says that through his *aretē*, Gelon set Sicily free: 14.66.1). However, Gelon does seem to have been popular among the Syracusans. When Gelon died he was buried grandly on the estate of his wife and awarded hero-cult (Diod. 11.38.4-5, cf. 14.63.3), a sign of his 'immortal remembrance' (Diod. 11.38.6). Diodorus says the entire population accompanied his body the four kilometres to his tomb (11.38.4). Even Herodotus, who is generally hostile to Gelon, says that his deeds were said to be the greatest, and he was by far the most important of the Greeks in his day (7.145.2).

On Gelon's death in 478 BC, Hieron, the second son of Deinomenes and Gelon's brother, whom Gelon had installed as ruler of Gela, succeeded him in Syracuse. It is possible (perhaps even probable) that a third brother, Polyzalus then became ruler in Gela. However, there were problems with the succession in Syracuse because Polyzalus was very popular. He probably won a chariot victory at Delphi in 478 (the year of Gelon's death) and possibly made a dedication of the famous Delphic charioteer (*F. Delphes* iii.4.452).[37] Diodorus says that Hieron saw that he was popular with the Syracusans (Polyzalus also seems to have held a special relationship with the army: Timaeus, *FGrHist* 566 F 93b), and Hieron thought he wanted to seize the *basileia*, and so was keen to get rid of him (Diod. 11.48.3). Hieron then employed mercenaries and gave himself a bodyguard, and sent Polyzalus on what Hieron hoped would be a death campaign (Diod. 11.48.4). Polyzalus, realising what was intended, fled to Gelon's old ally, Theron of Acragas (Diod. 11.48.5), who was also now his father-in-law since Polyzalus married Demarete, formerly the wife of Gelon, and Theron's daughter.[38] Theron, however, now had troubles of his own and decided the most expedient course of action was to make peace with Hieron (Diod. 11.48.6-8). The relationship with Polyzalus was apparently patched

[37] It is still uncertain whether the famous Delphic charioteer was a dedication made by Hieron, or by his brother Polyzalus; see L. MITCHELL 2013a, 94-5, 113-14 n. 21.

[38] Endogamous marriages, including marriage between half-brothers and sisters, was an important strategy for later Sicilian dynasties: see L. MITCHELL 2013a, 97-8.

up, and Diodorus says that Polyzalus was restored to the position of 'goodwill' he previously enjoyed (11.48.8), and so may have returned to Gela. However, he is never heard of again.

Hieron, in spite of – or perhaps because of – the uncertain start at Syracuse went to great efforts to solidify his position. He assumed the family priesthood that had been held by Gelon (Hdt. 7.153-4; Pind., *Ol.* 6.94-6), and was probably involved in temple-building (perhaps including the temple of Athena which has been incorporated into the seventh-century AD cathedral in Syracuse).[39] In 474 he had a significant military victory against the Etruscans when he sent help to the city of Cyme, for which he made dedications of armour at Olympia (OR 101).

His foundation of the city of Aetna was marked in Pindar's *First Pythian*, which also celebrated his chariot victory in 470 at Delphi. The city was created by up-rooting the people of Catana and Naxos and sending them to Leontini and resettling Catana with 10,000 of his supporters. He changed the name of the city to Aetna (Diod. 11.49.1-2; Pindar, *Pyth.* 1.29-33, 60-5), and his son Deinomenes was given it to rule (Pindar, *Pythian* 1.58, 60-1), supported by another Deinomenid collaborator, the panhellenic victor and war hero, Chromius (Pind., *Nem.* 1, 9). Diodorus says that Hieron founded Aetna so that he might have supporters ready at hand in case of need, and also so that he might receive hero-cult (and so that kind of immortality), which he did on his death (11.49.2). The foundation of Aetna was celebrated with vase paintings depicting myths related to the founding, coins (two issues, both with a seated Zeus on the reverse, and one of them very obviously Olympian Zeus), and poems by Simonides, Pindar and Bacchylides, and a play, *Aetnaeans*, by the Athenian tragedian Aeschylus (*Vit. Aesch.* 9) in 476.[40] It is also said that Aeschylus' *Persians* was performed at Hieron's court (schol. Ar. *Ran.*1028f), perhaps even before it was produced at Athens, a play which Bosher argues in this context would have resonated with themes of 'good' and 'bad' kingship.[41] Pindar's *First Pythian* of 470, on face value an encomium of good kingship, certainly ends with a warning in the cautionary tale of Phalaris of Acragas (95-8).

Hieron was also a victor at various panhellenic games, which were celebrated in epinician poetry: the single horse race at Olympia in 476 (Pindar, *Ol.* 1; Bacch. 5) and in 472,[42] the chariot race at the Pythian games [Delphi] in 470 (Pindar, *Pyth.* 1; Bacch. 4), and at Olympia in 468 (Bacch. 3). In *Olympian* 1 (celebrating the victory in the single horse race of 476), Pindar says that the horse-loving *basileus*, Hieron, 'gains the peaks of every *aretē*' (13). In the *First Pythian* (written in celebration of the chariot victory of 470), Pindar praises Hieron for delivering

[39] See DE ANGELIS 2016, 188.

[40] On the internationalisation of Hieron's court in art and culture, see DEARDEN 2012, 274-5.

[41] BOSHER 2012. Even it was not performed in Syracause as early as BOSHERER thinks, it does perhaps shed some light on the interest of the Syracusan elite in the Athenian rhetoric surrounding the developing constitutional form of democracy and its opposition to tyranny, a rather puzzling aspect of the play's (possible) production at Hieron's court.

[42] For this victory, see MORETTI 1957, 92 no. 234.

Hellas from the 'deep slavery' of the Carthaginians on the one hand (with Gelon at Himera), and on the other Hieron's own victory over the Etruscans at Cyme.[43] The poet prays that the Carthaginians may not return since the sons of Deinomenes have defeated them though their valour (*aretē*) (71-80). Similarly, in the *Second Pythian* (celebrating another chariot victory, although the date is uncertain) Hieron is thanked for bringing through his power (*dynamis*) an appearance of security (*asphalēs*) to the maidens of Zephyrian Locri after their war (8-20), and for this reason is called *euergetēs*, benefactor, and is said to excel everyone else in wealth and in honour, *timē* (59-61; cf. Bacch. 3).

Kathryn Morgan argues that this praise-poetry reflects early attempts to theorise a particular view of kingship.[44] Pindar says that Hieron wields a *themisteion skaptron*, a sceptre of lawfulness (*Ol.* 1.12; cf. 6.93), recommends that he guides the people with a just rudder (*dikaios pēdalios*) (*Pyth.* 1.86), connects Hieron as *basileus* with the Dorian Heracleidae, good order, the 'divinely built freedom of Hyllus' (*Pyth.* 1.60-5), and says that as leader (*agētēr anēr*), he instructs his son that by apportioning honours to the people he might turn them to harmonious quiet (*symphōnos hēsuchia*) (*Pyth.* 1.69-70).

Morgan has argued that the contrast between 'good kings' and 'bad kings' goes back to Homer and Hesiod.[45] It is probably significant that it is within this view of kingship that Hieron wanted himself to present himself, since Zeus as king (*basileus*) of the gods provided the model (Hes., *W&D* 668, *Theog.* 886). Human kings (*basileis*) on the other hand were 'from Zeus' (Hes., *Theog.*, 96), to whom Zeus gave the sceptre and the *themistes* (customary judgements) (e.g., Hom., *Il.* 9.96-9). The 470s and 460s were uncertain times when this kind of kingship was being challenged, especially by an elite who wanted a share in power. Not only was democracy at Athens developing a dangerous rhetoric that defined its constitution by opposition to one-man-rule,[46] but also other ruling contemporaries were under pressure.

Arcesilas IV of Cyrene, in particular, in the 460s was also using victories at the games and epinician poetry to support his rule, and we have already seen how *Pythian* 5 deliberately juxtaposes the foundation of Cyrene by his ancestor, Battus, and his victory. This ode celebrates Arcesilas' wealth, his *aretē*, his wisdom to bear well god-given power (*hē theosdotos dunamis*), especially as a king (*basileus*) who walks in the way of justice (*dikē*) (1-16). However, the position of the Battiads had already been seriously shaken during the reign of Arcesilas' great-grandfather, Battus III, when the Cyrenean *dēmos* were able to limit the powers of an

[43] The correlation of the battle of Plataea and the battle of Himera is already one that Gelon seems to have been willing to establish with a dedication of a golden tripod at Delphi after his victory at Himera (Diod. 11.26.7); see SCOTT 2010, 88.

[44] MORGAN 2015, 2-3.

[45] MORGAN 2015, 14-15; cf. HAUBOLD 2000, who has shown how the *Iliad* in particular critiques the role of leaders in relation to the people (*laoi*) in epic.

[46] On the association between tyranny and the development of Athenian constitutional ideology shortly after Marathon, see AZOULAY 2014, esp. 43-8.

already weakened ruling house. The Cyreneans were able to bring in the law-giver Demonax of Mantineia to restructure the constitution, so that the role of the king was reduced to only religious functions (Hdt. 4.161). Battus' successor, Arcesilas III, attempted to regain his power, but was assassinated, although his mother, the formidable Pheretime, restored the ruling house with Persian support (Hdt. 4.165-167).[47] In the 460s Arcesilas IV himself seems to have been under pressure from the local elite,[48] and his own rule crumbled (although it possibly survived to the 440s; he appears to have died at the city he founded, Euesperides (schol. Pindar, *Pyth*. 5.12, 34; Arist. fr. 611.17).[49]

As well as making a statement about kingship and its relationship to the gods, it was also prudent for Hieron and Arcesilas to emphasise the ancient, Homeric, and 'traditional' role of kings in their communities, which was ordained and authorised by Zeus. In this way they could attempt to bolster their position against these new politically subversive movements by creating create a sense of timeless authority about their roles which not only projected themselves into an immortal future but also embedded them in an ancient past.

The politics of power

Dougherty has rightly made much of the way that Hieron pulled together complementary ideological tools,[50] especially commissioned praise-poetry, victories at panhellenic games, the foundation of the new city of Aetna and the iconography of the coins, to support his rule. In Pindar's *Pythian* 1, the poet invokes Zeus with his thunderbolt and 'sleeping' eagle as ruler of the volcanic mountain of Aetna, the newly founded city of Aetna, and the victory at which the foundation itself was announced (29-33):

> Grant, O Zeus, that I may please you,
> you who rule that mountain, the brow of a
> fruitful land whose neighbouring city that bears
> its name was honoured by its illustrious founder,
> when at the racecourse of the Pythian festival
> the herald proclaimed it
> in announcing Hieron's splendid victory
> with the chariot. (Transl. Race)

[47] See B. MITCHELL 1966; id. 2000.

[48] See CHAMOUX 1953, 173-5; B. MITCHELL 1966, 108-10; id. 2000; BRASWELL 1988, 2-6.

[49] See CHAMOUX 1953, 202-9; B. MITCHELL 2000, 95-6.

[50] DOUGHERTY 1993, 83-102.

Nicholson has argued that the athletes/victors of epinician are not heroes, separated from the community, but are rather 'fundamentally part of the polis community'.[51] However, in *Pythian* 1, Hieron, by drawing together his city foundation and his victory is pointing to his heroic status and so setting himself apart. While he does not make a claim to divinity, he is pointing to the ways in which he is a king like Zeus, and that his kingship is authorised by Zeus.

However, unlike Gelon, much of Hieron's activity was not generally directed at a local Syracusan audience. Instead, unlike his elder brother, he chose to play to a much wider field and to position himself among the elite of southern Italy (especially Cyme and Epizypherian Locri) and the Greek mainland by spending money and developing his presence at the panhellenic centres of Olympia and Delphi. It is also significant that the founding of Aetna was announced at the games at Delphi, and that one of the Aetnaean coin issues used the iconography of an explicitly Olympian Zeus with his eagle on the sceptre together with the quadriga driven by Athena and accompanied by Nike. The praise-poetry of Pindar and Bacchylides was probably also performed at the festival where the victory was won as well as at local festivals (and elite events) in Sicily but was in any case aimed at a panhellenic audience.[52] Gelon also had an Olympic victory and made a dedication of a golden tripod at Delphi after his victory at Himera (Diod. 11.26.7), which made an explicit connection to the Greek victory against the Persians at Plataea,[53] as well as starting the construction of a treasury at Olympia which was completed by Hieron.[54] However, he was conspicuously less interested in other Greek affairs, and declined to take part in the Persian Wars of 480 when asked by the mainland Greeks (Hdt. 7.158-62). Rather, his interests were more focussed on Sicily.[55]

Hieron also made other dedications at Delphi, including a life-size statue of himself (Plut. *De Pythiae oraculis* 8), which Scott says ‘ensured an imposing spatial presence in all parts of the sanctuary.’[56] Hieron, however, seems to have wanted to match the achievements of his elder brother, and also to surpass them,[57] and to do this set his sights on a bigger stage and to make Syracuse an important 'Greek' centre, not just a Sicilian one.

[51] NICHOLSON 2016.

[52] CURRIE 2005, 16-18.

[53] See n. 43 above.

[54] On the treasury, see SCOTT 2010, 191.

[55] This focalisation on Sicily was not necessarily because of a potential Carthaginian threat: a number of commentators have pointed out that the Sicilians' wars with the Carthaginians usually arose out of squabbles between local dynasts rather than Carthage actually representing a continuous danger: e.g., HANS 1983. For the suggestion that Sicily formed a strong local and inward-looking identity through the fifth century: L. MITCHELL 2016.

[56] SCOTT 2010, 89.

[57] Hieron dedicated a similar tripod to Gelon’s at Delphi, possibly for his victory at Cumae (SCOTT 2010, 88 and n. 65).

Hieron died in 466 after a long illness. Diodorus says that Hieron did not have the same relationship with the Syracusans as Gelon had done, but was greedy for wealth (*philarguros*) and violent (Diod. 11.67.3-4), and that the Syracusans had only restrained themselves during Hieron's lifetime out of respect for Gelon. Aristotle says that as a means of control Hieron had secret police who attended meetings and public events (*Pol.* 5, 1313b12-16); whether or not this was actually true it does show how his rule was remembered. After his death the Catanians, who had once lived in what had become Aetna, returned there (driving out the Aetnaeans, who relocated to Inessa) and tore down his tomb (Strabo 6.2.3). Thrasyboulus, another brother, only ruled for 10 months on Hieron's death after being evicted by the Syracusans. It is said that they called their new regime a democracy,[58] and established a cult of Zeus Eleutherius (Diod. 11.72.2), but these revolutionaries were in fact those who could claim to be 'original citizens' (*archaioi politai*)[59] (Diod. 11.72.3, 76.5), so probably none other than the *gamoroi* or their descendants whom Gelon had used as the centre of his power network.[60]

Power in the Greek world was based on personal charisma which was displayed through military victory, success in the games, especially on the panhellenic circuit and the founding of cities. Gelon seems to have used his understanding of this dynamic to build his power base using tight personal connections with the Sicilian elite. As a result, he was remembered positively, and was honoured with hero-cult on his death, achieving a kind of immortality of memory, even though it is in fact hard to see some of his tactics as anything but brutal.

Hieron, on the other hand, does not seem to have been as effective at playing the game of power politics, at least in the longer term. The succession was difficult not only because of the great success of his elder brother, with which, implicitly at least, he had to compete, but also because he had to compete with his charismatic younger brother. In order to establish his own charismatic rule, the strategy he seems to have pursued was to position himself within a wider panhellenic audience. Hieron was not necessarily trying to 'routinise' his rule and shift the burden of charisma from his person to his office, but in trying instead to make his kingship charismatic on a panhellenic scale, Hieron lost the connection with the Syracusans and so the support of his core constituency and effectively destabilised the dynasty. His activities were still charismatic in scope but depended less on his personal

[58] It may have been a little early for their new regime to be given this name, as *dēmokratia* as a political label may have only emerged at Athens in the middle to late 460s. The term was probably coined about the time of Aeschylus' *Suppliants* (cf. 604, *dēmou kratousa cheir*), although the debate over the date of the play is still not settled. Many think that *POxy* xx 2256 makes a date after 467, or specifically 464/3, certain, while others still maintain that on stylistic grounds it must be earlier than this (e.g. SCULLION 2002).

[59] The claim of the *archaioi politai* could be verified, RUTTER suggests (2000, 146 with 138), by the lists of citizens held at the temple of Zeus (Plut. *Nic.* 14.6).

[60] One might ask whether this was really a democracy (RUTTER 2000), although the language of constitutional revolution probably proved very convenient for the Syracusan elite.

relationship with those he ruled. Indeed, he seems to have alienated them, at least to a certain extent. Although he was awarded hero-cult on death, the dynasty was brought down, and his tomb desecrated. Ironically, his memory was perpetuated, not as a good king, but rather as a bad one. He was shown not to be a metaperson after all.

The politics of royal power in the Greek world was based around anxiety and fear. In the first place this fear centred on the fact that the violence of the ruler could be unconstrained, that the ruler might become a bad king, a tyrant. Even the very display of power necessary to prove one's right to rule contained within it the potential for unlawful and unconstitutional violence,[61] especially if associated with claims to the kind of quasi-divinity associated with hero-cult. In the second place, rulers themselves were in a danger from those around them: potential rivals from inside the family, or from members of the elite who could compete with them in wealth and what it could bring with it, displays of *aretē*. However, there was also the risk of violence from the community itself, especially in retribution when the violence of the ruler was then turned against him, and he became the scapegoat or the sacrifice.

Despite his actual violence, Gelon as an astute and artful player of the game of royal power-politics was a winner, especially in his local milieu, so that even Herodotus could grudgingly praise him. Hieron, on the other hand, played his hand differently, perhaps anxiously, and lost the immortality of honour and praise. Power is like the wind: it blows wherever it pleases. You hear its sound, but you cannot tell where it comes from or where it is going.

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[61] In the later fifth century, this was something that the Athenians feared about Alcibiades: he showed his power through multiple victories at the Olympic Games, but there was something in the excess of his private life that made them think he was aiming at tyranny (Thuc. 6.16.2 with 6.15.4, 27.1-28.2; cf. Ar., *Frogs* 1422-5).

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«Like an unseen god» (Ctesias F1b §21, 7 Lenfant): The Unapproachability of the Near Eastern Kings in Greek Sources as Tool of Power

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Abstract. *The aim of this paper is to review the inaccessibility of the Near Eastern kings in Greek sources as a tool of power: inaccessibility, in fact, was considered by the Greeks an essential feature in order to rule over Asia; nonetheless, it is important to note that Greek sources on the one hand emphasize the importance and the political use of this tool and, on the other hand, reflect on the weakness of power built through the king's inaccessibility.*

Rezumat: *Obiectivul acestui articol este de a analiza felul în care inaccesibilitatea suveranilor din Orientul Apropiat a fost prezentată în sursele grecești ca un instrument al puterii. Mai mult decât atât, aceasta a fost considerate de către greci o condiție imperativă pentru a stăpâni Asia. Totuși, necesită observat faptul că sursele grecești accentuează importanța utilizării acestui instrument al puterii, dar în același timp scot în evidență și fragilitatea autorității fundamentate pe inaccesibilitatea suveranului.*

Keywords: Unapproachability; Near Eastern Kings; Greek Sources.

Numerous classical sources describe the elaborate procedures that made it possible to gain access to the Great King, or at least attempt to, at the Persian court:[1] admission to the king's presence required a complicated court protocol (difficult to reconstruct accurately) and involved long, frustrating waits.[2] Achaemenid kings are usually described as practically inaccessible, almost invisible, a feature that may also have given them an aura of

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[1] BRIANT 1996, 234-235; 269-274; 357-359 = 2002, 222-223; 258-262; 345-347; MILLER 1997, 125-127; ALLEN 2005; LLEWELLYN-JONES 2013, 66-72.

[2] Some aspects of the Achaemenid court etiquette are still debated (cf. bibliography at n. 1). In particular, it can be mentioned the known case of the προσκύνησις. See on this topic, for example, BRIANT 1996, 235 = 2002, 223; LENFANT 2009, 233-235; MATARESE 2014; TUPLIN 2017.

exceptionality.[3] Among the peculiar traits of this court etiquette, also ascribed by classical sources to Near Eastern kingdoms earlier than the Persians,[4] the remoteness of the king particularly impressed the Greeks, as is shown, for example, in the famous passage of the *de Mundo*[5] (which, as emphasized by Briant and Allen, among others,[6] provides a valuable summary of the Greeks' ideas on these features of Persian and Near Eastern court protocol).

First of all, as noted by scholars,[7] this inaccessibility (which, as already said, in Greek sources is not only a Persian feature but, more in general, a Near Eastern one) is usually viewed with suspicion by the Greeks and it also confers, in most cases, a tyrannical overtone to the king (as shown by the very significant Deioces in Herodotus I 96-101). Furthermore, the Oriental (and in particular Persian) nature of this feature emerges on several occasions. For example, Thucydides' words (I 130) on Pausanias can be emphasized: among the other obvious Persianizing traits adopted by Pausanias, the historian also mentions that he «made himself difficult of access» (δυσπρόσοδόν τε αὑτὸν παρεῖχε).[8]

In general, it seems clear that the Greeks were deeply affected by this specific element of the Achaemenid court, an aspect which, besides the historical and historiographical thoughts it has awakened (which will be discussed later), appears to have troubled them for very concrete reasons. For instance, two amusing pieces of evidence such as Aristophanes *Ach*. 80-82[9] and Epicrates fr. 3, 10-13 K.-A[10] can be mentioned in this regard: they show the irritation of the Greeks, forced to wait and overcome many hurdles in order to communicate with the Great Kings or the satraps (cf. Xen. *Hell*. I 6, 6-10; Plut. *Lys*. 6, 6-8); these adversities have been comically exaggerated in Aristophanes' verses and used as a paradigmatic example in Epicrates' fragment.[11]

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[3] See, for example, [Arist.] *Mund*. 398a (with a characterization of the Great King as a god; on the issue of the controversial Persian royal divinity, see Tuplin 2017). Cf. Hdt. I 99, 2 (referred to the Median king Deioces) and Ctesias F 1b § 21, 7 Lenfant (on the Assyrian king Ninyas).

[4] Cf. *infra*.

[5] [Arist.] *Mund*. 398a. αὐτὸς μὲν γάρ, ὡς λόγος, ἵδρυτο ἐν Σούσοις ἢ Ἐκβατάνοις, παντὶ ἀόρατος, θαυμαστὸν ἐπέχων βασίλειον οἶκον καὶ περίβολον χρυσῷ καὶ ἠλέκτρῳ καὶ ἐλέφαντι ἀστράπτοντα· πυλῶνες δὲ πολλοὶ καὶ συνεχεῖς πρόθυρά τε συχνοῖς εἰργόμενα σταδίοις ἀπ' ἀλλήλων θύραις τε χαλκαῖς καὶ τείχεσι μεγάλοις ὠχύρωτο· ἔξω δὲ τούτων ἄνδρες οἱ πρῶτοι καὶ δοκιμώτατοι διεκεκόσμηντο, οἱ μὲν ἀμφ' αὐτὸν τὸν βασιλέα δορυφόροι τε καὶ θεράποντες, οἱ δὲ ἑκάστου περιβόλου φύλακες, πυλωροί τε καὶ ὠτακουσταὶ λεγόμενοι, ὡς ἂν ὁ βασιλεὺς αὐτός, δεσπότης καὶ θεὸς ὀνομαζόμενος, πάντα μὲν βλέποι, πάντα δὲ ἀκούοι.

[6] BRIANT 1996, 270-272 = 2002, 259-260; ALLEN 2005, 39.

[7] MITCHELL 2013, 43-44; ALLEN 2005, 39; LLEWELLYN-JONES 2013, 47.

[8] See GOMME 1956, 433; HORNBLOWER 1991, 216.

[9] Ar. *Ach*. 80-82: ἔτει τετάρτῳ δ' εἰς τὰ βασίλει' ἥλθομεν· / ἀλλ' εἰς ἀπόπατον ᾤχετο στρατιὰν λαβών, / κἄχεζεν ὀκτὼ μῆνας ἐπὶ χρυσῶν ὀρῶν.

[10] Epicrates fr. 3, 10-13 K.-A.: καὶ Λαΐς ὀρθῶς <νῦν> νομίζοιτ' ἂν τέρας. / αὕτη γὰρ οὖν ὁπότ' ἦν νεοττὸς καὶ νέα, / ὑπὸ τῶν στατήρων ἦν ἀπηγριωμένη, / εἶδες δ' ἂν αὐτῆς Φαρνάβαζον θᾶττον ἄν·

[11] See BRIANT 1996, 358 = 2002, 346; TUPLIN 1996, 152; MILLER 1997, 125; OLSON 2002, 96-97.

That the Greeks were struck by this characteristic of the Oriental court can also be inferred by the fact that they speculated on the origin of this feature and on its political purpose (two aspects related to one another). We have some indications of this reflection in literary sources, historiographical in particular. Given the large number of testimonies on this topic, the discussion can be limited to a few examples (confined between the end of V and the beginning of IV century) which can be considered particularly meaningful and useful to clarify some issues, and also because they deal with the central moment of the establishment of this practice.

As regards the origin, the first aspect to point out is that Greek historians ascribed the introduction of this feature to various Near Eastern populations and/or kings: for example, it has been attributed to the Median king Deioces by Herodotus (Hdt. I 96-100), to the Assyrian Ninyas by Ctesias (F 1b § 21 Lenfant), to the Persian Cyrus by Xenophon (Xen. Xen. *Cyr.* VII 5, 37-55) and to Atossa, a figure whose chronological and geographical collocation is unclear, by Hellanicus (*FGrHist* 4 FF 178a-c). For different reasons (and it is interesting, as we will see dealing with all these stories, to reflect on the Greek etiological speculation on this matter), each of these figures substantially reformed the royal organization, providing it with a feature of unapproachability, typically Oriental for the Greeks. The other aspect to emphasize is the political importance of this reform: firstly, it can be inferred implicitly by the fact that this change usually takes place at the very beginning of a king's reign or sometimes, even more meaningfully, of a new empire or dynasty, (remoteness, therefore, seems characterized by a founding value); its relevance is also explicitly mentioned in the sources which, for various reasons depending on the king involved, point out the essential importance of the reform in establishing the power of a single man over a multitude of subjects (perhaps the whole population or just the noblemen, from case to case) and ensuring the exercise of such power (even when, at times, the king may be inadequate for his role). What may appear merely as a simple adjustment in court protocol is actually described as a key feature in building and maintaining royal power and rule over the subjects.

It is worth noting the difference of opinion among Greek historians regarding the personality and/or population who should be acknowledged as the innovator: this discrepancy reveals the historians' reflections, and their contrasting opinions, on the beginning of the Oriental monarchy and on the connections between the Persians and the previous Near Eastern kingdoms, an aspect that also involves the theory of the continuity of empires[12]. For example, the difference between Herodotus and Ctesias can be noted: the onset of the unapproachability of the king is ascribed to the Medes (Hdt. I 99-100), then inherited by the Persians, according to the former, but is ascribed to the Assyrians by the latter (Ctesias F 1b § 21 Lenfant; the same can be said for the so-called Median dress, which is Median

[12] On this topic see, for example, CALMEYER 1987, 18-20; TUPLIN 1994, 251-256; ASHERI 2003; WIESEHÖFER 2003; LANFRANCHI 2003; Id. 2011; ZOURNATZI 2013.

according to Herodotus I 135, but created by Semiramis as per Ctesias F 1b § 6, 6 Lenfant). As noted by Lanfranchi, there is a substantial difference between Herodotus and Ctesias: the former viewed the Achaemenids as heirs of the Medes, the latter practically as heirs of the Assyrians[13].

The contrasting views of Greek historians on the origin of the remote king, given their value as historiographical speculation, have raised scholars' doubts about the historical reliability of these sources, sometimes taking antithetical positions: are they evidence that the Greeks knew this feature was already a characteristic of Near Eastern kingdoms before the Achaemenids (an even more ambitious question because the Medes are involved) or are they simply a projection back into the past of an Achaemenid feature? We can also consider the more general question about whether and which traits were inherited by the Achaemenids from earlier kingdoms[14].

In general, in order to better clarify the numerous elements of the matter, it is important to discuss the texts mentioned above (focusing only on the subject of the kings' inaccessibility, considering the difficulty of some of these passages, such as, and above all, the Herodotean history of Deioces).

Starting with the Herodotean account of Deioces (Hdt. I 99-100), it must be emphasized that Deioces is the first Median king, «the founder», as Asheri called him in his commentary on Herodotus.[15] In the Histories, Deioces is not only an eminent king among Median rulers (and, more generally, among Near Eastern kings), he is also a key character for the Herodotean reflection on the development of personal power (as pointed out, for example, by Thomas and Walter, among others).[16] In the light of Deioces' importance in the Histories, it seems even more remarkable that, after having his palace and the city of Ecbatana built (a kind of synoecism), the Median king decided to establish a rule according to which «no one should come into the presence of the king» (Hdt. I 99, 1: οἰκοδομηθέντων δὲ πάντων κόσμον τόνδε Δηιόκης πρῶτος ἐστὶ ὁ καταστησάμενος, μήτε ἐσιέναι παρὰ βασιλέα μηδένα, δι' ἀγγέλων δὲ πάντα χρᾶσθαι, ὁρᾶσθαί τε βασιλέα ὑπὸ μηδενός)[17]: the king's unapproachability (also concretely achieved thanks to the new buildings) is therefore crucial; indeed, it is the climax of Deioces' entire political strategy which aims to put power into the hands of one man and to maintain such power. Moreover, Herodotus adds an etiological remark in Hdt. I 99, 2. The psychological nature, so to speak, of Deioces' decision can also be noted (similar perspectives can be found in the other sources):[18] not being seen creates an aura of

[13] See, e.g., LANFRANCHI 2010, 51-53.

[14] See, for different standpoints, BRIANT 1984, 98; Id. 1996: 36 = 2002, 26; LANFRANCHI 2010.

[15] ASHERI et al. 2007, 147.

[16] WALTER 2004; THOMAS 2012.

[17] Herodotus' text is based on WILSON's edition.

[18] Cf. *infra*.

exceptionality and conveys the idea that the king is superior to his subjects; this perception of the king leads the subjects (in Deioces' case, the noblemen he grew up with) to accept his power willingly and prevents them from plotting against him in order to dethrone him (Hdt. I 99, 2: ταῦτα δὲ περὶ ἑωυτὸν ἐσέμνυνε τῶνδε εἵνεκεν, ὅκως ἂν μὴ ὁρῶντες οἱ ὁμήλικες, ἐόντες σύντροφοί τε ἐκείνῳ καὶ οἰκίης οὐ φλαυροτέρης οὐδὲ ἐς ἀνδραγαθίην λειπόμενοι, λυπεοίατο καὶ ἐπιβουλεύοιεν, ἀλλ' ἑτεροῖός σφι δοκέοι εἶναι μὴ ὁρῶσι).[19]

Regarding the remoteness of the Median kings, another Herodotean passage (Hdt. I 114) can be cited: when Cyrus was still a child, playing with other boys and pretending to be their king, he «assigned some of them to the building of houses, some to be his bodyguard, one doubtless to be the King's Eye; to another he gave the right of bringing him messages; to each he gave his proper work» (Hdt. 114, 1: ὁ δὲ αὐτῶν διέταξε τοὺς μὲν οἰκίας οἰκοδομέειν, τοὺς δὲ δορυφόρους εἶναι, τὸν δέ κού τινα αὐτῶν ὀφθαλμὸν βασιλέος εἶναι, τῷ δὲ τινι τὰς ἀγγελίας ἐσφέρειν ἐδίδου γέρας, ὡς ἑκάστῳ ἔργον προστάσσων). This was only a game, but it is interesting to note that, as soon as he played the role of king, Cyrus established some of the functions which are effective, among other aims, in creating and maintaining a distance between the ruler and his subjects, thus confirming the relevance of unapporoachability, at least in Herodutus' idea of Median kingship.

Ctesias' account of Ninyas, as transmitted by Diodorus (Ctesias F 1b § 21 Lenfant), contains an important element of novelty (also to be found in the story of Atossa in Hellanicus):[20] the unmanly nature of the king. While Deioces wants to prevent other noblemen from understanding that he is no different from them, Ninyas' aim (embodied in his main purpose, i.e. «ensure the safety of his rule and to assuage the fear that he felt in relation to his subjects»,[21] directly linked to the king's military reform) seems also to have been to disguise his effeminate, luxurious lifestyle[22] which may have appeared inappropriate and unacceptable for a king.[23] He therefore creates a system designed to hide his behaviour from his subjects[24] (in this regard, we can note Ninyas' decision to have an entourage of concubines and, more importantly, eunuchs, whose unmanliness may have concealed the king's own) and to arouse fear in his subject through the new directives given to the army. The reasons lying

[19] Cf. Arist. *Pol*. III 1288a 15-19.

[20] Cf. *infra*.

[21] Translation by J. ROBSON.

[22] Ctesias F 1b § 21, 1-2 Lenfant: Μετὰ δὲ τὸν ταύτης θάνατον Νινύας ὁ Νίνου καὶ Σεμιράμιδος υἱὸς παραλαβὼν τὴν ἀρχὴν ἦρχεν εἰρηνικῶς, τὸ φιλοπόλεμον καὶ κεκινδυνευμένον τῆς μητρὸς οὐδαμῶς ζηλώσας. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς βασιλείοις τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον διέτριβεν, ὑπ' οὐδενὸς ὁρώμενος πλὴν τῶν παλλακίδων καὶ τῶν περὶ αὐτὸν εὐνούχων· ἐζήλου δὲ τρυφὴν καὶ ῥᾳθυμίαν καὶ τὸ μηδέποτε κακοπαθεῖν μηδὲ μεριμνᾶν, ὑπολαμβάνων βασιλείας εὐδαίμονος εἶναι τέλος τὸ πάσαις χρῆσθαι ταῖς ἡδοναῖς ἀνεπικωλύτως.

[23] Ninyas' effeminate behaviour is clearly described in Just. I 2, 11 (*contentus elaborato a parentibus imperio belli studia deposuit et, veluti sexum cum matre mutasset, raro a viris visus in feminarum turba consenuit*).

[24] Cf. Arist. *Pol*. V 1314b 28-34.

behind the introduction of the former practice, in particular, have clear etiological value, being one of the Greek explanations of the origin of Near Eastern remote kingship.

Ninyas' unapproachability and the peculiar directives given to the army achieve the king's aim of exercising a strong psychological effect on his subjects, as explicitly stated by Diodorus: the population lives in fear of the king and regards Ninyas as an invisible god against whom not one word of complaint should be pronounced (τὸ δὲ μηδ' ὑφ' ἑνὸς τῶν ἔξωθεν θεωρεῖσθαι τῆς μὲν ἀληθοῦς περὶ αὐτὸν τρυφῆς ἄγνοιαν παρείχετο πᾶσιν, καθάπερ δὲ θεὸν ἀόρατον διὰ τὸν φόβον ἕκαστος οὐδὲ λόγῳ βλαςφημεῖν ἐτόλμα). To quote Azoulay: «Invisibility can therefore be equated with panoptism».[25] Unlike Deioces in Herodotus, however, who wants his peer noblemen to think he was different from them and thus extraordinary, as noted by Lanfranchi, «Ctesias [...] is convinced that the pattern factually ultimately solicits the divinization of the king by all his subjects. [...] for Herodotus, inaccessibility and invisibility affect mainly the *élite*, for Ctesias, their effects are universal».[26]

In conclusion, it can be added that we have few details about how the kings of the following thirty generations ruled, from Ninyas down to Sardanapallus (Diodorus claims they followed Ninyas' example, παραπλησίως δὲ τούτῳ καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ βασιλεῖς, παῖς παρὰ πατρὸς διαδεχόμενος τὴν ἀρχήν, ἐπὶ γενεὰς τριάκοντα ἐβασίλευσαν μέχρι Σαρδαναπάλλου) but it must be stressed that the revolt leading to the downfall of Sardanapallus was started by an act of violation of the king's inaccessibility, i.e. the direct vision of the king.[27]

There are also some interesting aspects of remote kingship in the history of Cyrus in Xenophon's *Cyropaideia* (VII 5, 37-55): these chapters confirm unapproachability as a key trait of Near Eastern monarchies, from a Greek point of view. Soon after the conquest of Babylon, Cyrus, who during the campaign was always accessible to everybody, decides to change his attitude (cf. Xen. *Cyr.* VII 5, 46; 55), although the initial outcome is quite problematic due to the large numbers of people wanting to be accepted to his presence (Xen. *Cyr.* VII 5, 37-41): it must be underlined that Xenophon (Xen. *Cyr.* VII 5, 37) introduces Cyrus' will to reform his attitude regarding court etiquette as «a desire to establish himself as he thought became a king, but he decided to do it with the approval of his friends, in such a way that his public appearances should be rare and solemn and yet excite as little jealousy as possible»[28] (ἐκ δὲ τούτου ἐπιθυμῶν ὁ Κῦρος ἤδη κατασκευάσασθαι καὶ αὐτὸς ὡς βασιλεῖ ἡγεῖτο πρέπειν, ἔδοξεν αὐτῷ τοῦτο σὺν τῇ τῶν φίλων γνώμῃ ποιῆσαι, ὡς ὅτι ἥκιστα ἂν ἐπιφθόνως σπάνιός τε καὶ

[25] AZOULAY 2004, 151 n. 20. Cf. STEINER 1994, 132 on Deioces in Herodotus: «Deioces' written documents play a crucial role in keeping the tyrant hidden and his subjects in view». Cf. also *FGrHist* 689 F 2 (on which see LENFANT 2009, 277-298, with bibliography).

[26] LANFRANCHI 2010, 52.

[27] Cf. *infra*.

[28] Translation by W. MILLER.

σεμνὸς φανείη). It appears that, in Xenophon's opinion, remoteness is an essential feature for a Persian king.[29]

So, unlike Deioces, Cyrus perceives inaccessibility as a possible cause of jealousy and makes an effort to organize carefully the circumstances in which he is accessible to all. The peculiarity of Cyrus' behaviour, as pointed out by Azoulay,[30] lies in the fact that his wish is not to separate himself from all his subjects without distinction: he aims, instead, to set himself and the members of the court (his noble companions) apart from the rest of the population of the empire, while consolidating the bond within his court. In this, he is clearly distinct from Deioces who wishes to appear different from his former equals.

The last example which will be taken into consideration is Hellanicus' Atossa (*FGrHist* 4 FF 178a-c = 687a FF 7a-c),[31] who must be separated from Xerxes' mother. Unfortunately, due to the fragmentary, concise and problematic nature of Hellanicus' account on Atossa,[32] it is rather difficult to fully understand the history of this queen (for example, there is no certainty as to her geographical origin or the period she lived in and, as a result, her role in the development of Near Eastern kingship can only be conjectured).[33] First of all, there is an etiological aspect which can be compared to some extent to Ninyas' history in Ctesias:[34] Atossa must hide the fact that she is a woman and for this reason she institutes some forms of dress (such as the tiara and the ἀναξυρίδες) and, probably in order to establish separation from her subjects (functional to conceal her nature), she also adopts the use of eunuchs (like Ninyas) and letters (like Deioces) (κρυβοῦσαν δὲ τὴν τῶν γυναίων ἐπίνοιαν τιάραν πρώτην φορέσαι, πρῶτον δὲ καὶ ἀναξυρίδας, καὶ τὴν τῶν εὐνούχων ὑπουργίαν εὑρεῖν, καὶ διὰ βίβλων τὰς ἀποκρίσεις ποιεῖσθαι).[35] The need to hide the queen's womanhood seems to have played a central role in what appears to have been the beginning of the Oriental remote kingship in Hellanicus;[36] however, from his fragments, it is unclear whether Atossa's choice of an inaccessible kingship was due only to the need to conceal the fact that she was a woman or

[29] Cyrus completes his court reform with the introduction of a system of guards (Xen. *Cyr*. VII 5, 58-70).

[30] AZOULAY 2004,161.

[31] *FGrHist* 4 F 178a (Anon. *De mulier*. 7): Ἄτοσσα· ταύτην φησὶν Ἑλλάνικος ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς Ἀριάσπου ὡς ἄρρενα τραφεῖσαν διαδέξασθαι τὴν βασιλείαν. κρυβοῦσαν δὲ τὴν τῶν γυναίων ἐπίνοιαν τιάραν πρώτην φορέσαι, πρῶτον δὲ καὶ ἀναξυρίδας, καὶ τὴν τῶν εὐνούχων ὑπουργίαν εὑρεῖν, καὶ διὰ βίβλων τὰς ἀποκρίσεις ποιεῖσθαι. πολλὰ δὲ ὑποτάξασα ἔθνη πολεμικωτάτη καὶ ἀνδρειοτάτη ἐν παντὶ ἔργωι ἐγένετο. *FGrHist* 4 F 178b (Tatian. *Ad Gr*. 1): καὶ ἐπιστολὰς συντάσσειν (*sc*. εὗρεν) ἡ Περσῶν ποτε ἡγησαμένη γυνή, καθά φησιν Ἑλλάνικος· Ἄτοσσα δὲ ὄνομα αὐτῆι [ἦν]. *FGrHist* 4 F 178c (Donat. Ter. *Eun*. 167): *eunuchos a Persis institutos putant ex captivis; a Babylonibus enim Hellanicus auctor exstat id habuisse*.

[32] Fragment c from Donatus, in particular, presents both textual and interpretative issues. Cf. n. 33.

[33] On Atossa in Hellanicus see AMBAGLIO 1980, 133-134; GERA 1997, 141-150; PORCIANI 1997, 157-160; LENFANT 2009, 20 n. 1; CIOFFI 2012; POWNALL 2016, *ad loc*.

[34] GERA 1997, 148.

[35] GERA 1997, 148-149; PORCIANI 1997, 157-158; CECCARELLI 2013, 89.

[36] On Hellanicus' interest in inventions, see AMBAGLIO 1980, 133-134; GERA 1997, 144; FOWLER 2013, 688.

whether there was a more structured political plan (as per Deioces). Despite the fact that the *de Mulieribus* does not actually state this, it is possible to assume that Atossa, as a result of unapproachability, also gains an aura of extraordinariness: after all, she was thought to be the legitimate king.[37]

The different elements contained in these sources can now be summarized: many practical reasons are given for the choice of a condition of remoteness (although a fixed pattern aimed at concealing some kind of deficiencies can be recognized, in the cases of Ninyas and Atossa, or a dangerous normality, in the case of Deioces). In any case, besides the story of Atossa (too unclear to be judged), all the other sources state that the king is considered exceptional by his subjects (or at least a some of them) thanks to this kind of invisibility (but for Ninyas this exceptionality looks more like a consequence than a primary purpose).[38] Besides Greek opinion on this form of kingship (a judgment which, as we have seen, can fluctuate), in Greek perception this pursuit of an aura of exceptionality through isolation is useful to a single man to establish and retain his power: essentially, being unapproachable becomes necessary to make the image of the king extraordinary and this impression becomes an instrument of power, a form of psychological oppression (as described by the sources themselves). This tool of power is frequently used to mislead the mass of subjects, imposing the will of a single man at the expense of the people who are deceived about the king's actual qualities and intentions (and of those who, were they aware of them, would rebel against him).[39] It is possible to conclude that, from a Greek point of view, universal dominion over Asia must be managed through specific court etiquette and royal behaviour, including the king's remoteness.[40]

As a counterpart to the importance of the unapproachability of Near Eastern kings as an instrument of power (and, to some extent, as confirmation of this importance), it is necessary to mention the attempts to find forms of opposition to this kind of royal control. The desire for resistance emerges as a quest to take direct vision of the king, thus violating the royal self-representative structure, partially based on the king's remoteness, and expose (or threaten to expose) the king's flaws. It is also worth noting, as will be shown by some examples, that sometimes the beginning of revolutions, both real and potential, against royal power consists in the violation of the king's inaccessibility by means of a direct view of the monarch.

One of Ctesias' fragments (F 1b § 24; cf. FF 1ρε; 1ρα Lenfant), also allows us to reflect on the role of eunuchs in conspiracies against Eastern kings (a point for which Ctesias, in general, is

[37] GERA 1997, 150.

[38] LANFRANCHI 2010, 51.

[39] Cf. *infra*.

[40] LANFRANCHI 2010, 49 (referred to Ctesias' ideas on «universal dominion over all Asia» by Oriental kings).

an essential source, particularly regarding the Achaemenids):[41] this fragment of Ctesias makes clear that the view of Sardanapallus (and the consequent discovery of his depraved practices), achieved by corrupting a eunuch at the king's service, played a key role at the beginning of Arbaces' and Beleys' revolt.[42]

Eunuchs are frequently entrusted with the control of access to the king (as shown by the fragment just discussed): besides the above-mentioned stories of Ninyas and Atossa (which are also remarkable for the etiological thoughts on the role of eunuchs at Near Eastern courts), Ctesias' work can be considered in general, as can, for example, that of Herodotus concerning the Achaemenids (e.g. Hdt. III 77, 2). The role of eunuchs at court and their proximity to the king make them, as shown in Ctesias, key figures in plotting against the king (and sometimes these conspiracies are in favour of the eunuch himself).[43]

The importance of seeing the king, as an act of opposition to royal power and of essential relevance for the development of an actual subversive action, can be inferred, for example, from two relevant Herodotean passages. First of all, the story of Pseudo Smerdis' exposure (Hdt. III 68-69): it must be said that Pseudo Smerdis' story is certainly very problematic and his status, both juridical and physical, makes his story unique.[44] In any case, the episode is both useful and interesting for this discussion. From Herodotus' account it appears that, before starting the actual conspiracy against the usurper, Otanes, suspicious of the king's behaviour, decides to determine his identity with the help of his daughter, Phaedyme:[45] in Herodotus, the story of Pseudo Smerdis is actually based on the assumption that nobody could come close enough to the king to expose him.[46] Even more interesting is the Herodotean history of Intaphernes (Hdt. III 118-119): it can be pointed out that, on one hand, Intaphernes believes he is deceptively deprived of his right to see the king and therefore believes that Darius is abusing his power (Hdt. III 118) and, on the other hand, Darius is so worried by Intaphernes' actions that he fears a potential revolt by the seven conspirators

[41] On this topic see LENFANT 2012 (with bibliography).

[42] Ctesias F 1b § 24, 4-5 Lenfant: ἐφιλοτιμήθη δὲ καὶ τὸν βασιλέα κατ' ὄψιν ἰδεῖν καὶ τὸν ὅλον τούτου βίον κατασκέψασθαι· διόπερ δούς τινι τῶν εὐνούχων χρυσῆν φιάλην, εἰσήχθη πρὸς τὸν Σαρδανάπαλλον, καὶ τήν τε τρυφὴν αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸν γυναικώδη τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων ζῆλον ἀκριβῶς κατανοήσας, κατεφρόνησε μὲν τοῦ βασιλέως ὡς οὐδενὸς ἀξίου, προήχθη δὲ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἀντέχεσθαι τῶν δοθεισῶν ἐλπίδων ὑπὸ τοῦ Χαλδαίου. τέλος δὲ συνωμοσίαν ἐποιήσατο πρὸς τὸν Βέλεσυν, ὥστε αὐτὸν μὲν Μήδους ἀποστῆσαι καὶ Πέρσας, ἐκεῖνον δὲ πεῖσαι Βαβυλωνίους κοινωνῆσαι τῆς πράξεως, καὶ τὸν τῶν Ἀράβων ἡγεμόνα φίλον ὄντα προσλαβέσθαι πρὸς τὴν τῶν ὅλων ἐπίθεσιν.

[43] See LENFANT 2012. Cf. BRIANT 1996, 279 ff. = 2002, 268 ff. Despite this, eunuchs are sometimes considered (e.g. Hdt. VIII 105, 2; Xen. *Cyr*. VII 5, 59-60) among the most trustworthy appointees. See TOUGHER 2008, 43-44; LENFANT 2014, 429; 434-435.

[44] See, in general, BRIANT 1996, 109-118; 924 = 2002, 97-106; 895-896; ASHERI et al., 458-471; KUHRT 2007, 136-170.

[45] On this aspect see ASHERI et al. 2007, 466 (with bibliography).

[46] BRIANT 1996, 111-113 = 2002, 100-101 (who, quoting Just. I 9, 11 *quae res eo occultior fuit, quod apud Persas persona regis sub specie maiestatis occulitur*, wonders: «But can we be expected to believe that the king (or his substitute) would not have granted a single audience during the course of several years?»).

who killed Pseudo Smerdis, so he decides to imprison Intaphernes and his family, condemning them to death.[47] Many observations can be made about these Herodotean chapters. Above all, this episode is particularly illuminating because Intaphernes does not actually commit a real act of rebellion: in Herodotus' account, Intaphernes has no intention of revolting against the Great King, but Darius suspects him nonetheless. It appears to me that this scenario reveals the importance of the Great King's unapproachability as a tool of power and shows how any attempt to challenge such a tool is considered an act of rebellion against the king and his authority. Whether any actions actually oppose the power or simply appear to threaten this royal privilege, they are a cause of strong concern for the king. It can be added to these reflections that chapters 118-119 seem particularly relevant. First of all, Herodotus takes care to prepare the story earlier, in III 84, 2: it must be emphasized that the seven conspirators, having discussed Otanes' special condition, first establish how to regulate access to the king (probably also in the light of the Pseudo Smerdis affair), confirming once again the importance of this feature (τάδε δὲ ἐς τὸ κοινὸν ἐβούλευσαν, παριέναι ἐς τὰ βασιλήια πάντα τὸν βουλόμενον τῶν ἑπτὰ ἄνευ ἐσαγγελέος, ἢν μὴ τυγχάνῃ εὕδων μετὰ γυναικὸς βασιλεύς). Moreover, after the long excursus about Darius' new organization of the empire, chapters 118-119 end the story of the revolt of the seven against Pseudo Smerdis, describing the immediate developments among the members of the conspiracy. It can also be noted that these chapters contain the memorable argument of a brother's irreplaceability (Hdt. III 119, 6).[48]

To conclude about this episode, from the point of view of historical explanation, Martin West[49] suggested that it may reveal Darius' genuine concerns about Intaphernes and his reputation: Intaphernes/ Vindafarna, indeed, emerges as a chief figure in the Behistun inscription (he is first on the list of Darius' helpers and is entrusted with an army to quell another Nebuchadnezzar; DB §§ 50,[50] 68[51]); also in *Persians* (vv. 775-779),[52] despite doubts about

[47] Hdt. III 119, 1-2: Δαρεῖος δὲ ἀρρωδήσας μὴ κοινῷ λόγῳ οἱ ἓξ πεποιηκότες ἔωσι ταῦτα, μεταπεμπόμενος ἕνα ἕκαστον ἀπεπειρᾶτο γνώμης, εἰ συνέπαινοί εἰσι τῷ πεποιημένῳ. ἐπείτε δὲ ἐξέμαθε ὡς οὐ σὺν ἐκείνοισι εἴη ταῦτα πεποιηκώς, ἔλαβε αὐτόν τε τὸν Ἰνταφέρνεα καὶ τοὺς παῖδας αὐτοῦ καὶ τοὺς οἰκηίους πάντας, ἐλπίδας πολλὰς ἔχων μετὰ τῶν συγγενέων μιν ἐπιβουλεύειν οἱ ἐπανάστασιν, συλλαβὼν δὲ σφέας ἔδησε τὴν ἐπὶ θανάτῳ. On the form Ἰνταφέρνης see SCHMITT 2007, 148-149.

[48] See ASHERI et al. 2007, 506-507.

[49] WEST – WEST 1991, 187.

[50] Saith Darius the King: thereupon I sent forth an army to Babylon. A Persian named Intaphernes, my subject – him I made chief of them [...] (translation by R.G. Kent).

[51] Saith Darius the King: these are the men who were there at the time when I slew Gaumata the Magian who called himself Smerdis; at that time these men cooperated as my followers: Intaphernes by name, son of Vayaspara, a Persian; Otanes by name, son of Thukhra, a Persian; Gobryas by name, son of Mardonius, a Persian; Hydarnes by name, son of Bagabigna, a Persian; Megabyzus by name, son of Datuvahya, a Persian; Ardumanish by name, son of Vahauka, a Persian (translation by R.G. KENT).

the textual and historical reliability of these verses of the Aeschylean tragedy,[53] Intaphernes (called Artaphrenes), appears to have been one of the main members, if not the leader, of the conspiracy against Mardos.[54]

The important aspect of these examples, besides the fact that the easiest way of fighting a king's remoteness is by trying to see him, is that these actions are perceived by the protagonists of these stories as obvious attempts to subvert the authority of the ruler, and that sometimes they are (or at least they are seen as) crucial in order to begin a revolt against royal power.

In conclusion, as often is the case with classical sources on Persians, doubts remain on how many and which details regarding the kings' unapproachability can be considered historically accurate, especially as far as the origin of this feature is concerned: although some scholars, such as Lanfranchi, for example, have spoken in favour of the reliability of these sources, others are somewhat sceptical.[55]Besides their importance as valuable, yet arguable, instruments to reconstruct some aspects of the Achaemenid and Near Eastern kingdoms histories (their court etiquette in particular), these texts may, above all, play a crucial role in providing a better comprehension of the Greek historical and historiographical reflection on Achaemenid (and Near Eastern) kingship. The remoteness of the Great King (and Near Eastern kings) is, in fact, negatively marked and clearly opposed to the accessibility and availability of Greek rulers, as recently affirmed by Mitchell.[56]

Greek sources, moreover, assign to inaccessibility a central function for Achaemenid kingship and its image: such a pre-eminent role, at least according to the Greek view (which seems to have been deeply impressed by it) led Greek historians to speculate about the origin and purpose of the rulers' remoteness and to ascribe its creation to various populations and personalities (the stories of Deioces in Herodotus and of Ninyas in Ctesias, especially, can be mentioned). These thoughts are highly valuable to infer and better understand the disparate ideas of Greek historians on the development of Oriental kingship and, above all, on the relationships between Achaemenids and the earlier Near Eastern kingdoms, notably in the intricate field of monarchical power and its government.

As noted by Lanfranchi (with regard to Ctesias),[57] unapproachability, as part of both the peculiar court protocol and the ruler's behaviour, seems to have been considered by the

[52] [...] τὸν δὲ σὺν δόλωι / Ἀρταφρένης ἔκτεινεν ἐσθλὸς ἐν δόμοις / ξὺν ἀνδράσιν φίλοισιν, οἷς τόδ' ἦν χρέος. / ἕκτος δὲ Μάραφις· ἕβδομος δ' Ἀρταφρένης / κἀγώ· πάλου δ' ἔκυρσα τοῦπερ ἤθελον (West's edition); [...] τὸν δὲ σὺν δόλῳ / Ἀρταφρένης ἔκτεινεν ἐσθλὸς ἐν δόμοις / ξὺν ἀνδράσιν φίλοισιν, οἷς τόδ' ἦν χρέος, / [ἕκτος δὲ Μάραφις ἕβδομος δ' Ἀρταφρένης.] / κἀγώ· πάλου δ' ἔκυρσα τοῦπερ ἤθελον (Garvie's edition).

[53] On these verses see WEST – WEST 1991, 182-188; DI BENEDETTO 1993; GARVIE 2009, 300-301, 304-305.

[54] WEST – WEST 1991, 187; DI BENEDETTO 1993, 262, 269-271.

[55] Cf. n. 14.

[56] MITCHELL forth.

[57] LANFRANCHI 2010, 49.

Greeks as an essential feature in order to rule over Asia (as shown by the great care that, in classical sources, the Eastern kings take to preserve their remoteness). Nonetheless, it is particularly interesting to note the paradox emerging from classical texts about this style of rule: in fact, on one hand, Greek sources emphasize the importance and the political use of this feature – there is, indeed, acknowledgement of the psychological value of this instrument of power which can increase subjects' (at all economic and social levels) reverence and fear of the king, thus discouraging potential attempts of opposition or revolt and providing soundness and continuity for monarchical power.[58] However, on the other hand, the Greeks also reflected on the weakness of power built through the king's inaccessibility, pointing out that viewing the king may actually spark a revolt and make it possible to undermine the artificially made image of exceptionality, thus showing that sometimes the king, far from being an extraordinary creature, is actually a figure unworthy of power. One of the chief features in providing the Great King with authority and prestige also reveals, in Greek historical speculation, how unstable his power can be.

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[58] Cf. MITCHELL forth., evoking Kantorowitz' idea of the king's two bodies: «The ideology of royal separation helped to create stability within the office which stood apart from the person of the king, so that the office of kingship, and especially its heroic and charismatic qualities, could be maintained as immutable without a dependency on any particular incumbent».

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The Tyranny of the Peisistratidai in Athens: Expenses, Revenues and the Opposition to the Sole Rule

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Abstract. *The late archaic city-state of Athens was ruled first by Peisistratos who became a tyrant after three successive coup d'états. The rule of Peisistratos and his sons secured inner stability in Athens after the preceding internal conflicts. The tyrants promoted political and religious unification and centralization of the Athenian community, which involved the establishment or promotion of festivals and the construction of various public buildings. The architectural plans of the Peisistratids formed a major part of their politics. Their building policy required considerable resources, which could have been perceived as oppressive, and could have significantly contributed to their overthrowal.*

Rezumat. *În perioada arhaică târzie, orașul-stat al Atenei a fost condus initial de către Peisistratos, care a devenit tiran după trei uzurpări succesive. Domnia lui Peisistratos și a fiilor săi a garantat securitatea internă a Atenei, în urma precedentelor conflicte. Tiranii au promovat unificarea politică și religioasă și centralizarea comunității ateniene, ceea ce a implicat înființarea sau promovarea unor festivaluri, precum și construirea unor diverse edificii publice. Planurile arhitecturale ale acestora au constituit o coordonată majoră a politicii lor. Această politică edilitară necesita utilizarea unui volum semnificativ de resurse, ceea ce ar fi putut contribui la perceperea lor drept opresori chiar la înlăturarea lor de la putere.*

Keywords: Archaic Greek tyranny, Peisistratidai, Expenses, Revenues, Building projects.

Introduction

Among the numerous tyrannies emerging in Greece during the Archaic period (from the eighth to the end of the sixth century BC[1]) one of the most remarkable was surely the dynasty of the Peisistratidai ruling Athens during the years 561–510. The power of Peisistratos and his sons Hippias and Hipparchos secured inner stability for the polis after the preceding internal conflicts. The tyrants promoted political and religious unification and centralization of the Athenian community, which involved the establishment or promotion of Panathenaian festivals and the construction of various public buildings. The era of the tyranny was indeed later remembered as the golden age of Kronos. All these activities as well as other measures

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[1] All the following dates are BC.

for securing the power and suppressing the opposition required resources, which could have been gathered both from Athens and from abroad. The covering of these expenses could not always have been easy for the tyrants, and as far as they had to rely on the internal revenues, gathering these could have evoked opposition. As this could have caused problems for the tyrants and had effects on their popularity, the understanding of the ways the tyrants financed their power will be essential for properly understanding the motivation of the rulers and the reaction of the community.

The finances of Archaic poleis, not least of Athens, have been recently discussed by several authors, particularly by Hans van Wees emphasising the establishment of relatively developed financing systems during the period.[2] Attention has been paid also to the revenues of tyrants, and the ways how fundraising could have impacted the popularity of the rulers.[3] Concerning Athens, Marcello Valente has recently discussed the revenues of the Peisistratidai, viewing the tyrants as the founders of Athenian public taxation.[4] The present article naturally builds on these results. It will, however, pay special attention to the Peisistratid building programs as presumably the most expensive part of their policy, and especially, aims to establish how burdensome this could have been for the Athenians and which effects the problems with financing the activities had on the popularity of the rule.[5]

The finances of Peisistratos before the final confirmation of his power

The social and economic situation in the late seventh and early sixth century Athens was highly precarious and the state was split by internal tensions. Two elite leaders, first Kylon in the 630s and later Damasias in the 580s, tried to use these difficulties for achieving power, but without an essential success. Kylon's attempt was followed by continuous civil strife which Drakon and Solon tried to solve with their legislations. Solon succeeded to reorganise the state in many important aspects, which included, among many other legislative measures, an establishment or re-validation of earlier tax – *eisphora*. He stated that the treasurers must appointed from among the highest property class – the *pentakosiomedimnoi* – and some duties concerning the income and the expenditure was assigned to *naukrarioi* – the heads of twelve administrative and apparently taxation units (*naukrariai*) into which the state was divided.[6] All this demonstrates that public finances were of considerable importance for the proper functioning of the state.[7] The conflicts however continued,[8] and in the 560s there were three

[2] VAN WEES 2013; see also e.g. LYTTKENS 2013.

[3] KÕIV 2021 and in the present volume.

[4] VALENTE 2019; but see also SPAHN 1998.

[5] The question if the Athenian tyrants did or did not differ public funds from their own private wealth will not be discussed in the current research because it deserves a further in-depth analysis.

[6] Eisphora: Ath. Pol. 8.3; treasurers: Ath. Pol. 8.1; the duties of the *naukrarioi*: Ath. Pol. 9.3.

[7] The focus of this article does not allow to discuss Solonian reorganizations in detail, on his reforms see HIGNETT 1952, 90–103; DEVELIN 1989, 37–38; STANLEY 1999, 204–257; OWENS 2010, 97–145. Very little is known about Solonian

factions competing for the power. The *pedioi* (men from the plain) headed by Lykurgos were opposed to the *paralioi* (men from the shore) led by Megakles, to which Peisistratos added his own faction of *hyperakrioi* (men from beyond the hills) [9] At the same time, an implicit sign of the strengthening of the polis was the victory over Megara and the capture of its port Nisaia under the leadership of Peisistratos. However, the factional strife and the ease with which Peisistratos managed to seize the power in three succeeding times demonstrates the continuous instability of the political, economic and social situation.

During his first coup d'état Peisistratos seized Acropolis and achieved tyrannical power with the help of his bodyguard armed with clubs (*korynephoroi*), an event dated to 560/1.[10] Soon thereafter Peisistratos was overthrown by an alliance of Lykurgos and Megakles, but the latter was not content with the consequent political situation and proposed to Peisistratos to seize tyranny together with him. Peisistratos agreed and restated his tyranny by riding to the Acropolis on a chariot with a woman dressed as the goddess Athena, as if the goddess herself had established him to the power. The Athenians consequently surrendered to his rule. But this alliance did not last long and Peisistratos was again overthrown by Megakles and Lykurgos who re-established their alliance against him.[11]

We do not know much about the revenues or expenses of Peisistratos during these two short periods of tyranny. His family surely had considerable possessions, probably near Brauron in the eastern Attika if we can trust the evidence of our sources,[12] the revenues from which could have been used for both establishing and maintaining the power. Moreover, since all our sources agree that he left the Solonian constitution intact,[13] we can assume that as the head of the state he could exploit the taxes established by Solon. If the clubmen, with whom he first seized the power, were kept by him as a regular unit of bodyguard, he must probably have paid them. Moreover, we can suspect that the interest of Peisistratos and Megakles to conduct religious performances was not confined to the spectacle with the goddess Athena during Peisistratos' second coup d'état. There might have been still other expenses, which could have been covered from the public funds coming from the taxes fixed by Solon.

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taxation but his *eisphora* was supposedly corresponding to four 'property classes' attested to him (*pentakosiomedimnoi, hippeis, zeugitai* and *thetes*) cf. VAN WEES 2013, 85–92 (according to Ath. Pol. 7.3 however the 'property classes' might have existed even before Solon).

[8] The reforms of Solon however were followed by two years without any archons, according to Ath. Pol. 13.1 in 586/5.

[9] Hdt. 1.59; according to Ath. Pol. 13.4 (cf. Plut. Sol. 29.1) Peisistratos became the leader of an already existing group of *diakrioi* (men from the hills).

[10] Hdt. 1.59.5; Plut. Sol. 30.2; Ath. Pol. 14.1; Marm. Par. FGrH 239 40; for the dating cf. CADOUX 1948, 104–106; DEVELIN 1989, 42.

[11] Hdt. 1.60–61.2; Ath. Pol. 14.4–15.1.

[12] Plut. Sol. 10.2; Plat. Hipp. 228b.

[13] Hdt. 1.59.6 (who confines this to the first period of Peisistratos' rule); Thuk. 6.54.4–5; Ath. Pol. 14.3, 16; Plut. Sol. 31.

When Megakles and Lykurgos concluded an agreement against Peisistratos and he had to go into exile, all these revenues were cut off. Herodotos reports that the tyrant and his family settled down first at Eretria where they accepted the plan of Hippias to recover the power and to collect gifts from all the cities which owed them some requital. The Thebans were allegedly the biggest contributors, the Argive mercenaries joined him when he returned to Attica, and Lygdamis from Naxos supported Peisistratos with money and men.[14] The *Athenaion Politeia* adds the Eretrian aristocracy of *hippeis* as the supporters.[15] We can only guess if Argos, Naxos and Eretria, apart from the Thebans, might have been these cities which owed to Peisistratidai and consequently supported them with money. Peisistratos second wife was an Argive Timonassa and one of his sons Hegesistratos brought thousand Argives to fight for him,[16] which indicates close relations with Argos.

These obligations towards Peisistratos obviously must date from the first two periods of his reign, or from the time before his tyranny. Herodotos' account infers that these cities were indebted to Peisistratos and not to the citizens of Athens, because otherwise the former tyrant could not have requested the requitals when expelled from his polis. The creation of these debts must have involved cost for Peisistratos, which could have been covered either from his own resources or from the Athenian public funds, so far as he commanded them during his first short periods of tyranny. His family was surely wealthy, but almost certainly not wealthy enough for helping multiple city-states, which suggests that during the first two periods of tyranny Peisistratos had used the public resources for creating ties of friendship, even sort of dependency, between his own family and the influential circles outside Athens.

According to the *Athenaion Politeia* the Peisistratidai first settled to Rhaikelos on the shore of the gulf of Thermae on the Macedonian coast, from where they moved to the neighbourhood of mount Pangaion, to gather money and hire soldiers.[17] Herodotos notes the same district around Strymon river in the vicinity of mount Pangaion as the major source of Peisistratos' subsequent wealth[18], besides the gifts and contributions in money and men from his allies. This allowed them to return in the eleventh year to Eretria. The expenses of Peisistratos during this period were related to preparing his military actions in regaining the tyranny. After the ten years of preparation he landed with his army at Marathon, where collected gifts and gathered allies among the Athenians. He subsequently won a battle at

[14] Hdt. 1.61.

[15] Ath. Pol. 15.2.

[16] Ath. Pol. 17.3.

[17] Ath. Pol. 15.2.

[18] Hdt. 1.64.1. Herodotos and *Athenaion Politeia* mention Strymon as a source of revenues which may refer to the mines of noble metals of Mt. Pangaion or simply to the fertility of the Strymon plain (Strab. 7. F 33–34; Plut. Kim. 7.3).

Pallene against the citizen army trying to opose him, and seized the power in Athens,[19] at 546/5 according to the ancient evidence.[20]

B. Lavelle has suggested that Peisistratos relied almost exclusively on domestic Athenian military, and that Herodotos was mistaken in naming the Argives as mercenaries since the *Athenaion Politeia* counts them as close allies led by Peisistratos' son Hegesistratos.[21] Peisistratos had not been successful previously in securing power with local Athenian support, which indicates the crucial role of foreign help in his *coup d'état*. The *Athenaion Politeia* is very clear that this was the first time when Peisistratos attempted to recover his power by force, while Herodotos notices that his local supporters started to join him only after he had landed in Marathon.[22] Peisistratos must have been prepared to face a battle without the help of his Athenian supporters, which means that these formed only a supplementary force to his main army. It is hard to believe that all his foreign force was based only on friendship and good faith, which suggests that at least a part of them were hired mercenaries. We do not know the size or the exact composition of Peisistratos' army, but the whole preparation, food, ships and other supplies, as well as the payment for the Argive mercenaries, must have been expensive. Moreover, the *Athenaion Politeia* notes that after the battle of Pallene, when the power in Athens was firmly established, Peisistratos conquered Naxos and appointed Lygdamis as ruler.[23] This demonstrates that Peisistratos had to reward his supporters, for which additional revenues were surely necessary.

A part of the revenues was provided by the outside allies, mentioned above, for which Peisistratos had apparently taken care during the first periods of reign. Besides that, the resources of Strymon were probably important. Ancient Strymon was rich in forests, and the timber for building the ships necessary for bringing the force to Marathon might have come from there. However, the building of the ships certainly involved considerable expenses besides the timber. We can suppose that the cost of these military actions were to a great extent covered with the noble metals of the nearby Mt. Pangaion.

The expenses of Peisistratos during his third tyranny

The expenses of Peistratos during his third tyranny can be divided into four categories: the expenses to the military, the loans to the poor farmers, the expenses on the cults and for the building projects. Thukydides states that the Peisistratidai embellished their city, but also

[19] Hdt. 1.62–63; Ath. Pol. 15.

[20] Cf. CADOUX 1948, 39, 42; DEVELIN 1989, 45.

[21] Ath. Pol. 17.3. It seems interesting that when almost in all another points B. LAVELLE counts *Athenaion Politeia* as 'an ancient copywriter' of Herodotos (LAVELLE 1992, 8–12) then in the matter of understanding Argive mercenaries he judges this as more reliable than Herodotos (1.61.4).

[22] Ath. Pol.15.2; Hdt. 1.62.

[23] Ath. Pol. 15.3.

waged wars and provided sacrifices for the temples.[24] No wars of either Peisistratos or his sons before the murder of Hipparchos are recorded, but Thukydides could have meant Peisistratos' conquest of Sigeion from Mytilene and the conquest of Naxos.[25] These ventures required naval power which, however, must have been at least partially existent already when Peisistratos landed at Marathon. Maintaining of these ships must have been expensive.[26] The bodyguard of Peisistratos and his sons, referred to as *korynephoroi*, *doryphoroi*, or *phylakes* certainly required some more costs.[27]

In the field of the religious activities Peisistratos can be directly linked only with the purification of the island of Delos. As the removal of the bones of the dead from the temple area was carried out according to the bidding of the oracles,[28] we can suppose that Peisistratos was also active in Delphi. The promotion of the Panathenaian festivals has been attested for him and his sons.[29] The introduction of the city-Dionysia festival was dated to his reign in 534,[30] and a later tradition related him to the promotion of the cult of Dionysos.[31] The introduction of Eleusinian mysteries at Athens might have been founded also under the rule of Peisistratos.[32] The interest of the tyrant in the recitations of the Homeric epics during the Panathenaia festival is recorded by the tradition as well.[33]

Concerning the agricultural and economic politics of Peisistratos we have to rely on the notice of the *Athenaion Politeia* that he gave loans to the poor, so that they could maintain themselves by farming.[34] It seems however reasonable to suppose that these loans formed a smaller part of the total expenses of the tyrant.

The building projects of Peisistratos

The evidence for the building projects in Athens and Attica which might be date from the period of tyranny comes mainly from the archaeological record, and in many cases the more

[24] Thuk. 6.54.5.

[25] Sigeion: Hdt. 5.94; Naxos: Ath. Pol. 15.3.

[26] APERGHIS 2013, 4–5.

[27] *Korynephoroi*: Hdt. 1.59.5; Ath. Pol. 14.1; Plut. Sol. 30.2–3; Polyb. 1.21.3; *doryphoroi*: Thuk. 6.56.2, 57.1, 57.4; *epikouroi*: Hdt. 1.64.1; Thuk. 6.58.2; *phylakes*: Arist. Rhet. 1357b 313–3.

[28] Hdt. 1.64.2; Thuk. 3. 104.2.

[29] According to Arist. F 637 Rose/ sc. Ael. Ar. 13.189.4–5 Peisistratos even founded the Great Panathenaia. For associations between Peisistratos and the Great Panathenaia see MYLONAS 1961, 78; PAGA 2021, 82, for a detailed criticism see PARKER 1996, 89–92. On the relation between the development of the festival and the construction of the Acropolis' ramps see PAGA 2021, 39 n. 22.

[30] Marm. Par. FGrH 239 A 43; Plut. Sol. 29.6; Suda s.v. *Thespis*; cf. SIMON 1983, 104.

[31] Athen. 12.533c.

[32] On the mysteries see SHAPIRO 1989, 67–69.

[33] HIGNETT 1952, 330–331; DAVISON 1958, 26ff; WEST 1999, 364f contra JANKO 1992, 29, 32 according to whom the text existed before Peisistratos' time.

[34] Ath. Pol. 16.2.

or less precise dating is debatable.[35] The most notable among the buildings which could date from the first two short periods of Peisistratos' tyranny are perhaps the temple of Athena Polias and the *Hekatompedon* on the Acropolis. Their construction could have started earlier, but almost certainly continued under Peisistratos.[36] Besides these, some other dwellings were erected on Acropolis, as well as the wells and possibly a watersystem supplying Acropolis.[37] On the Agora the temple of Apollo Patroos,[38] and some other buildings were constructed during Peisistratos' reign.[39] Some buildings were erected elsewhere in Attica.[40]

The buildings that can be securely dated to the third period of tyranny ca 545–528 are less numerous. The constructions in the town of Athens were confined above all to the temple of Zeus Agoraios on the agora.[41] In the other parts of Attica the main building was apparently the colonnade of the Athena Sounias temple at Sounion.[42] Outside Attica Peisistratos was apparently involved in the development of the sanctuary at Delos, where the Archaic temple of Apollo was restored or built c. 550 or slightly later and reveals close connections to

[35] Although the dating of them has remained a problematic issue: see APF, 444ff; RUEBEL 1973, 125–136; HIND 1974, 1–18; RHODES 1976, 219–233; DEVELIN 1989, 41–47; PAGA 2021, 8 n.11, 30 n.2, 68, 136, 265.

[36] The temple of Athena Polias has been dated c. 570–525 (BOERSMA 1970, cat. 48; HURWIT 1999, 109–125, 130–136, 341 n.47; ÉTIENNE 2004, 42–48), and the Hekatompedon c. 570–550 (WYCHERLEY 1978, 144–145; BANCROFT 1979, ch 1–3; HURWIT 1985, 236–48; 1999, 106–125, 341 n. 48; ÉTIENNE 2004, 42–48). According to PAGA 2021, 30, 33–39, 43–51, 65–66, 71–72 it was the Bluebeard temple that was first erected on the Acropolis ca. 570–560 and replaced in 500 with the Old Athena temple.

[37] The Athena Nike Precinct (dated mainly to the 550s cf. RAUBITSCHEK 1949, 359–364; BOERSMA 1970, 161; HURWIT 1999, 105–106, 116) and other small buildings (see PICARD 1935, 595; DINSMOOR 1947, 125; 1950, 70 n.1). On wells and the water supply system see CAMP 1977, 46–47; DIMITRIADOU 2019, 184–187.

[38] Dated to the middle of the 6th century (cf. THOMPSON 1937, 8–12; THOMPSON 1962, 59–60; PAGA 2021, 88f contra HEDRICK 1988, 185–191 who doubts in the use of the 6th century building as a religious site. On the site see BOERSMA 1970, 17, cat. IX); DIMITRIADOU 2019, 170, 192.

[39] Building C in the Agora is dated to c. 600–575 (cf. BOERSMA 1970, cat. 124; DIMITRIADOU 2019, 192). Building F in the Agora from the middle of the sixth century could have served as prytaneion (THOMPSON 1940, 40–44) or residence of the tyrants (THOMPSON 1962, 21; BOERSMA 1970, cat. 144; SHEAR 1978, 6–7; CAMP 1986, 38 (a mansion where tyrants had their court), 44–45 (palace) cf. MORRIS 1987, 68; HURWIT 1999, 120–121; DIMITRIADOU 2019, 192–194; PAGA 2021, 86); House of Thamneus dated to c. 550 by BOERSMA 1970, cat. 145; DIMITRIADOU 2019, 173, 220.

[40] The sanctuary of Demeter and Kore and the wall of the precinct at Eleusis date from the middle of the 6th century (BOERSMA 1970, cat. 18, 21). Few shrines from the early or middle of the 6th century in the countryside include these dedicated to Apollo Proopsios on the Hymettos, to Athena Sounias in Sounio (BOERSMA 1970, cat. 34, 38, 51) and to Zeus Ombrios on the Hymettos mountain (BOERSMA 1970, cat. 71; DIMITRIADOU 2019, 189). The wall of the precinct of Demeter and Kore in Athens is dated to c. 550 (BOERSMA 1970, cat. 22).

[41] The temple of Zeus Agoraios (cf. BOERSMA 1970, 17, cat. 32; cat. 69). The building D in the Agora is dated to 550–525 by BOERSMA 1970, cat. 127 while DIMITRIADOU 2019, 192–194 dates it to 530.

[42] The colonnade of the temple of Athena Sounias (temple itself dates from the early or the mid-sixth century cf. BOERSMA 1970, 17, cat. XVII, cat. 51 contra PAGA 2021, 220–224 who dates it to 500); on the house(s) in Thorikos dated to the second half of the 6th century see BOERSMA 1970, 17, cat. 159; the temple of Plouton has also been dated to the years 550–500 cf. BOERSMA 1970, cat. 62.

Athens.[43] This project could be connected to the religious purification of the island ordered by the tyrant.[44]

However, although Peisistratos erected some constructions on the Agora, it seems clear that Agora had become the civic centre of Athens already on the first half of the sixth century, thus before the tyranny.[45] This contradicts the view that Peisistratos was the main contributor to its the development.[46] Only two Agora buildings – the temple of Zeus Agoraios and the building D – can be securely attached to this period of reign. The story that after the victorious battle at Pallene Peisistratos assembled Athenians at Theseion, let his associates to gather their arms and lock into the buildings nearby may suggest that Peisistratos had a part to play in the construction of Theseion.[47] If excluding the doubtful account of Theopompos concerning the tyrant's initiative in founding Lykeion,[48] then Theseion is the only building that the literary sources link to Peisistratos. Outside the agora, the construction of the temple of Dionysos Eleuthereus and of the scene for the dramatic performances can be linked to Peisistratos because of the alleged foundation of the festival of city-Dionysia by the tyrant.[49]

It is however remarkable that on the Acropolis no new buildings appear to have been erected during the years 546–528, except of some small dwellings which might have been built at the beginning of the third tyranny of Peisistratos.[50] It has been suggested that Peisistratos used Acropolis as his residence,[51] although there is no hard evidence for establishing this. His sons' supposed residence at the Agora will be touched upon below.[52]

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[43] The stone and the technic used were Attic cf. COURBY 1931, 213–215; SANTERRE 1958, 302–303; BRUNEAU – DUCAT 1965, 82 n. 11; BOERSMA 1970, 17–18, cat. 34; GRUBEN 1976, 14. This modest temple of Apollo Delios within the sanctuary may have been a part of the Peisistratos' restoration process cf. SHAPIRO 1989, 48.

[44] COURBY 1931, 213–215; SCHEFOLD 1946; BRUNEAU – DUCAT 1965, 17, 82 followed by BOERSMA 1970, 17–18, cat. 34.

[45] CAMP 1986, 37ff, PAGA 2021, 80ff, for a different dating see THOMPSON 1981; FRANCIS – VICKERS 1988.

[46] SHEAR 1978, 4–9; STEUBEN 1989, 81–84; HURWIT 1999, 120 and BOERSMA 2000, 54–55 have argued that Peisistratos essentially contributed to the development of the agora. Cf. DIMITRIADOU 2019, 192–196, 211; PAGA 2021, 86–88.

[47] The story recorded in Ath. Pol. 15.4; Polyaen. 1.21.2. Theseion has been dated to c. 575–550 cf. THOMPSON 1954, 36–44; 1966 (I), 47. On the site see BOERSMA 1970, cat. 30.

[48] Harpokration s.v. *Lykeion* referring to Theopomp. FGrH 115 F 136. According to Philochoros FGrH 328 F 37 it was Perikles not Peisistratos who was the *epistates* of Lykeion; cf. BOERSMA 1970, cat. XVII, XXV.

[49] The temple of Dionysos Eleuthereus dated to c. 550–500 (BOERSMA 1970, cat. 55; HURWIT 1999, 106, 117; while PAGA 2021, 145–150 dates it to 506/5 and the construction of the theatre to 500) along with the initial space of dramatic performances dated to the last third of the 6th century (cf. MARTIN 1951, 322–324; WYCHERLEY 1957, 162–163; PICKARD-CAMBRIDGE 1962, 68–89; HURWIT 1999, 106, 117, 121).

[50] On the dwellings see infra n. 37.

[51] ANDREWES 1956, 113; 1982, 415; BERVE – GRUBEN 1961, 64; but BERVE 1967, 549 hesitates. The presence of the residence as the reason of decrease of dedications has been postulated by RAUBITSCHEK 1949, 464–5; HURWIT 1999, 118–119.

[52] The number of dedications on the Acropolis increased during the second half of the 6th century (SCHRADER 1939, 9; RAUBITSCHEK 1949, 456; SCHOLL 2006, 131–136), but the significance of this fact for establishing the residence of the tyrant is debatable.

All the other constructions in Athens or in Attika mentioned above could have resulted from local initiatives, or are dated too uncertainly for being securely linked to Peisistratos' reign. The Archaic non-religious dwellings in the periphery of Attica from the Peisistratos era are few (the most important are the house(s) of Thorikos).[53] All this considered, we can conclude that no single construction in Athens can be firmly attached to Peisistratos, although we must assume that as the ruler he probably contributed to the construction of the two buildings on Agora which were probably built during the period of his reign, and to the continuation of the temple building on the Acropolis. This would suggest that his expenses on the building projects were, in all likelihood, not significantly bigger than what the Athenians had spent before the tyranny.

The revenues of Peisistratos during the third tyranny

According to Herodotos, Peisistratos started to collect money from the Athenians even before the battle at Pallene,[54] which clearly demonstrates his need for supplementary finances and reflects the high expenses for the seizure of the power at Athens. According to the *Athenaion Politeia* he subsequently collected a tithe from the agricultural production.[55] The amount of the tax is debatable, for which see below, but the fact of taxation can be trusted. The *Athenaion Politeia* connects the extraction of the tithe to the supporting of agriculture by the tyrant.[56] The author emphasizes that the loans to the poor farmers and establishing the juries for the *demoi* were intended to keep the farmers engaged in their private affairs and prevent from attending public business, while on the other hand his object was to increase his own revenues, as the growth of the agricultural production also increased the amount of the tithe he exacted. This shows that even the popular measure of supporting farmers was inspired mainly by Peisistratos' effort in securing revenues.[57]

There is no reason to doubt that Peisistratos continued to collect income from the district of Pangaion near the river Strymon. Since he had conquered Sigeion from Mytilene and his son Hegesistratos reigned there as a tyrant,[58] it seems possible that he collected revenues from Sigeion as well. Pangaion could have been the main source of silver used for the Athenian minting in this period. Despite the debates about the Athenian minting during the reign of Peisistratos and his sons it seems certain that the *Wappenmünzen* were already in use during the reign of the old tyrant.[59] The minting or even only the use of money issued by the

[53] Infra n. 42.

[54] Hdt. 1.62.2.

[55] Ath. Pol. 16.4.

[56] Ath. Pol. 16.3–4.

[57] VALENTE 2019, 268–269.

[58] Hdt. 5.94.

[59] Most scholars agree that *'Wappenmünzen'* were minted under Peisistratos reign: SELTMANN 1924; KRAAY 1976, 58ff; KROLL 1981, 1–32; KROLL – WAGONER 1984, 325–340; HAYMEN 1987, 35–37; APERGHIS 2013, 14 ff.

tyrant brought at least indirectly some profit to Athens and to its ruler. It might also be that the first ditches at Laureion were in use, but their impact could have been only local.[60]

The expenses of Hippias and Hipparchos (528–510)

Hippias and Hipparchos, the sons of Peisistratos who inherited the power of their father, more or less continued the previous policy, but there are indications that the expenses increased during their reign. The building of triremes as the new kind of warships instead of the previous *pentekonters* probably begun under their rule. Athenian trireme is recorded for the first time by Herodotos when he noted that the tyrants sent Miltiades to Chersonesos on a trireme,[61] which suggests that the new kind of warships were built during the reign of Hippias and Hipparchos. G. APERGHIS has proposed that the introduction of new Gorgoneion coins could coincide with the building of the triremes c. 515, caused by the needs to pay the navy.[62] In any case, the Peisistratidai probably renewed the Athenian navy, which must have required considerable funding, and although the aristocratic families who returned from exile during their rule might have partially covered these expenses,[63] this renewal must surely have put stress on the budget.

The military expenses of the tyrants included the bodyguard mentioned by Thukydides,[64] financing the loyal army of unknown composition and size but strong enough to take the Plataians under protection and support them against a Theban attack,[65] and to drive, after the assassination of Hipparchos, the Alkmeonidai and their supporters out of Attica.[66] Moreover, Hippias was able to invite Kineas with thousand of Thessalian cavalry to help him against the Spartans and the other enemies.[67] Even if Kineas came because of the friendship ties with the Peisistratidai we must assume that his cavalry needed supplies which were most probably covered by the Athenian tyrant.

[60] The first trenches from probable mining (so-called First Contact) date from the Bronze Age (NICOLET–PIERRE 1985, 31). Laureion was probably producing silver from the years of c. 515 (APERGHIS 2013, 12–50). PICARD 2001, 9–10 dates the 'introduction of the owls by Hippias' to 520–515. KRAAY 1962, 421 notes that Laureion might have started producing silver before 510 but from poorer upper levels.

[61] Hdt. 6.39.

[62] APERGHIS 2013, 16–20. According to VAN WEES 2013, 66, Athenian fleet could have been established using silver from Laureion c. 515.

[63] According to Hdt. 6.103. 1–3 Philaid Kimon Koalemos had already returned in c. 532. The archon list reveals that Alkmeonid Kleisthenes had returned from exile to Athens in order to serve as an archon c. 525/4 (IG. I³.1031.18).

[64] Thuk. 6.55–57.

[65] Hdt. 6.108; Thuk. 3.68.5. For the Peisistratid wars see VALDÉS GUIA 2019, 139–142.

[66] Hdt. 5.62; Ath. Pol. 19.3.

[67] Hdt. 5.64; Ath. Pol. 19.5. For the Peisistratid military expenses see VALENTE 2019, 270–271.

Concerning the religious activity of the Hippias and Hipparchos we know that they continued to organise the festivals of Panathenaia,[68] where the regular recitation of the Homeric epics probably begun during their rule.[69] They might have introduced the cult of Artemis Brauronia on the Acropolis,[70] they probably celebrated the festival of city-Dionysia, and could have been engaged in the organisation of the Eleusinian mysteries and other cultic celebrations. They were credited with the establishment of the cult of the Twelve Olympian gods and erecting the herms in Athens.[71] Like their father, they invested in buying the oracles.[72] The *Athenaion Politeia* describes Hipparchos as fond of amusement, love-making and poetry.[73] The tyrants invited poets, such as Anakreon and Simonides, Onomakritos and others,[74] who were probably active in the poetic contests of the major religious festivals.

Outside Attica Hipparchos probably dedicated a statue in the Boiotian Ptoion.[75] The dowry to Hippias daughter Archedike married to the son of the tyrant of Lampsakos also must have caused expenses.[76] All this shows that the younger tyrants were more personally engaged in cultic and related activities and carried on their father's religious policy.

The building projects of Hippias and Hipparchos

The buildings that can be dated to the reign of the sons of Peisistratos are numerous compared to the buildings of their father. On the Acropolis the temple of Athena Polias was renovated,[77] and the new temples of Athena Nike and Artemis Brauronia were erected.[78] Many edifices were built in the other places of Athens, especially at the Agora were the erection of the stoa basileios,[79] the Eleusinion at Athens,[80] the Enneakrounos fountain-house,[81] and other

[68] Hdt. 5.56; Thuk. 6.56–58; Ath. Pol. 18.2–3.

[69] On the recitation of the Homeric epics in Athens see infra n. 33.

[70] On the temple of Artemis Brauronia see SCHRADER 1939, 262–264, nr. 377–378; BOERSMA 1970, cat. XII; KAHIL 1981, 253–263; OSBORNE 1985, 154–157; SHAPIRO 1989, 65; HURWIT 1999, 117 n. 78; PAGA 2021, 236–240.

[71] Twelve Olympian gods: Thuk. 6.54.6–7 (for the testimonia see WYCHERLEY 1957, 78 (n. 203), 119–122 (n. 363–378), 210–211 (n. 698)) cf. PAGA 2021, 88 n. 27, 169f; the erection of herms: Pl. Hipparch. 228d–229b; Hesych. s.v. *Hipparcheias hermas*.

[72] Hdt. 5.90.

[73] Ath. Pol. 18.1.

[74] Anakreon and Simonides: Hdt. 6.59.3; Ath. Pol. 18.1; Onomakritos and others: Ath. Pol. 18.4; Pl. Hipparch. 228c; Hdt. 7.6; Aelian. Var. Hist. 8.2.

[75] BIZARD 1920, 237–241.

[76] Hdt. 6.59.3–4; the epitaph for Archedike, written by Simonides, is mentioned in Arist. Rhet. 1.9.

[77] BOERSMA 1970, cat. XVI; HURWIT 1999, 105–106, 116 together with Athena Polias sanctuary's old propylon dated to 520–10 or after 510 cf. BOERSMA 1970, cat. 73; HURWIT 1999, 111.

[78] The temple of Athena Nike dates from the end of the 6th century cf. BOERSMA 1970, cat. 46; HURWIT 1999, 116. According to PAGA 2021, 41f the earliest phase of the temple dates to the second quarter of the 6th century. On the temple of Artemis Brauronia see infra n. 70.

[79] Chronology is not settled: CAMP 1986, 38 dates the *royal stoa* to the end of the 6th century, THOMPSON 1981 to the 6th century but DIMITRIADOU 2019, 195ff to c. 500 and PAGA 2021, 108, 297 even to the period following 490.

constructions took place. Many structures were built in the other parts of Attica, such as fortification systems, temples, aqueduct, fountain houses, roads and other public constructions.[82] Many of these works served the purpose of the unification of distant regions with Athens (e.g. the roads). At the same time, bringing the different cults to the capital promoted the centralization of Attica, thus continuing the political line of Peisistratos. The most obvious examples of this policy were the altar of the Twelve Olympian gods dedicated by Peisistratos the younger,[83] serving as the zero point for measuring the distances, the erection of herms that marked out these roads,[84] and the Athenian waterworks.[85] These were the symbols of the unified and centralized Attica.[86]

The Agora was reshaped during the rule of the younger Peisistratidai. The 'palaces' of the archaic tyrants could have been remarkable buildings and often preserved over time: the residence of Polykrates of Samos was referred to even as late as the Roman times.[87] The residence of the Peisistratidai, however, is not mentioned in the literary sources, but it seems probable that if not Peisistratos himself then his sons lived on the agora, supposedly in the

[80] Travlos 1971, 198, fig. 260; THOMPSON – WYCHERLEY 1972, 152; PARKER 1996, 73 n. 24; HURWIT 1999, 106, 117, 121; DIMITRIADOU 2019, 173, 191, (including remains of some early buildings on this slope of the Acropolis) while PAGA 2021, 153–157 estimates that the whole site was developed not before the end of the 6th century. The nearby temple of Triptolemos however is dated to the second quarter of the sixth century cf. DIMITRIADOU 2019, 194 or to 500 by PAGA 2021, 155f.

[81] BOERSMA 1970, 18, cat. 100 and another fountain house mentioned by BOERSMA 1970, cat. 98; PAGA 2021, 81, 130f. The Southeast fountain house was believed to come from the Peisistratid era but dated to 490 by PAGA 2021, 108, 130–132.

[82] These include the Academy sanctuary cf. BOERSMA 1970, cat. VII and the precinct wall cf. BOERSMA 1970, cat. 16; the temple of Artemis Brauronia at Brauron cf. BOERSMA 1970, cat. XIII; cat. 42; Mounichia fortification cf. BOERSMA 1970, cat. 2; Eleusis city wall cf. BOERSMA 1970, cat. 8 (city-wall fortifications) and BOERSMA 1970, cat. 15 (precinct wall – fortifications); Eleusis Telesterion/Demeter and Kore temple c. 525 cf. BOERSMA 1970, cat. VI (sanctuary) and cat. 53 (Telesterion and fortifications); Eleusis Temple – contemporary to the Peisistratid Telesterion c. 520 cf. BOERSMA 1970, cat. 33; Thorikos theatre dated to 525 cf. BOERSMA 1970, cat. 85; the aqueduct dated to the early last quarter of the 6th century cf. BOERSMA 1970, cat. 104; Themis temple at Rhamnous from the end of 6th century cf. BOERSMA 1970, cat. XXIX, cat. 67; PAGA 2021, 202, 205. Rhamnous temple precinct wall from the end of the 6th century cf. BOERSMA 1970, cat. 26; Old Poseidon temple at Sounion from the end of the 6th century cf. BOERSMA 1970, cat. 63; the half-points of the roads of Attica were marked out by Hipparchos' *herms* (Pl. Hipp. 228c; CEG, 304) cf. SLINGS 2000, 58–60; PAGA 2021, 83, 219–220 n. 134.

[83] Thuk. 6.54.6–7; for the testimonia see infra n. 71.

[84] On the herms see infra n. 71.

[85] On the inscription see MEIGGS – LEWIS 1971, 11. On the dating see CADOUX 1948, 111–2; THOMPSON 1966 (II), 273. Cf. BOERSMA 1970, 13; FORNARA 1983, n. 37. On the possibility that wells were initiated by private ownership see PAGA 2021, 81–82 n. 8.

[86] When mentioning the embellishment of Athens Thukydides (6.54.5) had most probably in mind the development of the city as a whole, but he could have meant also that some buildings themselves were beautiful or meaningful, as when Hipparchos had inscribed moral messages on the *herms*. Cf. PEEK 1935, 461–463; CROME 1935/6, 300–313; KIRCHNER – DOW 1937, 1–3.

[87] Suet. Calig. 21.4.

Building F.[88] Thukydides mentions that the inscription of tyrants was later effaced from the altar of the Twelve Olympian gods by Athenians,[89] which suggests that the democratically minded citizens were prepared to destroy the monuments of the tyrants. This might have happened to the former residence of the Peisistratidai. The fortification of Mounichia and later of Acropolis, where Hippias found refuge when he had to face the growing opposition,[90] also must have involved considerable expenses.

Close to the end of the tyranny, probably in the years 515–513, there begun the construction of the enormous temple of Zeus Olympios.[91] This could have been inspired by the construction of the gigantesque Heraion on Samos by Polykrates,[92] but was surely intended also for securing the divine benevolence for Athens and its rulers. The Athenian Olympeion was so colossal that at the time when the Peisistratidai were overthrown estimably only the foundation and several column drums of the Olympeion were ready.[93] One of its architects, Kallaischros according to Vitruvius,[94] could have belonged to the clan of Medontidai as suggested by Kallaischros' name,[95] which implies that the initiative was shared with other major aristocratic families besides the tyrants. There are no indications until what period the construction works of this temple were carried on, but we can suppose that they were continued even as late as 511 when Athens became under attack and the tyrants had to find a shelter inside the walls of Acropolis.[96]

It is difficult to estimate which other buildings apart from the Olympeion, the fortification of Mounichia, and possibly Acropolis as the shelters of Hippias, could have been constructed at the end of the tyranny. However, it seems clear that the constructions of the sanctuary of Zeus Olympios which was supposed to become the landmark of Athens and their ruler, required enormous resources and must have put a huge pressure on the budget. The fact that a Medontid was probably an architect of the temple suggests that the construction of the Olympeion was not entirely a private initiative of the tyrants, but they reached out to find an acceptance or support from other aristocrats in securing this major project.

[88] According to KLUWE 1966, 33 tyrants lived in the lower city. For support and cemetery adjacent to the Building F thought to have belonged to the Peisistratidai see infra n. 39.

[89] Thuk. 6.54.6–7. Cf. infra n. 71.

[90] Ath. Pol. 19.2; Thuk. 6.59.2; Hdt. 5.64; BOERSMA 1970, 15.

[91] Arist. Pol. 5.11. For the dating cf. BERVE – GRUBEN 1961, 394ff; WYCHERLEY 1964, 163ff; PAGA 2021, 132–136.

[92] The construction of the Samian Heraion is mentioned in Hdt. 3.60; Arist. Pol. 5. 1313b 22ff. On the competitive element between the two tyrannies see SHAPIRO 1989, 6–7, 112.

[93] Arist. Pol. 5.1313b 22ff; Paus. 1.18.6–9; Vitr. 7. praef. 15; BOERSMA 1970, 25; DE LIBERO 1996, 106f.

[94] Vitr. 7. praef. 15; JUDEICH 1931, 383.

[95] APF 8792 IV; TRAILL 10, 2001, 29 n. 552215.

[96] For these events cf. Thuk. 6.59.4; Ath. Pol. 19.6; Hdt. 5.64.1–2, 65.1–2; Ar. Lys. 1153; sc. Ar. Lys. 1153; Mar. Par. FGrH 239 A 45.

The amount of the projects built under the rule of Hippias and Hipparchos was thus certainly bigger than what was erected by their father.[97] Their achievement is especially remarkable when considering that they reigned only about sixteen years. The majority of the buildings the construction of which has been dated from 528/7 until approximately 515 had mainly public function, which probably made the spending of public funds on their erection justified in the eyes of the Athenians. We can suppose that during Peisistratos' rule the political and social tensions were still smouldering so that the tyrant had to be cautious in his investments. Moreover, both the public and the private wealth might have been reduced because of these tensions as well as by the exile of many powerful aristocratic families. This could have been the reasons for the different extent of building activity of the old tyrant and his sons.

The revenues of Hippias and Hipparchos

Thukydides, our best source for the incomes of the tyrants, wondered that they managed to embellish their city, wage wars and provide sacrifices for the temples, while at the same time exacting from the Athenians only one twentieth (5%) of their income.[98] However, the 1/10 tax mentioned by Atenaion Politeia for Peisistratos and the 1/20 tax noted by Thukydides for the tyrants represent different traditions concerning the same tax, in which case the more specific figure of Thukydides would be preferred, and there would be no need to suppose a reduction of the taxation between Peisistratos and his sons.[99] The tyrants continued receiving revenues from the Strymon area,[100] probably also from Sigeion which was under the control of Hegesistratos,[101] and for a certain period they might have received revenues even from Chersonesos where they sent their friend the Philaid Miltiades to reign.[102]

The list of Athenian archons shows that Alkmeonidai and Philaidai were present at the city during the tyranny.[103] The mighty aristocratic families probably supposedly contributed considerably to the revenues, either directly by paying taxes, or indirectly by contributing to the building projects of the tyrants.[104] The Medontid participation in the construction of

[97] It is remarkable that one of the two buildings at the agora that was constructed during their father's rule (building D) was shortly afterwards demolished and replaced by the Peisistratos' sons cf. BOERSMA 1970, cat. 127. The buildings C and D might have served as a meeting-place for the Boule see MARTIN 1951, 263, 270; BOERSMA 1970, 15 n. 182.

[98] Thuk. 6.54.5.

[99] Cf. BERVE 1967, 64; DE LIBERO 1996, 126 ; VALENTE 2019, 266–267.

[100] Infra n. 18.

[101] Hdt. 5.94.2.

[102] Hdt. 6.39, 103.4, Mark. Vit. Thuk. 10. Miltiades governed Chersonesos until was driven out by the Scythians, but retained the city with assistance of the Dolonkoi (Hdt. 6.40).

[103] For the details see DEVELIN 1989, 47.

[104] CADOUX 1948, 109; DEVELIN 1989, 46f.

Olympeion appears as an indication for this. Moreover, it seems possible that the ditches of Maroneia at Laureion already gave enough silver for minting coins from it (although the origins of the silver coins of Peisistratidai is debatable), and we can suppose that the silver from Laureion converted into the minted money was supposedly an important source of income for the young tyrants.[105] Hippias presumably charged a fee for compulsory re-minting.[106] In addition to that he allegedly called in the existing currency, promising to pay the holders at a fixed rate. But when they came to receive the new mintage, he reissued the old coins.[107]

As pointed out by M. Valente, this latter measure was one of the financial stratagems invented by Hippias for increasing the revenues beyond what was provided by the taxation inherited from his father. The Aristotelean *Oikonomika* states that, besides the deception with the currency, he offered for sale the upper stories which projected over the public streets, together with flights of steps, railings, and doors that opened outwards. The owners of the buildings bought them, and in this way a large sum of money was collected. He moreover offered exemption from performing liturgies in return of paying a presumably regular tax, and required an amount of barley and of wheat, and an *obolos*, to be paid to the priestess of Athena when somebody died or was born.[108] The details may be questionable, but the tradition leaves no doubt that Hippias was remembered for his concern for increasing the revenues.

The crisis of the budget, increase of the opposition, and the causes of the tyranny's overthrow

The years 528/7–15/4 were the culmination of the peaceful reign of the Peisistratid family, the period when the Alkmeonidai, the Philaidai and probably the majority of the exiled aristocrats returned to Athens. The 'golden age of Kronos' ascribed to Peisistratos continued after his death.[109] Only some indications show tensions, like the killing of Kimon Koalemos in 528 by the young tyrants.[110] This era ended with two crucial events: the murder of Hipparchos in 514, and the loss of Strymon to the Persians, which took place at roughly the same time, at 515–513.[111] When the conspirators had murdered Hipparchos, Hippias became crueller, suspicious and harsher, wishing to avenge for his brother, killing and exiling many people

[105] VALENTE 2019, 201–202. On the debatable origins of the Laureion silver see infra n. 60.

[106] Probably refers to the minting of owls cf. VAN WEES 2013, 98, 125–126.

[107] Arist. Oen. 1347a.

[108] Arist. Oen. 1347a; see VALENTE 2019, 271–273.

[109] Ath. Pol. 16.7; Ps.-Plat. Hipparch. 229 b3–4.

[110] Hdt. 6.34–38, 103.2–4.

[111] For the dating see BERVE 1967, 50, 69f; COLE 1975, 42–44; KRAAY 1976, 59f; ANDREWES 1982, 408f; BALCER 1988, 1–21; HAMMOND 1980, 53–61; LAVELLE 1992, 5–23.

and becoming untrusting and bitter towards everybody,[112] which in turn led to a growing opposition and the exile of many influential Athenians.

All these actions certainly had an impact to Athenian economy and decreased the revenues of the tyrant. Before this the expenses were not enormous and were balanced by the multiple revenues: the taxes, the revenues from Strymon and other colonies, and the aristocratic families who had returned from exile and probably contributed to the Athenian well-being. Now, on the one hand, the surely significant revenues from the region of Strymon fell out, while on the other hand Hippias obviously was not willing, perhaps not able, to cut his expenses. The construction of Olympeion was surely planned by that time, perhaps on the initiative of Hipparchos who has been described as the initiator of cultic and cultural innovations.[113] It seems possible that the Peisistratidai started to build this most expensive project when they believed that their revenues would cover the expenses. The exact time of the beginning of the construction cannot be established, but it is almost certain that the project was planned, and probably decided upon, when the tyrants still controlled the district of Strymon, and when the ditches of Maroneia at Laureion gave enough silver.[114] The increase of silver from Laureion opening the perspective of even more income in the future might have triggered the decision to start with the project. Moreover, the tyrants could have hoped that the expenses could be partly covered by members of other aristocratic families. Be this as it may, Hippias certainly continued with the project after the loss of Strymon and the murder of Hipparchos.[115] He might have seen Olympeion not as only a symbol of the family's rule, but also as the memorial for his brother whose initiative he did not want to suspend. Peter Spahn has suggested that the tyrants justified their tax collection with a religious argument, presenting it as a common contribution to the gods.[116] If this is true, Hippias could hardly have allowed to stop building the temple and thereby weakening the legitimacy of the taxation at the time of political and financial crisis. He almost certainly needed the construction as a symbol of his power and a pledge for divine favour, which suddenly became questioned at this time.

Additional costs were caused by the fortifications of Mounichia started by Hippias during his last years of rule,[117] and by perhaps an additional fortification of Acropolis,[118] again in response to the smouldering of his power. All this must have strongly burdened the diminishing budget of the tyrant. This must have caused difficulties, and the need of replacing the lost income. We can therefore suppose that the additional and unusual fund-

[112] Ath. Pol. 18ff; Thuk. 6.57ff.

[113] Infra n. 73–75, 82.

[114] Infra n. 60.

[115] For the continuation of the works see DE LIBERO 1996, 106ff.

[116] SPAHN 1998, 201–202.

[117] Ath. Pol. 19.2.

[118] Hdt. 5.64; Ath. Pol. 19.5.

raisings of Hippias were introduced in this period.[119] As H. van Wees has pointed out, fund-raising was an exceptional measure in the Archaic period. It is mentioned only on five occasions: in addition to Hippias in relation to Kypselos, Lygdamis and the Spartans.[120] Hippias however was the only one to whom more than one stratagem was ascribed, which implies financial difficulties faced by the tyrant, while the circumstance that this fund-raising was remembered by the tradition indicates the extraordinary nature of this measure and probably that it was perceived as a burden by the citizens. In any case, as the external income from Strymon had fallen out, more revenues had to be gathered from Athens for enabling the continuation of the highly expensive projects.[121] Although the estates of the exiled aristocrats remained in Attica and might have been exploited by the tyrant, it seems still reasonable to suppose that the burdening of the common people increased as well, since they were the largest group of tax payers in Athens. The tyranny must have become more burdening not only by the cruelty of Hippias but also because of the increasing taxation. All this must have increased opposition.[122]

The tyranny was overthrown by the Spartans on the initiative of the Alkmeonidai and other aristocrats going into exile after the assassination of Hipparchos,[123] But we can suppose that an anti-tyrannical opposition existed in Athens already before the plot. Thukydides notes that although the conspirators were few, as was necessary for maintaining the secrecy, they expected that many Athenians would join them for overpowering the tyrants.[124] The plotters could hardly expect to receive a broad support without being aware of an opposition against the tyranny. However, there is no doubt that the opposition against Hippias increased significantly after the plot and the murder of Hipparchos, allegedly because of the growing harshness of the tyrant. The sources, probably based to a great extent on the traditions of the elite families, overlook the economic factors including the possible economic pressure of the people. But given the decreased revenues and growing expenses of the ruler, thus the unavoidable need to fill the gap in the budget, we have every reason to suppose that this was an important factor contributing to the increase of the discontent. As the income from Strymon had fallen out, Hippias had no other option than to rely more heavily on the internal resources. He probably did not wish to increase the direct taxation, and tried to rely on extraordinary fund-rising testified by Aristotle. However, the economic burden of the people must have increased. This was probably a part of the 'harshness' of Hippias remembered by the Athenian tradition, and must have strongly contributed to the tyranny's growing

[119] According to KRAAY 1962, 421 the minting from Laureion silver started long before 510. PICARD 2001, 7, followed by APERGHIS 2013, 12, have supposed that the minting started in 520–515.

[120] VAN WEES 2013, ch 2 n. 35, 38.

[121] Increase of expenses and taxation under Hippias is pointed out by VALENTE 2019, 268.

[122] VALENTE 2019, 270–271.

[123] Hdt. 5.62–65; Thuk. 6.59.4; Ath. Pol. 19.

[124] Thuk. 6.56.3.

hatefulness and its overthrow. Perhaps the exiling of the wealthy opponents was partly caused from the desire of the tyrants to embezzle the possessions and incomes of the aristocrats.

Conclusion

This discussion suggests that dynamics of the revenues and expenses of the Peisistratidai did strongly affect their popularity and success as rulers of the Archaic Athens, and had an impact to the eventual fall of the dynasty. As long as the poor Athenians had, in the form of the loans, a share of the revenues of the tyrant, and the Peisistratidai had no need to become burdensome, their tyranny was popular and successful, but as soon as the funds were spent and the growing expenses had to be compensated by increasing taxation, the tyranny became to be felt oppressive, which evoked opposition and can be seen as a reason of its eventual overthrow.

During the reign of Peisistratos the expenses were comparatively modest. The buildings which can be clearly related to him were rather modest in numbers and character. Many of these constructions were started before the tyranny and only completed during his rule, which suggests that the costs did not exceed the previous expenses. Although the expenses of the tyrant were surely not limited to the building costs, the sources of wealth in his disposition were sufficient for covering them. Strymon region provided a considerable income, the tyrant had enough resources to give loans to the poor which in turn increased their production and thus the taxes they paid. This, combined with the economic and political stability brought by the monarchy – a major positive change compared to the previous internal tensions and civil strife – secured the popularity of the reign.

When Hippias and Hipparchos inherited the power the expenses probably started to increase. A simple comparison of the numbers indicates that the cost of the buildings erected during their reign was considerably higher than the cost of the constructions initiated by their father. This however did not reduce the dynasty's popularity until the tyrants possessed adequate revenues and need not to increase the taxation. This situation ended with the conquest of the Strymon region by Persians and the assassination of Hipparchos, which, on the one hand cut off a considerable part of the income, and on the other hand necessitated more attention, and expenditure, for the maintenance of the power. The recently started construction of the Olympeion alone needed vast amount of incomes, creating an additional tension for the revenues. All this probably led to the increasing taxation, partly in the form of fundraising exercised by Hippias. The growth of expenses due to their building programs gouged tyrannical reign but was difficult to be stopped because the cessation of the projects could have been interpreted as a sign of weakness. The unwillingness and incapability to avoid this kind of spending, and the consequent increase of the financial burden of the

Athenians must have increased the already significant opposition, enhanced repressions, which contributed further to the unpopularity of the tyranny and to its decline.

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Monarchy in the Iron Age Levant and Archaic Greece: the Rulers of Corinth in a Comparative Context

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Abstract. Tyrannies emerging in the Greek poleis during the Archaic period (8.–6. centuries BC), among which the rule of the Kypselid dynasty in Corinth appears as an outstanding example, were in many respects comparable to the city-state monarchies in Ancient Near East, particularly in Iron Age Levant. The rulers performed important governmental functions and were able to legitimate their power for a notable period of time. However, differently from the East, these monarchies were never wholly entrenched and were eventually replaced by republican governments. The article explores the reason for this difference, suggesting that it was caused by the relative egalitarianism of the Greek society precluding an accumulation of sufficient resources for entrenching the power.

Rezumat. Tiraniile apărute în cetățile grecești în timpul perioadei Arhaice (secolele VIII-VI î.Hr), în rândul cărora dinastia Kypselidă din Corint se remarcă în mod exceptional, au fost în multe privințe comparabile cu monarhiile orașelor-stat din Orientul Apropiat antic, în special cu cele din Levantul din timpul Epocii Fierului. Conducătorii exercitau importante funcții guvernamentale și erau capabili să-și legitimeze puterea pentru o perioadă semnificativă de timp. Totuși, spre deosebire de cele din Orient, aceste monarhii nu erau niciodată pe deplin înrădăcinate și erau, mai devreme sau mai târziu, înlocuite de guvernări republicane. Articolul de față analizează motivele pentru care a existat această deosebire, sugerând că a fost cauzată de relativul egalitarism al societății grecești, ceea ce a împiedicat acumularea de suficiente resurse în mâinile puterii pentru ca aceasta să fie cu adevărat consolidată.

Keywords: Archaic Greece, Greek tyranny, monarchies, early statehood.

Introduction

Personal leadership, i.e. community members following or obeying to one particular person as their leader or ruler, has been a very usual leadership pattern in the human history, developing long before the emergence of state societies.[1] The people might have understood

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[1] The recognition of this has produced the neoevolutionist band–tribe–chiefdom–state development model (SERVICE 1962; 1975; CARNEIRO 1981; JOHNSON–EARLE 1987; EARLE 1997; etc.) which, despite criticism (YOFFEE 1993; 2005, 22-31; PAUKETAT 2007) and recent emphasis on more collegial evolutionary possibilities (FEINMAN 1995; 2001; BLANTON et al 1996; KIENLIN–ZIMMERMANN 2012; BLANTON–FARGHER 2008; 2016; FLAIG 2013), is still, at least implicitly, followed by scholars.

it as an imitation of the ways of heavenly powers.[2] Early states, at least the so-called pristine states, have generally emerged as monarchies, both world-wide and in the Near Eastern region.[3] During the Bronze Age both the city-states (or micro-states) and, of course, the empires in the Near East and the Eastern Mediterranean were almost invariably governed by monarchs. We cannot exactly establish the leadership patterns in the fourth millennium BC[4] Uruk in Mesopotamia,[5] but there is no doubt that from the Early Dynastic period the Sumerian city-states were headed by kings. Kings ruled in Mari and Ebla in the third millennium Syria, and in the subsequent periods – the Middle to the Late Bronze Age and the Iron Age – almost all city-states in the whole Fertile crescent from Mesopotamia to the southern Levant were monarchies.[6] The Bronze Age Aegean was probably no exception to this rule. The lack of adequate evidence does not allow to establish the leadership patterns in the emerging Minoan polities, and some forms of collective government have been suggested,[7] but from the Late Bronze age when the Linear B tablets start to give evidence for the political system, it is reasonably clear that the Greek (Mycenaean) states, both on Crete and on the mainland, were governed by monarchs (*wanaktes*).[8]

The Greek city states – poleis – emerging during the so-called Archaic Period (8th–6th centuries), a few centuries after the 12th century collapse of the Bronze Age civilisation, look exceptional on this background. Although there certainly emerged monarchies – called tyrannies (*tyrannis*) by the contemporaries and the later Greeks – and many poleis were for certain periods of time governed by the sole rulers, this monarchy appeared only as an alternative to the collective leadership. The dynasties were usually unable to entrench their

[2] GRAEBER–SAHLINS 2017, 1-22. Already FRIEDMAN–ROWLANDS 1977, 206-208 have viewed the supposed closeness to the supra-natural sphere as the principal promotor of elite leadership in early societies, and CLAESSEN 1978, 555-559 has described the power in the 'early state' as relying essentially on an imagined heavenly authority and prototypes (see also TRIGGER 2003, 79-87).

[3] YOFFEE 2005, 42-90 has viewed the city-statehood as the primary way of state formation. For city-states as a parallel development to the territorial macro-states see STONE 1997; MORRIS 1997, 98–100. A pervasive synthesis of monarchy in the early state societies, the city-states included, is given by TRIGGER 2003, 71-91, 664.

[4] All the following dates will be BC.

[5] See SELZ 1998; 2005, 31-42.

[6] Sumerian city-states: POSTGATE 1992, 109-154; KUHRT 1995, 33-40; GLASSNER 2000; EDZARD 2004, 43-61; SELZ 2005, 41-63; VAN DE MIEROOP 2007, 45-47, 55-59; CHARVÁT 2007, 251-255; LIVERANI 2014, 93-114; SCHRAKAMP 2013. The 3rd millennium Ebla: EDZARD 2004, 65-68; VAN DE MIEROOP 2007, 59; LIVERANI 2014, 115-128. Old Assur: LARSEN 1976, 109-223; 2000, 83-85; VEENHOF 2003, 73-82; 2010: especially 52-53, 65-70; FAIST 2010, 16-17; AUBET 2013, 279-286. The Bronze Age Levantine city-states: NIEMEYER 2000; PFOH 2016, 89-167. The Anatolian principalities from which the Hittite empire eventually arose were also monarchies (BRYCE 2005, 21-40).

[7] See DRIESSEN 2002; HAMILAKIS 2002; for doubts about Minoan kingship see also MANNING 2007, 118-120; SCHOEP 2010, 116-117. Other scholars accept that Minoan palaces were headed by kings: BETANCOURT 2002; MARINATOS 2009.

[8] For the monarchy of the palatial LBA see e.g. KILIAN 1988; HALSTEAD 2007; SHELMERDINE–BENNET 2007; NAKASSI–GALATY–Parkinson 2010; BURNS 2010, 105–129; FITZSIMONS 2011 (for a different point of view see SCHMITT 2009; 2017 viewing the Mycenaean palaces as places of cultic and social interaction of an oligarchic elite).

power, were sooner or later overthrown and replaced by a collective rule. Although tyrannies continued to emerge during the Classical period (5th–4th centuries) and monarchies became increasingly influential during the 4th century, the attitude towards sole rule was sceptical. Monarchy was often demonised as an inherently bad form of government, and the originally neutral terms *tyrannis* and *tyrannos* – synonyms for *monarchia* (sole rule) and *monarchos* (sole ruler) – acquired the meaning of lawless and violent rulership.[9]

This difference from most of the early city-states, and from the city-states in the Near East and the eastern Mediterranean in particular, requires explanation. The following comparative discussion will, on the one hand, point out several characteristics showing the Greek tyrannies as a natural part of the city-state monarchies of the eastern Mediterranean, and will, on the other hand, consider the reason for the divergent development leading to the abandonment of monarchy and the confirmation of collective power. Corinth, a wealthy polis on the juncture of the central and southern Greece, producing one of the most famous Archaic Greek tyrannies, will be taken as the prime example for the discussion, and will be compared above all to the Iron Age microstates in Levant. In both cases we have to do with relatively small states, often city-states, evolving after the collapse of the Late Bronze Age kingdoms.[10]

Power base of monarchies in the Near East

Rulers must achieve compliance of the subjects. They provide necessary leadership for the community, but must be able also to use force or at least to credibly threaten with it. Usually rulers combine these strategies.[11] An entrenchment of power requires legitimation, which in the early monarchies usually involves enhancing an ideology viewing monarchy as the divinely established norm, almost a part of the world order, and presenting the ruler as a divinely protected benefactor and caretaker of the subjects.[12] On the other hand, monarchs need means for suppressing the almost always existing opposition. For all these purposes it is necessary to establish control over the resources that would sustain the rule, enabling to reward loyal subjects and to fund the physical force assuring compliance.[13] In the other words, besides the social, ideological and military base of the reign it is crucially important to establish a solid economic base, which on the one hand depends on the social, ideological and

[9] See BARCELÓ 1993, 83-202; DE LIBERO 1996, 21-38; PARKER 1998; ANDERSON 2005, 203-214; KÕIV 2016a, 15-25.

[10] The article will thus elaborate the argument in KÕIV 2021, focusing on the example of a particular city-state.

[11] See especially HAAS 1982, 172-182.

[12] For the importance of the ideology in formation of the early state power see especially CLAESSEN 1978, 555-567; CLAESSEN–OOSTEN 1996; EARLE 2002, 367-383; TRIGGER 2003, 486-494; YOFFEE 2005, 38-40. The importance of paying attention to the subjects' interests for achieving compliance has been pointed out by BLANTON–FARGHER 2008, especially 12-24; 2016, 99-158.

[13] HAAS 1982, 173-178; EARLE 2002, 60-64.

military resources of the ruler, while on the other hand sustains these and thereby enables an effective rule.

In the Ancient Near East, the social capital of the kings was granted by their role of representing the polities outwards, taking care of the legal order as the supreme judges and, occasionally, lawgivers, and presenting themselves as the 'good shepherds' of their people. They led the military forces and represented their people before the gods, which included dedication of temples as probably the highest reverence to the gods for attaining their benevolence towards the city and demonstrating the piety of the ruler.[14] On the other hand, the monarchies controlled strategic resources of their realms and were generally able to derive affluent revenues. During the Bronze Age, the states were usually organised around big central institutions – the royal and/or temple households – functioning as centres of redistributive economies.[15] The palatial households enabled the kings to reward followers, not least by granting land leases to them, which sustained their elite status, made them dependent from the monarchy and confirmed their loyalty towards the ruler.[16] This enabled the rulers to command the manpower in war, to conscribe corvée labour, and to tax the peasant farmers. The Late Bronze Age monarchies in the Aegean were based on similar centrally controlled palace economies. Although the exact proportions and relationship between the palatial and the private sector in the Mycenaean states is debatable, there is no doubt that a considerable part of land and other resources was under palatial control.[17] This control of the strategic resources, and the consequent loyalty of a critical part of the elite, made monarchies, at least ideally but often in practice, the guarantors of the stability in the society as a whole.[18] It was natural that kingship was generally accepted as a legitimate form of government, as almost the only possible kind of political organisation. A balance of power and mutual agreement was established between the monarchs and their communities, or at

[14] For the responsibilities of kings and royal ideology see e.g. SUTER 2013; SAZONOV 2016, 36-46 (Sumer); POSTGATE 1992, 149-150, 262-266 (Early and Middle BA Mesopotamia); HELTZER 1982, 178-181 (Late BA Ugarit); SOMMER 2000, 239-242; 2008, 94-100; WOOLMER 2011, 52-54 (Phoenicia).

[15] Temples with hierarchically organised priesthoods played a crucial role in the emergence of Sumerian city-states (see note 6), and despite a decline of their political significance in the second millennium (VAN DE MIEROOP 2007, 93-94) they retained the status of important economic institutions with large land holdings and numerous dependents – see AUBET 2013, 238-242, 258-263, 273-274, 279; DANDAMAEV 1979; BEDFORD 2005, 81-83. Royal household are documented from III millennium Akkad (SCHRAKAMP 2017) and Ebla (see note 6), and from the LBA Syrian city-states Emar (PRUZSINSZKY 2008, 74; DÉMARE-LAFONT 2008, 210), Alalakh and Ugarit (especially HELTZER 1982; SOMMER 2000, 196-200), not speaking about the big territorial states.

[16] The system is perhaps best testified from the Babylon of Hammurapi (LIVERANI 2014, 242-244), but was surely more widespread (SELZ 2007, 280-282). The charioteers (*maryannu*) forming the elite force of the LBA kingdoms were probably attached to their rulers as the possessors of royal fiefs.

[17] See the literature in note 8 above. King (*wanax*) might have relied on the loyalty of the elite warriors know as 'followers' (*e-qe-ta*) attached to the palace and controlling the professional soldiers, and perhaps receiving land grants from the king – see DEGER-JALKOTZY 1978; MONTECCHI 2014.

[18] Pointed out by BUNNENS 2000, 14.

least between the monarchs and the elites, which in the city-states were usually represented by councils of elders, and in some cases perhaps by broader assemblies.[19] The legitimacy of sole rule was generally accepted, and the position of a king on the top of social pyramid was hardly contestable.

In the Iron Age following the 12th century collapse of the Late Bronze Age socio-political system the relative importance of palatial economies decreased, and the significance of private sector correspondingly increased,[20] while in the Aegean the palatial economies were abolished altogether. In the Greek world the transformation led eventually to an establishment of collective rule, the poleis, while the monarchies which emerged were increasingly resented. In the Near East, despite the changes, monarchy continued as the normative form of government on both the imperial and the city-state level. The eastern monarchs clearly maintained, or re-developed, relatively stable means for confirming the power and attaching the followers. In this respect the Levantine states, many of them city-states of comparable size to the emerging Greek poleis, serve as good examples against which the contemporary development in Greece can be compared.

In a number of the states re-emerging in Syria and Levant after the collapse of the Late Bronze Age kingdoms, the kings could build their power on tribal loyalties and ties of kinship. The Aramaic states in Syria and states like Ammon, Moab and Edom in Jordan and Palestine can serve as the examples. The small and relatively egalitarian agro-pastoral communities developing in these regions, emancipated from the palatial control and deprived of stately protection, were probably organised along (real or fictive) kinship ties, both internally and in building up intracommunity networks. The heads of these tribal unions, whose leadership was required above all during wars, commanded the loyalty of their people and established dynasties when succeeding to make their initially presumably charismatic leadership hereditary. Many states emerging here were designated as the 'houses' (Bīt) of eponymous dynasty founders (Bīt Gabbari, Bīt Agūsi, Bīt Bahiani, Bīt Hazaili), in all likelihood the heads of a tribal unions.[21] Not all tribal leaders, we must assume, could entrench the power.[22]

[19] The councils of elders (Sumerian abba uru, Akkadian *šibutu*) and/or assemblies (Sumerian unken, Akkadian *puhrum*, West Semitic *tahtamum* – for the meanings of these terms see FLEMING 2004, 203-211) are well documented in the Mesopotamian city-states from the EBA until the first millennium Babylonia (see OPPENHEIM 1964, 111-112; LIVERANI 1993; VAN DE MIEROOP 1999, 121-128; the Sumerian cities: JACOBSEN 1943; RHEE 1981, 17-19; KATZ 1987; POSTGATE 1992, 80-81; SELZ 1998, 301-305, 316-317; 2005, 39-40; GLASSNER 2000, 43-48; WESTENHOLTZ 2002, 27-29; VAN DE MIEROOP 2013, 28-21, 285-287; for the Old Assur see the literature in note 6; the New Babylonian cities: DANDAMAYEV 1997, 145-146; LARSEN 2000b, 123-125; BARJAMOVIC 2004, 77-84); collective bodies are known from the III millennium Ebla (ARCARI 1988, 125; SELZ 1998, 302-303, 320-321; THUESEN 2000, 59), from III–II millennium Emar and Tuttul (ARCHI 1990, 24; DURAND 1990, 55-56; FLEMING 2004, 212-216; PRUZSINZSKY 2008; DÉMARE-LAFONT 2008, 208-213), from Ugarit of the II millennium (HELTZER 2001; 2005); from Palestine in the Amarna period (NIEMEYER 2000, 100-101; BENZ 2015, 459-461). For a synthesis see KÕIV 2011a, 110-114.

[20] SOMMER 2000, 156-266; MONROE 2009; SHERRATT 2014; 2016; MORENO GARCÍA 2016.

[21] See LIVERANI 2014, 396-400; BUNNENS 2000, 13-15; SADER 2016 (Aramaic states); ROUTLEDGE 2004; 2016 (Moab); TEBES 2016 (Edom described as a chiefdom); NIEHR 2018 (Samal).

However, the late 9th century stele of King Meša of Moab suggests that success in wars enabled the kings to establish an effective control of the people, to exploit the war-captives as slaves, thereby to concentrate resources for notable building projects, and to entrench and perpetuate the kingship in that way.[23] Control of the trade passing their territories could have been an additional source of income for these rulers.[24]

The kingdom of Judah under the Davidic dynasty probably emerged in a similar way.[25] It was referred to as Bīt David on the Dan Stele from the northern Israel and the Meša Stele from Moab, and the Biblical evidence (the books of Judges and Samuel) infer a fundamental importance of tribal structure and kinship ties for the early Hebrew society. However, although the monarchy is likely to have arisen from tribal leadership and the kings presented themselves as the promoters and favourites of the 'national' god JHWH (like Meša of Moab promoted his tribal god Kemoš), the Israelite and Judahite monarchs soon established a veritable control of economy and of the strategical resources. Ahab the king of Israel was able, in the battle of Qarqar against Assyria in 853, to put on field 2000 war chariots, besides the 10 000 soldiers, the maintenance of which must have required considerable means.[26] The Biblical evidence tells that Salomon had cities for storing supplies, for his chariots and horsemen, that he imposed corvée labour, had twelve officers over all Israel who were in charge of providing food and supplies for the king and his household, and forced the non-Israelite local peoples into servitude. These means allegedly enabled him to build the temple in Jerusalem, his own palace, the walls of Jerusalem, and the cities of Hazor, Megiddo and Gezer; he could donate twenty cities (presumably villages) to Hiram the king of Tyros in return of the Lebanese cedar wood that Hiram provided for the construction of the temple of JHWH, and he conscripted 30 000 men of forced labour to be sent to Lebanon for supplying the wood.[27] We may of course doubt the accuracy of this evidence so far as the reign of Salomon is concerned,[28] but it still shows the confidence with which the Deuteronomic historian(s) assumed a command of huge resources by an Israelite king. More reliable

[22] Note the discussion between Bienkowski 2009 (seeing these kingdoms as shortlived, based on charismatic leadership) and ROUTLEDGE 2016, 83-92 (regarding the kingship of Moab as entrenched).

[23] A translation e.g. in ZWICKEL 2013, 152-153. The control (or loyalty – mšm't – see ROUTLEDGE 2016, 89) of the people stated in line 28, the use of the Israelite captives for the construction works in lines 25-26. Building projects are testified also archaeologically (ROUTLEDGE 2016, 90).

[24] ROUTLEDGE 2016, 91-92.

[25] See MASTER 2001; LEHMANN–NIEMANN 2006; NIEMANN 2015; 2016. For the Dan and Meša Steles see e.g. ZWICKEL 2013, 152-153; LIVERANI 2014, 405. For the tribal basis of the early Israelite society (the importance of the 'clans' – *mišpahah*) see e.g. FAUST 2012, 8-14; 170-174.

[26] See e.g. FALES 2017, 226-227.

[27] 1 Kings 3.7 (12 officers in charge of providing food and supplies); 5.27-28 (30 000 men sent to Lebanon); 9.11-19 (cities donated to Hiram, forced labor and buildings, cities for storage, chariots and horsemen – the same in 2 Chron 8.6 – and the servitude of the conquered peoples). According to 1 Kings 10.26 Salomon had 1400 war chariots and 12 000 horsemen stationed in the cities for chariots and in Jerusalem.

[28] For the question of the reliability of the Biblical record see FINKELSTEIN 2015 with references.

evidence for the later monarchs confirms this. We are told about the store-cities of Israel destroyed by the forces of the 9th century Syrian king Ben Hadad, about the 9th century king Jehoshaphat of Judah building cities of store, and about the wealth of late 8th century king Hezekiah of Judah, including store-houses for grain, wine and oil, and stalls for the flocks and herds he allegedly possessed in abundance.[29] The ability to concentrate resources is demonstrated by the magnificent 9th century palaces / administrative buildings, for which the edifices in Megiddo and Samaria in Israel and Lachiš and Beeršeba in Judah serve as outstanding examples.[30] On the local level a state-run storage might be testified by the numerous storage installations in different parts of the land.[31] The early 8th century Samaria ostraca indicate a stately collection of agricultural production which derived, at least in part, from the royal estates, and similar system may be testified by the jars with the kingly (*mlk*) stamps from the late 8th and 7th century Judah.[32] We cannot tell how the necessary resources, not least the land for maintaining the force, was achieved in the first place, but can guess that conquests enabled the kings to take possession of lands in the valleys, not traditionally owned by the farming communities of the highland, to keep these under direct control as bases for royal household or to distribute as grants to the supporters.[33] However, the Biblical evidence suggests that the kings used to increase their holdings by appropriating the possessions of others, which could cause hard feelings among the subjects.[34]

Monarchy persisted also in the city-states of Phoenicia and was established in the Philistine city-states, the small territories of which, the maritime contacts, and in the case of the Phoenicians the colonisation in the Mediterranean, make them probably the closest Near Eastern parallel to the Greek poleis. The internal organisation of the Philistine states is hardly known. However, the Biblical and the Assyrian evidence leaves no doubt that they were ruled by monarchs.[35] A well-known inscription from the 7th century Ekron makes it clear that the

[29] 2 Chron 16.4 (the store-cities of Israel destroyed); 2 Chron 17.12 (Jehoshaphatõs cities of store); 2 Chron 32,27-29 (the wealth of Hezekiah).

[30] See FAUST 2012, 46-95; ZWICKEL 2013, 147-148; VAN DER WEEN 3013, 169.

[31] ZWICKEL 2016. For the stately bureaucracy in Israel see AVISHUR–HELZER 2000; KESSLER 2006, 85-88.

[32] See KESSLER 2006, 91-92; FAUST 2012, 193-194; and especially 2011 suggesting that the taxation of the rural population was mediated by the lineage structures which organized this production on the level of local communities, and that in Judah most of the foreign trade, including the grain export, was to a great extent monopolized by the king. LIPSCHITS 2018 connects the emergence of this system with the tax requirements of Assyria from the late 8th century, but the earlier evidence from Israel suggests that also in Judah a comparative royal economy was developing independently of the Assyrian taxation.

[33] CHANEY 1986, 67-68; FAUST 2012, 261.

[34] Ezekiel 46.18 warns the king not to seize the land of others, but to give grants of land from his own holdings. Note also the story of Naboth, Jezebel and Ahab in I Kings 21.1-16. See Lewis 2017: 36.

[35] Achiš the king of Gath, by whom David allegedly sought refuge, is mentioned in 1 Samuel 21.11-16; 27.2-6. Assyrian sources mention king Hanun od Gaza in 722/21, a king of Ašdod replaced by a rebel Yamani in 712, the kings Sidqa of Aškelon and Padi of Ekron in 701, and Ikausu the king of Ekron from the first half of the 7th century (see GITIN 1998, 173; SHAI 2006, 357; BEN SHLOMO 2014, 719).

monarchy was hereditary and the kings presented themselves as the favourites and protectors of a goddess.[36] The monumental architectural complex from which the inscription derives likewise testifies an integral connection of royalty with divine powers, indicated by the natural connectedness of the throne room and the temple.[37] Moreover, the monumental temple-palace complex contained thousands of storage jars and other vessels which, like the olive oil installations from city, suggest olive production organised by the state. A comparable royal winery from Aškelon is another example of a management of lucrative production, and probably trade, which must have concentrated vast resources into the hands of the Philistine kings.[38]

Concerning the Phoenicia states we have evidence of series of kings forming well established dynasties from Byblos, Tyros and Sidon, and there can be hardly any doubt that the other city-states were likewise ruled by monarchs.[39] The only possible exceptions are presented by the Early Iron Age Arwad, the people of which figure in the Assyrian sources as independent entities without any king mentioned before the 9th century (from which time Arwad was undoubtedly a monarchy),[40] and by Tyros during the short period of the Neo-Babylonian rule in the 6th century when the city was headed by two suffetes – a system forced upon by Nebukadnezzar II of Babylon and abolished after his death.[41] These cases excluded, monarchy persisted as the normative form of government, as it had been during the Bronze Age. The kings represented the cities outwards, commanded armed forces, and interacted with the divine sphere as priests of the highest divinity of their state, as testified by the inscription of two 6th and 5th century Sidonian kings – Tabnit and Ešmunazar II – acting as the priests of the goddess Aštarte. The lavish burials of the kings are testified by the monumental sarcophagi discovered above all from Byblos and Sidon.[42]

However, private trade flourished in the Phoenician cities,[43] and at least the wealthier part of the population had some say in the government. We have evidence for councils of

[36] The inscription records that Akhayuš (Ikausu – see the previous note) the son of Padi, son of Ysd, son of Ada, son of Ya'ir, ruler of Ekron, built the temple for Ptygh (a goddess) his Lady (BEN SHLOMO 2014, 719; SCHÄFER-LICHTENBERGER 2016, 108-109).

[37] GITIN 1998, 173-179.

[38] FAUST–WEISS 2005, 73; FAUST 2011, 267; BEN-SHLOMO 2014, 722-723.

[39] For the political order of the Phoenician states see BONDÌ 1995a; NIEMEYER 2000; SOMMER 2000, 91-266; WOOLMER 2011; MORSTADT 2015, 61-112; SADER 2019, 51-146; KATZENSTEIN 1997 (Tyros); BOYES 2012 (Sidon); ELAYI 2015 (Arwad).

[40] The earliest king of Arwad recorded in the extant sources is Mattan-Baal mentioned by Šalmaneser III among his enemies in the battle of Qarqar in 853. The absence of hereditary kingship in the earlier Arwad is supposed by BRIQUEL-CHATONNET 2000 and supported by SADER 2019, 64-65.

[41] The events are recorded in Josephus C. Ap. I 156-159 and confirmed by the Babylonian evidence (see KATZENSTEIN 1997, 325-343; SADER 2019, 134-135).

[42] See BOYES 2012; MORSTADT 2015, 61-67, 79-81, 85-101.

[43] See TSIRKIN 1990; BONDÌ 1995b, 345-347; SOMMER 2000, 189-266; HEINZ 2002, 234-236; LIVERANI 2003, 131-133; WOOLMER 2011, 53

elders besides the kings. The Egyptian 'Story of Wenamun', describing the (real or fictious) events in the 11th century, mentions an 'assembly' summoned by Zakarbaal the king of Byblos.[44] The treaty between Assarhaddon of Assyria and King Baal of Tyros from the 7th century mentions the 'elders of the country in counsel' besides the Tyrian king.[45] 'Elders of Byblos' are mentioned slightly later by prophet Hezekiel.[46] From the Classical authors we hear about 'elders' or 'senators' of Tyros in connection to the 4th century events.[47] Moreover the fact that Assyrian sources sometimes refer to the Phoenician states as 'people' of these cities or lands (note especially a text of Šalmaneser III where 'the people of Tyros and Sidon' are listed besides 'Jehu of Bīt Ḫumrî', making thus a difference between the Phoenician cities labelled as 'people' and Israel represented by the king) may suggest that a notable part of their population had some sort of political rights.[48] The kings of Sidon were titled as 'Kings of Sidonians', which may suggest that the founder of the dynasty was acclaimed king by the people.[49] An Athenian decree from the 4th century mentions 'those who participate in government' (*politeuomenoi*) in Sidon besides the king,[50] and Classical authors imply the existence for broader assemblies in the Phoenician states.[51] We can therefore assume the existence of some collective bodies in the Phoenician cities, although there are no local sources which could explicitly testify this. The possible composition and competences of these bodies as well as the circle included among the 'people' or the *politeuomenoi*, thus the extent of the circle of those who might have enjoyed some political participation, remain a guesswork. We must however consider that the Phoenician cities were relatively small, and the city centres, sometimes located on islands or narrow promontories, still smaller, while the broader hinterland controlled by the city-states was volatile and not permanently tied to the capital centres. It is extremely unlikely that the inhabitants of the hinterland were included among the possible citizens. We can guess that 'those who participate in government' included only the people of the narrow city centres, probably only a wealthier part of it, and that the participation in the councils was usually confined to the heads of the wealthy merchant families as the scholars usually assume. The Phoenician states can be

[44] ANET 25-29 (29).

[45] SAA 2 5, III 7′ (ANET 533-534); see FALES 2017, 241.

[46] Hezekiel 27.9.

[47] Arrianos Anab. II 16.7 ('elders of Tyros'); Iustinus XVIII 4. 15 (Tyrian senators). Diodoros VI 45.1 writes about 100 noble councillors besides the Sidonan king.

[48] Some examples are noted in FALES 2017, 226-229. The inscription of Šalmaneser – RIMA 3 A.0.102.8.22′-27′ (p. 48) quoted by FALES 2017, 228. Whether 'the people of Tyros' mentioned in the treaty Assarhaddon and Baal of Tyros (note 45) suggest an assembly besides the council of elders (as implied by NIEMEIER 2000, 101) cannot be proven.

[49] SADER 2019, 104.

[50] IG II² 141. 31-32.

[51] Curtius Rufus (IV 1. 16) speaks of the 'will of the people' of Sidon and mentions a *contio* (assembly) of Tyros (IV 3. 21). When Arrianos (Anab. II 15. 6) speaks of a decision of the *koinon* (community) of the Tyrians, this also can point to the assembly of this city. An assembly of the Phoenicians during Xerxes' campaign against the Greeks was mentioned by Herodotos VII 23.

therefore described as oligarchies headed by the mostly hereditary monarchs, which ruled over a relatively broad but loosely integrated and mutable hinterland.

No centrally managed palace economies are directly testified from the Phoenician cities. However, two monumental buildings from Early Iron Age Dor, one probably an administrative centre (palace?) and the other a storage installation filled with numerous jars, indicates an effective control of resources by the local ruler.[52] Despite the lack of definite evidence we can still suppose that palatial economies continued in the Phoenician states, even if their importance versus private enterprise declined compared to the Bronze Age.[53] We can also suppose that the kings could derive revenues from the agricultural hinterland. Biblical evidence tells that Salomon of Israel gave 20 'cities' (presumably villages) to Hiram the king of Tyros in return of cedar wood that the Phoenician king provided for his building projects.[54] The reliability of this evidence may be doubtful, but comparable or even considerable bigger donations of territories to Tyros and Sidon by the Assyrian and Persian kings are testified by more reliable sources.[55] The obvious interest of the Phoenician kings to have these lands under their control leaves no doubt about the economic importance for these monarchies. The possible absence of hereditary monarchy in the early Arwad may be connected with its tiny hinterland during this period, which could not allow a concentration of agricultural resources and thereby to build up a secure economic base for a permanent monarchy.

Above all, the Phoenician kings participated in the lucrative trade of their states, and most notably, profited from the trade with the strategically important timber from the Lebanon hinterland the access to which they controlled. The king of Tyros possessed merchant ships besides the ships of the 'people of Tyros', as we know from the treaty between Sennaherib of Assyria and Baal of Tyros,[56] and the contemporary king Ikkilû of Arwad 'turned the whole trade to himself' around his state by 'providing for anyone who comes to him, but killing anyone who docks at the Assyrian quay'.[57] The king must have greatly profited from this concentration of trade to the port(s) under his control. The control of the trade with the Lebanese timber is indicated by various sources. We have already noted the wood provided by Hiram of Tyros to Salomon in exchange to 20 villages, in addition to which Salomon allegedly provided yearly 100,000 bushels of wheat and a thousand gallons of oil from pressed olives as

[52] SADER 2019, 47, 48.

[53] Note the somewhat divergent judgements of SHERRATT 2016 and MANOLOVA 2020, 1200.

[54] 1 Kings 9.11-14. The kings of Tyre were probably able to derive income from the hinterland of Akko in the northern Israel (AUBET 2014, 712; MORSTADT 2015, 108).

[55] The territory of Sidon in the 8th and early 7th century extended far towards north (apparently granted by the Assyrian kings – see the discussion in SADER 2019, 91-94), while during the Persian hegemony it was enlarged southwards, including Dor and Joppa (SADER 2019, 94-96). Tyros was granted with some territories of Sidon when the latter was in 677 destroyed by Essarhaddon of Assyrian (Sader 2019: 121).

[56] SAA 2 5, iii 15'-22'. See FALES 2017, 242.

[57] SAA 16 127, 13-23. See FALES 2017, 243-244.

'food' for Hiram's 'household'.[58] The control of the timber trade by the king of Byblos is indicated by the 'Story of Wenamun',[59] and the importance of the control of the timber resources is demonstrated by the documents of the Assyrian kings imposing to the Phoenician rulers the task to supply the timber.[60] Metallurgy seems to have been equally under royal control.[61]

All this suggest that a great deal of the Phoenician trade was organised directly by the royal agents an brought revenues to the kings, while on the other hand the rulers profited from trade also indirectly by taxing the commercial activities in the ports. Moreover, the representation of their polities in the international relations, not least by arranging agreements with the foreign states (either their equals as the Israelite kings or the imperial powers as Assyria, Babylonia and Persia), made the monarchies in the Phoenician cities necessary for the local merchants for granting the conditions for successful international trade.[62] And as the cities depended on the import of agricultural produce, the ability of the kings to derive revenues by taxing the agricultural hinterland was, besides funding the royal power, probably vitally important for the whole urban population. We can therefore suppose that the Phoenician monarchies were supported by the city dwellers, including the commercial elites, and were funded by adequate revenues.

Thus, despite the collapse of the Late Bronze Age palatial system the economic basis for monarchy persisted in the Near East. Kingship still functioned as the ultimate controller and central manager of an important sector of the political economy. The monarchs generally controlled strategic resources of their polities and derived sufficient revenues for effective power building. Royal power was moreover generally profitable for the elite, opening possibilities which could have been unattainable without it. This granted elite support to the monarchies. Particular kings might have been perceived as better or worse, many of them were violently overthrown and replaced by others, but there is no sign that monarchy as the legitimate form of government was ever questioned.[63]

Monarchy in the early Greek poleis: the case of Corinth

In the Aegean, palatial monarchy disappeared with the 12th century collapse and did never emerge again in a similar form. Sole rule, however, did not disappear. The small communities developing during the Early Iron Age could have practiced various form of

[58] 1 Kings 5.25. See also note 28.

[59] ANET 25-29 (28).

[60] SAA 19 22, 8-r2 (a letter of a governor to Tiglatpilesar); RINAP 4 1, V73-VI1; ANET 291 (a prism of Essarhaddon imposing to the Phoenician rulers the task to supply the timber). For the discussion of this evidence see FALES 2017, 230-247.

[61] SADER 2019, 306.

[62] AUBET 2014, 707: 'archaeology reflects a strong continuity with Late Bronze Age traditions in which private trade and institutional trade were intermixed and coexisted.'

[63] Pointed out by WIESEHÖFER 2015, 62-63; LURAGHI 2018, 25.

leadership, and many of them were probably headed by personal leaders arising from the local elites, but we can hardly speak about statehood or proper monarchy during this period.[64] More reliable evidence for sole leadership more or less coincides with the state formation, detectable from the 8th century. This was indeed the period when the growth of population and wealth, the rise of big settlements developing into veritable towns, and the emergence of sanctuaries of both local and pan-hellenic significance indicates the formation of bigger and better organised communities reasonably described as incipient poleis.[65] For many poleis the evidence pertaining to the earliest events after the end of the Heroic Age (a legendary reflection of the Late Bronze Age) recorded by the later traditions consists of the stories about sole rulers, or about the rule of narrow kinship groups (or families) often headed by a single man.[66] Such dynasties heading the poleis at the beginning of the Archaic period can be exemplified by the Penthilids of Lesbos, the Neleids of Miletos, the Basilids of Ephesos and Erythrai, the Temenids of Argos and the Bakchiads of Corinth.[67] The belief of later writers that these dynasties had been in charge without interruption since the end of the Heroic Age, thus throughout the Early Iron Age, is contradicted by the obviously stateless society during this period, the instability of the settlement pattern and power relations suggested by the archaeological record, which would hardly have allowed single families to

[64] The concept of EIA monarchy rests almost entirely on the evidence of the Homeric poems (see especially DEGER 1970; CARLIER 1984, 136-290; 2006; LENZ 1993), and depends largely on the debatable historicity of the 'Homeric world' (see LURAGHI 2013c, 134-135; KÕIV 2016a, 9-15). Several scholars have been sceptical about the EIA monarchy and suggested the possibility of the collective rule (ANDREEV 1979; DREWS 1983; VAN WEES 2002, 114; MORRIS 2003, 10; DICKINSON 2006, 240; 2017, 16-17; OSBORNE 2009, 144; KÕIV 2016a, 15, 70; 2016b, 338-341). In the archaeological record the only more or less obvious sign of personal leadership, the 10th century 'heroon' of Lefkanid (POPHAM–TOULOUPA–SACKETT 1982; POPHAM–CALLIGAS–SACKETT 1993; LEMOS 2002, 140-146, 161-168; DICKINSON 2006, 191-193), appears as a singular phenomenon (see MITCHELL 2013, 36-39; KÕIV 2016b, 302-308). MAZARAKIS AINIAN 1997 has detected a number of supposed 'rulers' dwellings' in the archaeological record, but none of these can be considered as certain (see KÕIV 2011b, 163-165).

[65] On the growth of the elite display and the different views on the rise of aristocracy in the 8th century see SNODGRASS 1980, 15-84; MORRIS 1987, 171-210; 2000, 195-306; WHITLEY 2001, 98-101; ULF 2001; COLDSTREAM 2003, 109-366; HALL 2007, 127-131; OSBORNE 2009, 66-130; ROSE 2012, 68-92; OBER 2015, 132-137.

[66] The difference between narrow oligarchy and a monarchy is highly conditional in these cases. SANCISI-WEERDENBURG 2000, 13-14 and MITCHELL 2013, 91-118 have indeed pointed out that tyranny was largely a family affair.

[67] In Mytilene on Lesbos the possibly reliable record begins with the rule of the Penthilids followed by a series of tyrannies mentioned by the contemporary poet Alkaios (Arist. Pol. 1311b 23-30, 1285 a31ff; Strab. XIII 2.3; Dio. Laert. I 74; see PAGE 1955, 149-243; DE LIBERO 1996, 314-328; KÕIV 2016a, 28-33). From Miletos the tradition reports a competition inside the ruling family of the Neleidai and the tyranny of Amphitres (Konon 44; Nic. Dam. FGrH 90 F 52). In Ephesos the rule of the family of Basilidai was followed by a tyranny of Pythagoras (Pherekydes FGrH 3 F 155; Baton FGrH 268 F3). In Erythrai we hear about the rule of the Basilidai (Arist. Pol. 1305 b19-22) and an early tyranny of Ortyges and his companions (Hippias FGrH 421 F 1; see BERVE 1967, 9-7; DE LIBERO 1996, 375-376; THOMAS 2019, 245-260). On the Temenidai see the next note. The Bakchiadai will be discussed below. Despite the questionable reliability of these accounts they demonstrate that the historical memory concerning these poleis begins with the stories about dynastic rule.

maintain an exclusive power during several generations. But the traditional evidence leaves hardly any doubt about the rule of these dynasties in the early Archaic age, from which we can expect some more or less reliable evidence. There is every reason to suppose that the proper establishment of their power became possible with the 8th century state formation, and that the formation of these poleis, consequently, took place under sole leadership. Some strong monarchs reputedly emerged from these dynasties, best exemplified by the quasi-legendary Pheidon of Argos who allegedly subjected a considerable realm in the north-eastern Peloponnese.[68] Monarchies continued, or re-emerged, during the following Archaic period, for which Argos, Sikyon and Corinth in the Peloponnese, and Ephesos, Miletos and Samos on or near the Anatolian coast, all among the most important Archaic poleis, serve as obvious examples.[69]

From the 7th century at the latest the Greeks called sole rulers 'tyrants' – *tyrannos* (singular), the rule *tyrannis* – or used the abstract nouns *monarchos* and *monarchia* (literally: 'sole ruler' and 'sole rule'). How were sole rulers, or leaders, called earlier cannot be stated with any confidence – *basileus*, the term for the legendary kings in the heroic epic is a possibility, but the use of it for the contemporary monarchs in the Archaic period can hardly be testified.[70] Whatever the case, there is no reason to assume that the earliest testification of the word *tyrannis* indicates the date of the emergence of the kind of regiment marked by it,[71] or to use the terminology of later sources for distinguishing between legal kings (*basileis*) and illegal tyrants (*tyrannoi*) among the Archaic rulers. The classical and post-classical sources simply cannot present reliable evidence for this. What we can say is that an effective monarchy after the 12th century collapse in Greece re-emerged with the rise of polis and probably contributed to the state formation.

A good example of dynastic power in the early Greece is presented by Corinth. Situated on the Isthmus between the Central Greece and the Peloponnese, Corinth was one of the principal nodes of trade in the Aegean world. Urban centre emerged here from the 8th century onwards and developed soon into a notable city on the foot of a steep acropolis.

[68] Hdt. VI 127.3; Ephoros FGrH 70 F 115; Arist. Pol. 1310 b 26-27; for the discussion of the evidence see KÕIV 2003, 239-297; HALL 2007, 145-154. All the ancients except Herodotos dated Pheidon to the very beginning of the Archaic period (for the ancient datings see especially KÕIV 2001 and 2003, 255-276; the moderns have dated Pheidon to the 8th (HUXLEY 1958; BERVE 1967, 6; GEHRKE 1990, 38-42; DE LIBERO 1996, 208; KÕIV 2003, 255-276, 344-353), the 7th (ANDREWES 1956, 40-41) or the early 6th century (KELLY 1975, 94-111; CARLIER 1984, 387-388; BARCELÓ 1993, 114).

[69] See the detailed discussion in DE LIBERO 1996.

[70] The only more or less certain example is given by an oracle quoted by Herodotos (V 92 ε) where Kypselos the ruler of Corinth was called '*basileus* of glorious Corinth' – see below.

[71] LEWIS 2008, 16; KÕIV 2016a, 24. The fact that the earliest use of the word *tyrannis* known for the late 5th century sophist Hippias of Elis (FGrH 6 F 6) and for us (Archilochos fr. 19 West, referring to the Lydian king Gyges) dates from the mid-7th century cannot exclude the possibility that similar monarchs emerged already before that date – Hippias refers to the use of the term not the beginning of the historical phenomenon. Note OGDEN 1997, 148 accepting that there could have been 'tyrants' in Greece before the Archaic era.

Already before that, from the 9th century, the archaeological evidence shows a growth of elite display in a number of burial places near the future town, suggesting the emergence of probably competing elite families. During the 8th century, especially around the middle of this period, a number of cemeteries within the settlement clusters were abandoned and the burials were afterwards concentrated mainly to the plain northeast of the consolidating town, where elite burials were placed around a Bronze Age burial mound, probably viewed as a tomb of ancestors. This, and the increasing habitation in the future city centre, indicate a significant change reasonably interpreted as polis formation.[72] The earliest monumental temples in the town, and another on Isthmos outside the conurbation, date from around the middle of the 7th century.[73] During the 7th century Corinth became the leading ceramic producer of the Aegean world. The Corinthians were among the pioneers of the Greek colonisation, reputed as the founders of Syracuse in Sicily in the 730s,[74] which developed into the biggest and mightiest Greek polis in the west. They must have closely interacted with the Phoenicians and were strongly influenced by the eastern culture, as demonstrated by the orientalising stile of the Corinthian pottery, while their colony Syracuse became the chief opponent of Carthage founded by the Phoenicians from Tyre and becoming the main Phoenician metropolis in the western Mediterranean.

Around the middle of the 8th century, thus probably at the crucial period of the incipient urbanisation and the formation of the polis community, a kinship group called the Bakchiads, reputedly the descendants of Heracles and of an eponymous Bakchis a son of Dionysos,[75] confirmed their power in Corinth. The precise time of their ascendance cannot be established. The belief of the ancients that their ancestors had ruled Corinth uninterruptedly since the Dorian invasion can be almost certainly rejected as unhistorical.[76] However, there were accounts about internal troubles in Corinth around the middle of the 8th century, which deserve attention. Later sources report about internecine conflicts among the Bakchiads leading an institutionalisation of the Bakchiad rule (dated to 747 by the later sources). Another story tells about a sacrilegious crime committed by an arrogant Bakchiad man

[72] See ROEBUCK 1972, 101-103; WILLIAMS 1982, 11-12, 18-19; SALMON 1984, 59-62, 75–80; MORGAN 1999, 406-410, 472-473; POLIGNAC 2005, 60-61; KOURSOUMIS 2013, 45-50; FREDRIKSEN 2013; TZONOU–MORGAN 2020, 726-730. The most comprehensive discussion of the burial record is given by DICKEY 1992. For the recent excavation results see PFAFF 2007; YANNOPOULOU et al. 2013; SANDERS et al 2014; ASLAMITZIDOU 2018. The continuing elite display indicated by the burial record is minutely analyzed in an important paper by VAN WEES (forthcoming).

[73] For the temples see BRONEER 1971, 40-53; GEBHARD 1993, 159-163; MORGAN 1999, 428-429; RHODES 2003; BOOKIDIS 2003, 48-50; TASINOS 2013, 16; KOURSOUMIS 2013, 45.

[74] Thuc. VI 3-4 who dates the foundation to 733.

[75] The Bakchiads were reputed as the descendants of Aletes the legendary founder of the Dorian Corinth and a grand-grand-grandson of Heracles (Diod. VII 9; Schol. Pind. Ol. XIII 17b–c; Paus. II 4.3-4). Bakchis the Bakchiad ancestor, a descendant of Aletes, was seen as a son of Dionysos (Schol. Ap. Rhod. 1212), implied by his very name related to Bakchos. The stemma in Diod. VII 9 and Paus. II 4.4 places Bakchis to the late 10th century.

[76] As the name of the last king Telestes, from *telos* (the end) is obviously invented, we cannot expect any reliable information about his predecessors either. See SCHMITZ 2010, 22-26; KÕIV 2016a, 57-61; 2019, 119.

which, on the on hand, led to the expulsion of the culprit and the foundation of Syracuse by (dated to 733 by the later sources), while on the other hand produced a curse of the Bakchiads which apparently caused their eventual overthrow three generations later.[77] Both these traditions infer serious vicissitudes, which could be connected to the establishment of the Bakchiad rule. Chronologically, both point to the period of state formation suggested by the archaeological record, which justifies the assumption that they reflect actual upheavals from which the Bakchiads emerged as the rulers of Corinth.[78] The elite cemetery northwards of the town emerging since ca 800 may be seen as the Bakchiad's burial plot, and some formalisation in it ca 720 can the mark the definite establishment of their power. We might assume that the deceased of the Bronze Age tombs around which the burials were arranged were seen as the ancestors of the emerging dynasty.[79]

The exact character of the Bakchiad rule was not quite clear for the ancients. According to Herodotos the Bakchiads were endogamous, which suggests a relatively broad group; according to Diodoros they numbered over 200, and according to Aristotle they descended from 7 daughters and 3 sons of Bakchis, which can suggest that they were believed to have been divided into 10 families.[80] However, Hans van Wees has in his recent scrupulous study of the early Corinthian burial evidence come to the conclusion that the 8th to early 7th century North cemetery was used by three very narrow but closely related elite groups, possibly families, and suggests that this was the burial place of the Bakchiads. If he is right, this would narrow down the size of the ruling dynasty.[81] A probably Archaic oracle quoted by Herodotos called them 'monarchic men', which emphasises the exclusiveness of their rule, comparable to a monarchy, while the historian himself, whose anti-monarchical attitude and narrative context required a clear distinction between the rule of the Bakchiads and the following 'tyranny' of the Kypselids, let the Corinthians to speak about their oligarchy.[82] The later authors present conflicting views concerning their rule. On the one hand, it was believed that each year they appointed one of them to be the head of the state as *prytanis*, while on the other hand they were called tyrants, and were allegedly headed by hereditary kings (*basilees*)

[77] See KÕIV 2019, 108-112.

[78] Diod. VII 9 and Paus. II 4.4 believed that at 747 (for the date see JACOBY 1902, 150-155 and MOSSHAMMER 1979, 234-245), after internal conflicts, the Bakchiad reign was reorganised and henceforth they appointed an annual *prytanis* (ruler) from among them. For the possible reflection of real development see KÕIV 2003, 339-344; 2019, 119.

[79] Van Wees (forthcoming) suggests that the elite burials around the earlier tumulus belonged to the Bakchiads. We may speculate that the tumulus might have been identified as the tomb of Bakchis, or perhaps of Aletes the supposed founder of the Dorian Corinth (see note 75).

[80] Hdt. V 92β; Diod. VII 9.6; Arist. fr. 611.19 Rose. According to Hdt. V 92γ the Bakchiads sent ten men from among them to kill the baby Kypselos (see below), which can also imply a tradition about ten families of the clan.

[81] VAN WEES forthcoming.

[82] Hdt. V 92β presented the story of the Kypselids as a warning against tyranny, was thus motivated to distinguish their monarchy from the previous Bakchiad rule, and could have chosen the terms accordingly.

until the very end of their rule.[83] Aristotle classified their power as kingship (*basileia*),[84] but it would easily suit also with his definition of *dynasteia* – the voluntary rule by narrow elite group where son succeeds father in office. The philosopher compares this kind of rule to tyranny.[85]

Be this as it may with the exact power relations among the Bakchiads, probably not indicated by the oral tradition from which the information surely derives and therefore unclear for the ancient writers, there is hardly any doubt that they formed a dynasty monopolising the power in Corinth, and that the period of their rule (90 years according to the tradition, indicating three generations) from the 8th century establishment to the overthrow, marked the emergence of Corinth as a prosperous polis. The Bakchiads probably established some laws concerning the system of land tenure, suggested by Aristotle's notice of a certain Pheidon legislating in the early Corinth, probably during the Bakchiad rule.[86] They almost certainly organised public buildings in the town and might have erected (or at least started the building of) the first monumental temples.[87] The colonies to Syracuse and Korkyra (Korfu) were reputedly sent under their rule.[88] Later authors believed that they derived revenues from trade,[89] and we can assume that they also possessed considerable landed property.

However, around the middle of the 7th century the Bakchiads were overthrown, allegedly because of their arrogance and violence. The tradition tells that this was accomplished by the war-leader (*polemarchos*) Kypselos, himself a Bakchiad from his mother's side, who rallied the

[83] Diod. VII 9.6 and Paus. II 4.4. tell about the annual *prytaneis* (see note 78) while in VII 9.3 Diodoros states that the oldest son always inherited the position of the king (*ebasileuse*) until the tyranny of Kypselos. Nic. Dam. FGrH 90 F 57.1,6 calls the last Bakchiad leader a *basileus*. The Bakchiads as tyrants (*tyranneusantes*) in Strab. VIII 6.20. See KÕIV 2019, 120-122.

[84] According to the *Korinthion Politeia* of Aristotle, the kingship (*basileia*) in Corinth lasted from Bakchis until Periandros the son of Kypselos turned it into *tyrannis* (Arist. fr. 611.19-20 Rose; the same point of view in Nic. Dam. FGrH 90 F 58.1), which was, according to Aristotle, the first change of the constitution of Corinth. He did not indicate any difference between the rule of the Bakchiads and Kypselos the founder of the following dynasty. A degree of continuity between the Bakchiads and the Kypselids is accepted by SCHMITZ 2010, 46-47; KÕIV 2016a, 61-64; 2019, 119-122.

[85] Arist. Pol. 1292b4-19; 1293a30-31; 1302b17-18.

[86] Arist. Pol. 1265 b13-16 (quoted and discussed below, with notes 144-147). Aristotle's statement that Pheidon was 'one of the most ancient lawgivers' (ὢν νομοθέτης τῶν ἀρχαιοτάτων) is likely to suggest the period of the of the Bakchiad rule, although the time immediately after the overthrew of the following Kypselids cannot be completely ruled out. Pheidon could well have belonged to the Bakchiad family, as did the Theban legislator Philolaos (a Bakchiad emigrant from Corinth according to Arist. Pol. 1274 a32-b6), perhaps his contemporary.

[87] The temple, like the city walls, could have been constructed both at the time of the Bakchiads and during the following rule of Kypselos.

[88] Archias the founder of Syracuse was reputedly a Bakchiad (as indicated by the combination of Plut. Am. Narr. 2; schol. Ap. Rhod. 1212; Max. Tyr. 18.1; Parthen. Erot. 14). Korkyra was according to Strab. VI 2.4 and schol. Ap. Rhod. 1212 founded at the same time.

[89] Strab. VIII 6.20.

discontent people against the previous rulers, overthrew the Bakchiad *basileus* (king), and was himself proclaimed the *basileus* by the people.[90] The fabulous birth story of Kypselos told that already before his birth the oracles predicted that he would overthrow the predecessors, that the Bakchiads tried to kill him when he was born, but he miraculously escaped the death to fulfil the prediction.[91] One of the oracles quoted by Herodotos addressed him as the '*basileus* of glorious Corinth'.[92] Coupled with the opinion of Diodoros that the Bakchiads were headed by hereditary *basileis*, with the account of Nikolaos of Damascus that Kypselose was proclaimed *basileus* instead of the last Bakchiad 'king', and the circumstance that Aristotle's qualified the rule of both the Bakchiads and of Kypselos as *basileia*,[93] this can suggest that the nature of the power did not crucially change with the Kypselos' coup. Instead of viewing this as a replacement of oligarchy with tyranny we should see here rather a shift of the power from one branch of the dynasty to another, which could, admittedly, have brought along a narrowing of the circle of the rulers.

Kypselos reputedly expelled the Bakchiads, thus got rid of the most dangerous competitors, and restored the rights of those who were expelled during their rule. He confiscated (literarily 'made public' – *edēmeuse*) the property of the Bakchiads,[94] thereby taking their possessions under control. He further levied the people with a tithe, allegedly to fulfil the promise to dedicate the property of the Corinthians the Olympian Zeus he had given before the establishment of his power.[95] He founded a number of colonies in the North-Western Greece, and placed his (legitimate and illegitimate) sons as the rulers.[96] And he probably organised extensive building works in Corinth: the city walls could have been built and the monumental temples in the town centre and at Isthmia finished during his reign.[97] Later tradition remembered Kypselos as a popular ruler who even did not need any bodyguard for protection.[98]

Kypselos' son and successor Periandros was perhaps the mightiest Greek ruler of his time, governing a small-scale empire. He controlled the colonies founded by his father, to

[90] Nic. Dam. FGrH 90 F 57.4-6.

[91] Hdt. V 92β- ε. For the discussion of the meaning of the story see HOW–WELLS 1912, 50-55; ANDREWES 1956, 45-48; WATERS 1971, 13-15, 19f; ZÖRNER 1971, 26-35, 47-49; STAHL 1983; WĘCOWSKI 1996; GRAY 1996; JOHNSON 2001; DEWALD 2003; MOLES 2007; GIANGIULIO 2013; KÕIV 2019, 98-103.

[92] Hdt. V 92ε.

[93] Diod. VII 9.3; Nic. Dam. FGrH 90 F 57.1,6; Arist. fr. 611.19-20 Rose. See note 84 above.

[94] Nic. Dam. FGrH 90 F 57.7.

[95] Arist. Oec. 1346 a31-b5. Kypselos allegedly promised to dedicate the property of the Corinthians to Zeus when he will become the ruler, and consequently demanded from the people one tenth of their possessions during ten years.

[96] Most of the measures, including the colonies at Leukas and Anaktorion (Strab. VIII 2.8 etc.), are related by Nic. Dam. FGrH 90 F 57.7. According to Hdt. I 14 Kypselos dedicated the Corinthian treasure house at Delphi. The golden statue at Olympia was ascribed both to Kypselos (Arist. Oec. 1346 a31-b5; Agaklythos FGrH 411 F 1; Strab. VIII 6.20; Plut. Pyth. Or. 13; Paus. V 2.3) and his son Periandros (Ephoros FGrH 70 F 178; Suda s.v. *Kypselidon anathemata*).

[97] See notes 72-73.

[98] Nic. Dam. FGrH 90 F 57.8; Arist. fr. 611.20 Rose; Pol. 1315 b28-9; 1310 b29-30.

which he probably added some new. He allegedly kept navies on both the Corinthian and Saronic gulf and fought many wars (the conquest of Epidauros and a war against Sicyon can be specified).[99] Above all, the tradition leaves no doubt that he possessed wide international authority and was in good terms with many rulers both in Greece and abroad. He had good relations with the panhellenic sanctuaries at Delphi and Olympia to which he, or his father, made precious dedications;[100] he was married to a daughter of the tyrant of nearby Epidauros,[101] was the friend of the contemporary tyrant of Miletos,[102] and was called to mediate the dispute between Athens and Mytilene over Sigeion near Troy.[103] Outside Greece he had relations with the dynasty of the Lydian kings, possibly inherited from his father,[104] while the account that his nephew and successor was called Psammetichos (the Hellenic form of the name of the Egyptian king Psamtik) infers relations, perhaps intermarriage, with the Egyptian rulers.[105]

Internally, Periandros reputedly established a strict order in Corinth. We are told that he relied on a bodyguard of 300 men, founded a special council for restricting expenditure, prohibited luxury, compelled the people to work, forbade the use of slaves, did not allow the people to dwell in the town, and even banned the informal gatherings on the agora, fearing that the people might conspire against him.[106] Whatever was the exact aim of these measures, in all likelihood recorded imprecisely, perhaps incorrectly, by the later tradition, they obviously depict Periandros as a ruler regulating the internal order of the state. The tyrants,

[99] Nic. Dam. FGrH 90 F 58.3 (wars and navies); Arist. Pol. 1315 b29-30 (Periandros as a warlike tyrant); Hdt. III 52.7 (war against Epidauros); Frontinus Strat.3.9.7 (war against Sicyon); Periandros was certainly believed to have controlled Korkyra (Hdt. III 48-53; Nic. Dam. FGrH 90 F 59); according to Nic. Dam. F 59.1 his son Euagoras founded Poteidaia; according to Arist. Pol. 1304a31-34, 1311a40-b2 a younger Periandros ruled Ambrakia. Plut. De ser. num. vind. 552e seems to ascribe to Periandros the foundation of Leukas and Anaktorion, the foundations of Kypselos according to Nic. Dam. F 57.7). For the colonies see BERVE 1967, 20, 527; SALMON 1984, 209-217; DE LIBERO 1996, 153-156.

[100] Kypselos allegedly built a treasure house at Delphi (Hdt. I 14.2; Put. Mor. 400de; Paus. X 13.5) and the Kypselids dedicated a golden statue of Zeus at Olympia (Ephoros FGrH 70 F 178; Arist. Oec. 1346 a31-b5; Agaklythos FGrH 411 F 1; Strab. VIII 6.20; Plut. Pyth. Or. 13; Paus. V 2.3; Photius and Suda s.v. *Kypselidon anathemata*). A fragmentary inscription from Olympia (IvO 650 mentioning Boῶ[ν] Κυψ[έλου]) probably derives form a Kypselid dedication. See DE LIBERO 1996, 147-149; KÕIV 2019, 97 n. 27.

[101] Hdt. V 50; Heracl. Pont. fr. 114 Wehrli.

[102] Hdt. I 20 telling how Periandros gave valuable information to Thrasybulos the tyrant of Miletos; another story told about Thrasybulos' advise to Periandros to annihilate the outstanding men in the polis (Hdt. V 92ζ-η; Arist. Pol. 1284 a26-33, 1311 a20-3 tells it other way round, Periandros advising Thrasybulos).

[103] Hdt. V 95; Arist. Rhet. 1375 b31; Timaos FGrH 566 F 129; Strab. XIII 1.38-39; Apollodoros FGrH 244 F 27.

[104] Periandros' alleged decision to send the Korkyraian boys to Alyattes for castration (Hdt. III 48.3; Nic. Dam. FGrH 90 F 59.3; Diog. Laert. I 95) probably indicates pre-existing relations. It is notable that one of Kypselos' sons was called Gordios (Arist. Pol. 1315b26-27), an obviously Anatolian name, and that the dedications of the Phrygian and Lydian kings in Delphi were kept in the treasury of Kypselos (Hdt. I 14.1-2). See SHANKS 1999, 54.

[105] Arist. Pol. 1315 b27; Nic. Dam. FGrH 90 F 59.4, 60.1.

[106] Arist fr. 611.20 Rose; Nic. Dam. FGrH 90 F 58.1; Ephoros FGrH 70 F 179. Aristotle (Pol. 1313 a36-b32) considers such measures typically tyrannical, aimed at keeping the people under control, and claims that most of these was implemented by Periandros.

either Kypselos or Periandros, or perhaps already the Bakchiads before them, might have established the division of the Corinthians into the eight *phylai*, the structural units into which the citizens were divided in the following times.[107] Periandros hosted the famous dithyrambic poet Arion,[108] and erected public buildings like his father. He allegedly planned digging the Ithmian channel, while the archaeological record would date to his reign the building of *diolkos* (the way for carrying ships over Isthmos), the construction of the harbour at Lechaion and perhaps of the building of the new temple of Apollo on the Corinthian agora.[109] All these achievements considered, there is no surprise that Periandros was included among the Seven Sages celebrated for their political wisdom and services to their poleis.[110]

We have thus evidence for two successive dynasties ruling the early Corinth, whose reign virtually marked the emergence of the Corinthian polis, and probably the peak of its power and renown. The Bakchiads seem to have formed a broader group than the Kypselids, but this does not warrant distinguishing between the Bakchiads as 'traditional' rulers and the Kypselids as 'illegal tyrants'.[111] Both dynasties were headed by a sole ruler described in the sources as *basileus* or *tyrannos*. As these terms were used indiscriminately before the late 5th century, the late sources giving this evidence cannot reliably indicate any distinction, and we can doubt if such a distinction was made at all during the Archaic era.[112] Both dynasties presented themselves as legitimate (for which see below), and the duration of their reign – three generations for the Bakchiads and two for the Kypselids – suggests that for a relatively long time this legitimacy was accepted by a considerable part of the Corinthians.

The functions performed by the Corinthian rulers and the ways of legitimating the power were clearly comparable to the city state monarchies of the east. The Bakchiads and the Kypselisds were war-leaders.[113] They presented themselves as the caretakers of justice and

[107] Nic. Dam. FGrH 90 F 60 implies that after the expulsion of the Kypselids the Corinthians were divided into eight parts (*oktades*). The tradition ascribing the establishment of the eightfold division to Aletes the legendary founder of the Dorian polis (Suda sv *panta okto*) may suggest that that the division dates from an early period: probably from the time of the Bakchiads (Reobuck 1972: 115-116) or the Kypselids (SALMON 1984, 206-207). See also SHANKS 1999, 54; KÕIV 2003, 235-236; GROTE 2016, 146-148.

[108] Hdt. I 23-24.

[109] Intention to dig the channel recorded in Diog. Laert. I 99; on the archaeological evidence for Periandros' buildings see especially SALMON 1984, 201-202; SHANKS 1999, 61-65.

[110] Plat. Prot. 343A; Rep. 336A (who, like many other writers, protested against this inclusion); Diog. Laert. I 94-100; etc. On Periandros among the Sages see ENGELS 2010, 45-47.

[111] The supposed tomb epigram of Periandros called him *prytanis* (Diog. Laert. I 97), thus ascribing him the same title that allegedly had been used by the head of the Bakchiads. This might suggest that the Kypselids reputedly left the formal 'constitution' of the Bakchiads unchanged and ruled as the traditional heads of the state.

[112] As pointed out in KÕIV 2016a, 24-25.

[113] This is clearly stated for the Kypselids (see note 99 above). For the Bakchiads the evidence is scarce and of doubtful reliability: they allegedly fought an early successless war against Megara (Zenob. V 8; Demon FGrH 327 F 19; Schol. Plat. Euthyd. 292e; Schol. Aristoph. Ran. 439. Plut. QGr 17; see HAMMOND 1954; LEGON 1981, 54-55, 60-70; SALMON 1984, 179-192; TAUSEND 1992, 99-102; KÕIV 2003, 229-232; VAN WEES 2003, 62-64) and Kypselos reputedly held the position of war-leader (*polemarchos*) before the fall of their rule (Nic. Dam. FGrH 90 F 57.5).

social order, as indicated by the oracle, quoted by Herodotos, stating that Kypselos would set Corinth straight (*dikaiozei de Korinthon*),[114] and acted as lawgivers arranging the internal order of Corinth. And they took care of the worship of the gods, making precious dedications in the pan-hellenic sanctuaries and erecting temples at home. Both dynasties claimed divine protection for their power. The Bakchiads indeed claimed descent from Herakles and Dionysos, and perhaps suggested that their ancestors had been ruling Corinth from the time of the legendary foundation. The rule of Kypselos was allegedly legitimated by the will of the people proclaiming him to be their king,[115] and by the oracles inferring divine support to the establishment of his rule. One of them, noted above, explicitly blessed Kypselos as the *basileus* of Corinth,[116] perhaps comparing him to the heroic kings of the legendary past. The very story of his miraculous escape from death in infancy, similar to the legends of eastern rulers like Sargon and later Kyros, served to legitimate his power, and may have been purposefully promoted by the Kypselids for comparing the dynasty founder to the legendary Sargon.[117] All this considered, there can be no doubt that both dynasties regarded themselves as legitimate, being sanctioned by the gods and probably by the consent of the people. Monarchy was ostensibly firmly entrenched.

Unfortunately, we have no evidence concerning the functioning of the collegial organs, either under the Bakchiads, or under Kypselos and Periandros, although the story that Kypselos was proclaimed *basileus* by the people can infer an acclamation by the assembly. However, these institutions functioned under some other Archaic monarchs (e.g. the Athenian Peisistratids, the Deinomenids of Syracuse).[118] The evidence from Mytilene on Lesbos is particularly significant in this respect. When the early 6th century poet Alkaios was exiled during the reign of some tyrants, he complained about exclusion from *agora* (assembly) and *bolla* (council) that had been attended by his father and grandfather, which indicates not only that assembly and council functioned under his contemporary tyrants, but also that these organs were traditional in Mytilene, thus functioning also during the previous Penthilid dynasty.[119] The situation in Mytilene where the Penthilids were followed by subsequent monarchs is clearly comparable to the sequence of the Bakchiads and the Kypselids in

[114] Hdt. V 92β. See MCGLEW 1993, 61-74; Shanks 1999: 60-61. The legislative activity of the tyrants has been pointed out by SALMON 1997, 63-66; ROSE 2012, 239; TAYLOR 2022, 318-319; for the fluid difference between tyrant and lawgiver see BERNHARDT 2022.

[115] See note 90.

[116] Hdt. V 92ε.

[117] GIANGIULIO 2013, 231-234.

[118] Ath. Pol. 14.1 reports that the assembly voted a formal decision giving Peisistratos the bodyguard, while Thuc. VI 54.6 and Ath. Pol. 16 stated that the Peisistratids ruled through the traditional institutions (see LAVELLE 2005, 89-90; ROSE 2012, 341-345; SANCISI-WEERDENBURG 2000, 11-12). In Syracuse Gelon was allegedly proclaimed the king (*basileus*) by the Syracusians (Diod. XI 23.3), probably by the assembly mentioned by Diodoros below (26.5; see also Polyain. I 27.1; Aelian. VH VI 11).

[119] Alkaios fr. 130b. 3-7; see Kõiv 2016a: 33.

Corinth, which, considering the alleged acclamation of Kypselos by the people, makes the functioning of collective bodies in Corinth under the monarchs highly probable.

However, both the Bakchiads and the Kypselids were overthrown, the Bakchiads by Kypselos and the Kypselids by the Corinthian people, and both were demonized by the following government. The Bakchiads were described as unjust by their Kypselid successors (Kypselos indeed had to 'make Corinth straight' by expelling the Bakchiads), and when their ancestor Bakchis was described as lame and ugly, as told by Aristotle, and the dynasty as cursed because of their earlier crime, we can suspect the Kypselid propaganda in work here.[120] The attitude towards the Kypselids was twofold. On the one hand the tradition describes Kypselos in positive terms, as a hero liberating Corinth from the oppressive Bakchiads,[121] and the inclusion of Periandros among the Seven Sages suggests the existence of a positive tradition about him. This favourable tradition could have been shaped by the tyrants, but as it survived long after the tyranny's fall it must have been entrenched in the local memory, perhaps reflecting the real popularity of Kypselos and the glory the city achieved under his successor. On the other hand, if Kypselos retained his predominantly positive image throughout the later times (the negative appraisal of Herodotos was clearly exceptional, caused by his generally anti-monarchical attitude and the narrative context)[122], representing thus the positive aspects of the monarchy, his successor Periandros was, despite his achievements, remembered in predominantly negative terms.[123] He was reputed as a cruel man repressive towards the people,[124] harsh towards his own family and almost deranged in his sexual desires. He allegedly killed his wife out of jealousy, believing the accusations of his concubines whom he later set to fire when regretting the murder, had sexual intercourse with his wife's dead body,[125] stripped the women of Corinth of their clothes and jewellery for appeasing the dead wife,[126] had sexual relationship with his mother,[127] expelled his son from home causing his eventual death, and sent the sons of outstanding men of Korkyra, an island polis under his rule, to the Lydian king Alyattes for castration.[128] This unfavourable tradition

[120] Arist. fr. 611.19 Rose. For the 'lameness' and the curse of the Bakchiads see KÕIV 2019, 108-112.

[121] The story of the infancy and the rise of Kypselos is clearly favourable to him (ANDREWES 1956, 47-48; ZÖRNER 1971, 27, 31-32; OOST 1972, 16–18; SALMON 1984, 187-188; MCGLEW 1993, 71; SCHMITZ 2010, 30-31; CATENACCI 2012, 38-46; KÕIV 2019, 100-103).

[122] Hdt. V 92δ. See KÕIV 2019, 100-103.

[123] It was assumed that Periandros turned the good kingship of Kypselos into an evil tyranny (Nic. Dam. FGrH 90 F 58.1; in a milder form in Arist. Pol. 1315 b28-30; fr. 611.20 Rose). Herodotos V 92ζ also believed that Periandros became worse than his father.

[124] As noted above (with note 106), he compelled the people to work and prohibiting gatherings, allegedly for making them busy and thus avoiding any plotting against the ruler; besides this, he reputedly drowned the pimps into the sea (Arist. fr. 611.20 Rose; Hermippos FHG iii 40 fr. 16 ap. Athen. X 443a).

[125] Hdt. V 92ζ; Diog. Laert. I 94.

[126] Hdt. V 92ζ; Ephoros FGrH 70 F 178.

[127] Diog. Laert. I 96; Parthen. Erot. 17.

[128] Hdt. III 50-53.

can, on the one hand, reflect the growing resentment against the tyranny, and we can perhaps believe that, partly because of this resentment, Periandros was, in reality, more repressive than his father. On the other hand, this ambivalence illuminates the controversial attitude towards the monarchy, remembered both as a glorious rule bringing Corinth to the apex of glory, and as an unacceptably repressive government. As often in the oral traditions concerning the great dynasties, the positive aspects were connected with the dynasty founder, while the negative traits were ascribed to the last great figure, making him a monster contrasted to his heroic predecessor. Sargon and Naram-Sin, the paradigmatic rulers of Akkad, serve as good examples for this, showing that the Corinthian dynasty was no exception in this respect.[129]

However, the evidence leaves no doubt that the Kypselid monarchy became oppressive and hateful. The tradition tells that in the end the Corinthians hated the tyrants so much that they killed Periandros' successor (called either Kypselos or Psammetichos) and desecrated the tombs of the Kypselids, throwing their remains out of the Corinthian land. An oligarchic government was thereby established,[130] which apparently secured the internal stability of Corinth for almost two hundred years.[131]

This evidence demonstrates that the Corinthian polis emerged and developed under dynastic rule. The rulers performed functions and legitimated the power similarly to the kings in the east. Nor is there anything extraordinary in overthrowing a dynasty, or in hating particular rulers. Demonising the overthrown predecessors has been usual in history. Viewed from this perspective the Corinthian monarchy seems easily comparable to the city-state kingdoms elsewhere, not least the commercial Phoenician city-states, which were of more or less the same size as Corinth and where the ruling dynasties profited from trade as the Bakchiads allegedly did. Corinth, like many other poleis ruled by tyrants, compares well to the monarchical city-states of the Near East.

Clearly different from the east is however the fact that when the Kypselids were overthrown they were not replaced by a new dynasty, but monarchy was abolished altogether. Typically for Greece, it was not only a particular ruler or dynasty that was condemned, but the whole concept of monarchy was demonised. We lack contemporary evidence from Corinth, but Archaic poetry from elsewhere shows strong criticism of sole rule. Monarchy was equalised with 'devouring' the community and enslaving the people, or viewed as a punishment of the citizens for their vices, an evil for the polis and a danger for

[129] Note the similarity to the traditions about the rulers of Akkad: Sargon the dynasty founder depicted as the hero and Naram-Sin its last outstanding member as an arrogant ruler causing the fall of the dynasty and the Akkadian state. For the discussion and more examples see KÕIV 2018.

[130] Nic. Dam. FGrH 90 F 60; Arist. Pol. 1315 b27.

[131] The subsequent history of Corinth is discussed in detail by SALMON 1984, 231-386; see also LEGON 2004, 467.

the ruler himself.[132] Poleis took legislative measures for avoiding the emergence of a monarch (note the 7th century legislative inscription from the Cretan polis Dreros precluding the repeated tenure of the highest state office, probably with the purpose of avoiding the monopolisation of power),[133] and the turn from the Archaic to the Classical period (the late 6th and the first half of the 5th century) marked a widespread abolition of tyrannies and their replacement with republican governments.[134] The originally neutral words *tyrannis* and *tyrannos*, meaning simply 'monarchy' and 'monarch', attained increasingly negative connotation, until were defined by the Athenian philosophers as the terms for bad and lawless rule and contrasted to the good and lawful monarchy called *basileia* (kingship),[135] for which, however, no real example from the Greek poleis was easily found.[136]

Thus, although many poleis emerged under dynastic rule, for which Corinth appears as an excellent example, and the tyrants acted in many ways similarly to the city-state rulers of the east, achieved legitimation for their power and often brought prosperity for their poleis, in the long run monarchy failed to consolidate the polis society. Even those dynasties which had successfully maintained stability during a fairly long period of time were eventually unable to entrench the power, became hateful, were violently overthrown and replaced by collective governments. Rather than sustaining social coherence, like in the Near Eastern and other early states, monarchy in Greece became a destabilizing factor, a trouble-maker, and was consequently abolished.

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[132] Alkaios complained that tyrant (his enemy Pittakos) 'devoured' the polis (fr. 129.23-4, 70.7), 'set it upside down' (fr. 141), and 'brings the people to ruin' fr. 70.12), that it was necessary to save the people from this (fr. 129.20; fr. 75 and 348 mention tyranny in an equally reproachful context). Solon viewed monarchy as the enslavement of the people (fr. 9 West), something that must be definitely avoided (fr. 32, 33 West). Theognis 39-52 saw monarchy as a punishment for the people for their badness (*hybris*), while in 1181-1182 the *tyrannos* is described as devouring the people, and killing him won't cause vengeance. See BARCELÓ 1993, 92-102; DE LIBERO 1996, 28-35; PARKER 1998, 155-157; ANDERSON 2005, 205-210: KÕIV 2016a. 17-19.

[133] For the decree see KOERNER 1993, no 90; GAGARIN 1986, 81-97; 2008, 45-49, 76-79; 2013, 223-224; HÖLKESKAMP 1999, 262-269; GAGARIN–PERLMAN 2016, 200-207. The anti-monarchic purpose of the degree has been suggested by GEHRKE 1993, 63-64; HALL 2007, 135 and MITCHELL 2013, 15; see also SEELENTAG 2015, 139-155. Note the statement of Aristotle (Pol. 1305a15-19) that a number of early tyrants had acquired the power through some high state office.

[134] The tyrannies were abolished in Athens, on Samos, in the poleis on the Anatolian coast (here in connection to the resistance to the Persian power upholding these rulers); many tyrannies were allegedly abolished by the Spartans (Plut. De mal. Herod. 21; FGrH 105 F 1). Tyrannies collapsed in Sicily (Akragas and Syracuse) and Italy (Kyme and Rhegion) in the 470s and 460s (see LURAGHI 1994).

[135] This distinction was allegedly made by Socrates (Xen. Mem. IV 6.12) and was accepted by both Plato (Politikos 291d-292a) and Aristotle (Pol. 1279 a33-b10) – see KÕIV 2016a, 23-24. For the concept of tyranny in the 4th century political thought see most recently SCHMITZ 2010, 19-22 (focusing on Aristotle) and LURAGHI 2013a; 2013c, 139-144; NIPPEL 2017.

[136] It is notable that from the five kinds of 'legal' monarchy distinguished by Aristotle (Pol. 1284 b35-1285b33) the only recommendable, the *pambasileia* (described more precisely in Pol. 1288 a7-29), was a construction for which no real example was mentioned. LURAGHI 2013c, 142-144; 2015, 78; 2018: 24 and DREHER 2017, 173-174 note that ideal kingship was constructed simply as the antipode of hateful tyranny.

Problems with entrenching the power

This failure of monarchy, exceptional in the eastern Mediterranean context, requires explanation. We cannot simply refer to different cultural tradition, but must explain how and why such a tradition developed. Monarchy had been the dominant form of government in the Aegean Late Bronze Age, heroic epic sustained a traditional view of heroic kingship as an ideal for Archaic elite, and contacts with the Near Eastern world provided the Greek leaders with imitable examples of the eastern rulers. The contemporary poets leave no doubt that sole rule was a desirable goal,[137] and the frequent emergence of tyrannies in the Archaic Greece show that these desires were indeed realised in practice. Periandros (or his daughter) was credited with the saying that 'tyranny is a slippery thing – it has many lovers',[138] which wonderfully expresses both the desirability and the inherent instability of monarchic power. As monarchies did not become traditional, there must have been strong forces which, different from the city-states in the Near East, forbade an entrenchment of sole rule. We must ask what made the members of the society unwilling to obey and able to resist a monarch, and why were the rulers eventually unable to break this opposition. This must have been conditioned by the nature of the Greek society developing after the 12th century collapse.

As noted above, a successful and sustainable government requires support, or at least consent, of the subjects. Rule must seem necessary, beneficious, or at least acceptable for a critical part of the population. At the same time, an effective reign requires a concentration and control of resources. The supporters must be rewarded for assuring their loyalty, the wars, the festivals, and the building projects have to be financed, and the rulers need to build up repressive apparatuses to suppress the opposition. All this needs to be financed.

The relative longevity of several dynasties, and their achievements, show that many Greek monarchs, including the Corinthian rulers, succeeded in securing the power base, at least for a certain period of time. Both the Bakchiad and the Kypselid reign must have been accepted by many, both dynasties were capable of effective resource concentration, and Periandros had means for maintaining a bodyguard, probably composed of mercenaries.[139] The rulers clearly must have derived considerable revenues. The questions we must ask are, which kind of support could the rulers receive from the community, how were the supporters rewarded, how was the necessary resource concentration achieved, to which extent did the

[137] Archilochos fr. 19, 23 West, our earliest evidence for the use of the word *tyrannis*, make clear that sole rule was desirable and enviable. See also Solon fr. 33-34 West.

[138] Hdt. III 53.4: Τυραννὶς χρῆμα σφαλερόν, πολλοὶ δὲ αὐτῆς ἐρασταί εἰσι. Herodotos let this be said by Periandros' daughter acting as her father's messenger, but we can assume that this was transmitted as a saying of Periandros. For the other sayings ascribed to him see Diog. Laert. I 97-98.

[139] Periandros' bodyguard of 300 soldiers (Nic. Dam. FGrH 90 F 58.1; Arist. fr. 611.20 Rose) probably consisted of mercenaries. Mercenaries were allegedly employed by Peisistratos (Hdt. I 61.4, 64.1; Ath. Pol. 15.2), Lygdamis of Naxos and Polykrates (Polyainos I 23); and we can be fairly sure that similar measures were used by many Archaic tyrants (see De Libero 1996: 396-398). Aristotle (Pol. 1285 a25-28; 1311 a7-8) regarded the employment of foreign mercenaries as typical for tyranny.

position of a monarch depend on it, and how did the rest of the community, either the elite or the common citizens, respond to the fundraising by the rulers.

Two essential factors must be taken into account when considering these questions. On the one hand, tyrannies emerged in the period of economic growth and increasing prosperity. The historian Thukydides later explicitly connected the rise of tyrannies with the increase of wealth and revenues,[140] and the correspondence of the Bakchiad and Kypselid rule with the rise of Corinth as one of the wealthiest poleis clearly supports his point of view. The availability of the resources surely was a necessary condition for the concentration of wealth necessary for an effective reign. On the other hand, attaining control of this wealth, above all taking possession of large parcels of land as the principal source of income in an agrarian society, could not have been easy. As Greece is a rugged country with relatively small arable plains separated by often steep mountains, and therefore strictly limited lands possessed by the communities, the prospects of land accumulation were inevitably restricted. Extensive landholdings of the elites would have meant landlessness for the others, while the existence of a broad circle of landholders precluded the concentration of the lands to the top.

Corinth had the territory of ca 900 km²,[141] and when counting that about a third of it was arable,[142] we can assume that the polis possessed ca 300 km² (30 000 ha) of arable land. Survey evidence from a number of other Greek regions indicates that peripheral lands were not yet cultivated during the early Archaic period, which suggests that only a part of the arable land, mainly the plain from the Sikyonian border in the west to the Isthmos in the east was cultivated at that time. We may perhaps count with about two thirds of the total amount thus with ca 20 000 ha. How big part of this was possessed by the Bakchiads can be only guessed. We do not know how big was the circle of the Bakchiad rulers, and how numerous were the elite families outside this circle. That such families existed can be inferred from the tradition about the non-Bakchiad background of Kypselos' father.[143] However, the Bakchiads almost certainly did not possess most of the arable land in Corinth. Not only that we must account with the estates of the non-Bakchiad elite, there is evidence that a considerable part of the land was possessed by the citizen smallholders. This can be inferred from the Aristoteles' statement about the legislation of Pheidon, probably during the Bakchiad period. According to Aristotle, Pheidon 'thought that the house-holds and the citizen population ought to

[140] Thuc. I 13.1. Thukydides could not have possessed written evidence from the period of the emergence of tyranny and must have generalised from the stories of oral tradition, but he seems to have hit the point.

[141] SALMON 1984, 19.

[142] This seems to be a reasonable assumption: Attica with the territory of ca 2500 km² (HANSEN 2004a, 72; 2004b, 624) is estimated to have possessed ca 90 km² of arable land (see JAMESON 1992, 144-145 with references); Mantinea with the territory of ca 295 km² possessed probably up to 100 km² of arable land (HODKINSON–HODKINSON 1981, 175; see ROY 1999, 375 n. 138).

[143] According to Hdt. V 92β his father Aetion was a Lapith, while according to Paus. II 4.4 he descended from a pre-Dorian family originating from Corinth's neighbourhood. Both traditions make him thus distinct of the Dorian Bakchiads.

remain the same/equal (*isos*), even though at the outset the *klēroi* of all were of unequal in size'.[144] Unfortunately, we cannot tell from which source did the philosopher gather this information (it could derive, directly or indirectly, from some ancient inscription or form oral tradition) and, consequently, to which extent his view could be relied on. Nor does this short statement make clear how exactly Aristotle understood the enactment. However, despite the possibly variable readings,[145] the passage demonstrates that, according to Aristotle, there was a clear notion of citizenship in the early Corinth, that citizenship was tied to land ownership, and that the land plots were of different size. The context in which the statement was introduced makes it clear that in Aristotle's opinion Pheidon's aim was to keep the number of the citizens constant by avoiding their impoverishment and thus falling out from the citizenry.[146] This makes sense only if a considerable part of the citizens possessed relatively small parcels.[147] If Aristotle was correct, this would indicate the existence of a class of citizen smallholders during the Bakchiads' rule, and indeed the Bakchiads' concern about the preservation of this circle.

The landholding pattern in the early Corinth can be approached also in another way, by reading back form evidence concerning the end of the Archaic era. As noted above, Corinth with the territory of ca 900 km² possessed probably ca 30 000 ha of arable land, most of which was probably cultivated by that time. The number of the landholdings can be calculated on the basis of the evidence of Herodotos, giving the number of the hoplites (heavily armed infantry men) that Corinth, among the other poleis, put on the field in 479 in the battle of Plataia against the Persians. As hoplite equipment – shield, helmet, spear and often panzer – was relatively expensive, the men who could afford this could not have been poor in the contemporary standards, and most of them must, in the agrarian society, possessed an adequate amount of land. The hoplite numbers, therefore, are a relatively reliable guide for establishing the number of the landholdings.

According to Herodotos, there were 5000 Corinthian hoplites in the battle of Plataia.[148] This would allow 6 ha per a hoplite (30 000 : 5000 = 6) if we would equate the number of the

[144] Arist. Pol. 1265b 6-16: Φείδων μὲν οὖν ὁ Κορίνθιος, ὢν νομοθέτης τῶν ἀρχαιοτάτων, τοὺς οἴκους ἴσους ᾠήθη δεῖν διαμένειν καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν, καὶ εἰ τὸ πρῶτον τοὺς κλήρους ἀνίσους εἶχον πάντες κατὰ μέγεθος·

[145] The statement could mean that the number of the *oikoi* and of the citizens must remain constant (OOST 1972, 13), or that the size of the *oikoi* and the number of the citizens must remain constant (LINK 1991, 50-51), or that the number of the *oikoi* must remain equal to the number of citizens (ZURBACH 2017, 502-503). All these readings, however, imply that the constancy of the number of the *oikoi* was prescribed, and that the lawgiver was concerned about the number of citizen landholders.

[146] Aristotle argues against Plato's suggestion that the citizen landholdings should be of equal size, objecting that if this equality would be preserved without birth control this would lead to the birth of extra children for whom no property would be available, and thus to poverty and internal conflict. Pheidon maintaining the number of the citizens and the properties (or the correspondence between them) apparently avoided this threat.

[147] This militates against the opinion of WILL 1955, 317-319 that Pheidon intended to preserve intact the large holdings of the Bakchiads.

[148] Hdt. IX 28.3.

hoplites with the number of landholdings and assume that all the land was divided among the hoplites. This, of course, could not have been exactly the case. On the one hand, we must take into account that the 5000 hoplites probably did not constitute the total hoplite force. If we assume, reasonably, that this was a two-third mobilisation,[149] then the actual number of the hoplites must have been even bigger (ca 7500) and the average land plot smaller – ca 4 ha.[150] On the other hand, we cannot automatically equate the number of the hoplites with that of the landholdings even if assuming that most of the hoplites possessed land. Some household could have put forward more than one hoplite (perhaps father and son, or two brothers) while in some others of hoplite standard nobody might have been able to fight at the moment. Moreover, as Corinth was a notable commercial and trade centre a certain number of the hoplites could have been city dwellers who did not possess land outside the town. However, we can suppose that some of the poorer people, below the hoplite standard, also possessed land. A year before Plataia Corinth contributed 40 triremes (manned with ca 8000 men) to the Hellenic fleet at Artemision and Salamis.[151] Although the fleet could have been manned partly by employed foreigners and by slaves, this nevertheless implies a considerable number of citizens below the hoplite standard, who could have fought as light armed soldiers at Plataia, where their number was allegedly roughly equal to that of the hoplites.[152] Many of the poorer citizens surel were landless city dwellers, but these who possessed land would have inevitably reduced the possible share of the hoplites. We must also account with the bigger landholdings of the elite, whose members probably fought among the hoplites.[153]

Despite all the uncertainties, we can be sure that at the end of the Archaic period a big majority of the Corinthian hoplites were smallholders possessing hardly more than 5 ha of land, and that most of the arable land in Corinth was divided among them. This would allow to speculate about the size of the land possessed by the wealthier elite. Let us conjecture without counting the possible landholdings below the hoplite standard, and assume that 1000 of the 5000 hoplites formed an elite possessing more land than average.[154] The 4000 'average' hoplite households of 5 ha would, in this case, possess 20 000 ha (4000 x 5 = 20 000). This

[149] So VAN WEES 2013, 250 n. 72.

[150] The evidence of Herodotos for the Spartan numbers can be instructive in this respect. There was allegedly 8000 Spartans at the time of the Persian War (VII 234.2) of whom 5000 were present at Plataia (IX 28.2). The same proportions for Corinth would suggest the existence of 8000 Corinthian hoplites, which would allow only 3.75 ha for an average hoplite.

[151] Hdt. VIII 1.1.

[152] Herodotos (IX 29.2) states that the poleis generally put on field as many light armed fighters as there were hoplites.

[153] No Greek cavalry in the battle is mentioned by Herodotos, which suggests that all the soldiers above the hoplite standard fought as hoplites.

[154] Simonton 2017: 41-54 counts that ruling elite in Classical oligarchies included ca 10% of citizens. Following the evidence of Herodotos that there was 5000 hoplites and the same number of lightarmed soldiers at Plataia we can count with ca 10 000 Corinthian citizens.

would leave 10 000 ha for the wealthier part – that is ca 10 ha for an 'elite' family (10 000 ha for 1000 families). There was surely a still narrower and wealthier group of families among this broad elite, but the previous calculation shows that not much land was left for their possessions which, consequently, could not have been very extensive. If to conjecture, for the sake of argument, that there were 20 top elite families in Corinth, who possessed ca 50 ha each,[155] thus 1000 ha all together, this would leave the total of 9000 ha for the rest broader elite, thus slightly over 9 ha for each wealthier family.

We would have in such a case:

ca 20 families with ca 50 ha each = 1000 ha

ca 1000 (980) families with ca 9 ha each = 9000 ha (more exactly 980 x 9 = 8820)

ca 4000 families with ca 5 ha each = 20 000 ha

These calculations are obviously hypothetical, but the evidence would hardly allow a very different solution.[156] The landholding pattern in the early 5th century Corinth must have been fairly egalitarian, and the possessions of the elite restricted.

This evidence does not of course concern the period of the Bakchiad and Kypselid rule more than hundred years earlier. However, we must consider how was such a landholding pattern arrived at. We must accept that the number of smallholdings could have increased when the previously neglected lands in the periphery were cultivated, a process suggested by the archaeological surveys in many parts of Greece (but not in Corinthia),[157] but this could not have changed the landholding pattern on the plain where most of the more than 5000 late Archaic hoplites surely had their possessions.[158] Still less could this development reduce the possessions of the elite. Some effect on the rise of the hoplite numbers could be ascribed to

[155] This can be indirectly supported by the evidence for the Solonian census classes in Atens (Ath. Pol. 7.4). VAN WEES 2013, 230 calculates that a *zeugites* (aquiring annually 200 *medimnoi* of production from his household) must have possessed ca 14 ha of land as the minimum. The member of the wealthiest class – the *pentakosiomedimno*i (aquiring annually 500 *medimnoi*) – must thus have possessed at least 35 ha. Up to 50 ha for a top elite household seems thus a reasonable size in the Archaic Greece. The nature of the Solonian census classes, and the reliability of the evidence, is however debatable (see e.g. DE TE CROIX 2004, 5-69; RAAFLAUB 2006, 404-421; VALDÉS GUÍA – GALLEGO 2010; DUPLOUY 2014; VALDÉS GUÍA 2019, 394-402).

[156] If assuming that Corinth had 10 000 citizens at that time (5000 hoplites + 5000 light armed soldiers) then 10% of them would have possessed about a third of the arable land. This would be more or less in line with the suggestion of FOXHALL 1992, 157-158; 2002, 211 that in the Classical Athens about 9% of households owned around 35% of the land.

[157] Recent field surveys can suggest that the countryside in most of the regions in Greece was relatively thinly settled during the early Archaic era, which implies that habitation was concentrated mainly in the more or less nucleated centres on the plains, while the peripheral areas were occupied only in the late Archaic and Classical periods (see FOXHALL 2013; for the comparable evidence from the neighbouring Sikyon see LOLOS 2011, 269-376; but see RONNINGEN 2021, 83-166, whose research of Attika suggests different conclusions). VAN WEES 2013, 235-242 has consequently posited a notable increase of the hoplite numbers at that time, resulting from agricultural expansion creating the previously largely missing class of yeoman farmers.

[158] The early Archaic 'empty' countryside cannot indicate that the land on the central plains was not possessed by smallholders, but suggests is that the farmers lived in nucleated settlements, not far from their plots given the small size of the poleis.

the growth of the urban population. Herodotos said that the Corinthians did not despise the artisans as much as most Greeks did,[159] which suggests that several artisans here were relatively well-to-do people and therefore probably served as hoplites.[160] But their number could hardly have been very significand.[161] Most of the city dwellers, including the elite families who probably preferred to live in the polis centre, are likely to have possessed land, as was typical for the Greek poleis.

Therefore, if suggesting that in the earlier period more land was held by the elite, which would allow bigger possessions for the ruling Bakchiads, we must assume a land reform in the course of which the elite landholdings were distributed among the previously landless people. Is there any evidence for that?

That some change in the land possession took place is indicated by the tradition that Kypselos confiscated ('made public') the holdings of the Bakchiads.[162] He might have distributed these to his supporters, which, if these supporters were landless people, would obviously have increased the number of the peasant farms. Kypselos was indeed reputed as a popular ruler, and might have owed his popularity among the commoners to this move. However, such a measure has never been ascribed to any Archaic tyrant by the ancient sources, which suggests that nothing of this has been recorded in the tradition. This makes it more probable that Kypselos kept the lands in 'public' possession, thus presumably under his own control. Some further change could have taken place when the Kypselids were overthrown. We can assume that their lands were confiscated and possibly divided among the citizens (although no evidence for this is available). Hans van Wees has recently noted an increase of the number of elite burials during in the first half of the 6th century, which can be reasonably connected with the Kypselids' overthrow,[163] and perhaps with the distribution of the lands previously hold by the tyrants. However, this would indicate a rearrangement of landholdings among the wealthier elite rather than a distribution to the (prospective) smallholders. The fact that Corinth was subsequently governed by an oligarchy surely does not suggest any democratising reform distributing the land between the previously landless people and thereby essentially increasing the number of the small property owners.[164]

[159] Hdt. II 167.2.

[160] Potters' dedication in an extra-urban sanctuary are testified from Penteskouphia near Corinth (D'AGOSTINO–PALMIERI 2016).

[161] The number of the artisans and traders was probably very limited even by the end of the Archaic period (VAN WEES 2009, 456 estimates that the production of the widely exported Athenian pottery involved less than one percent of the Athenian population). Concerning Corinth, it has been estimated that many potters worked on seasonal basis while the full professionals formed a rather insignificant sector of the Corinthian economy (SALMON 1984, 101; SHANKS 1999, 42-50).

[162] Nic. Dam. FGrH 90 F 57.7; Hdt. V 92ε.

[163] VAN WEES forthcoming.

[164] For the Corinthian constitution see SALMON 1984, 231-239; LEGON 2004, 467; see also SIMONTON 2017, 192-193.

There would be therefore little reason for assuming a radical change of the landholding pattern either after the overthrow of the Bakchiads or after the Kypselid tyranny. We must consequently accept that the averages suggested for the early fifth century apply also for the earlier period. The expropriation of the Bakchiads and the Kypselids is likely to have brought changes within the wealthier sector – among the ca 1000 families probably consisting the elite – rather than a massive redistribution in favour of the poor. We must accept that the comparatively equal land distribution pertains also to the period the Bakchiads and the Kypselids, which can only mean that the extent of land possessed by either of these dynasties must have been comparatively modest. Even if assuming that the whole of the 1000 ha which later could have been possessed by the top families was held by the Bakchiads (an impossible suggestion in my view), and was thereafter taken over by the Kypselids, this would mean a tiny proportion compared to the total of ca 30 000 ha (or perhaps ca 20 000 ha, when assuming a smaller amount of cultivated land for the Bakchiad era). We might of course speculate that the elite possessions were slightly bigger than proposed here, but without assuming a fundamental social revolution during or after the Kypselid tyranny, for which no evidence is available, it would be impossible to assume that the rulers, or a narrow elite, possessed anything approaching the majority of lands in the Archaic Corinth. The evidence form other poleis suggests a similar picture.[165]

The majority of the Corinthians during the dynastic period were thus smallholders, and these smallholders possessed most of the arable land in Corinth. We can be sure that the smallholders fighting as hoplites and forming the majority of the citizens were economically relatively independent from the wealthier elite. The only possible, though indirect, evidence is given by the early Hellenistic historian Timaios, stating that the Corinthians possesses 460 000 slaves, and that Pythia therefore called them *choinikometres* (according to the measure of rations for the slaves).[166] The number is of course incredible, but it demonstrates that Corinth was proverbially famous for the extent of its slave population. Timaios stated this in the third book of his history, thus in the early part of the work, which suggests that he had reason to mention the importance of slavery in Corinth in connection to its early history.[167] This implies that the early Corinthian elite exploited above all chattel slaves, not the citizen population, which, combined with the concern of preserving the numbers of landholding citizens by the legislator Pheidon, suggests that the smallholders were more or less protected from direct exploitation. Such a view is supported by the evidence of Hesiod and Homer

[165] This corresponds with the evidence for the other poleis (see KÕIV 2021, 153-155), which supports the opinion of Hanson 1995: 181-201 that there was no radical inequality in the holding of rural property in the Archaic poleis, contrary FOXHALL 1997; VAN WEES 2006; 2013 describing the Archaic poleis as much more hierarchical (the suggestion of FOXHALL 1992, 157-158; 2002, 211 that in the Classical Athens about 9% of households owned around 35% of the land surely does not indicate any radical inequality).

[166] Timaios FGrH 566 F 5 ap. Athen. VI 103 (272b).

[167] VAN WEES forthcoming.

(perhaps from the 7th century, the very time of the Bakchiad and Kypselid rule).[168] The Homeric epics infer that the elite *basileis* exploited above all slaves (*dmōes*) and occasionally wage laborers (*thētes*),[169] while the *Works and Days* of Hesiod leaves no doubt that the relatively broad circle of farmers below the elite *basileis* was economically independent.[170] No dependent peasantry is mentioned by either Homer or Hesiod.[171]

The early Corinthian society, like the societies on most of the other contemporary Greek poleis, was thus composed of an elite possessing relatively modestly sized lands and exploiting mainly chattel slaves, and a broad circle of usually economically independent smallholders. The elite families were rich compared to the smallholders, but compared to the contemporary states in the east the society was egalitarian and the possessions of the elite restricted.[172]

Building up a solid economic power base for a permanent dynastic rule must have been notoriously complicated in such a society. Any elite family or kinship group could hardly have possessed ancestral lands sufficient for effective power building, or considerably larger than what was controlled by the potential opponents. If the Bakchiads took hold of big parcels of land, this must have taken place at the expense of their competitors, which was bound to cause opposition among the other elite families whose rights were thereby injured. The Kypselids could have been in a better position in this respect, as they could simply take over and manage the Bakchiad possessions. However, even if up to 1000 ha was possessed by the Bakchiads and taken over by their successor, these lands were still hardly large enough for being distributed as grants to numerous followers and thereby assuring their loyalty. If divided among the supporters, this could have satisfied only a relatively small circle of citizens (supposing that 1000 ha was divide to the plots of 5 ha, this would have reached for 200 people), and above all, would have left the rulers without the revenues from this land. It is therefore more probable that Kypselos kept the Bakchiads' lands under his direct control. This would have preserved the revenues that the Bakchiads had enjoyed, and secured a sort of 'royal household', similar to the palace holdings in the east. 'Royal holdings' (*basilikon*) is

[168] E.g. WEST 1966; 1995; BURKERT 1976; TAPLIN 1992, 33-35; BURGESS 2001; FINKELBERG 2017; 2018.

[169] *Dmoes*: *Odyssey* I 398, 430-431; XIV 115, 272, 302, 340, 449-450; XV 386–388, 425–429, 450–484; note also *Iliad* XXI 453–454; Wage labourers (*thetes* and *erithoi*): *Iliad* XVIII 550, 560; XXI 444-445; *Odyssey* IV 644; XVIII 357-361; and Hes. Erga 602-603. See SCHMITZ 2004, 111-119; HARRIS 2012; ZURBACH 2017, 232-251, 292-293; LEWIS 2018, 107-120.

[170] For Hesiod's status and attitudes see WILL 1965; MILLET 1984; RAAFLAUB 1993, 59-64; EDWARDS 2004; CLAY 2003; SCHMITZ 2004, 27-104; VAN WEES 2013, 226-229 (who overrates the wealth and status of the Hesiodic 'gentleman farmers', not accounting with the idealised exemplariness of Hesiod's farm); BARRY 2016; VALDÉS GUÍA 2019, 389-394.

[171] Pointed out by VAN WEES 2009, 451-452; LURAGHI 2009. 273; ZURBACH 2017, 254.

[172] The easiness with which the Lydian Kroisos reputedly enriched Alkmeon (Hdt. VI 125) indicates the modesty of the Greek wealth by the eastern standards. The comparative egalitarianism of the Greek society as the key for understanding the emergence of polis has been often pointed out: MORRIS 2000, 109-191; ULF 2001, 174-179; RAAFLAUB 1993, 46-82; RAAFLAUB–WALLACE 2007; KÕIV 2011a, 126-138; LYTTKENS 2013, 35-38.

indeed attested for the early 5th century Syracusan tyrants.[173] If a similar strategy was used by the Corinthian rulers, the consequent permanent possession of the relatively big landed estate could have been crucial for financing their reign, which could significantly contribute to their ability to keep the power for the relatively long time.

Additional revenues could have been acquired from outside. The Bakchiads reputedly profited from trade.[174] One of them, Demaratos, reputedly made a huge fortune from trade between Corinth and Italy, and settled there when the Bakchiads were overthrown.[175] The reliability of this evidence may be doubtful, but it still demonstrates the assumption that income from maritime trade formed an essential part of the wealth of the Bakchiads. The wide spread of the 7th century proto-Corinthian pottery supports this assumption, and we can guess that this income was essential for confirming the dynasty's power. Concerning the Kypselids, we are told by Aristotle that Periandros levied custom duties.[176] Combined with his alleged plan to dig the channel through Isthmos, the construction of *diolkos* and the improvement of the ports at his time, this indicates the wish to promote trade and to profit from this. Kypselos' strategy of founding colonies on the western coast, close to the seaway to Italy and Sicily, and on the northern shore of the Aegean, may also have had at least partially commercial motives. If the Kypselids were, like Demaratos, personally engaged with trade remains a matter of guess.

Trade and piracy belonged together in the early Greece,[177] which makes it almost certain that booty from sea-robbery, as well as from the wars, was equally essential for the rulers. We lack particular evidence for the Bakchiad and the Kypselids, but from elsewhere in Greece the evidence is illuminative. Polykrates the tyrant of Samos allegedly put war captives to build the fortifications of Samos,[178]and it has been credibly suggested that he made huge profit from slave trade.[179] If Aiakes the *epistates* ('the president') who made a dedication to the Samian Heraion 'from the booty' was an earlier tyrant of Samos, this would demonstrate that piracy of the Samian rulers was traditional.[180] Most of the captives taken by the Sicilian tyrants Theron of Akragas and Gelon of Syracuse in the battle of Himera in 480 were kept in communal possession (*es to demosion*), thus presumably under the rulers' control, and put to work in the public building projects organised by the tyrants.[181] Alliances with the potentates

[173] Thrasybulos of Syracuse allegedly added the confiscated properties 'to the royal household' (*eis to basilikon*) – Diod. XI 67.5.

[174] Strab. VIII 6.20.

[175] Dion. Hal. III 46.3. See also Liv. I 34.1; Strab. V 2.2; Polyb. VI 11a.7.

[176] Arist. fr. 611.20.

[177] See e.g. MELE 1979; RHILL 1995.

[178] Hdt. III 39.4.

[179] CARTY 2015, 144-148 suggests that Polykrates sold slaves to the Egyptian king Amasis.

[180] TOD 1951, no 7: Ἥρηι τὴν σύλην ἔπρησε. For the possible connection between Aiakes and Polykrates see BARRON 1964, 218-219; SHIPLEY 1987, 70-2; DE LIBERO 1996, 253-257; CARTY 2015, 49-66.

[181] Diod. XI 26.

of other polities, for which Periandros was particularly famous, also played crucial role. Again, we lack direct evidence for how this profited the Corinthian rulers, but in Athens Peisistratos allegedly acquired the means for achieving power from abroad, while Polykrates of Samos tried, fatefully, to attain wealth from the Persian satrap.[182]

The external resources, however, were highly precarious and ephemeral, and perhaps above all, the tyrants had almost no chance of monopolizing the access to them and precluding this for the opponents.[183] The colonies founded and ruled by the Kypselids might have given some possibilities to control maritime trade, and the rulers were surely able to deny the opponents from an access to the ports of Corinth, but they could hardly have had the possibility to prevent the opponents to possess ships and profiting from trade and piracy outside their realm. Corinth had no natural resources comparable to the Lebanese seder wood the export of which could have been controlled, an there was no possibility to assume the role of a necessary mediator in the trade with some foreign power.

Besides the revenues from the lands kept under the rulers' direct control, the rulers could impose taxes, as is reported for the Kypselids.[184] Periandros moreover allegedly compelled the people to work, which may indicate the establishment of a sort of corvée obligation necessary for executing the magnificent building projects.[185] Aristotle considered taxation and imposing work obligation as a typically tyrannical measures, and saw Periandros as the first to introduce them.[186] We can suppose that the Kypselids were heavily dependent of these measures for financing their rule.[187]

However, if taxation and corvée labour were traditional and therefore perceived as natural in the Near Eastern states, they were bound to cause resentment among the traditionally independent members of the Greek poleis. If the attempts to secure revenues by taking more land under control must have alienated those whose possessions were thereby expropriated, usually the elite families, the taxation and the work obligation threatened to alienate the smallholders who were not accustomed to a direct economic exploitation. The

[182] Peisistratos: Hdt. I 61.3-4, 64.1; Ath. Pol. 15.2. Polykrates: Hdt. III 120-125. The private character of Peisistratos' means for rising to power is pointed out by SANCISI-WEERDENBURG 2000, 10. See the discussion VALENTE 2019 and KALDMA in the present volume.

[183] The Alkmeonids, the opponents the Peisistratid tyrants, were able to acquire foreign wealth in a comparable amount (Hdt. VI 125; see also V 62.3).

[184] Nic. Dam. FGrH 90 F 57.7; Arist. Oec. 1346a31-b5. Aristotle (Pol. 1313b26) considers taxation as a typically tyrannical measure.

[185] Nic. Dam. FGrH 90 F 58.1.

[186] Arist. Pol. 1313b18-26. According to Aristotle, work obligation was aimed at keeping the people busy, and thus unable to plot against the tyrant. However, the real purpose of these measures was probably economical, as accepted in Ath. Pol. 16.4 describing the policy of Peisistratos.

[187] Taxation of the subjects is recorded also for the Peisistratids of Athens (Thuc. VI 54.5; Ath. Pol. 16.4.). However, the fact that Aristotle regarded both taxation and establishing work obligation typical for tyrannies suggests that the Kypselids and the Peisistratids were no exception.

possibilities to build up a sustainable economic power base were therefore scarce, and the chances to maintain a repressive apparatus, like hiring mercenaries, relatively restricted.

It is therefore natural that for being successful the rulers must have relied on consensus of the citizens. Monarchy could have been perceived as beneficial as crisis management, providing internal stability. The establishment of the Bakchiad power probably resulted from the internal conflicts in the course of the 8th century polis formation, reflected by the traditions about the internecine murders, the sacrilegious crime and the consequent emigration. The internal peace and stability that the Bakchiads may have granted could have been perceived as a relief. Combined with the following economic prosperity, and the legislation of Pheidon protecting the rights of the smallholders, this could have secured the citizens' loyalty towards the rulers. We do not know why exactly was the rule eventually perceived as oppressive. However, Nikolaos of Damascus reports that when Kypselos was *polemarchos* before his coup, he set free the persons who were to be imprisoned for some charges, providing the guarantors for them,[188] which may imply some oppressive obligations established by the Bakchiads. Be this as it may, we can accept the tradition that Kypselos successfully exploited the discontent towards the previous rulers and rose as a charismatic leader reputedly restoring justice as the oracle in Herodotos suggests.[189] The magnificent building projects promoting the glory and the unity of the polis, and perhaps the successful wars, the booty from which could have been in part shared by the community members and which surely exhorted the feeling of 'national' pride, were probably a further factor promoting the loyalty of the citizens.[190]

But charismatic rulership could not have lasted for long, and a strong personal power was not indispensable for securing internal stability. Building projects could have been organised collectively, military leaders elected, and in the world of numerous economically independent actors there was hardly any need, or indeed possibility, for a centralised management of production. Fundraising for covering the expenses must have evoked resentment, which compelled the rulers to enforce obedience and secure the revenues repressively. It is hardly possible to make sense of all the alleged measures of Periandros, but the tradition leaves no doubt that they targeted at increasing the revenues, taking control of the citizens' private lives and suppressing the opposition. These aspects were clearly connected. Effective fundraising necessitated control but also evoked opposition, and the increasing needs to suppress this required additional revenues and still stronger control, which in turn promoted discontent and made the opposition stronger. Growing discontent among both the elite and the commoners undermined the support and required a repressive

[188] Nic. Dam. FGrH 90 F 57.5.

[189] See above, with note 114. If he distributed among his supporters a part of the confiscated the Bakchiad possessions this probably contributed to his charisma.

[190] For tyranny as charismatic leadership relying on the consent of the people see LAVELLE 2005, 155-162 (concerning Peisistratos); WALLACE 2009, 413-417; MITCHELL 2013, 57-90, especially 64.

apparatus which proved too expensive for the available sources of income. This made eventual collapse inevitable, resulting in replacement of monarchy with more consensual collective rule.

Conclusion: egalitarianism and the failure of monarchy in early Greece

The evidence allows to describe archaic Greek tyranny as a failed attempt to establish a permanent city-state monarchy when statehood re-emerged after the disintegration of the palace-centred kingdoms of the Late Bronze Age. Monarchies emerged together with the city-states and in many poleis this clearly promoted the polity formation. Like rulers everywhere the monarchs organised defence and led their communities in wars, tried to hold up internal order and sought the benevolence of divine powers by representing their communities before the gods. This could bring comparatively long-lasting success, as demonstrated by the at least five generations of rule by the successive and probably related Bakchiad and Kypselid dynasties in Corinth. In long term, however, the sole rule proved both unnecessary and inacceptable. Differently from the states in the Near East, including the city-states, where monarchs relied on tribal loyalties and palace economies enabled to reward and thereby grant the loyalty of the elites, the comparatively egalitarian society without hierarchical kinship groups developing in Greece precluded the establishment of an adequate base for monarchic power. The society composed of a broad circle of independent landholders did not need a sole ruler, and the restricted social hierarchies precluded an effective enforcement of power from above. As the economy was based on free interaction of private individuals there was no need for a central economical management, while the absence of traditional ties of dependency among the community members, and the limited possessions of the elite, avoided a concentration of wealth necessary for the formation of an adequate economic basis for sole rule. The Greek monarchs attempted to build up this, comparable to the palace economies and the royal taxation in the city-states of the east,[191] and some of them were initially successful, but differently from the eastern states with entrenched elite power, this proved both insufficient and dangerous. Attempts to establish an effective control over resources evoked resentment, and the revenues that could have been gathered, not least through expropriations and exploitation of the citizens, were insufficient for covering the costs of the repressive apparatus necessary for assuring compliance. The rulers lacked the means for rewarding the members of the elites for granting their loyalty. Elite families did not profit from monarchy and saw the ruler as a competitor depriving them of the honour, authority and perhaps the income they deserved. This compelled the monarchs to seek support from below, as demonstrated for Kypselos who rose as a popular leader. Aristotle

[191] This has been recently pointed out by ROSE 2012, 234-237 who, however, pays no attention to the undesirable consequences of these measures for the tyrants.

indeed believed that most of the early tyrants relied on the support of demos.[192] The reliability of this evidence has been questioned,[193] but the inherent weakness of the monarchs' position suggests that the support or at least consent of the people was highly necessary.[194] The economically independent and militarily equipped smallholders could have supported the monarch as a crisis-manager, perhaps as protector against elite pressure, but they were jealous about any curtailment of their rights, and sufficiently strong to resist economic exploitation. Neither the elite nor the commoners, consequently, saw any need for permanent sole leadership, and the communities were able to arrive at political decisions and to carry them through collectively. The need for monarchy was confined basically to the crisis situations requiring a temporary concentration of power.

The failure of monarchy in Archaic Greece was, consequently, caused by development of the relatively egalitarian society after the 12th century collapse. Differently from the Near East where social hierarches were preserved or relatively quickly resumed, and palace economies retained a notable importance, the small Greek communities with restricted land resource developed only flat hierarchies with hardly any chance for an establishment of an incontestable elite power. The monarchs, emerging as the successful members of the internally egalitarian and highly competitive elite, were unable to concentrate sufficient resources for firmly establishing the power. They had to rely on personal charisma and communal consent, which was however difficult to maintain outside the periods of crisis. The attempts of a proper institutionalisation of the power inevitably affected the rights of the others, undermined the necessary support and led to the fall. As the result, monarchy was perceived not as a glorious rule but a hateful tyranny. The natural outcome of the Greek egalitarianism was the development of a political system based on compromise between the independent actors, i.e. the system known as the republican polis.

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[192] Arist. Pol. 1310 b15-18, 28-32; see also 1315 b 14-22.

[193] CAWKWELL 1995; DE LIBERO 1996, 400-402; ANDERSON 2005, 194-198.

[194] See LAVELLE 2005, especially 155-163; RAAFLAUB–WALLACE 2007, 42-43; WALLACE 2007, 75-76; 2009, 413-417; HALL 2007, 142-143; KÕIV 2011a, 134-135; ROSE 2012, 341-350.

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Compliance and Endurance. The Athenian Power Building through the Melian Dialogue

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Abstract. *The Melian dialogue in the 5th book of Thucydides can be seen as one of the most important texts for political science. Two opposing political ideas are confronted by the historian: on the one hand Thucydides presents the Athenians as promoters of the idea of legitimacy of unlimited growth of power; on the other hand, there were the Melians who did not accept the 'law of the stronger'. The Melians were conquered, and their arguments could not save them, but in the longer perspective the Athenian empire was destined to collapse. Through the dialogue, Thucydides compares the 'law of the stronger' ignoring the rights of others, and the appeal to justice by the weaker party trying to demonstrate their reasons to oppose the imperialist power.*

Rezumat. *Dialogul Melian din cartea a V-a a lui Tucidide poate fi văzut ca unul dintre cele mai importante texte pentru știința politică. Istoricul se confruntă cu două idei politice opuse: pe de o parte, Tucidide îi prezintă pe atenieni ca promotori ai ideii de legitimitate a creșterii nelimitate a puterii; pe de altă parte, erau Melienii care nu acceptau „legea celui mai puternic". Melienii au fost cuceriți, iar argumentele lor nu i-au putut salva, dar, în perspectivă mai lungă, imperiul atenian era sortit să se prăbușească. Prin dialog, Tucidide compară „legea celui mai puternic" ignorând drepturile celorlalți și apelul la justiție al părții mai slabe care încearcă să-și demonstreze motivele pentru a se opune puterii imperialiste.*

Keywords: Melian dialogue, Athenian imperialism, Greek political thought, Thucydides, democracy.

Introduction[1]

In the fifth book of the history of Thucydides there appears one of the most discussed events of the Thucydidean narration of the Peloponnesian war, the Melian dialogue. Melos, an island-city of the Aegean, kin to the Lacedaemonians,[2] decided to stay neutral during the war. This fact provoked in the year 416[3] the reaction of Athens which could not permit a

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[2] For Melos as perceived Spartan colony, see MALKIN 1994, 74ff.

[3] All dates are B.C.

small island-city to stay independent in an area of the Athenian domination.[4] This event led the Athenians to approach Melos and – through one of the most famous dialogues in the ancient history – to give to the islanders an ultimatum, in order to make them join the Athenian League and submit.[5] The event itself was not of great importance for the continuity of the war since Melos was a poor island-city with an insignificant naval force. The conquest of the island would not have significantly changed the strength of the Athenian army. But the discussion that arose between these cities, both defending their own stance with several arguments, is one of the events that offers an idea of both the relationships between the Greek city-states of the 5th century, and of the size of power that Athens gained after the Persian wars and the way that the city used this power towards its allies.

The dialogue is considered by many scholars as the representative example of Athenian imperialism. The Athenians with an extreme demonstration of their power tried to convince the Melians that they had no hope to win a war against them and that the only way of salvation was the submission to the dominant power, Athens. The strict interlocutory form of the passage was created on purpose by Thucydides. The historian, according to De Romilly,[6] wanted to offer a superior form of impartiality to the reader and additionally to intensify the dramatic nature of the dialogue in which both parts express different arguments intending to support their own point of view. In particular, the Athenians wanted the expansion of the dominance of their power, while the Melians struggled to save themselves. During this highly interesting dialogue, both cities supported their "own" truth which is relevant to the power that each part had. The core of the Thucydidean passage is how does each part understand the idea of justice.[7] Is justice an objective value or a relative one?

The relativity of justice

If we try to analyse the text in more detail, we will observe that the relevance of justice is a main theme of the dialogue. By calling on the justice, *τὸ δίκαιον*,[8] both parts try to support their position and prove that they are in the right. In the subsequent passages, we can observe the use of this key-word repeatedly from Thucydides: this was the main idea, on

[4] Thucydides narrates that the Athenians under Nicias had attacked the Melians again in 426, but did not press the attack home (Thuc. 3.91.1-2).

[5] For a more detailed narration of the events in Melos see among others the detailed work of DEININGER 1987, and RENGAKOS 1984, 93-102. See also CRANE 1998, 237ff. for similar examples of "confrontations between the ruthless strong and the helpless weak" before Thucydides and especially in the *Histories* of Herodotus. For a more philological approach of the dialogue see among others the very interesting work of CANFORA 1992, and the monograph of CAGNAZZI 1983.

[6] De ROMILLY 1963, 307.

[7] On the idea of power in Thucydides and its function in the work of the historian, see the interesting work of ERBSE (1989).

[8] See BÉTANT 1847, *ad locum* for the translation of the term *δίκαιος* in Thucydides: iustus (just), aequus (equal), legitimus (lawgiving).

which both cities based their arguments. The idea of justice was of course a relative concept in ancient Greek thought. It can be perceived in many ways and I think that the Melian dialogue is an extremely representative example of the relativity of the idea of *δίκαιον* for the Greek thought.

The Melians, tried to convince the Athenians that the decision to stay neutral in the war was just and refused to obey them by becoming a part of the Athenian League. This decision was, in their opinion, the proof of the fact that justice was on their side, since the Athenians could not understand their right to stay neutral in the war:

> "In our view you have come with your own preconceived judgement of this discussion. The result is likely to be that if we win the moral argument and so do not submit, we face war; and if we grant your argument, we face servitude (*κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς περιγενομένοις μὲν τῷ δικαίῳ καὶ δι' αὐτὸ μὴ ἐνδοῦσι πόλεμον ἡμῖν φέρουσαν, πεισθεῖσι δὲ δουλείαν*)."[9]

The Melians clarified their just position but were completely aware that both options – to comply or not – would cause them trouble. This idea was maintained through the whole dialogue and was the main argument of the Melians against the authoritarian mood of Athens. The Melians would mention afterwards that "[...] yet, as for fortune, we trust that our righteous stand against injustice will not disadvantage us in divine favour (*ὅσιοι πρὸς οὐ δικαίους ἱστάμεθα*)."[10] Their innocence was, according to them, out of question.

It could be said that an argument like that of the Melians cannot be overthrown: who could say that a state, which is supporting its freedom and independence, is wrong? Yet the Athenian ambassadors managed to make a case for the fact that justice was on their side, a fact that would have clarified that the truth is a relative value:

> "So keep this discussion practical, within the limits of what we both really think. You know as well as we do that when we are talking on the human plane questions of justice only arise when there is equal power to compel: in terms of practicality the dominant exact what they can and the weak concede what they must (*ἐπισταμένους πρὸς εἰδότας ὅτι δίκαια μὲν ἐν τῷ ἀνθρωπείῳ λόγῳ ἀπὸ τῆς ἴσης ἀνάγκης κρίνεται, δυνατὰ δὲ οἱ προύχοντες πράσσουσι καὶ οἱ ἀσθενεῖς ξυγχωροῦσιν*)"[11]

As stated by the Athenians, justice exists between cities of equivalent power. When this rule does not apply and the one side is more powerful than the other one, then the law that matters is the law of the strongest. This absolute – arrogant– declaration of the Athenians

[9] Thuc. 5.86, all transl. are taken from HAMMOND 2009, *ad locum*.

[10] Thuc. 5.104.

[11] Thuc. 5.89.

was the core of their argumentation: the Melians should think *σωφρόνως*[12] and not even try to support their position since the Athenians were the possessors of power and the one that has the power has also justice on its side. According to De Romilly "men normally talk of justice only when they cannot act by force".[13] This is why justice exists only between cities of equivalent power: when the one city cannot dominate the other one by power, a common justice has to exist, in order to resolve the disputes. In the case of Melos and Athens however, there was no need to resolve the issues with justice: Athens was more powerful and could act by force and if someone can act by force, justice comes secondary.[14]

The law of the strongest was analysed afterwards by the Athenians:

> "We believe it of the gods, and we know it for sure of men, that under some permanent compulsion of nature wherever they can rule, they will (*ἡγούμεθα γὰρ τό τε θεῖον δόξῃ τὸ ἀνθρώπειόν τε σαφῶς διὰ παντὸς ὑπὸ φύσεως ἀναγκαίας, οὗ ἂν κρατῇ, ἄρχειν*). We did not make this law; it was already laid down, and we are not the first to follow it (*καὶ ἡμεῖς οὔτε θέντες τὸν νόμον οὔτε κειμένῳ πρῶτοι χρησάμενοι*); we inherited it as a fact, and we shall pass it on as a fact to remain true for ever; and we follow it in the knowledge that you and anyone else given the same power as us would do the same (*ὄντα δὲ παραλαβόντες καὶ ἐσόμενον ἐς αἰεὶ καταλείψοντες χρώμεθα αὐτῷ, εἰδότες καὶ ὑμᾶς ἄν καὶ ἄλλους ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ δυνάμει ἡμῖν γενομένους δρῶντας ἂν ταὐτό*)."[15]

The nature of the human being is to rule and whoever can have the opportunity to possess the power, will do the same. The Melians would have done also the same if they had had this opportunity. According to the theory of the Athenians, the Melians had no other option than to obey the dominant power, since this is the nature of the human being when it is weaker than the one that has the power. Like BOSWORTH mentions, "they are weak and their very weakness compels Athens to incorporate them into their empire. There is no sanction they can invoke, no alliance or treaty to give them protection, and no possibility that Athens

[12] The term literally means to think with "soundness of mind, prudence, discretion" (see LSJ 1996, *ad locum* and BÉTANT 1847, *ad locum*, but NORTH 1966, 109) very accurately notes that sophrosyne in this case "means recognizing the realities of political life, acquiescence in the laws of nature that require the weak to obey the strong".

[13] DE ROMILLY 1963, 306.

[14] See on this subject the very interesting discussion between ANDREWES and RADT. When it comes to the present passage, ANDREWS (1970, 16) believes that "terms like *δίκαιον* retained their standard meaning for Thucydides, as is shown most Athenians here allow that justice is a usable concept between cities on the same level of power: only in the case of disproportionate power it does not apply [...].But the open admission is abnormal, for evidence enough remains to show that the ordinary citizen, even of great power acting arbitrarily, preferred to think that his city's action was morally justified". On the other hand, RADT (1976, 34f.) rightly notes that the cases in which two sides use justice in order to resolve their disputes because of their similarity of power are actually exceptional; the rule in the disputes of two cities is their dissimilarity, where justice can have no application, only the law of the strongest has.

[15] Thuc. 5.105.2.

herself will ever face the same situation. Under such conditions justice is an irrelevancy and there is no point invoking it."[16]

From the afore-mentioned passages, we can understand which idea existed in the Greek world of the last quarter of the 5th century about power and justice. From the text it is obvious that there is no common law among the Greek city-states, which can adjust the relationships between them. The Greek cities were organized in extremely different ways and the effort of the Athenians to create a united Athenian League of the island city-states could not work in the same way for each of them. As reported by Andrewes, "there existed between cities no sanction comparable to the rule of law within the city", which means that "justice between cities was not merely flouted in practice but unmanageable in theory."[17] Every city-state had its own laws and it was completely normal that the political mentalities of the different cities would have been in conflict when their representatives had different interests. And in Bosworth's opinion, in the case of the Melian dialogue, the discovery of a common law was even more difficult, since the two opposed parts were not of equivalent power: the two cities in conflict had a relationship comparable to the one between master and slave in civil war.[18] Neutrality was impossible for the Melians, but this was not the norm for the relationships between the city-states during the Peloponnesian war. As Morrison justly remarks, there are examples of cities which remained neutral in the war, like Argos. According to this scholar, "The question is not whether neutrality can be a viable policy, but rather whether it is possible or advisable for a weak, small polis to claim neutrality"[19] and this is the point of the Melian dialogue. Weakness of the enemy was the key-word for the tyrannical behaviour of the Athenians and because of this weakness the Melians had no possibility to escape from slavery.

The arrogance of Athenian Imperialism[20]

As stated by Wassermann,[21] the Melians stood against the Athenians as representatives not only of a different political ideal but also of a different age. The Melians represented the old Greek ideas of morality, according to which the gods support the weaker ones that suffer from the unjust power, because they have always the right to resist, like they did in the case of the war between the weak Greek city-states and the powerful Persian Empire.[22] This idea

[16] BOSWORTH 1993, 38.

[17] ANDREWES 1970, 164. See also HEATH 1990, 385ff. for other examples of Athenian speeches, in which the speakers "dismiss considerations of justice as irrelevant to decision-making in questions of international relations".

[18] BOSWORTH 1993, 39.

[19] MORRISON 2000, 144.

[20] On the causes of the Athenian Imperialism in the work of Thucydides see FORDE 1986; on the history of the Athenian Empire in general see MEIGGS 1972.

[21] WASSERMANN 1947, 28.

[22] Thuc. 5.104.

was perfectly expressed by the Syracusian Hermocrates who, in the year 425, spoke in front of the Greeks of Sicily, in order to convince them to unite their forces and protect the island from the imperialistic plans of Athens. Inter alia Hermocrates said:

> "That the Athenians should be thus acquisitive and calculating is wholly understandable. My complaint is not of those who seek domination, but rather of those who are too ready to submit to it. It has always been in human nature to dominate the subservient — but also to defend against the aggressor (*καὶ οὐ τοῖς ἄρχειν βουλομένοις μέμφομαι, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ὑπακούειν ἑτοιμοτέροις οὖσιν*)".[23]

The Athenians had the right to be imperialistic, but the cities had not the right to comply without resistance. The nature of the human being is to resist anybody, who wants to attack him. This idea had been represented in grand manner by the Greek city-states during the Persian wars, when the cities showed an exemplary resistance to the huge empire that came to conquer them. In the case of the Melian dialogue, however, this idea seemed already distant in time. It was not a case that the Athenians rejected immediately this general belief by saying that the gods would support the strongest one since the nature of every human is to rule when he can,[24] and that the weaker one has no other choice than to comply and accept it.[25] This mentality of the Athenians may not have been new for human history, but was certainly new for the Greek world of the Persian wars, which was characterized by independent city-states with not much will of expansion outside the core of the city. Not even Sparta can be characterized by imperialistic strategy by ruling the Peloponnesian League: in this case, the League had strategic and political motives but does not move imperialistically in the Greek area. Athens was the first city to show clearly an imperialistic attitude and establish an Athenian hegemony in the Greek world.

The Melian dialogue manages to illuminate precisely this part of Athenian history: its transformation from the Greek city of the Persian wars focused on its salvation from the Persian invasion and its internal development to an imperialistic power. This was not the first time that Thucydides notices this transformation of Athens. In the first book of his work, during the speech of the Athenian ambassadors in the Spartan assembly before the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, in order to convince the Lacedaemonians to avoid the explosion of this war, the Athenians said the following:

> "So too we have done nothing surprising or contrary to human nature in accepting an empire when it was offered to us and refusing to give it up, under the domination of the three most powerful motives — prestige, fear, and self-interest (*οὕτως οὐδ' ἡμεῖς θαυμαστὸν οὐδὲν πεποιήκαμεν οὐδ' ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀνθρωπείου τρόπου, εἰ ἀρχήν τε διδομένην ἐδεξάμεθα καὶ ταύτην μὴ ἀνεῖμεν ὑπὸ <τριῶν> τῶν*

[23] Thuc. 4.61.5.

[24] Thuc. 5.105.

[25] Thuc. 5.89.

> *μεγίστων νικηθέντες, τιμῆς καὶ δέους καὶ ὠφελίας*). Nor again did we start anything new in this, but it has always been the way of the world that the weaker is kept down by the stronger (*οὐδ' αὖ πρῶτοι τοῦ τοιούτου ὑπάρξαντες, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ καθεστῶτος τὸν ἥσσω ὑπὸ τοῦ δυνατωτέρου κατείργεσθαι*). And we think we are worthy of our power (*ἄξιοί τε ἅμα νομίζοντες εἶναι*). There was a time when you thought so too, but now you calculate your own advantage and talk of right and wrong — a consideration which has never yet deterred anyone from using force to make a gain when opportunity presents (*καὶ ὑμῖν δοκοῦντες μέχρι οὗ τὰ ξυμφέροντα λογιζόμενοι τῷ δικαίῳ λόγῳ νῦν χρῆσθε, ὃν οὐδείς πω παρατυχὸν ἰσχύι τι κτήσασθαι προθεὶς τοῦ μὴ πλέον ἔχειν ἀπετράπετο*)."[26]

The Athenians referred to the hegemony that they had gained over the city-states of their League during the Persian wars since the Athenian navy was the force to determine the victory of the Greek cities. Gomme characterizes this passage as "the first frank expression of selfish imperialism, the natural right of the stronger to act as he would, in the *History*; though here spoken in self-defence".[27] The Athenians were, according to the text, not the first to establish the law of the strongest, but as reported by Andrewes, Athens "was the first to introduce it into the Greek political world."[28] Andrewes believes that Athens since 445 had been "attempting to create some sort of unity in Greece, even while leaving a quite genuine 'autonomy' to each state in her league". Obviously, Athens started the League with this motivation, that is to create a united force of Greek city-states, an effort that however ended with the transformation of the League into a cruel hegemony, in which the Athenians as the strongest ones had the absolute power. This was the new idea that Athens imported into the Greek world. In a world where the city-states created their own history and lives independently, Athens gained power and became the inhuman hegemon, because they considered this to belong to the nature of the stronger one. Although Thucydides narrates in the *Pentakontaetia* the establishment of the Athenian hegemony and its hegemonic attitude,[29] this raw admission of the Athenians about the law of the strongest at the beginning of the war seems a bit premature since the city had not demonstrated yet its cruel face. ANDREWES supports the idea that this passage was written by Thucydides at the same period when the historian wrote the dialogue, when he was already aware of the transformation of Athens into hegemony.[30] The statement of the Athenians already in the first book about the right of the stronger to impose himself on the weaker could be seen as the effort of Thucydides to prepare the reader for the cruel evolution of the Athenian power.

[26] Thuc. 1.76.2.

[27] GOMME 1945, 236.

[28] ANDREWES 1970, 174.

[29] Thuc. 1.97-101.

[30] ANDREWES 1970, 175.

Although this imperialistic policy of Athens is highlighted in other passages of the work of Thucydides, the dialogue is presented as the highpoint of this imperialistic attitude: the Athenians, without pretexts, declare once and for all their superiority. Lebow and Kelly note that "the Melian Dialogue represents the intellectual descent of Athens into despotism",[31] a form of power, in which 'honour' has no importance anymore, only 'fear and profit' has.[32] In this passage of the Thucydidean history is pointed out, in Meiggs's opinion,[33] more than any other place, the tyrannical character of the Athenian League, which is maintained for no other purpose than the interest of Athens. According to Lebow and Kelly, Thucydides wanted to make here an indirect comparison between the tyrannical behaviour of Athens and the hostile attitude of Persia during the Persian wars. Literally they mention that: "the Athenians have become the Persians, long the symbol of rank despotism to the Greek world".[34] The same attitude which Athens had fought during the Persian wars was the attitude that the city showed toward Melos. The Athenians had been transformed from victims to perpetrators, from the ones to protect the Greek city-states to the ones to conquer them. Athens, a city based on a democratic regime, and the most important power to support the freedom of Greece during the Persian wars, had become the "Persian King", conquering Greek cities, taking advantage of them financially and threatening with extinction every city that would dare to resist its power. In my opinion, this was the purpose of Thucydides by writing such a dramatic dialogue in this specific moment of the war: he wanted to highlight the Athenian imperialism and arrogance, just a year before the Sicilian expedition, which would change the history of Athens once and for all.

Conclusions: What is the purpose of Thucydides with the narration of the Melian dialogue?

When it comes to the end of the Melian dialogue, Thucydides delineates the cruelty of the Athenians towards the islanders:

> "Of the Melian population the Athenians executed all the grown men who came into their hands and enslaved the children and women (*οἱ δὲ ἀπέκτειναν Μηλίων ὅσους ἡβῶντας ἔλαβον, παῖδας δὲ καὶ γυναῖκας ἠνδραπόδισαν*). Later they colonized the place themselves, sending out five hundred settlers of their own."[35]

[31] LEBOW – KELLY 2001, 599-600

[32] See Thuc. 1.76.2, where the Athenian ambassadors justify the power of the Athenian empire on the basis of three elements, 'honour', 'fear' and 'profit', here reduced to two according to the scholars.

[33] MEIGGS 1972, 384.

[34] LEBOW – KELLY 2001, 600.

[35] Thuc. 5.116.4.

Obviously, Melos had not been the one and only island-city which rebelled against the oppression of Athens. Mytilene, another city-state of the Aegean decided in 427 to deny the alliance with Athens and join the Peloponnesian League.[36] The reaction of Athens was immediate and the Athenian *ekklesia* decided to punish the city and destroy it.[37]. During the journey of the Athenian ship to Mytilene with the message to fulfil the decision of the *ekklesia*, however, a second assembly, influenced by the speech of Diodotus, decided to retract the destruction of the city and sent a second ship to Mytilene to catch the first one.[38] The story ends with the capitulation of the city to the Athenians, but not with the destruction of it, as was decided at the beginning.[39] It is interesting that in the case of Mytilene the Athenians realized the cruelty of their decision and interrupted the destruction of the island city even at the last minute, while in the case of Melos it seems that the Athenian ambassadors acted without a second thought. Kallet justly remarks that in the case of Mytilene, the Athenians changed their minds "on the basis of rational calculation of the economic benefit of leniency: in order to decrease the chance of costly sieges in the future".[40] In the case of Melos, on the other hand, even if the starting point of the dialogue has been once more to avoid a costly siege, it seems that at the end the Athenians acted not by logic but by passion and revenge and destroyed the island city to the core. The next act of the Athenians described in the work of Thucydides was also characterized by passion, not for revenge this time, but for conquest and money, but this time it did not lead to a happy end for Athens.

The cruel act of destroying Melos appears in Thucydides as the narrative preamble to the next event in his work, the expedition of Athens against Syracuse. As Zimmern notes, "still hungry, the imperial city lifted up her eyes towards a better prey, from a small island in the East towards a larger in the West",[41] and it is not a coincidence that the chronological order of two episodes are extremely close in the Thucydidean narration. As already mentioned, even though Thucydides does not say so clearly, the dramatic way of describing the invasion against Melos by using a dialogue, the only dialogue in the work of the historian, highlights the next event, the Sicilian expedition, which ended dramatically for the Athenians. In the year 415 the Athenians, too confident about their power, decided to declare an extremely risky war and start an expedition against Syracuse, thinking that they could conquer the city. In just two years the Athenian soldiers suffered a total defeat from the united powers of Syracuse and Sparta, which resulted in Athens losing the biggest and strongest part of its army. This catastrophe, which Thucydides in 7. 87 characterizes as the most important event

[36] Thuc. 3.8.

[37] Thuc. 3.36.1-3.

[38] Thuc. 3.49.

[39] Thuc. 3.50.

[40] KALLET 2001, 11.

[41] ZIMMERN 1924, 443.

of the war, defined once and for all the future of Athens – its final defeat by the Lacedaemonians in 404, after which the city never managed to restore its former power.

Knowing the continuation of the history, it is inevitable to connect the dialogue with the subsequent Athenian disaster in Syracuse and the consequent decline of Athenian imperialism: the Sicilian defeat almost appears as the consequence of the arrogant behaviour of the Athenians against the Melians. Hornblower justly remarks that Thucydides "did not invent the fact that 416 comes before 415, and 'Melos' before 'Sicily'. But Th.'s juxtapositions and his emphases are his own contribution" by noting "the dramatic effectiveness of the transition straight from a successful attack on a small island [...] to a failed invasion of a large one".[42] Thucydides could have described the events at Melos without the dramatic dialogue. But he chose this way to describe it, in order to point out the subsequent disaster of Athens.[43] Our historian "is here both tragic and instructive", as Hussey justly remarks.[44]

It is not the first time that the Athenians commit a corresponding massacre. In the year 421 Athens attacked with the same cruelty Scione in Macedonia, which had rebelled against the Athenian League:

> "At about the same time in this summer the Athenians succeeded in taking Scione by siege: they killed the grown men, enslaved the children and women (*ἀπέκτειναν τοὺς ἡβῶντας, παῖδας δὲ καὶ γυναῖκας ἠνδραπόδισαν*), and granted occupation of the land to the Plataeans."[45]

The way that Athens behaved to the city of Scione was the same as towards the Melians. But the way that the historian describes the events makes the difference. In the case of Scione, Thucydides refers to another cruel event of the Peloponnesian war, one of the many that are described in his work. In the case of Melos, however, the tone and the form of the narration changes into a detailed and intense dialogue, in which both parties support with passion their arguments. The Athenians, as reported by Liebeschuetz,[46] seem to commit *hybris*

[42] HORNBLOWER 2008, 217.

[43] Note at this point the opinion of ANDREWES (1960, 3), who believes that "It cannot be said that the Dialogue is there solely, or even primarily, to explain the vote in favour of the expedition of Sicily". According to him one should not consider the expedition in Sicily as the consequence of the Melian dialogue, since the two episodes of Thucydides represent other ideas, even if "the state of mind illustrated in the Dialogue is of course not irrelevant to 415". ANDREWES believes that the purpose of Thucydides with the Melian dialogue is to point out the immoral character of the events, while in the case of Syracuse the historian does never speak about the morality of the intervention in Sicily but handles it more as the consequence of the ill-regulated ambition of Athens. ANDREWES believes that "the Dialogue is about quite other matters, the danger of revolt within the empire and the lengths to which Athens might legitimately go in forestalling it" (p. 4). Even if I understand the way of thinking of ANDREWES, I would disagree, since, for the reasons explained in my text, I think that the two episodes are connected and that Thucydides was aware of the events in Sicily and their importance for the city of Athens when he wrote the dialogue.

[44] HUSSEY 1985, 128.

[45] Thuc. 5.32.1.

[46] LIEBESCHUETZ 1968, 76.

with their arrogant behaviour towards the weaker city, a *hybris* that they had to pay for later when their own army was destroyed. De Romilly, who has thoroughly analysed the nature of Athenian imperialism, mentions that "the brutally imperialistic policy described by the Athenians in the Melian dialogue carries within it the seeds of its own destruction".[47] The Athenians, as stated by Macleod, are presented as the victims of their own power, a situation not comparable to the time of Pericles when the leader managed "to control the natural impulses of the Athenian people and empire".[48] In the case of Melos, the Athenians, aware of their power, were out of control and committed a crime which could not have remained unpunished in the continuation of the history. Thucydides manages to point out the nature of the human being: the more power someone gets, the higher is the risk to become arrogant and provoke his own destiny. Power, even in the hands of the most prudent men, can be transformed into despotism when those who possess it are not in the position to handle it. When this happens, the authoritarian use of power can become self-destructive for the one behaving in such an arrogant way. This is in my opinion the message that Thucydides wants to communicate with the Melian dialogue.

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[47] DE ROMILLY 1963, 295.

[48] MACLEOD 1974, 395.

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Show Trials and The Opposition to Pelopidas and Epameinondas

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Abstract. *The paper suggests that there are traces of political opposition in Thebes during the years of its hegemony in Greece (371-362 BCE). The analysis of a trial against Epameinondas in 369 BCE, signals this event as a political trial. Other episodes during these years demonstrate that this and other trials can be considered as examples of Schauprozess, as lately theorized by Koskenniemi. In a system where political opposition was restrained by the lack of institutional provisos, the trials were used to attack opponents, using legal means for achieving political ends.*

Rezumat. Articolul de față sugerează faptul că pot fi identificate anumite amprente ale unor confruntări de ordin politic în Theba pe parcursul hegemoniei sale asupra Greciei (371-362 î.Hr.). Analizarea procesului împotriva lui Epaminondas din 369 î.Hr. scoate în evidență caracterul politic al acestuia. Alte episoade identificate pe parcursul acelor ani demonstrează că, pe lângă cel al lui Epaminondas, și alte procese reprezintă exemple de Schauprozess, conform teoretizării lui Koskenniemi. Într-un sistem în care opoziția era descurajată de lipsa unor posibilități instituționale, procesele erau folosite pentru atacarea unor adversari, utilizând mijloace legale pentru îndeplinirea unor obiective politice.

Keywords: Epameinondas, Pelopidas, Thebes, Schauprozess, Opposition.

Introduction: A Troubled Political Climate

Political opposition was a frequent phenomenon in classical Thebes. Yet, this process is not too easy to isolate, throughout the history of this city and of the league to which it variously belonged.[1] One will find a convenient starting point in a later observation, in the treatise *On the Cities of Greece,* written by Herakleides Kritikos in the Second Century BCE (16-7). The author claims that the Thebans use any excuse to kill each other (16),[2] and he lingers on the internal violence which characterizes the daily life of the city in the Hellenistic period. This view of a perennial internal strife draws on a long tradition, which was also applied to the Boiotian population as a whole. This is not the place to comment on the internal

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[1] The most recent and comprehensive surveys of the history of the city are DEMAND 2015, ROCKWELL 2017 and CARTLEDGE 2020.

[2] The chapters of Herakleides might reflect the conflicts following the redistribution of lands, after the reconstruction of Thebes in 316 BC: ARENZ 2006, 150-1.

subdivisions of the Boiotian cities during the Persian Wars[3] but it is reasonable to claim that, already around the mid-5th century BCE, the tradition of Boiotia as a landscape of internal divisions was well established.

Pericles, for instance, claimed that the Boiotians could be compared «to holm-oaks, because they were ruining one another by civil wars just as one oak causes another oak's fall».[4] Another example of this perception comes from a Theban himself. In his exhortation to the Boiotian soldiers who were about to fight the Athenians at Delion (424 BCE), the Theban boiotarch Pagondas warned against the dangers of a non-united stand to the enemies. In the past the Athenians «had gained control of our land as a result of our internal dissension».[5] This ancient *stasis* dated by the speaker to 457 BCE cannot be a commonplace argument, since the existence of a regional structure in the first half of the 5th century BCE in Boiotia is now accepted.[6] These two references imply that it was often taken for granted that the Boiotians could disagree among themselves.

Furthermore, there was a specific episode which was used to exemplify how, in Thebes itself, there was not a compact reaction to moments of political stress. From an early stage, some members of the Theban elite tried to detach themselves from the pan-hellenic view of Thebes as an inherently pro-Persian city. Herodotus is the first source on these internal debates, as he implies that, after the battle of Plataia, the Greeks put under siege Thebes and asked for «those among them who had medized», which must imply an internal subdivision and that there were Thebans who had *not* medized.[7] Another prominent Theban politician, Timagenidas, confirms this conflicted climate, when he declares that «we have medized not alone, but recurring to the common treasure».[8]

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[3] Hdt. 7.132: «The following Greek peoples gave the king earth and water: the Thessalians, Dolopians, Enienians, Perrhaebians, Locrians, Magnesians, Malians, Achaeans of Phthiotis, and, led by the Thebans, the rest of the Boeotians except the Thespians and Plataeans» (tr. R. WATERFIELD). On the internal subdivision of the Boiotians, see VANNICELLI 2017, 449-50.

[4] Ar. *Rhet.* 3.4.1407a, tr. W. RHYS ROBERTS. Aristoteles recalls this simile in the chapter on the similes in the third book of his *Rhetorics,* but does not specify where this passage originally occurred. He does not systematically offer the context for the other quotes of the speeches of Pericles: *Rhet.* 1.17.1365a; 3.10.1411a; 3.19.1419a.

[5] Thuc. 4.92.6, tr. M. HAMMOND. Cp. Thuc. 3.62.5, with HORNBLOWER 1996, 295-6 and ALLISON 2011.

[6] See BECK – GANTER 2015 and SCHACHTER 2016, with previous scholarship. Rhetorical strategy by Pagondas: GOMME 1956b, *ad loc.*; HORNBLOWER 1996, *ad loc.*; TUFANO 2021. Internal dissensions in the poleis, but not in the federation: GEHRKE 1985, 166 n.16.

[7] Quote: Hdt. 9.86.1. Innocence of the children of Attaginus: Hdt. 9.88. See ASHERI in ASHERI – VANNICELLI 2006, 296-7 and STEINBOCK 2013, 318 on this ritual norm.

[8] Hdt. 9.87.1. On the recurrence of the topos in Thebes, see HIGNETT 1963, 23-4; BUCK 1979, 135; FLOWER – MARINCOLA 2008, *ad loc.*; on the ambiguity of the sentence, see MACKIL 2013, 31. For the view that this reading of the political constitution of the time is moulded on the contraposition oligarchy/democracy, see OSTWALD 2000, 21-6 and ASHERI in ASHERI – VANNICELLI 2006, 296 (one should also consider the oligarchic elements of the constitution of the post-447 Boiotian koinon: see SIMONTON 2017, 200-4). Our understanding of these passages is also based on

This perspective may offer a different light on a discussed argument used by the Thebans against the Plataians in the debate of 427 BCE reported by Thucydides. To deny their past alignment with the Persians, the Thebans assert that they were governed, then, by a *dynasteia* which had imposed their will on the whole city.[9] In light of the picture provided by Herodotus, the cursory remark deserves attention, since it offers further proof of this divided memory, which betrays a likely internal opposition to the pro-Persian faction. Later sources confirm this contraposition between the will of a few and the opposition of the many in Thebes in 480 BCE.

The picture of this internal opposition assigned by Thucydides to the Thebans resurfaces in Diodorus (11.4.7), who draws on Thucydides and on Ephorus, a good reader of Boiotian sources. In the second century CE, both Plutarch (*Arist.* 18.7) and Pausanias (9.6.2) know this tradition: the version of Pausanias has a further detail on the internal politics. He claims that «at that time an oligarchy was in power at Thebes, and not their ancestral form of government».[10]

The use of the memory of this internal conflict has been investigated elsewhere, with a special eye to the Athenian perception;[11] here, we would like to draw on its value as a clue to the early existence, in Thebes, of a lively climate of political opposition. In this paper, I concentrate instead on a specific later episode that represents an important manifestation of this internal opposition, in Thebes. The episode, a trial, occurred in 369 BCE, therefore under a different political climate, since in no way can we compare the *koinon* of the fourth century BCE (379/8 - 338) to the primordial stage of the classical period; however, I argue here that the trial of Pelopidas and Epameinondas offers an intriguing contribution to the implications at a federal level of what was, at first sight, a civic conflict among aristocrats.

A Political Trial

The first Peloponnesian campaign of Thebes (winter 370/69 BCE) was a success: not only did the Thebans provide help to the Arcadians, but they also launched a direct attack against

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the awareness of the richness of the local tradition which arose in Thebes on the Persian Wars: see e.g. TUFANO 2019a, 249-59.

[9] *Dynasteia*: Thuc. 3.62.3.

[10] Tr. W. H. S. JONES. The allusion to the *patrios politeia*, whatever the sources of Pausanias for the history of Thebes are, draws us back to an oligarchic, aristrocratic view. It remains unclear, however, what this ancestral government was. The suggestion that it entails an oligarchic perception is based on the Athenian use of the label, which was however multifaceted: SHEAR 2011.

[11] STEINBOCK 2013, 118 and 149-54.

Lakonia, at the urging of their Peloponnesian allies.[12] The decision to extend the goals of this mission to the area around Sparta had not been explicit from the outset; yet, any support to its enemies must have implied the possibility. This extension could not, on its own, look as an improper violation of the mandate that the army had received in Thebes.

In these years, foreign policy was in the hands of the federal assembly, which took place in Thebes: «external affairs were [...] formally the responsibility of the federation».[13] A pivotal part was also played by the seven boiotarchs elected every year: as exemplified by a discussion that took place before the battle of Leuktra,[14] on the battleground the single votes of the boiotarchs could decide something more than the military line of action. More in general, the military and the civil powers of the boiotarchs were often expressed in their management of alliances and treaties: in receiving the embassies and in referring to the assembly, the boiotarchs of these years prosecuted a tradition of administration of the foreign policy which constantly characterizes the history of boiotarchy in Boiotia.[15] There were no significant additional institutional bodies: the eponymous archon is not known to have exerted real political tasks.[16]

On the return of the boiotarchs from the Peloponnesus, they were tried in Thebes for the violation of a law concerning the span of their task. The sources on this so-called 'first trial' of Epameinondas and Pelopidas, since there probably was a second one, actually concerned a decision which was taken in the Peloponnesus in the previous campaign.[17] None of these sources is a historiographical text, which is a first limit to our understanding; secondly, they diverge on a number of relevant details. For this second reason, H. Beister aligned them in two subgroups, suggesting that a series of them offer the original version of the events, as it was probably transmitted in the 4th Century BCE, whereas others would preserve a fictionalized derivation of that core.[18] Before commenting on this suggestion, the interpretation of the trial demands a brief summary of the relevant sources in chronological order.

[12] So ROY 1994, 190-1. Ancient sources: Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.25-32; Diod. 15.63.3-65.5; Paus. 9.14.4-7; Plut. *Ages.* 31-2. Discussion of the campaign: WISEMAN 1969; BUCKLER 1980, 135-42; ROY 1994, 189-94; MUNN 1997, 87-90; CARTLEDGE 2002, 253-5; HORNBLOWER 2011, 254-6.

[13] Rhodes 2017, 61.

[14] Paus. 9.13.6-7, with SALMON 1995, 376. A similar disagreement occurred before the battle of Delion in 424 BCE: the Theban boiotarch Pagondas had to persuade the other ten boiotarchs to attack (Thuc. 4.91-2; see ROESCH 1965, 98 and TUFANO 2021, 426-7).

[15] For this diachronical approach to their functions, see SALMON 1995, 376-8.

[16] On this eponymous archon, see SALMON 1995, 369-70.

[17] The main treatment of this trial is still BEISTER 1970, 75-105, with a rich discussion of the previous scholarship. Later discussions include BUCKLER 1978 and 1980, 135-42.

[18] BEISTER 1970, 85-97.

The first witness, Cicero,[19] recalls in his *On Invention* that Epameinondas was at the time the sole general in command (*imperator*) and that he did not pass the army to his successor (*praetor*) who had been nominated *ex lege*: Epameinondas thus remained in office for a few days beyond the due time and was sequently prosecuted.[20] The reported speech concentrates on a rhetorical strategy allegedly used by Epameinondas, not mentioned by the other sources: one ought not always expect that the law literally authorizes such exceptions as the extension of the office, if this is done for the sake of the public interest. Most of the relevant chapters in Cicero, from the imprecise lexicon to the formalistic speech, show both the use of rhetorical texts and a deliberate alteration;[21] the focus of the violation is on the extension of the office.

A few years later, Cornelius Nepos claims, in the *Life of Epameinondas* (7.3-8.5), that in 369 BCE Epameinondas was one of the three main generals, including Pelopidas, who had led the army in the Peloponnesus. Their successors came there, because, *criminibus adversariorum* (7.3), the men had raised hostilities in their fatherland (*invidiam*): a public vote had been obtained to remove the men from their leadership.[22] In the words of Nepos, the legal grounds for this turnover was a law, which condemned to death those who would stay in power beyond the legal terms.[23] Epameinondas argued instead that they would stay to finish the war they had started: the law had been created to save the state (*rei publicae conservandae*) and, for this same reason, it could not be noxious to the public interest. Nepos is the most detailed source on this speech delivered by Epameinondas to his colleagues on the spot; however concise, the words of Epameinondas confirm the current interpretation of the law which demanded the boiotarchs to end their mandate at a certain point of the year, because this was linked to the mandatory declaration of their expenses and service.

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[19] Cic. *Inv.* 1.55-6.

[20] Cic. *Inv.* 1.55: *in hac causa, quae apud Graecos est pervagata, cum Epaminondas, Thebanorum imperator, quod ei, qui sibi ex lege praetor successerat, exercitum non tradidit et, cum paucos ipse dies contra legem exercitum tenuisset, Lacedaemonios funditus vicit* (tr. C. D. YONGE: «[I]n this cause which is very notorious among the Greeks, that of Epaminondas, the general of the Thebans, who did not give up his army to the magistrate who succeeded him in due course of law; and when he himself had retained his army a few days contrary to law, he utterly defeated the Lacedaemonians»)..

[21] «A model case in the schools for argumentation» (PRITCHETT 1974, 17).

[22] Nep. *Ep.* 7.3*: maxime autem fuit illustre, cum in Peloponnesum exercitum duxisset adversus Lacedaemonios haberetque collegas duos, quorum alter erat Pelopidas, vir fortis ac strenuus. Ei cum criminibus adversariorum omnes in invidiam venissent ob eamque rem imperium iis esset abrogatum atque in eorum locum alii praetores successissent, Epaminondas populi scito non paruit* (tr. J. SELBY WATSON: «But the most remarkable instance was, when he had led an army into the Peloponnesus against the Lacedaemonians, and had two joined in command with him, of whom one was Pelopidas, a man of valour and activity; on this occasion, when, through the accusations of their enemies, they had all fallen under the displeasure of their countrymen, and their commission was in consequence taken from them, and other commanders came to take their place, Epaminondas did not obey the order of the people»).

[23] Nep. *Ep.* 7.5: *lex erat Thebis, quae morte multabat si quis imperium diutius retinuisset quam legis praefinitum foret.*

In the narrative of Nepos, on their return to Thebes after four months, Epameinondas persuaded his colleagues to argue that he had forced them to disobey the law and this strategy led to their acquittal (*Ep.*7.4). Epameinondas himself said to the judges, as the final speaker, that he had willingly disobeyed the law and accepted the consequences, on one caveat: the judges should write, on his future epitaph, all the merits and the deeds performed by the man for his fatherland, ever since the battle of Leuktra.[24] The judges laughed at this suggestion and acquitted him. Despite its exaggeration, this apology entails what may actually look like a list of the tasks performed by Epameinondas as a boiotarch, as any boiotarch should have done before the beginning of the new year (he had performed this duty also in 371/0, the year of Leuktra). One then begins to wonder whether the progressive and various rhetorical use of this material did not modify the original traces of a less dramatic confrontation.[25]

After Nepos, the next source in chronological order is Plutarch. We lack, unfortunately, his *Life of Epameinondas*;[26] yet, it is possible that the differences between the representation of the event in the extant *Life of Pelopidas* and in the *Moralia* stem from the joint use of the two biographies. In the *Life of Pelopidas* (24.1-25.2), the boiotarchs in charge are more than three (unlike in Nepos), since there are 'others' apart from Pelopidas and Epameinondas:[27] still in the Peloponnesus, these colleagues remind the two of the law which demands the alternation in power, to little use. Epameinondas, in fact, succeeds in arguing for a permanence – here, too, of four months, as in Nepos –, and the men stay to invade Lakonia. Significantly, the sole fame of the two leaders persuades the Greek allies in their army, without an official vote:[28] this is the sole instance where we learn of the possibility of a legal extension. Perhaps, if we cautiously recall the *populi scito* which, in Cornelius Nepos (*Ep.* 7.3), had been communicated to Epameinondas, the institutions had a communication strategy to authorize an extension,

[24] Nep. *Ep.* 8.2-3, tr. J. SELBY WATSON: «[T]hat they would inscribe in their judicial record of the sentence passed upon him, "Epaminondas was punished by the Thebans with death, because he obliged them to overthrow the Lacedaemonians at Leuctra, whom, before he was general, none of the Boeotians durst look upon in the field, and because he not only, by one battle, rescued Thebes from destruction, but also secured liberty for all Greece, and brought the power of both people to such a condition, that the Thebans attacked Sparta, and the Lacedaemonians were content if they could save their lives; nor did he cease to prosecute the war, till, after settling Messene, he shut up Sparta with a close siege"».

[25] For the reading that Epameinondas' speech would be an example of account-giving, see BEISTER 1970, 102 and LURAGHI 2008, 220.

[26] On the relationship between this lost biography and Pausanias, see FRAKES 2017 and TUPLIN 1984, whose skepticism is here endorsed.

[27] Plut. *Pel.* 24.1: εἰς μέντοι Πελοπόννησον ἀμφότεροι βοιωτάρχοντες; 24.3: οἱ δ'ἄλλοι βοιωτάρχαι.

[28] Plut. *Pel.* 24.5: ἀλλ' ἡ δόξα τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἄνευ δόγματος κοινοῦ καὶ ψηφίσματος ἐποίει τοὺς συμμάχους ἕπεσθαι σιωπῇ πάντας ἡγουμένοις ἐκείνοις (tr. B. PERRIN: «[b]ut the reputation of the two men, without a general vote or decree, induced all the allies to follow their leadership without a murmur») See *infra* on the detail of the *dogma.*

or to publicly remind the existence of the law. In both cases, the enmity raised in Nepos by the adversaries (*invidiam*) remains exceptional and an 'unnecessary' detail, in contrast with the version of Plutarch, and thus retains particular relevance if it lay behind the call to the fatherland.

We thus gather the impression that the trial may not have been a formalistic application of a law. The same *invidia* of Nepos (*Ep.* 7.3) returns in the *politikos kai syggenes phthonos* which prompted, in Plutarch's view (*Pel.* 25.1), the trial when the men returned to Thebes. Despite the previous narrative that Epameinondas had to persuade his colleagues (Pelopidas had voted for him)[29] to stay in the Peloponnesus, leading to a collegial responsibility, only Pelopidas and Epaminondas are isolated, summoned to the court, and acquitted. The biographical genre may distort the line of the events, but it is likely that only some of the boiotarchs on the field were actual leaders of the army. From this point of view, Appian's later note on the reciprocal assignment of a part of the army may not only depend on his Roman reading of the events, as if the two men were two consuls.[30] Pelopidas was acquitted before Epameinondas, who proved great virtues in his speech, not recalled by Plutarch in the *Life of Pelopidas*.

The topic of Epameinondas' virtues resurfaces, with more details on the speech, in the passages of the *Moralia* on the trial.[31] These passages confirm that the army stayed for four additional months and that Epameinondas used his own merits to prove that his decision had been right for Thebes. In the list of achievements recorded in the *Sayings of Kings and Commanders* (194B),[32] in particular, there is an interesting parallel with the merits recorded by Nepos, including the building of Messene, without the inclusion of Leuktra. Despite the mandatory prudence on the chronological grounds, this anecdotical perspective isolates the achievements of just one year, 370/69, and confirms the aforementioned strategy that Epameinondas used his defence speech to finally deliver his yearly account as a boiotarch.

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[29] Plut. *Pel.* 24.2: Πελοπίδας δὲ πρῶτος Ἐπαμεινώνδᾳ γενόμενος σύμψηφος. This note on the vote may depend on the emphasis on the role of Pelopidas by Plutarch (BEISTER 1970, 81 n.3), who may have derived this stress from his source Callisthenes (SORDI 1989, 128-30 = 2002, 485-7, also in favour of a date of the campaign in 371/0 BCE). Indeed, it is noteworthy that we lack any other name for the other boiotarch(s) on the spot.

[30] App. *Syr.* 213: στρατὸν ἑκάστῳ δόντες.

[31] Plut. *Mor.* 194A-B; 540D-E; 817F.

[32] Plut. *Mor.* 194B: εἰ δὲ δεῖ τι πάντως εἰπεῖν πρὸς τοὺς δικαστάς, ἀξιοῦν, ἂν ἀποκτείνωσιν αὐτόν, ἐπιγράψαι τῇ στήλῃ τὴν καταδίκην, ὅπως οἱ Ἕλληνες εἰδῶσιν ὅτι μὴ βουλομ ένους Θηβαίους Ἐπαμεινώνδας ἠνάγκασε, τὴν Λακωνικὴν πυρπολῆσαι, πεντακοσίοις ἐνιαυτοῖς δῆωτον οὖσαν· οἰκίσαι δὲ Μεσσήνην δι'ἐτῶν τριάκοντα καὶ διακοσίων· συντάξαι δὲ καὶ συναγαγεῖν εἰς ταὐτὸν Ἀρκάδας· ἀποδοῦναι δὲ τοῖς Ἕλλησι τὴν αὐτονομίαν. ταῦτα γὰρ ἐπράχθη κατ'ἐκείνην τὴν στρατείαν (tr. W. GOODWN: «if any thing at all were to be answered to the judges, he entreated them, if they put him to death, to write his fault upon his monument, that the Greeks might know that Epaminondas compelled the Thebans against their will to plunder and fire Laconia, which in five hundred years before had never suffered the like, - to build Messene two hundred»).

Both the extant *Life* by Plutarch and the relevant passages in the *Moralia* convey an exhaltation of the role of Epameinondas in these events, which is absent in Pausanias. This point and further arguments invite us to reconsider carefully the old view that Pausanias drew on the lost *Life of Epameinondas.*[33] In Pausanias (9.14.5-7), Epameinondas chooses to stay *despite* the law; there is not the common rhetorical strategy that violating it is for a good scope: «Epameinondas, disregarding the law as out of date (οὐκ ὄντα ἐν καιρῷ), remained in office».[34] Instead, the general claims that it is an outdated custom and he only decides to return, apparently over an unclear disagreement concerning the behaviour of his own army around Sparta.[35] Epameinondas alone stands in front of the jury and is acquitted. This is described as an obvious decision, clearly in light of the achievements of the man, and all we can infer is that, as in the *Life of Pelopidas* and in Cicero, the isolation of one's defence may depend on his leading position in the army.

The version of Appian in the *Syrian Wars* (212-8) is not a proper historical description of the event, as the comparison of the trial with that of Scipio the Elder may suggest that he is drawing on a rhetorical source. There is also the possibility that Appian drew on Cornelius Nepos. However, there are some relevant differences between the two authors which suggest they were probably offering different versions of the same sources.[36] In Appian, Epameinondas and his two colleagues are summoned back for the weight of the *diabole* against Epameinondas (213: ἐπὶ διαβολῇ μετεκάλουν). Nonetheless, they choose to stay for another six months (not four, as everywhere else) and thus attack the Lacedemonian garrisons and help the Arcadians. In this version, there is no mention of the attack against Lakonia, which reappears only in the defence speech of Epameinondas.

This man speaks after the pitious and long speeches of the other two, which are not recorded:[37] Appian seems aware of the personal vein of the trial. The list of the achievements in the speech is the same as in Nepos's version, but this time the jurors do not laugh and, conscious of the merits of the man, acquit him without even voting and escape:[38] this final detail is in line with the concise note by Pausanias on the absence of a vote procedure. The absence of the laugh is significant, because another author is also silent on this. Aelian almost

[33] This view can be contrasted from two points of view: on one side, the contrast between Plutarch's surviving texts and Pausanias speaks against a likely derivative origin (TUPLIN 1984); on the other side, the complex range of the sources underlying Pausanias' Boiotian book can hardly be reduced to few and contemporary sources (see, with previous scholarship, GARTLAND 2017).

[34] Paus. 9.14.5, tr. W. H. S. JONES.

[35] Paus. 9.14.6: ἐν τούτῳ δὲ οἱ τῶν Θηβαίων σύμμαχοι κατέτρεχον διασκεδασθέντες χώραν τὴν Λακωνικὴν καὶ ἥρπαζον τὰ ἐξ αὐτῆς· τοῦτο Ἐπαμεινώνδᾳ παρέστησεν ὀπίσω Θηβαίους ἐς Βοιωτίαν ἀπαγαγεῖν.

[36] BEISTER 1970, 94-6; BUCKLER 1978, 40.

[37] App. *Syr.* 215: οἴκτῳ τε χρώμενοι καὶ λόγοις πλείοις καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν ἐς τὸν Ἐπαμεινώνδαν ἀναφέροντες.

[38] App. *Syr.* 218: ἐξέδραμον ἐκ τοῦ δικαστήριου.

literally quotes Plutarch from the *Sayings* in his *Varia Historia* (13.42), where he does not comment on the reaction. Despite some attempts at understanding it, it is really left apparently to the sensitivity of the single source whether the paradoxical reply by Epameinondas deserves laughter or serious praise.

To sum up the picture which emerges from the sources, I suggest the following scenario. Epameinondas, Pelopidas and possibly one or two boiotarchs had been dispatched to the Peloponnesus. None of our sources claims that all the seven boiotarchs had been sent: the total number had been seven on the battlefield at Leuktra,[39] also thanks to the proximity to Thebes, but it may have looked dangerous to send all the leaders abroad at the same time. Moreover, what we know from the later events suggests that, preferably, the boiotarchs performed tasks in different areas: Pelopidas seems to have been seen, especially afterwards, as a 'King in the North'.[40] It is therefore likely that a number between four and three boiotarchs remained in Thebes. Since this was the first big mission abroad on behalf of the relatively newborn Boiotian league, the events were to prove the difficulties deriving from a miscalculation in the months spent abroad: Plutarch recalls that, apart from the fear of the law, the other boiotarchs wanted to come back τὸν χείμωνα φεύγοντες (Plut. *Pel.* 24.2).

The attack on Sparta may have actually been decided on the spot, but it will hardly have been the real allegation against the men: however risky, a mission in support of the enemies of Sparta could have been a possible future prospect of the campaign from the beginning. Perhaps time management was indeed the issue, despite Epameinondas' claims, in all the sources, that it was the 'good for Thebes' and the military mandate. The necessity to be in Thebes at the end of the Boiotian year was probably introduced to present the accounts of the tasks performed: the capital sanction confirms what we perceive as a pivotal importance for the whole federation. As stated before, this was still a relatively new political creation: the conventional date of 379 BCE for the institution of the *koinon* after the liberation of Thebes actually implied that it must have taken years to introduce a series of new institutions and laws.

We know that Epameinondas, Pelopidas, and the other unknown boiotarch(s) were supposed in any case to be in Thebes before the winter solstice. What remains unclear is whether the new appointed boiotarchs actually reached the men in the Peloponnesus, to remind them of this necessity, or whether they remained in Thebes. Both Plutarch and Cornelius Nepos highlight that, had there been a public authorization, the decision to stay would have looked less controversial.[41] In the current state, the *doxa* of the men (Plutarch)

[39] Paus. 9.13.6. BUCKLER 1980, 138-9 posits that there were seven boiotarchs.

[40] See shorty, on the Northern ventures of the Thebans in the early 360s, HORNBLOWER 2011, 256-60.

[41] Plut. *Pel.* 24.3: ἄνευ δόγματος κοινοῦ καὶ ψηφίσματος; Nep. *Ep.* 7.3: *ei cum omnibus adversariorum omnes in invidiam venissent ob eamque rem imperium iis esset abrogatum.* The second passage is linked to the problem whether the new

and their awareness that the law had not been thought for such a *kairos* (Pausanias) could persuade the army to stay. However, their enemies in Thebes did not agree with this extension, which arrived after a series of events that had been extremely successful for the army led by Epameinondas and Pelopidas. In the first place, it is likely that the appointees themselves had not been aware of the possibility to stay longer abroad, since all the previous military campaings of the Boiotians had never required more time than the campaigning season.[42]

It is then almost certain that the decision to stay was a clear violation of the law. Despite the pending punishment, the boiotarchs stayed in the Peloponnesus: only Cicero, who is not interested in these minor details, dares suggest that this extension was a minor one (*paucis diebus*). It is reasonable to claim that four months, spent in victorious commitments, were spent by the army in the Peloponnesus. The commanders were aware of the pending trial and its indictment does not raise suspicions; a further perspective derives, nonetheless, from the inclusion of the motif of the envy and of the hatred, behind the trial.

The same motif is attested for what was the 'so-called' second trial, recorded by Diodorus (15.72.1-2): after the second Peloponnesian campaign, Epameinondas was tried for having allegedly favoured the Spartans, by granting a truce in a difficult moment. Notwithstanding the ambivalence of this accusation, even on this occasion οἱ φθονοῦντες αὐτοῦ took the chance to charge him with treason.[43] Thenceforth, Epameinondas participated to the next campaign to rescue Pelopidas in the North as a private soldier, because he was found guilty and deprived of the boiotarchy.

A Show Trial and Theban Oppositions

In a federation inevitably bound to its chief city, Thebes, there was little space for debate: the principal assembly was held in Thebes and even the boiotarchs, to our knowledge, always came from Thebes.[44] This second point may be due to our scarcity of sources, but it remains likely, in light both of the permanence of the property qualification and of the technical necessity to be in the city in the decision-making processes. Moreover, the boiotarchs represent a complex political reality, because they form a board that can move and settle important federal decisions regarding internal and external policies. This mobility expands

elections had already taken place before the departure of the army. The law seems to imply that, even if that had been the case, the appointees should have been present all the same to account for their year. According to Nepos and to Appian, the successors even reached the boiotarchs; the aforementioned passage by Nepos would imply that Epameinondas had already been not reelected (*ob eam rem*, sc. *invidiam*). If this is true, the suggestion remains that, had they been re-elected, they would not have been immediately summoned back.

[42] On this detail, BUCKLER 1980, 138-9.

[43] Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.15-7. On the second trial, see BEISTER 1970, 105-10.

[44] See SORDI 1973 and RHODES 2016, 60-1 on this point.

the weight of their power, but also delimits and makes any form of political opposition difficult.

It is then perhaps unsurprising that these three events that can be linked with the existence of political opponents to Pelopidas and Epameinondas occurred in the physical absence of the men from the city. After the first instance previously discussed, a second charge was levied against Epameinondas on his return from his second Peloponnesian campaign: despite the different accusation (of bribery), we are again in the pattern of the political use of justice, in the words of Diodorus.[45] Finally,[46] there was the famous episode which resulted in the destruction of Orchomenos.

The city was razed by the Thebans, probably in 364 BCE.[47] The tragic decision implied that the Thebans «slew the male inhabitants and sold into slavery the women and children»; as such, it was recalled as a vivid example of the realist approach of the Boiotians among themselves.[48] It all started from a plot organized by some Thebans and three hundred Orchomenian knights: the detail of the absence of Epameinondas and Pelopidas is meaningful. According to Plutarch and Pausanias, had the famous generals been there, Orchomenos would not have suffered such a harsh retaliation.[49] Different views of the Theban imperialistic policies were probably at stake here.[50] In support of this thesis, the political use of these trials is confirmed by the presence in Thebes of *other* boiotarchs, those who actually enacted the entire trial:

«the men who had originated the action [...] disclosed to the boiotarchs the projected attack, thus betraying their fellow conspirators [...]. The officials arrested the knights from

[45] Diod. 15.72.2.

[46] The last line of *CEG* 2.632 seems to allude to an internal contraposition with Epameinondas (οὐδ' Ἐπαμεινώνδα δεύτεροι ἐδράμομεν), as argued, e.g., by Tod (*GHI* II 130) and TUFANO 2019b. The text looks like the epitaph of three distinguished memebers of the Theban elite (Xenokrates, Theopompos, and Mnasilaos); the recent redating to the late Fourth Century BCE (PAPAZARKADAS 2017), despite the immediate reference of the lines to the battle of Leuktra, raises a number of issues on the overall reading of the document (cp. TUFANO 2019b). Another possible instance of a statue erected to commemorate a boiotarch emerges from a dedication published by DUCREY – CALAME 2006: the dedicant, Hippias son of Erotion, was a boiotarch and dedicated a statue by Lysippos to Zeus Saotas.

[47] The date results from the chronology of Diodorus and from the silence of Isocrates in the *Archidamus* (Isoc. 6.27). In the passage, Isocrates only recalls the destruction of Thespiai and Plataiai (373 and 371 BCE, respectively). The fictional date of the dialogue is 366/5 BCE and it is believed that the author wrote it not considerably after (ZINGG 2017, 80): for this reason, the absence of the indication of Orchomenos represents a relatively safe argument. On his own, Diodorus may be proven wrong against the generally accurate Pausanias (9.15.3), who dates the plot in 368 BCE.

[48] Quote: Diod. 15.79.6; example of political realism: Dem. 20.109.

[49] Full narrative of the episode: Diod. 15.79.3-6. Relevance of the absence of Epameinondas and Pelopidas: Plut. *Comp. Pel. et Marcell.* 1; Paus. 9.15.3.

[50] So BERTOLI 2005, 129-30.

Orchomenus and brought them before the assembly, where the people voted to execute them, to sell the inhabitants of Orchomenus into slavery, and to raze the city».[51]

This combination between the central role of the boiotarchs, who bring to the assembly the conspirators, and the will of the assembly, resembles from a close distance what must have occurred when Epameinondas and his colleagues came back from the Peloponnesus in early 369 BCE. Some sources state that there were three boiotarchs in the army; others adopt a general plural. Notwithstanding the silence on this point, it is legitimate to claim that some boiotarchs, as already argued in the previous section, were still in Thebes and brought to the assembly in the first place for the violation of the law. It was a political trial, as already evidenced by Beister, but there was probably more behind the episode.[52]

Our consideration of these trials which involved Epameinondas and Pelopidas showed that these were the moments when political opposition became visible and used its most convenient instruments of action. If we consider the output of these trials, they were twice victorious for the people not directly associated with Epameinondas: in the second process, the boiotarch was made a simple soldier; in 364 BCE, our sources explicitly claim that he was not content with such a harsh verdict.[53] The real political rationale of this plot, moreover, remains mysterious. According to Diodorus the plot aimed at the establishment of an aristocracy in Thebes,[54] which is in contradiction with our understanding of the constitution of these years. To the aforementioned episodes, finally, we may add a series of undated anecdotes which also betray a form of juridical opposition to Epameinondas and to Pelopidas.[55]

On the one hand, then, these small sketches highlight a debated political climate, where the adversaries of the leaders of imperialistic Thebes were active and often aggressive in

[51] Diod. 15.79.5, tr. W. OLDFATHER. On the actual extent of *andrapodismos,* see GACA 2010.

[52] BEISTER 1970, 104: «Der Spruch der Richter ist also weniger juristischen Maßtaben zu messen, sondern vielmehr als ein politisches Urteil über die Hegemoniepolitik des Epameinondas anzusehen».

[53] Paus. 9.15.3.

[54] Diod. 15.79.3: βουλόμενοι τὴν ἐν Θήβαις πολιτείαν εἰς ἀριστοκρατικὴν κατάστασιν μεταστῆσαι.

[55] Plut. *Pel.* 25.5-7 (Menekleidas has the Thebans dedicate a commemorative painting to another man rather than to Pelopidas: the victory concerned, at Plataea, is dated to before Leuctra, and the outcome of the process is a heavy fine on Menekleidas, whereas Pelopidas bestows his merits on the entire Theban community); *Mor.* 799E-F (Epameinondas refuses to reply to a general *kategoria* and leaves the theatre to reach the gymnasium: this is also the only source on the setting of these trials); *Mor.* 811B (Epameinondas is appointed τέλμαρχος as an insult, but succeeds in displaying great virtues in this task, connected with «the removal of dung and the draining off of water in the street». The words τέλμαρχος and τελμαρχία in the passage are a correction by WINCKELMANN and VAN HERWERDEN to the transmitted forms in τελε-; we have no further indication in the sources on this office, which must have been of extreme importance in a city where, according to Euboulos in the *Mysoi,* F 66.3 Hunter, each house had its own latrine by the door).

court. On the other hand, once we consider the actual influence and success of the policies enacted by Epameinondas and Pelopidas, we get the impression that «legal and historical truth are far from identical».[56]

To understand the impact of these trials in the context, one can look at what contemporary political realists define as a "show trial" (*Schauprozess*). The label was clarified firstly by Hans Morgenthau, who is well-known for his contributions to the study of political realism. His suggestion was reprised, among others, by Winfried Meyer in his investigation of a trial which took place in 1947 against sixteen people, who were convicted for crimes against humanity and war crimes, for their responsibilities in the concentration camp of Sachsenhausen. According to Meyer, the trial took the form of a *Schauprozess* and five characteristics of this spectacularization are singled out.[57] Firstly, the confession and the awareness of the responsability are the premise, and not the outcome of the process (1); this is based on the principle of the maximal probability and the objective possibility that the violation occurred (2). Not all the usual technicalities of the trial are followed (3): the formal rights of the defendants, in fact, are not protected (4) in what is an uncommonly officialized and sponsored public event (5).

Proceeding in this direction, Martti Koskenniemi applied the theory of the show trial to further case studies of trials concerning genocides and humanity crimes between the end of last century and ours.[58] Very often, the discovery and the listing of the evidence look redudant in the face of what appears to be the real goal of the process: the accused party is already known as guilty and the trial only looks like a performance of truth, where the thesis and the voices of the victims are finally given voice, after years of silence and of persecutions. No real or proper defence is expected, but mostly the officialization and publicity of the crime. Both Meyer and Koskenniemi address show trials that are inevitably linked to emergencies (Koskenniemi) and to violations connected with dictatorships and totalitarisms (Meyer): the topics of their investigations thus explain why points (3) and (4), in the systematization of Meyer, cannot be traced in the case of the trial of Epameinondas; at the same time, the perfomance of truth in Thebes resulted in a glorification of the voice of Epameinondas, whereas normally convicted criminals of international crimes are not allowed long speeches (purportedly so, in the analysis of Koskenniemi).

Epameinondas and the boiotarchs close to him were never guilty of such vast crimes: on the contrary, the only instance where such a parallel may partially work, in terms of extent and cruelty, concerns the destruction of Orchomenus, which was later reproached by Epameinondas himself. The previous treatment of these trials, nonetheless, with a focus on

[56] KOSKENNIEMI 2002, 11.

[57] MEYER 1997, 154-5.

[58] KOSKENNIEMI 2002.

the first one, proves that these were used to promote the image of the 'other Thebes': this peculiar opposition betrayed the existence of the Thebes of the boiotarchs less enamoured with the prospect of a hegemonial Thebes, or who were perhaps more favourably inclined to the Spartans and were therefore unwilling to let brash men like Eameinondas burn the bridges with the Lacedaimonians. Another aspect of the novelties implied by the institution of the new koinon after 379 BCE is the apparent disappearance of the parties in Thebes: until 395 BCE, for instance, we know that different groups had confronted in Thebes. There had been an 'anti-Spartan' group and a group which, to balance this leaning, had been accused of 'atticizing', although, for a lacuna (*H. Oxy.* 20.1 Chambers), this may equally have been a way by their opponents to indict them in the eyes of their fellow Thebans. Whether these groups were actual parties in the contemporary meaning of the word is still debated, although we incline to believe so, once we exclude from the label of 'party' all those traits which are inevitably linked with contemporary politics.[59]

Our sources tend to describe these groups as 'those around X', *hoi peri tou deina*, so that these clubs did not suddenly disappear with the new constitution. Only, the structures of the new federal state denied them that space in the public confrontation, which had hitherto existed, even during the Peloponnesian War, when different voices had coexisted in the federal assembly of Thebes.[60] In the Thebes of Epameinondas and Pelopidas, the members of the opposite party must have found these show trials a convenient starting point to expose their enemies and let them show their own truth. It is probably no coincidence that the list of merits uttered by Epameinondas in the trial of 369 BCE echoes so closely the literary epitaph of Epameinondas:[61] both the traditions develop from a climate where the *persona loquens* was showing his own deeds as well as using them to defend formalistic illegally actions.

The defence of Epameinondas was successful not only because it provided the Thebans with the *apologia* which, as a boiotarch, he was obliged to provide at the end of the year; Epameinondas was also successful because, on that occasion, his violation of the law had been counterbalanced by the merits for Thebes. As far as the second trial is concerned, Xenophon

[59] See TUFANO 2019b, 201-2.

[60] Thuc. 5.36-8, with SALMON 1995, 378.

[61] This is the epitaph of Epameinondas as recorded by the richest source, Pausanias (9.15.6), who claims to have seen it in Thebes (but see KNOEPFLER 2007, 121-2): «By our counsels Sparta was shorn of her glory,/ And holy Messene finally received her children:/ With Thebes' arms Megalopolis was surrounded,/ and all Greece won independence and freedom» (tr. H. BECK). All these merits resemble «un manifesto di propaganda politica» (BREGLIA 2008, 385); they are also recorded in the version of Epameinondas' fictional epitaph recorded by Nepos (*Ep.* 8.3-4, tr. J. SELBY WATSON: «Epaminondas was punished by the Thebans with death, because he obliged them to overthrow the Lacedaemonians at Leuctra, [...], and because he not only, by one battle, rescued Thebes from destruction, but also secured liberty for all Greece, and brought the power of both people to such a condition, that the Thebans attacked Sparta, and the Lacedaemonians were content if they could save their lives; nor did he cease to prosecute the war, till, after settling Messene, he shut up Sparta with a close siege»).

almost lauds the man,[62] who was nonetheless probably found guilty in Thebes, if his rank changed. «As a trial writes history in the immediate aftermath of the events, its interpretation will necessarily be based on fragmentary evidence and influenced by interpretations by contemporaries with a concrete stake in the result».[63] And yet, it was argued here that political opposition in Thebes had to write history, if it wanted to survive under the current political system. These trials were a feasible strategy which can be retrieved, through a careful consideration of the sources.

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[62] Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.17: σπονδὰς ποιησάμενος, ὡς τοῖς πλείστοις ἐδόκει, πρὸς Θηβαίων μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς ἑαυτῶν [Λακεδαιμονίων].

[63] KOSKENNIEMI 2002, 22.

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